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Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXVIII December 1974 No. 4

POLITICAL SCIENCE

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba

Designed for the one-quarter or one-semester course, this extensively revised and shortened version of the eminent authors' AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (described below) provides a totally unbiased working knowledge of the American political system. Lighter in approach and 40% shorter than the parent text, this core text has been completely rewritten. It now includes new data throughout, new controversies (each chapter concludes with a controversial question designed to help the student understand underlying issues), more photographs, and an expanded treatment of Watergate. Examples apply everyday experiences to American politics. Tentative: 384 pages; $6.95; paper. February 1975. *Instructor's Manual.*

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba

This introduction to the foundations, spirit, and operation of the American political system includes innovative discussions of how the U.S. economic system has shaped our democracy, how political capitalism effects the class structure, the degree to which the principle of democracy has its roots in the hearts and minds of the American people, and how the American citizen participates in political life. Policy is discussed in depth with applications made to taxes, medical care, desegregation, and Vietnam. There is a postscript on Watergate. 630 pages; $10.95; cloth. 1974. *Instructor's Manual.*

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE, Third Edition

William Ebenstein, C. Herman Pritchett, Henry A. Turner, and Dean Mann

This text provides a thorough understanding of the theory and actual functioning of American democracy. Focusing on the conflicting forces that shape the political process, it emphasizes basic theory while giving attention to pertinent historical information, institutional operations, and empirical political behavior. The authors examine the gap between promise and performance in the American system, using the comparative approach throughout. 528 pages; $8.50; paper. 1973. *Instructor's Manual.*

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FROM HARPER & ROW

10 East 53d Street, New York 10022

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXVIII December 1974 No. 4

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Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin
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ARTICLES

1482 **Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971.** This study reports the codification of basic authority characteristics of 336 national political systems (polities) that functioned in 91 nation-states between 1800 and 1971. In form the typical 19th-century polity was an autocracy with minimal functions. Its 20th-century counterpart was either an activist plural democracy or an activist autocracy. The incidence of system-transforming political change has been equally high and pervasive in both European and Third-world polities, but greater in the 20th century than the 19th. The data are used to test three hypotheses that attribute the persistence and adaptability of political systems to their authority characteristics. "Institutionalization" arguments about the stability-enhancing effects of complexity and directiveness receive no consistent support. Conventional beliefs about the greater durability of democracies vs. autocracies vs. anocracies (uninstitutionalized polities) are confirmed only in Europe in the 20th century. The most durable historical and Afro-Asian polities have been either autocratic or anocratic. The data generally support the hypothesis that "pure" political systems—consistently democratic *or* consistently autocratic—are more durable than systems of mixed authority characteristics. Long-term trends in political "development" and their determinants are discussed in the light of the findings.

By Ted Robert Gurr, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University.

1505 **On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique of a Process.** Starting with nineteenth-century jurisprudence, this essay traces the changing perceptions of the nature and role of groups in politics as affected in turn by scientific reformism, classic pluralism, and descriptive science orientations to the study of politics. The work of Laski and Bentley is highlighted.

The essay contends that political science has not grown by scientific study laid upon scientific study, but rather by a process of gradual encroachment of ideas in which basic premises, questions, and terms shifted without adequate examination. It is argued that this change is not properly portrayed as a trend from abstract legal metaphysics to ever more sophisticated approximations of reality. The forgotten contributions of past orientations are stressed, and the reasons that Bentley was ignored in his day discussed.

More specifically, the study concludes that the process of accretion of ideas was of some benefit to political science as a discipline, but the heritage left by this process was negative in two important respects: the neglect of a dynamic in favor of a static perspective, and the divorce of normative theory from empirical research on American politics.

By G. David Garson, Assistant Professor, Tufts University.

1520 **Ethnic Voting and Political Change in South Africa.** Immediately prior to the 1970 parliamentary election in the Republic of South Africa, 462 white voters in Cape Town were questioned about their demographic backgrounds, voting intentions, and political attitudes. The study showed that ethnicity is the major determinant of party vote: Afrikaners vote for the National Party, the English-speaking for the United Party. SES-related factors predict party identification only insofar as they covary with ethnicity. While a liberalization of political attitudes with rising SES can be observed, this has no bearing on electoral behavior. Party vote is not related to ideological or issue orientations, but is related to the intensity of the voter's identification with his own ethnic group and with white South Africans in general. Voters tend to react positively or negatively to the NP, with the UP serving chiefly as a vehicle for protest votes against the government. The slight drop in NP support in 1970 was due to a key group of abstainers who—while basically Nat supporters— were more liberal than those who said they would vote for the NP. It is "Ambiguous Afrikaners" (those who are changing to an "English" identity), and only some of those, who are defecting completely from their traditional political allegiance. They represent the one sign of potential change in South Africa's uniquely stable political system.

By Stanton Peele, Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior, Harvard Business School, and Stanley J. Morse, Fulbright Professor of Social Psychology, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, Brazil.

1542 **Hobbes and His Audience: The Dynamics of Theorizing.** This paper argues for a conceptualization of political theory based upon a jurisprudential model of reasoning, rather than the more commonly accepted model of logical demonstration. The purpose of political theorizing is to persuade and convince, not to prove; consequently it is a form of argument necessarily directed at a particular audience or audiences. Hobbes is examined as a theorist who directed his argument at those audiences which were politically most significant. This paper explores that aspect of Hobbes's theory which was intended to persuade his Puritan audience. Hobbes attempted to persuade the Puritans by presenting his argument in a manner subtly similar to the style of reasoning they were familiar with in religious terms. This interpretation is supported by a comparison of the arguments of Hobbes and Calvin. This analysis of Hobbes is intended to illustrate both a general view of the nature of political theorizing, and the advantages of adopting an historical method in examining past political theorists.

By Mark Gavre, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

1557 **Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis.** The political incorporation and municipal segregation of classes and status groups in the metropolis tend to divorce fiscal resources from public needs and to create and perpetuate inequality among urban residents in the United States. An investigation of data collected for a large number of metropolitan areas in 1960 reveals a number of variables associated with inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipalities in metropolitan areas. The level of income inequality among municipal governments in metropolitan areas varies directly with: location in the South; age, size and density of the metropolis; nonwhite concentration; family income inequality; residential segregation among social classes; housing segregation by quality; and governmental fragmentation. The data provide support for the argument that governmental inequality occupies a central position in the urban stratification system.

By Richard Child Hill, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Michigan State University

1569 **Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation.** The widely accepted expectation achievement approach to conflict, which views conflict primarily as a response to relative deprivation, has recently been challenged by proponents of a political process approach, the central features of which are mobilization of power resources and the struggle for power. Here a power balance model of conflict is developed which incorporates the core concepts from both approaches. In this model the difference in power resources between the contending parties is used as the central independent variable. Relative deprivation, utility of reaching the goal and expectancy of success are introduced as intervening variables to relate the effects from changes in the balance of power between the parties to the probability of manifest conflict between them.

According to the power balance model of conflict different types of relative deprivation (aspirational, decremental and progressive) will be differently correlated with the probability of conflict. The overall correlation between relative deprivation and conflict is expected to be insignificant. Situations where the difference in power resources between two parties is decreasing are seen as most conducive to conflict. When the power resources of an already weaker party are decreasing, the probability of conflict is assumed to be lower than when the weaker party is gaining power resources.

by Walter Korpi, Professor of Social Policy, Swedish Institute for Social Research and Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm.

1579 **The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents.** The purpose of this paper is to specify the conditions in which parents influence the party identification and certain issue attitudes of their adolescent children (recent high school graduates). The nature and extent of the parent-adolescent attitude correspondence is first established. Next, parental as opposed to environmental explanations for this correspondence are considered. Finally, the effects on parental influence of family interaction, political interest, issue salience to the parent, and accuracy of the adolescent's perception of the parental attitude are analyzed. Issue salience and perceptual accuracy are found to have strong effects; the other variables have lesser or no effect. When issue salience and perceptual accuracy are held constant in a multivariate equation, the beta weights indicating the influence of the parent attitude on the attitude of the adolescent are very similar for all issues and party identification. It is concluded that idiosyncratic variations in successful parent-child attitude transmission can be explained by a general equation.

By Kent L. Tedin, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Houston.

1593 **Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives.** In this paper one party leadership strategy with respect to the committee system of the House is examined. Building on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, scarcity, and exchange, a very elementary, yet explicit, theory is constructed. It is shown that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. The leaders increase the number of positions on those committees prized by the members in order to guarantee a steady supply of resources to gain leverage with the members. But a steady increase in the supply of positions reduces the scarcity of positions and hence their value to the leaders. Thus, a consequence of the strategy is the need periodically to reorganize or make adjustments in the committee system.

By Louis P. Westefield, Assistant Professor of Government and Public Affairs, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville.

1605 **Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case.** Ethnic groups argue that a certain proportion of administrative positions should be filled by their members. This concern assumes that a bureaucrat applies to his tasks the values and interests of his social background. Evidence from Zambia, a country in which ethnic and regional differences have been highly politicized, suggests that this assumption lacks empirical support. The fundamental guidelines that appear to shape administrative behavior in Zambia are the calculations of what must be done to achieve individual career advancement. Administrators are, in addition, constrained from pursuing parochial interests by the range of authority and discretion attached to their particular positions.

Although bureaucrats do not appear to provide ideal representatives for ethnic interests, the ethnic composition of the most visible echelons of the government is of critical political significance. This is particularly evident in a country like Zambia where ethnically defined groups are contending for positions in the new postcolonial society. The symbols of power can be as important as power itself.

By Dennis L. Dresang, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

1618 **Levels of Sociocultural Development Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis.** Recent studies of regional economic development of the Soviet Union have suggested that since 1958, Soviet union republics have become less equal in their levels of industrialization, share of investments, and living standards. This paper assesses the degree to which equality of social and cultural development characterizes Soviet ethnic groups and union republics. Drawing aggregate data chiefly from the 1926, 1959, and 1970 Soviet censuses, the analysis shows that: (1) relative variation (inequality) in the sociocultural development of Soviet nationalities has declined continuously and markedly over time on measures of education and occupational structure, but that large inter-nationality disparities remain in the development of skilled manpower; (2) inter-nationality variation in family role structures has been slower to decline than differences in education and appears to follow a curvilinear pattern: for a time during the Soviet era, inter-nationality differences *increased* but have been followed recently by significant declines. Furthermore, it is shown that (3) on the average the sociocultural development of union republic populations well exceeds the development of the indigenous nationalities in these republics.

By Brian Silver, Assistant Professor of Government, Florida State University.

1638 **Models of Statistical Relationship.** The choice among measures of relationship has increasingly become a matter of the interpretation of their intermediate values. Interpretations are important, but a prior question is the statistic's implicit model of a relationship—what it considers a perfect relationship, and what it considers a null relationship. A family of models based on combinations of certain maximum- and null-value conditions is analyzed in this paper. The distinction between the models can be used to shed light on the stakes involved in the choice among dichotomous variable measures as well as that among familiar ordinal statistics.

The models are ordered in terms of their leniency, and the coefficients based on each model are specified. An empirical analysis shows that the different measures are positively correlated, but those measures based on different models can differ sharply from one another. Statistics based on the same model covary regardless of differences in their interpretations. Since different models are intended to measure different concepts, multiple coefficients can allow investigators to examine their data in greater detail. Several political examples of the use of multiple models are provided.

By Herbert F. Weisberg, Associate Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.

1656 **Individual and Contextual Variables in British Voting Behavior: An Exploratory Note.** This note reports the results of an initial exploration into the significance of the social environments ("contexts") in which people live in the shaping of their individual political behavior. Many scholars have argued that social scientists should pay more serious attention to contextual variables when they go about constructing social theories. But there have been few systematic efforts to demonstrate empirically the overall importance of contextual variables as predictors of individual behaviors, especially relative to the importance of personal ("individual") predictors. Here the relative potency of two sets of predictors—one individual and one contextual—is investigated for a sample of British voters by means of a well-known multivariate search strategy, "tree analysis." The results suggest that contextual variables have little to add to explanations of voting behavior based on individual variables—at least for these data.

By C. Neal Tate, Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Texas State University.

1663 **Community and Control: Critical Democratic Theory in the Progressive Period.** Current political debate over the flaws and the fate of the American liberal tradition mirrors closely the critiques of the Progressive period. A number of those thinkers—theorists of "social control," exemplified by Ward and Ross—took aim not at the liberal-utilitarian conception of the ends of politics but rather at the notion that these goods would be produced by the politics of *laissez-faire*. A second body of critics—here termed "communitarians" and including Cooley, Royce, Croly, DuBois, and Dewey—leveled a more fundamental indictment: liberal individualism left men's needs for human sympathy, shared meanings and loyalties, and common effort unfulfilled. But the difficulties of the communitarian theorists, the range of associations on which they pinned their hopes and their fundamental ambivalence concerning politics demonstrate how little in the way of ideological or social-structural reinforcement the environment provided for one who would apply the insights of Burke or Hegel or Tönnies in America. Modern political criticism has resurrected the themes of the Progressive period, but even such bridge-builders as Dahl and McWilliams have not been sufficiently attentive to interrelationships among the persisting critiques of liberalism and to the shape ameliorative communities might assume.

By David E. Price, Associate Professor of Political Science and Policy Sciences, Duke University.

1679 COMMUNICATIONS

From Jerome R. Corsi, Christopher Bruell, Raisa B. Deber, Virginia Gray, John P. Diggins, A. James Gregor, Gordon Tullock, Peter Bernholz, William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, Nigel Howard, John C. Harsanyi

1696 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

1696 Political Dictionaries: A Bibliographical Essay. Charles Abrams, *The Language of Cities: A Glossary of Terms;* Maurice Cranston and Sanford A. Lakoff, eds., *A Glossary of Political Ideas;* Joseph Dunner, ed., *Dictionary of Political Science;* Florence Elliott, *A Dictionary of Politics*, 6th edition; Walter Laqueur, ed., *A Dictionary of Politics;* Edward Luttwak, *A Dictionary of Modern War;* Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, *The American Political Dictionary;* Geoffrey K. Roberts, *A Dictionary of Political Analysis;* William Safire, *The New Language of Politics: A Dictionary of Catchwords, Slogans and Political Usage;* Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, *Dictionary of American Politics*, 2nd edition.

By Clement E. Vose, John E. Andrus Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.

1706 Political Implications of Gender Roles: A Review of the Literature. This essay introduces the reader to the contemporary literature on gender roles and feminine behavior, including the major concepts, empirical findings, and social thought which have implications for political behavior and research. Gender roles as they relate to the psychology and activity of men and women, and their systemic cultural, economic, and legal ramifications provide an explanation and a basis for understanding political behavior, including recurrent women's protest movements. Contemporary writing contributes to building a nonandrocentric and accurate body of knowledge regarding political woman, and it calls into question the ideology of the biological determinism of political activity. The literature surveyed has potential usefulness for public policy: an expansion of democracy is viable with the discernment and removal of barriers which hinder substantial proportions of women from achieving political leadership and hence participating in authoritative decision making and value allocation. A bibliography of major references is appended.

By Wilma Rule Krauss, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.

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The American Political Science Review

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EDITORIAL COMMENT

Happy Anniversary. Professor Herbert Weisberg sentimentally passed up the chance to get "Models of Statistical Relationship" published earlier so that it could appear in this issue, twenty years to the month after the classic article by Leo Goodman and William Kruskal on which it is based.

A pang of envy frequently attacks us when we contemplate the greener and better tended forage available to "harder" disciplines (like statistics), where scholars can actually build upon one another's work, where agreement can be reached about what the problems are, and where consequently there can be such things as "classic" articles, statements which productively focus the attention of many minds and which may be superseded, but are rarely misunderstood.

As little as this thumbnail sketch describes political science, it did occur to us to cast a backward glance at the *Review* of 20 years ago. Would we find anything at all in Volume 48 worth noting today? Any memorable articles, never mind classics? Somehow, we doubted it. Political science lurches from fad to fad, we thought, ignores its roots, cultivates illiteracy. There would be nothing of contemporary interest, only evidence of false starts, blind alleys, brave futile beginnings. We were wrong! Managing Editor Hugh L. Elsbree presided over what even the most jaded graduate student can recognize as a cornucopia. Not the least interesting was Ralph J. Bunche's Presidential Address, marking the 50th anniversary of the Association. But there was much, much more.

In those days, it appears, political scientists had not yet lost their taste for politics and government. Bertram Gross and John Lewis discussed the beginnings of the Council of Economic Advisors. Richard Neustadt contributed his notable and enduring "Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance." Ralph Huitt's "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study" appeared. Happy Anniversary, one and all. In comparative government Volume 48 features (among others) a bibliography on comparative administration by Fred Riggs, an article on Asian neutralism by Robert Scalapino, and a discussion of Great Britain by Leon Epstein.

In party politics there were articles by V. O. Key, Duane Lockard and that odd couple, Ranney and Kendall. David Spitz contributed "Democracy and the Problem of Civil Disobedience"; Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism" and Emmette Redford "Administrative Regulation: Protection of the Public Interest."

Henry Kissinger shed his warm-up jacket with "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich." And there was even something for premature formal theorists: Shapley and Shubik's "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System."

Most of us have seen citations to one or more of these articles within living memory; whether "classics" or not, evidently they have had something to say to political scientists that has been more than ephemeral. And this is why a subscriber would have been ill-advised to wrap fish with old copies of volume 48 of the *Review*.

Can we say as much of more recent volumes? Readers had better decide for themselves. For ourselves, we are reminded of the time we served on a committee to hire a sociology department. One committee member, a very dubious historian, said: "Let's get somebody like Robert MacIver." We said, "O.K., let's." The historian replied: "They don't make them like that anymore."

Emily Post Says. Although norms concerning multiple submissions and appropriation of the work of others are well settled in our profession—and indeed in the scholarly community generally—an occasional slipup comes to our attention, suggesting that it may be worthwhile to describe some of the underlying rationale of *Review* policy for people who may have tuned in late.

Each year, scholarly journals ask scores of scholars to set aside their own work in order to evaluate the merit of articles proffered for publication. An editor of the *Review* has reason to know how many scholars—they are legion—do these unpaid, anonymous chores willingly, graciously, even promptly. This creates an obligation on our part, at the least to avoid bothering our referees frivolously or in vain.

When an author submits the same manuscript simultaneously to two or more unwitting editors, he is asking them to become his accomplices in wasting the time of referees. For only one journal can print the manuscript. Consequently the courteous thing to do is to submit articles to journals one at a time, and hope for the best.

In these harsh days of tenure squeezes and publish or perish, there must be a strong temptation for authors to cut down on the agony of waiting by trying a buckshot approach to all journals at once. That constitutes an imposition on a lot of colleagues, however, and journal editors, fortified by an advisory opinion of the APSA ethics committee, take a dim view of multiple submissions.

An even more straightforward rationale underlies the APSA policy concerning the reprinting of articles. Our position for years has been that persons wanting to reprint an article must seek and receive the permission of the scholar who did the work, before the Association, as copyright holder, will grant its permission to reprint. The technicalities of copyright law may or may not support the Association's scrupulousness on this issue; nevertheless to us it seems manifestly reasonable that authors retain control over the reprinting of their work, and the Association acts accordingly. In this, we consider that we are following a well-understood, if unwritten rule of the profession, and cannot imagine, in any case, that a political scientist seeking to reprint the work of a colleague would dream of neglecting to ask the author's permission.

Readers will also be gratified to learn that we oppose plagiarism (as well as piracy) and think well of springtime. But enough of controversy.

On Scholarly Infallibility. We see by the papers that Washington columnist Joseph Kraft says political science is in big trouble. He doesn't know the half of it, we thought, until we read a little farther and discovered he didn't know the other half of it, either. His argument goes this way: because the state of our knowledge about voting behavior is unsettled, and because the nature of voter commitment to political parties in America is changing, political science has "lost its way."

Many political scientists will testify that they weren't heading in that direction anyhow, that some folks in Our Nation's Capital must have a mighty narrow idea of what political science is. What puzzles us even more is this cultivated and well-informed layman's peculiar conception of the calling of the scholar. And if Joseph Kraft has such a misconception, heaven knows how many others do as well.

It is our duty, it seems to us, less to celebrate past victories over ignorance than continually to confront what we don't know, to grapple with the anomalous, the imperfectly understood. The existence of perplexity in a scholar is, we believe, an unmistakable sign of life (maybe the only sign of life) and in a discipline, likewise.

This leaves open—as it had better—the question of our competence, individually or collectively, to focus our inquiries, to organize our assaults upon our ignorance with skill and sensitivity. On this score people are entitled to have their doubts. But not on the question Mr. Kraft raises. Scholars are not oracles. Our commitment is to inquiry, not to final solutions, and it is amazing that a Washington pundit would want us crowding his territory.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Christopher H. Achen, Yale University, "Political Belief Systems in Mass Publics: The Problem of Inconsistent Opinion Survey Responses"

Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, Carnegie-Mellon University, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

Neal Andrews, Wayne State University, "Integration and Community in Communist Theory"

Robert L. Ayres, University of California, Berkeley, "Development Policy and the Possibility of A 'Liveable' Future for Latin America"

Richard Allen Chapman, University of Montana, "*Leviathan* Writ Small: Thomas Hobbes on the Family"

John P. Clark, III, City College, Loyola University, "On Anarchism in an Unreal World: Kramnick's View of Godwin and the Anarchists"

Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J. Levesque and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Campaign Resource Allocations Under The Electoral College"

David Collier, Indiana University, and Richard E. Messick, Office of U.S. Senate, "Functional Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption"

Andrew T. Cowart, University of Iowa, Tore Hansen and Karl-Erik Brofoss, University of Oslo, "Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting"

Geoffrey Debnam, University of Otago, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz"

Douglas Dobson, Northern Illinois University and Douglas St. Angelo, Florida State University, "Party Identification and the Floating Vote: Some Dynamics"

Claude S. Fischer, University of California, Berkeley, "The City and Political Psychology"

Robert C. Fried, University of California, Los Angeles, "Party and Policy in West German Cities"

Richard Funston, San Diego State University, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections"

Sheldon Goldman, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, "Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited"

Fred I. Greenstein, Princeton University, "The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies"

Fred W. Grupp, Jr., University of Connecticut and Allan R. Richards, Louisiana State University, "Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making"

Susan Blackall Hansen, University of Illinois, Urbana, "Participation, Political Structure, and Concurrence"

K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia, "Underdevelopment and the 'Gap' Theory of International Conflict"

Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, University of Minnesota, "Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan and Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations"

Jae-on Kim, University of Chicago, John R. Petrocik, University of Chicago and Stephen N. Enokson, University of Iowa, "Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individualistic Components"

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J. A. Laponce, University of British Columbia, "Spatial Archetypes and Political Perceptions"

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Peter M. Leslie, Queen's University, "Interest Groups and Political Integration: The 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark"

Patrick J. McGowan, Syracuse University and Robert M. Rood, University of South Carolina, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to 19th-Century Europe"

Alan Marsh, University of Michigan, "The 'Silent Revolution,' Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain"

Joseph A. Massey, Dartmouth College, "The Missing Leader: Japanese Youths' View of Political Authority"

Kenneth John Meier, Syracuse University, "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis"

Fritz Nova, Villanova University, "Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review"

N. Patrick Peritore, University of Missouri, Columbia, "Some Problems in Alfred Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology"

Adam Przeworski, University of Chicago, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?"

Douglas Rae, Yale University, "The Limits of Consensual Decision"

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Paul R. Schulman, University of Tennessee, "Non-Incremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternate Paradigm"

J. S. Sorzano, Georgetown University, "David Easton and the Invisible Hand"

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Meredith W. Watts, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, "B. F. Skinner and the Language of Technological Control"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Hobbes's Doctrine of Method"

Mary B. Welfling, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, "Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa"

Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971*

TED ROBERT GURR
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The "stability" of political systems has been attributed to factors as diverse as modal personalities, popular well-being, and a chief executive's rights with respect to a hostile assembly. The "constitutional engineering" approach which prevailed from World War I through the 1940s was largely discredited by the failure of engineered democratic experiments in many of the "new nations," and in some old ones like Weimar Germany. In the 1950s, the search for political explanations of political stability lost favor to socioeconomic and environmental explanations. The effects on stability of productivity, mass education and communication, cultural homogeneity, "cross-cutting cleavages," and, most recently, international inequalities and dependencies have now been studied, with results less than wholly satisfying. "Political" explanations again are being adduced and tested, but two of the major approaches, those of "political culture" and "political performance," have the faint but distinct odor of tautology about them because the antecedent conditions of the "good polity" are often indistinguishable, definitionally or operationally, from their claimed effects.

This paper does not take direct issue with other approaches, but it does attempt to deal afresh with a perennial question of political analysis: whether the durability (persistence and adaptability) of political systems depends at all upon the nature of their structures of political authority. One of the questions raised, and tested, is whether typological traits like "democracy" and "autocracy" predict consistently to durability. A second question is whether such universal traits as the "institutionalization" or internal coherence of authority structures affect durability, and if so, whether the universal traits are more or less important than typological ones. This study's answers to these questions also suggest answers to some hoary debates, for example whether active or passive polities fare better, and whether systems with "mixed" authority characteristics have better survival prospects than "pure types."

One distinctive feature of this study is the uniquely broad empirical base used to assess such questions. National systems of all types are included: emirates, parliamentary democracies, peoples' democracies, and all the rest. Moreover the universe of analysis encompasses most national states of the 19th and 20th centuries, including many which no longer exist. The only significant exclusions are the "new nations" established since World War II. Thus the authority characteristics of national political systems, and their durability, can be examined separately by world region and in different historical eras.[1] And the incidence and broad patterns of structural change in those systems can be mapped on a worldwide basis, during the seven or eight generations since the American and French Revolutions.

The first part, below, discusses some basic concepts of the study. Part II surveys the procedures used to measure political authority characteristics and summarizes the coded data. The next part similarly reports on the "durability" data and includes "life expectancy" tables for polities. The final section presents and tests three hypotheses which link authority characteristics to durability. Numerous other hypotheses about the determinants of durability, which can be tested against the same data, will be evaluated in future papers.

Assumptions and Concepts

The study has no implicit ideological axes to grind. I do not assume that political systems which are durable are necessarily the better for

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* This research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation to Princeton and Northwestern Universities, and by institutional support from both universities. The sources were screened and coded by Erika B. K. Gurr, the initial data analysis was carried out by Herman Weil, and Robert Harmel and Robin Gillies checked the data set for errors and reanalyzed it. The coding guidelines were prepared in collaboration with Harry Eckstein, who provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper as did Gurston Dacks, Raymond Duvall, Kenneth Janda, James Rosenau, James Thomason, and Dr. Weil. The author and coder also thank their friends and colleagues, too numerous to mention, from whom were cozened professional judgments about hard-to-interpret political conditions in odd corners of the world.

[1] The new nations are very numerous and too short-lived to warrant definitive judgments about the durability of their political systems. Analysis of polities in older nations should provide a baseline of generalizations which can be used later to assess the prospects of the new nations. The numbers of states included, by world region, are:

Europe	49[a]
Central and South America	23
Africa	4
Asia	15

[a] Including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Orange Free State, South Africa, and the United States.

being so, though large portions of mankind have evidently valued political continuity over discontinuity. Nor do I hope to demonstrate that "democratic," or "autocratic," or highly competitive political systems are more or less good than others. Rather, my central concern is whether any of the prevailing scholarly and popular beliefs about the viability of particular kinds of national political arrangements have historical or cross-cultural validity.

Authority and Authority Patterns. The meaning of "authority" in this study requires clarification. I am not concerned with the *extent* of political systems' "authority," either in the sense of legitimacy as understood by Weber or in the sense of the amount of control or coercion they exercise. The object of this inquiry is polities' patterns of authority as defined by Eckstein: an authority pattern is a "set of asymmetric interactions among hierarchically ordered members of social units that involve the direction of the unit."[2] More loosely, the state's authority pattern is the set of structures and processes through which directives applicable to members of the state are made, issued, and enforced.

We have specified elsewhere a set of 12 basic dimensions which can be used to characterize and compare the authority patterns of any social units.[3] The political systems studied here are characterized on five of these dimensions:

(1) The openness of *Recruitment* to superordinate positions. Recruitment is "open" to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates. This study focuses on the modes by which executives are recruited.

(2) The extent of *Decision Constraints* on superordinates, indexed in this study by the extent of limitations on the decision-making powers of the chief executive.[4]

(3) The amount of *Participation*, which is high to the extent that there is a large volume of influence attempts by subordinates via open channels. The operational focus is on the extent and openness of political competition and opposition.

(4) The *Directiveness* of the social unit, which is high to the extent that a wide scope of members' activities is closely regulated and sanctions frequently imposed for violations. The Directiveness of polities is evaluated in this study by reference to the scope of governmental regulation of societal functions.

(5) The *Complexity* of decision structures, indexed here by the plurality of top decision-making structures and the degree of governmental decentralization.

Polities. The unit of analysis in this study is not the nation-state or national political community as such but rather the *polity* or political system: that is, the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs. These systems are described in terms of the above five dimensions of authority patterns. When a system changes abruptly and substantially on one or more of these dimensions the change is treated as the end of one polity and the beginning of another. A very few nations, including Britain and Costa Rica, had the "same" gradually-changing polity throughout the era in which they are studied here. In contrast, some nations experimented with more than 10 successive political systems; Greece and Guatemala are examples. This study is based on data for 336 polities which functioned in 91 nominally-different states at some time during the 19th or 20th centuries or both.

Political Stability and Durability. Political stability is ordinarily discussed in empirical political science as a valued condition. The same is true of the now- more-fashionable term which has partly replaced it, "political performance." We speak of the "stability" and "performance" of political systems in ways analogous to physicians' concern with the health of a patient and economists' evaluations of the efficiency of an enterprise. But, whereas physicians are largely agreed about the characteristics of healthy people, there is much inconsistency and disagreement about what constitute the "vital signs" of political systems. With reference to "performance," Eckstein has argued for four all-but-axiomatic dimensions: the political system which performs well must have some degree of efficacy, legitimacy, civil order, and durability.[5] The empirical literature on political stability exhibits an even wider range of relevant phenomena. Hurwitz has recently pointed to five different views of political stability, in terms of (1) the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime; (2) the relative absence of violent civil conflict; (3) the absence of structural change in the political system; (4) the relative longevity of "governments," especially executives and cabinets; and (5) the presence of multiple societal attributes, often including economic and social well-being as well as more narrowly political variables.[6]

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[2] Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, 47 (December, 1973), pp. 1153. For a survey of conventional academic definitions of "authority" see Robert L. Peabody, *Organizational Authority* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), chap. 2.

[3] In Harry Eckstein and Ted Rober Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis For Political Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, forthcoming), Part II.

[4] At the time this study was begun we treated Decision Constraints as a simple and distinct dimension. We later came to regard it as a synthetic concept, i.e., a multiple function of a number of other dimensions. In either conceptualization it is a dimensional concept and can be used, as it is here, to characterize and distinguish among political entities.

[5] Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions* (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1971), Vol. 2, No. 01–017. Gabriel Almond has identified five categories of system performance, which

Some of the conceptual and operational diversity with which stability is treated arises from unresolved questions about what are the "most important" facets of political systems. The lack of agreement on what is "most important" reflects, first, a normative condition: Western political analysts value different characteristics of political systems. Second, it reflects a lack of paradigmatic agreement about what conditions are essential to the proper functioning of political systems. The common emphasis on civil strife as the opposite of political stability, for example, reflects a premise that civil order is a paramount political variable—a view that can be rationalized either on the evaluative grounds that civil order is an ultimate good, or by the functional argument that a substantial degree of civil order is a requisite for the effective operation of a polity.

This study rests on the premise that the most important feature of any political system, for purposes of description, is its pattern of authority relations. A "stable" political system, on this premise, is one whose authority patterns remain similar over a long period of time. The most enduring systems, though, are not necessarily those which are rigidly resistant to change. Three of the most long-lived and change-resistant polities identified in this study are Czarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and China under the Manchu Dynasty, each of which collapsed utterly under the impact of internal and external crises, to be replaced by wholly new political systems. The most durable political systems, in my view (and also from the perspective of the "general systems" literature[7]) are not merely persistent but also demonstrate a capacity to adapt more or less gradually in response to internal and environmental stress. English parliamentary democracy is the most long-lived "adaptable" polity among the 336 cases, and at its present age of 280+ (dating from ca. 1689) it is younger than were either Czarist Russia or the Ottoman Empire when they collapsed. The most salient feature of the English system, however, is that it has undergone a fundamental change *of* system during the last two centuries nearly as great as the system change from pre- to post-revolutionary Russia, and it has done so through an incremental series of changes *in* its system, i.e., changes that at no point were large and abrupt enough to warrant the conclusion that a "new" polity had come into being.

Durability is the term used here for the distinguishing property of systems which both persist and adapt. It is a variable property, of course, and is judged according to the historical experience of a polity. Note that durability at time x conveys no necessary implications about future durability. The future prospects of any contemporary polity, evaluated now, are presumably a function of a number of traits and conditions of the sort which this study attempts to identify. Conceptually durability is a single property. It has two separable aspects, however, which are sufficiently different, operationally and empirically, that they are treated separately throughout this study.

(1) *Persistence* is defined simply as longevity: it is the length of time a political system endures without major, abrupt change in its authority pattern. In a previous empirical study of political performance I also dealt with polities' persistence, reporting evidence from a small set of cases that persistence is closely correlated with, and substantially determined by, other aspects of performance, notably decisional efficacy, legitimacy, and civil peace.[8] The present study differs in these important respects: it makes conceptual and operational distinctions between persistence and adaptability; it uses more comprehensive data on authority for a much larger universe of cases; and it attempts to relate authority characteristics directly to durability.

(2) *Adaptability* refers here to the extent of a political system's demonstrated capacity for undergoing incremental change in its authority pattern. This definition requires a brief justification. In a general sense, adaptability signifies a capacity of people and institutions to cope with various

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have to do with how well such functions as regulation, extraction, and distribution are performed; see his "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives," *Comparative Political Studies,* 1 (January, 1969), pp. 460–467.

[6] See Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability: A Review Essay," *Comparative Politics,* 5 (April, 1973), pp. 449–463.

[7] See, for example, Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967) and W. Ross Ashby, *Introduction to Cybernetics* (New York: Wiley, 1956).

[8] Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, *Political Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study* (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1971, No. 018), pp. 72–85. The dependent variable of this earlier study was labeled Durability but was defined as Persistence is in this study.

kinds of stresses. Scholars might reasonably define the adaptability of political systems in such terms. But there is an operational argument against doing so. In some of our previous work on political performance Harry Eckstein and I encountered prohibitive operational difficulties when attempting to evaluate political systems' responses to stress: stresses are numerous and incommensurate, and viable responses to them vary with situations.[9] There is also a theoretical argument for focusing on changes *in* the system. A polity which gradually changes itself in response to stress demonstrates a higher order of what we mean by adaptability than one which suppresses or survives the effects of stress without change. This is analogous to the argument in the general systems literature that an adapting system is one whose parameters change in response to environmental change. It is a considerable accomplishment for political systems to deal with, say, economic malaise or civil war, or crises of integration or of distribution, without themselves changing. But a higher order of adaptability is evidenced by polities which cope with change partly by changing what they do *and* partly by changing aspects of themselves.

Measuring Characteristics of Political Authority

Categories and Measures. The literature of comparative politics offers many conventional categories and variables for the description of authority patterns, few of which correspond precisely to the 12 dimensions of authority specified in the analytic scheme Eckstein and I developed.[10] What we conceptualize as the "openness of Recruitment," for example, is more commonly described by reference to the prevalence of competitive election, appointment, cooptation, ascription, seizure of power, and so forth. For this study our first step was to identify and define briefly some of these conventionally-categorized properties of political systems, concentrating on those which (a) were regularly referred to in scholarly analyses of historical and contemporary polities, and (b) could be related, at least loosely, to some of the dimensions of the analytic scheme. The properties on which we finally settled are listed in Table 1.

A coder tested the workability of operational definitions for an initial set of such categories by applying them to source materials on a few countries, including some which were intrinsically difficult to analyze. The categories were successively redefined on the basis of a series of trial runs. Some were eliminated, others added, operational definitions were revised, concrete examples

Table 1. Operational Definitions of Authority Dimensions

1.1 *Openness of Executive Recruitment*	
Type of recruitment	*Openness score*
Competitive	5
Caesaristic	4
Dual executive	3
Designation	2
Ascription	1
1.2 *Decision Constraints on the Chief Executive*	
Extent of constraints	*Constraints score*
Coequal with or subordinate to legislature	4
Substantial limits	3
Some limits	2
Unlimited	1
1.3 *Extent of Political Participation*	
Pattern of participation	*Participation score*
Institutionalized	5
Factional/restricted	4
Uninstitutionalized	3
Restricted	2
Suppressed or nonexistent	1
1.4 *Directiveness: Scope of Governmental Control*	
Scope of control	*Directiveness score*
Minimal	5
Segmental minus	4
Segmental	3
Segmental plus	2
Totalitarian	1
1.5 *Complexity of Governmental Structures*	
a) *Executive characteristics*	*Weight*
Collective	4
Qualified individual	3
Pure individual	1
b) *Decision constraints*	*Weight*
Coequal	4
Substantial limits	3
Some limits	2
Unlimited	1
c) *Centralization*	*Weight*
Decentralized	4
Centralized	1
Complexity score = a+b+c (range 3 to 12)	

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[9] Some of these problems are discussed by Ted Robert Gurr, "Vergleichende Analyse von Krisen und Rebellionen," in Martin Janicke, ed., *Herrschaft und Krise* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973), pp. 68–69, and by Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance*, pp. 69–73. Other approaches to crises and crisis-response are to be found in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[10] These have been used in collateral research. See Eckstein and Gurr, Parts II and IV, and the studies cited there for use of these dimensions in collateral research.

were chosen. In the process of revision we sought a closer "fit" between the categories and the concepts of the analytic scheme, but the final translation of the coded categories in terms of authority dimensions was made only after the data on 336 polities were coded and ready for analysis. The advantage of this procedure was to keep the coding close to the kinds of information given in the sources, thereby maximizing both the completeness and reliability of coded information.

Indicators of Authority Dimensions: The information coded in these categories is in nominal form, but by making certain assumptions, the categories were used to make two alternative kinds of indicators. First, five indicators of authority dimensions were constructed by ordering the relevant coded categories along each dimension, then assigning rank scores to the categories. The results of this exercise are on display in Table 1. Note that the dimensions are defined *a priori*, and that these specific indicators reflect both the exigencies of imprecise or limited information and the characteristics of the kind of units being surveyed; many quite different operationalizations of the dimensions are equally or more appropriate.

Two of the dimensions are represented by categories which are self-evidently scaleable. The categories of *Decision Constraints*, for example, refer directly to different degrees of limitation on the decision-making powers of chief executives by the legislature (and similar accountability groups). The categories of governmental *Directiveness* are defined so as to refer to apparently-equal increments in the scope of control and regulation. The other dimensional indicators require more explanation.

Recruitment to any position or set of positions is "open" to the extent that all lower-ranked individuals have equal opportunity to attain it. Recruitment by lottery is the theoretical extreme of openness, but no chief executives in recent history have been so chosen. Of the more common modes of Recruitment to the position of chief executive, competitive elections are judged to be more "open," while succession to a royal parent (ascription) is the most "closed." The "dual executive" combination of a monarch who shares power with an elected premier makes a natural midpoint to the scale. The "Caesaristic" pattern of executive self-selection by seizure of power is toward the open end of the scale, but less open than competitive elections because a military base is usually necessary and attempts are very risky (both of which constrain opportunity). "Designation" is the choice of chief executives within the elite without formal competition; opportunity is restricted to a very small, pre-determined group of "eligibles," most of whom have little influence over the outcome. The point is that this ordering of categories is based on informed judgments of what each mode of Recruitment implies about the opportunities inherent in the process.

Participation is indexed by reference to prevailing patterns of political competition among all members of the polity. It is assumed that the volume of Participation is greatest when there are relatively stable and enduring political groups (not necessarily parties) which regularly compete for national political influence ("institutionalized" competition). Participation tends to be least when no open, organized competition is allowed. (There is some participatory activity in even the most closed and repressive polity, just as there is much apathy in multi-party systems; the point is that the volume of participation *tends* to be much greater and influential in the latter than in the former.) The difference between the "factional/restricted" (4) and "restricted" (2) categories is substantial. The former label refers to a pattern of intense, often violent competition between "in" and "out" factions, who hold power *seriatim* and repress their opponents: participatory activity is high, even though some groups are temporarily excluded. The purely "restricted" category is characterized by persisting, institutionalized restriction on Participation by some large classes of people; contemporary South Africa and pre-revolutionary Russia are examples.

Complexity of governmental structures is simplest in a unitary state with one-man dictatorship. Conditions which increase complexity include (a) decision making by collectivities rather than individuals; (b) the presence of several overlapping decision-structures at the same level; and (c) the vertical differentiation of a unit (here the polity) into distinct sub-units on the same level. The three sets of ordered categories shown in Table 1 correspond closely to these three facets of complexity.

The ranked categories in Table 1 are scored so that high scores represent relatively high levels of subordinate (citizen) participation and low levels of superordinate (elite) control, while low scores signify the opposite conditions. For purposes of some analyses the categories are assumed to represent approximately equal units along the underlying dimensions, hence the indicators are treated as having interval properties.

These five indicators are referred to below as *authority indicators* and are capitalized to distinguish them from more colloquial uses of the same terms.

Indicators of System Type: The second set of indicators constructed from the coded data con-

Table 2. Operational Definitions of Scales of Autocracy, Democracy, Anocracy

	Categories and Weights by System Type		
Authority variable	Autocracy	Democracy	Anarchy
Executive recruitment	Ascription = 1 Designation = 1 Dual = 1	Competitive elections = 2	Caesaristic = 1
Decision constraints	Unlimited authority = 2 Slightly limited = 1	Legislative parity = 2 Substantial limits = 1	None[a]
Participation	Suppressed = 2 Restricted = 1	Institutionalized = 2	Uninstitutionalized = 2 Factional/restricted = 1
Directiveness	Totalitarian = 2 Segmental plus = 1	None[c]	Minimal = 2
Centralization	None[b]	Decentralized = 1	Decentralized = 2
Maximum score	7	7	7

[a] None of the categories of decision constraints seems uniquely or predominantly associated with the anocratic polity. Whatever the relative independence of their executives, the more salient characteristic of such polities is their lack of directiveness.

[b] Centralization is not a distinctive feature of autocracies, in view of the large portion of competitive democracies that share that characteristic.

[c] No particular level of directiveness is distinctively characteristic of democracies; empirically the range is from "minimal" to "segmental +."

sists of three measures of system type. That is, some of the categories are distinctively associated with polities of "democratic" or "autocratic" type, while others are typical of the so-called "anocratic" or uninstitutionalized state.[11] Still other categories signify intermediate conditions. The indicators rest on these difinitional assumptions:

(1) The essential quality of the "autocratic polity" is the institutionalized monopolization of power and political activity by the state.

(2) The essential quality of the "democratic polity" is the presence of multiple institutionalized centers of power, some of which are open to widespread citizen participation.

(3) The essential quality of the "anocratic polity" is its relative lack of political power and institutionalization.

The indexes constructed on these assumptions are shown in Table 2. The principle is that each polity is given a weighted score depending on the nature and number of autocratic, democratic, and anocratic properties it has. The categories of executive Recruitment and Participation are all distinctively associated with, and distinguish among, the three system types. The categories of the remaining three authority indicators provide the basis for further distinctions between two of the three types.

No attempt is made to label a polity as a "democracy" or an "autocracy." Rather, the indices make it possible to distinguish *degrees* of autocracy, democracy, and anocracy in any system.[12] Most systems in fact have mixed authority

[11] I have resorted to a neologism, suggested by Harry Eckstein, because no conventional term describes well the kind of state I have in mind: one which has minimal functions, an uninstitutionalized pattern of political competition, and executive leaders constantly imperiled by rival leaders. The term has the same Greek root as anarchy, which means literally the absence of any sort of rule. *Anocracy*, on the same basis, means literally the absence of power or control, though of course I use it to signify states which approach but do not reach the extreme condition. Archetypical examples in history include the Holy Roman Empire and many lesser medieval principalities.

[12] The literature includes a number of indicators of "democracy." One is Fitzgibbon's set of judgmental indicators of the extent of democracy in Latin American countries; see Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1967), 129–166. An index of "democratic development" based on electoral characteristics is used by Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (December, 1967), 1002–1009. Arthur S. Banks has recently assessed empirically the extent of what he calls "democratic performance" in a large number of nations in the 19th and 20th centuries, in "Correlates of Democratic Performance," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (January, 1972), 217–230. A critical review of this literature is John D. May, *Of the Conditions and Measures of Democracy* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press,

patterns, as demonstrated by their scores on these indicators. An extreme example is the political system of Uganda immediately after independence: it was characterized by competitive elections, legislative parity with the executive, uninstitutionalized political competition, decentralization, and minimal scope of government. This combination translates into a "democracy" score of 5 and an "anocracy" score of 6.[13] This, however, was an unusual (and unstable!) case: most polities score low on two of the three indicators. These indicators are referred to below as *system indicators.*

Procedures. Three features of the operational procedures are described here: (1) the universe of analysis; (2) coding procedures, with special reference to the problem of identifying fundamental, abrupt polity changes; and (3) the data collection process.

Universe of Analysis: The initial universe of analysis comprised the 82 nations which Singer and Small identified as being members of the international system at any time between 1817 and 1940.[14] This list was used partly as a way of ensuring that the sample included the more important historical states as well as contemporary ones. Coding, however, was not limited to the periods during which these nations were members of the international system: their political systems were coded for all periods between 1800 and 1970 during which they had internal autonomy. Korea, for example, was a member of the international system by Singer and Small's criteria only from about 1889 to 1904; Korea's political system is coded in this study from 1800 through 1904 (when it came under Japanese control), and North and South Korea are coded separately from 1948 through 1970. This study also includes predecessor states to those on Singer and Small's list: an example is Gran Colombia, the predecessor state, from 1821 to 1830, of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. A second reason for relying on Singer and Small's list was that it gave at least preliminary assurance that a moderate amount of historical information would be available on these states. Only four states proved uncodable for our purposes: Mongolia, Mecklenburg, and the two Hessen. If a political system was in existence in 1800, its approximate date of origin was identified but its "initial" authority characteristics were coded as of 1800.

Three kinds of political entities are excluded from the universe of analysis so defined. Among them are (1) countries like Leichtenstein and Bhutan, too small or peripheral to be "in" the international system; (2) "new nations" of the post-1940 era; and (3) states during periods of colonial rule, except for colonies which gained internal autonomy and then independence prior to 1940. New Zealand, for example, is coded from the beginning of effective internal rule in 1857, although it did not obtain Dominion status until 1907.

Identifying Polity Changes: The termination of a polity and (usually) the inception of its successor are defined by a major, abrupt change in the pattern of political authority. The operational determination of such changes is both difficult and crucial to the validity of measures of persistence and adaptability. It is easy enough to make a theoretical distinction to the effect that an abrupt change *of* system is a polity change, whereas a change *in* the system is not. But the historical data seldom manifest such clear-cut changes of state: the speed and extent of political change are continua. Hence it was necessary to specify *a priori* some criteria for "change of system." The criteria, summarized below, are "reasonable" in terms of the framework of this analysis, but they have an irreducible element of arbitrariness.

An *abrupt change* is any one major change (defined below) that is accomplished in ten years or less. *Major changes* in patterns of political authority are defined operationally in terms of six of the authority dimensions in Table 1. For example, a change in a polity's pattern of Participation from "institutionalized" to "restricted," or vice versa, is major. A change from "restricted" to "suppressed," though, is defined as minor. The need for brevity precludes discussion of the rationale for each such rule. The full set is summarized in Figure 1: transitions marked by solid lines are "major changes," dotted lines signify "minor changes." Changes in Directiveness of two or more categories also are treated as "major," though they virtually never occur abruptly except as a concomitant of some other, major political transformation. One-category shifts in Directiveness are "minor changes."

Since political change must be both major and abrupt to constitute a "polity change," any modification in the operational distinctions between "major" and "minor" change would alter decisions about polity termination, and thereby change (a) the number of polities identified, (b) their scores for persistence and adaptability,

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1973). But there seem to be no attempts to index degrees of "autocracy" or any variable similar to "anocracy."

[13] Uganda is not among the countries included in the analyses of this paper; it was coded in an extension of the study to "new nations."

[14] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815–1940." *World Politics,* 18 (January, 1966), 236–282.


Openness of Executive Recruitment
Competitive
Caesaristic
Designation
Dual exec.
Ascription
Decision Constraints
Coequal
Slight limits
Substantial limits
Unlimited
Participation
Institutionalized
Factional restricted
Uninstitutionalized
Suppressed
Restricted
Executive Characteristics
Collective
Qualified individual
Pure individual
Centralization
Centralized
Decentralized
Directiveness
Any change of two or more categories is "major", one is "minor"
change from one of these categories to the other is "major"
change from one of these categories to the other is "minor".

Figure 1. Major and Minor Changes in Characteristics of Political Authority

and, possibly, (c) the findings of this study. Some such reanalyses are being made, and the coded data and narrative documentation are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research for those who wish to make others.[15]

Many stipulations other than the operational definitions of "abrupt" and "major" authority changes were used in coding decisions about the birth and death of polities. These are some of the more important:

(1) *Changes in form vs. practice:* Legal or constitutional enactments of major authority changes do not signify changes of polity unless accompanied by equivalent changes in practice. Formal changes were taken in coding as clues or indicators that changes in practice might have occurred, or were to be attempted. Only if other evidence testified to the reality of constitutionally prescribed change was the date of a formal enactment used as the change point. Conversely, major changes in authority practices were treated as "major" whether or not accompanied by formal, constitutional change.

(2) *Power seizures:* Seizures of power are not necessarily indicators of "major change." Additional evidence of basic changes in authority practice was needed to warrant a decision that one polity had died and that a new "revolutionary" one had been born. Ecuador provides a striking case in point: it has had dozens of coups since its founding, including several allegedly revolutionary ones, but in not one instance could we find evidence that a major change of political system followed therefrom. The state operates now with a political system that is little changed, except in Directiveness, from that established in the 1830s.

(3) *Transitional periods:* Not all new polities emerge phoenix-like out of the ashes of their predecessors; months, sometimes years may elapse while the ground-rules of the new polity are worked out and put into effect. In France, General de Gaulle's assumption of power in June, 1958, sounded the death-knell of the Fourth Republic; the four months until the referendum of October 1958, which approved the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, are coded as a transitional period. In the 20th century, transitional periods are relatively brief, as this one was; in the 19th century, when political systems were often more ephemeral and communications slower, they tended to be longer. About 45 per cent of the 336 polities identified in this study began with transitional periods; such periods are not included in the lifespans of either predecessor or successor polities.

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[15] Preliminary results of analyses by Robert Harmel of Northwestern University, using more restrictive definitions of what constitutes a "polity change," are consistent with most of the findings reported below. An important exception is his finding that some sets of incoherent polities, especially in Europe, have been as durable as coherent democracies and more so than coherent autocracies.

Data Collection: Data were collected by a single coder working with increasingly-refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. On three occasions all information gathered to date was reviewed and recoded to ensure its consistency with more detailed guidelines. Multiple historical sources were used for each country, along with reference to such standard sources as the *Statesman's Yearbook*, the *Annual Register*, the *Encyclopedia of World History*, and Banks's *Cross-Polity Time Series Data*.[16] The procedure involved, first, identifying a number of historical and social science texts and monographs for each state, then compiling from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial political change were identified while compiling each chronology and then scrutinized, using diverse sources, to determine whether events met the specified criteria for changes of and in polities. Changes of system were thereby identified and separate coding sheets then were prepared for each polity. The same sources were searched for information on authority characteristics. Some characteristics could not be coded for some polities, but the total missing-data component for the six dimensional indicators was less than one per cent. Authority changes short of policy termination were also described, and for each altered polity a separate authority profile was coded at its termination (or as of 1971, for continuing polities). Altogether about 40 per cent of all polities underwent minor or gradual major changes in authority characteristics between their origin and termination.

Data other than that on authority characteristics and system change points were also collected, including considerable information about the circumstances of each polity change. This information was later subjected to content analysis, and each polity coded for the internal and external conditions of its birth and death—i.e., the conditions which precipitated each change of system. Data on population and on the source of each new polity's authority pattern also were recorded. None of these data are analyzed in this paper.[17]

Reliability and Validity: The necessary condition for obtaining reliable coded data in social research is to use procedures that maximize its internal consistency. The reliance in this study on pretested and detailed coding guidelines, periodic reviews of prior coding, and a single knowledgeable, trained coder constitute a *prima facie* case for its reliability. There are four kinds of tests of the reliability thereby achieved. One is to have other coders replicate part or all of the coding using the same instructions and materials. This was not done in this study for want of resources and because alternatives were at hand. The second is to solicit expert opinions on the accuracy of coded judgments. This was done sporadically but not systematically in this study, by consultation with area experts, and their opinions are incorporated in the coded data. The third is to test the internal consistency and accuracy of the data. One such test applicable to this study is to ascertain whether each successive pair of polities are distinguished from one another by one or more changes in authority characteristics defined *a priori* as "major." This test was made and a few of the codings revised accordingly. One side benefit of this and other such tests was virtually to eliminate punching errors from the data set. The final kind of test is, technically, convergent validation: one determines whether other coded data on the same or similar variables yield similar results. A substantial test of this sort is described below, and others are in progress.

Ten of the countries in this study were included in the author's earlier study of political performance. In that study I identified the approximate dates of polity transformation between 1840 and 1970, applying less precise versions of the guidelines employed here to more summary sources.[18] The results are compared here:

(1)	Instances of agreement about periods of polity transformation	36
(2)	Instances of polity transformations identified in the current study but not the prior one	6
(3)	Instances of polity transformation identified in the prior study but not the current one	3

The ratio of agreement between the two studies is thus 36/45, or .80. The nine instances of disagreement were checked against the detailed chronologies compiled in the second study. The dis-

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[16] William L. Langer, comp. and ed., *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed., 1968); Arthur S. Banks, comp., *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971.)

[17] The following materials cannot be published for reasons of space but are available from the author and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research: the coding guidelines and category definitions; frequency distributions of coded authority data; list of countries coded; and dates of polity transformation in each. Available from the Consortium only are the full set of coded data for all polities and narrative summaries of the political events and changes for each polity, with lists of sources used.

[18] See Gurr and McClelland. This is a convergent validation test rather than a test of intercoder reliability because different instruments and sources were used in the two studies. Carryover from the first to the second studies was minimized by two circumstances: the coder in the present study did not examine the results of the first study before or during the coding, and the author compared the results of the studies only after the completion of data collection in the second study.

Table 3. Average Scores on Authority Indicators by Cluster of Polities

Cluster of Polities[b]	Openness of Recruitment (range 1–5)	Decision Constraints (range 1–4)	Participation (range 1–5)	Directiveness (range 1–5)	Complexity (range 2–12)
	Authority Dimensions[a]				
All (336)	*2.99*	*2.03*	*3.03*	*4.25*	*4.44*
Polities by region:					
European (158)	2.92	2.29	2.82	4.04	4.83
Latin (120)	3.33	1.74	3.39	4.44	3.90
Afro-Asian (58)	2.45	1.93	2.86	4.45	4.46
Polities by date of establishment					
19th Century (161)	2.66	1.92	3.09	4.82	4.26
20th Century (175)	3.29	2.14	2.97	3.73	4.60
Continuing in 1971 (69)	3.42	2.47	2.96	3.09	5.04

[a] Operationally defined in Table 1. For the purpose of this analysis, polities which underwent minor or gradual changes in authority characteristics between their origin and termination, or between their origin and 1971, were given the average of their initial and final scores on the dimensions.

[b] N's are given in parentheses. Some of the means are based on slightly smaller N's because of missing data.

crepancies proved to be the result either of insufficiently-detailed information in the sources used in the first study, or of the more precise criteria used to define "abrupt, major change" in the present study. In short, these results substantially support the reliability with which this study identifies system change points. A more comprehensive assessment of the validity of this study's coding of authority characteristics and its identification of change points is now being made, via a comparison with Banks's time-series data on type of political regime.[19]

Data on Authority Patterns. Some of the data on authority characteristics are summarized in Tables 3 and 4, for all 336 polities and for some temporal and regional subgroups. The "19th-century" group includes all polities established prior to 1900—some as early as the 13th century. The "20th-century group" comprises those established between 1900 and 1970, while the 69 "continuing polities" are the political systems in the set which were functioning in 1971. These groups are referred to below as "clusters."

These are some of the more noteworthy generalizations about the dimensions of authority: (1) Recruitment of the chief executive has become increasingly open over time. It has been most open in the Latin polities, partly because of the prevalence there of the relatively open "Caesaristic" pattern. (2) Chief executives have operated with the fewest constraints in the 19th century and in Latin political systems; they are most circumscribed in European and the continuing polities. (3) Participation varies less among the clusters of polities than any other authority characteristic. The most highly participatory polities are the Latin, not because many have had institutionalized electoral systems (score of 5) as much as because of the prevalence among them of the "factional/restricted" pattern, which signifies more vigorous Participation than any of the remaining categories. (4) The scope of governmental Directiveness varies more markedly among clusters than any other authority characteristic. Few 19th-century polities had more than minimal scope (a score of 5), while the average for contemporary polities is at the "segmental" midpoint of the scale. (5) Complexity tends to vary with Directiveness and Decision Constraints: like both of them it is highest in the European polities, on the average, and has increased over time.

The average autocracy, democracy, and anocracy scores of polities in Table 4 provide a more familiar standard for evaluation than the authority indicators, though they are of course constructed from the same coded data. Three distinctive patterns deserve comment: (1) The average scores on the system indicators are low throughout, and the percentages of "pure types" are lower than might be expected. Less than two-thirds (63 per cent) of all polities have scores above the midpoint on any of the three indicators, the others

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[19] Banks, *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data,* codes "type of regime" in four categories, civilian, military-civilian, military, other; and also rates the effectiveness of legislatures. Despite the lack of discrimination in these sets of categories, they permit some general comparisons with the coded data on polities. Michael Ward of Northwestern University has used the Banks data to construct approximately-comparable indicators of five authority dimensions. Scores on his indicators, taken at the midpoints of polity lifespans, have these Pearson r coefficients with the scores used in this paper: Openness .50; Decision Constraints .77; Participation .61; Directiveness .52; Complexity .81.

Table 4. Average Scores on System Indicators, by Cluster of Polities[a]

Group of Polities[b]	Autocracy		Democracy		Anocracy	
	M score	% 3.5+	*M* score	% 3.5+	*M* score	% 3.5+
All (336)	*2.48*	*30%*	*1.29*	*18%*	*1.97*	*15%*
Polities by region:						
European (158)	2.60	35%	1.56	25%	1.57	6%
Latin (120)	2.18	21%	1.08	10%	2.49	23%
Afro-Asian (58)	2.80	36%	1.03	14%	2.00	21%
Polities by date of establishment:						
19th Century (161)	2.43	23%	0.93	9%	2.78	24%
20th Century (175)	2.53	37%	1.63	26%	1.23	6%
Continuing in 1971 (69)	2.60	41%	2.32	39%	0.92	4%

[a] The possible range of scores for each characteristic is 0 to 7. The polities with scores of 3.5+ are relatively "pure" cases of Autocracy, Democracy, and Anocracy respectively. Also see footnote (a) to Table 3.

[b] *N*'s are given in parentheses. Some of the means and percentages are based on slightly smaller *N*'s than those shown because of missing data on some of the authority characteristics.

have "mixed" authority patterns. The mixed and anocratic polities together are more numerous than all those which approximate the two "classical," democratic and autocratic types. (2) Relatively autocratic polities are and have been more common than relatively democratic ones. Proportionally, polities with distinctly autocratic characteristics have been most prevalent in Afro-Asia and in the 19th century, as might be expected, but they also are more common than democracies in Europe and among 20th-century polities. (3) There are distinct temporal trends in the data. Autocratic and democratic traits have both increased markedly, while anocratic characteristics have decreased precipitously. As one consequence, the proportion of highly autocratic and democratic polities together has increased very substantially, from 32 per cent among polities established before or during the 19th century to 80 per cent among contemporary polities.

A number of causal or correlational questions are raised by these data. Some of them will be treated in the final section, after the data on durability are examined.

Measures of System Durability

The Components of Durability.

(1) *Persistence* is the number of years a polity endures without an abrupt, major change of pattern. Such scores are available for the 267 historical polities in the universe of 336, rounded to the nearest year.

(2) *Adaptability* is less precisely indicated by a polity's number of minor and gradual major changes in authority characteristics (see Figure 1), to which are added the number of imposed polity interruptions. "Imposed interruptions" are changes imposed by a foreign power; it is assumed to be a mark of adaptability if a conquered country, on regaining independence, re-establishes the polity that existed before intervention. In such instances the imposed change is not treated as a polity change. The formula is:

Adaptability = 2×no. of major gradual authority changes +
2×no. of imposed polity interruptions +
1×no. of minor authority changes.

The justification for combining these three characteristics into a single indicator is conceptual. The three components have low but positive intercorrelations (.09 to .23). All have substantial *r*'s with the composite indicator: adaptability correlates .67 with number of major gradual changes, .72 with number of minor changes, and .56 with number of interruptions.

The persistence and adaptability scores were correlated as an empirical test of the conceptual argument that they are two components of "the same" variable. They are significantly related in all clusters ($r = .48$ in the historical polities and .72 in continuing ones) but they generally share less than 50 per cent common variance. The measure of adaptability is particularly insensitive at lower levels of durability: half the historical polities had lifespans of 12 years or less, but more than four-fifths of these had (as might be expected) 0 adaptability scores. Persistence and adaptability therefore appear to be sufficiently different aspects of durability to warrant being treated as separate dependent variables in analyses below.

The Durability Data: Persistence. The persistence data can be summarized and interpreted in various ways. Figure 2 shows the distribution of lifespans of the 267 historical polities identified in this study, by decade, and of ages of 69 contemporary



Figure 2. Persistence of Historical and Continuing Polities, by Decade

polities. Probably the most noteworthy aspect of Figure 2 is the high "infant mortality" rate of new polities. Although the average lifespan of historical polities is 32 years, fully half underwent a fundamental transformation before or during their 12th year. The median lifespans of the more important clusters are:

European polities	12.2 years
Third-world polities	12.3 years
19th century polities	19.9 years
20th century polities	9.0 years

There is no difference between the European and Third-World (Latin plus Afro-Asian) polities, but the difference between older and newer polities is quite significant; fundamental political change has been considerably more frequent in the 20th century than previously. It should also be noted, however, that the median attained age of the 69 "continuing" or contemporary polities is greater than any of the above, 22 years. Since they, as a group, have survived well beyond their predecessors, it is logical to infer that they include not only

Table 5. Survival Probabilities for Polities by Attained Age, All Contemporary and Historical Polities

Attained Age	No. of Polities "At Risk"[a]	Probability of Survival through Age[b] 5	15	25	50	75	100	150
0	330	.80	.52	.34	.21	.11	.09	.04
5 years	249		.65	.45	.28	.15	.11	.06
15 years	143			.71	.46	.25	.19	.10
25 years	93				.66	.38	.29	.16
50 years	53					.60	.47	.27
75 years	30						.80	.52
100 years	17							.70

[a] The number of historical polities which reached the attained age listed plus the number of continuing polities (as of 1971) which reached the next-higher tabled age. For example: The number of polities "at risk" at year 0 includes all historical polities plus the 62 continuing polities (of 69) which were more than 5 years old in 1971; this base is used in calculating the p of polities surviving through age 5. The base for calculating the 15-year survival p is all historical polities plus the 46 continuing polities which were more than 15 years old in 1971, and so forth. This procedure of adjusting the "at risk" population enables us to use information on the attained age of continuing polities without biasing the probability estimates. The persistence data used to construct this and the next table, and Figure 2, differ very slightly from that used in the remainder of this article.

[b] The computation formula for each probability estimate is:

$$px = \frac{\text{survivors at age } X}{\text{no. of polities at risk}},$$

where X signifies the survival age for which p is being estimated.

the survivors of stochastic processes of political decay but also a relatively high proportion of "successful," adapting systems.

Let us assume, though, that the incidence of system change has a substantial stochastic element, and that the persistence of a polity can be estimated on the basis of its attained age alone. Tables 5 and 6 are constructed on such assumptions. Table 5 uses data on all historical and contemporary polities to estimate their survival prospects at various ages. The current political system of Colombia was established in 1957. Therefore, as of 1972, when it had endured for 15 years, the tabled data indicate that it has a .7 chance of surviving without major, abrupt change for another ten years, but only a .2 chance of surviving through the year 2072—assuming, of course, that the processes affecting polity survival in the sample of 336 continue to produce the effects they had between 1800 and 1970. The historical data provide no firm basis for persistence estimates for more long-lived polities like those of contemporary Britain and the United States, though: very few polities in the sample survived longer than these without a system transformation, and those which did were "traditional" empires.

The "life expectancy" estimates of Table 6 are derived from survival estimates for various clusters of polities. They do not signify survival probabilities; rather they signify the "expected" lifespans of polities of different attained ages.[20] Like the estimates in Table 5, these figures are both a descriptive generalization from the data on 336 polities and a forecasting instrument. If one takes them at face value, they suggest that a contemporary 75-year-old polity is likely to endure a full 170 years or so. Such forecasts cannot be taken very seriously when applied to individual systems. But they do provide a sort of benchmark against which to evaluate proposed theoretical explanations of polity durability: Can those theories account for why particular polities persist either less or longer than would be predicted on assumptions of randomness? And, can those theories make more accurate predictions than can be made on a "life expectancy" basis?

The Durability Data: Adaptability. Table 7 provides an overview of the adaptability scores.

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[20] The "life expectancy" estimates are of total polity lifespan, including attained age. For example, a 50-year-old Third-World polity would be expected to survive another 50 years for a 100 year total. The figures are equivalent to medians, not averages: they are the age beyond which less than half the polities of a cluster (including historical and contemporary polities) are known to have survived. The inclusion of contemporary polities increases the medians for polities at year 0 over the medians which are listed for regional and historical clusters of polities in the text, above.

Table 6. Life Expectancies of Polities at Various Attained Ages[a]

Attained Age	Life Expectancies ($p=.5$) All polities	European	Third World[b]	19th Cent.	20th Cent.[c]
0	16	16	16	22	13
5 years	22	22	23	36	17
15 years	46	47	44	55	32
25 years	64	62	65	69	41
50 years	94	84	100	94	—
75 years	156	170	145	156	—

[a] The "expected" lifespan of polities attaining a particular age is the age at which $p=.50$, determined by interpolation from survival probabilities as shown in Table 5. For example, the life expectancy of a polity at birth, evaluated by reference to all polities as in Table 5, is between 15 years ($p=.52$) and 25 years ($p=.34$). Linear interpolation between the two indicates that $p=.50$ is about 16 years.

[b] The Latin and Afro-Asian polities are combined.

[c] Life expectancies beyond 15 years are based on very small N's because polities established in the 20th century are by definition a "youthful" cohort: the oldest is a mere 70.

Adaptability has been greater among European and Latin polities than Afro-Asian ones, and also greater among continuing polities and those established in the 19th century—but no more than can be accounted for by their greater average age. The greatest adaptability is manifested by the contemporary polities, many of them also long-lived. Their adaptability sharply distinguishes them from the long-lived, inflexible traditional polities in the set of 336. A comparison of the frequency of adaptations in three groups of polities is instructive. The following groups include all 31 polities which survived more than 75 years. For each group their average adaptability scores have been calculated (in scale points: minor changes = 1, major gradual changes = 2) per 100 coded polity years, excluding imposed interruptions and their pre-1800 histories if any. The results are these:

11 continuing polities averaged 4.5 adaptations per 100 years;

5 historical quasi-democracies averaged 6.2 adaptations per 100 years; and

15 historical autocracies averaged 1.3 adaptations per 100 years.

The historical autocracies though long-lived were manifestly inflexible, and their political systems collapsed, often in revolutionary circumstances. The long-lived historical democracies experienced very considerable changes *in* system before an abrupt change *of* system; these latter changes were usually in the "democratic" direction. The long-lived continuing polities, most of them also democracies, have demonstrated a lesser but very substantial capacity for adaptation.

Authority Characteristics as Determinants of Durability

The data and indicators constructed from them have been described in detail because they are new and reflect concepts most of which are not in common currency. Some of their many theoretical

Table 7. Polity Adaptability Scores

	All polities	European polities	Latin polities	Afro-Asian polities	19th Cent. polities	20th Cent. polities	Continuing polities
No. of polities[a]	324	152	120	52	149	175	69
Distribution of scores, %							
0	61%	54%	68%	65%	64%	58%	38%
1–2	23	26	18	27	17	29	33
3+	16	20	15	8	19	13	29
Mean	1.09	1.30	1.02	0.67	1.29	0.93	1.96

[a] Includes all 336 polities, except for 12 polities whose pre-1800 lifespan exceeded their post-1800 lifespan, and whose adaptability scores were therefore judged to be unreliable.

uses are explored here by evaluating three general, but specifically "political," hypotheses about effects of authority characteristics *per se* on the persistence and adaptability of polities.[21]

> *Hypothesis 1:* Persistence and adaptability tend to be greater in polities of high Directiveness and Complexity.

This might be called the "bigger is better" hypothesis. Its first part is a codification of the contention, or assumption, that powerful, multifunctional states have better survival prospects than states which do little. This view has considerable currency among Third-World leaders, for example, many of whom have argued that the viability of less-developed nations requires the state to control economic functions and mobilize social and political forces. Their principal models are the successful Communist states. Both parts of the hypothesis are consistent with a "general systems" type of argument, to the effect that complex systems with substantial control over their environments are more likely to adapt successfully in response to stress than are others. Huntington's views about the importance of "institutionalization" for political stability also converge on the hypothesis: complexity and autonomy are among the characteristics he attributes to "institutionalized" political structures.[22]

> *Hypothesis 2:* Persistence and adaptability tend to be enhanced most by democratic authority traits, less by autocratic traits, and least by anocratic traits.

The superiority of democratic authority patterns derives from the virtues conventionally attributed to plural democracies. They are allegedly more responsive to citizen and interest group opinion, hence more adaptable and less susceptible to abrupt, revolutionary transformation than other polities. Autocracies, in turn, are likely to be more durable than anocracies because they can better command the resources and coercive force necessary to control disaffected subjects.

> *Hypothesis 3:* Persistence and adaptability tend to be greater in polities with consistently democratic and autocratic authority patterns than in polities with mixed or anocratic authority patterns.

This hypothesis follows from Eckstein's argument that organizations with coherent authority patterns ought to outperform—including outlast—organizations with incoherent patterns.[23] The authority characteristics of "coherent" polities are logically or psychologically consistent with one another and thereby enhance the polity's capacity to endure. The authority characteristics of "incoherent" polities are mutually dysfunctional, and under stress such systems are subject to abrupt, fundamental change. For example, a polity which has institutionalized political competition but a nonelected chief executive who is subject to few or no constraints is "incoherent." Two more coherent, mutually functional patterns are (1) institutionalized competition in conjunction with an elected, responsive executive, or (2) suppressed competition with a nonelected executive holding unlimited powers. The characteristics of highly democratic polities, as operationally defined in this study (see Table 2), are coherent in this sense, and so are the characteristics of highly autocratic polities. The highly anocratic and mixed polities are not, or at least they are operationally defined so that they include a greater proportion of inconsistent patterns.

Research Strategies. The dependent variables of all three hypotheses are persistence and adaptability. Three interrelated strategies are used to assess their hypothetical causes. (1) One is to correlate indicators of authority characteristics with the durability measures for all cases; this tests for the existence and strength of systematic relationships across the full range of cases. (2) The second strategy is to identify two "extreme" subsets of polities, the most short-lived and long-lived, and then to determine which of the postulated authority characteristics distinguish significantly between them, and between them and the "middling" cases. This procedure gives us information on authority characteristics that make most difference at the extremes of durability. (3) Finally, both kinds of comparisons are replicated for different clusters of polities: (a) The results of comparisons for European, Latin, and Afro-Asian polities are reported separately. If the alleged effects of authority characteristics on durability are universals, then statistical relationships should be similar within each of these clusters. But should relationships vary markedly from one cluster to another, they suggest that other, more remote or controlling conditions are systematically influencing the effects of authority characteristics on durability. (b) Separate comparisons for historical and contemporary polities also are reported. If the correlates of durability are different between these two groups, the inference is that the survival-enhancing characteristics of polities have changed systematically over time.

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[21] Note that the independent variables are structural properties of the political system, not properties of other social institutions: data are not available here to test directly Harry Eckstein's proposition that congruence between nongovernmental and governmental authority patterns determines the performance and durability of political systems. See his "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical Framework," *Comparative Political Studies,* 2 (October, 1969), 283.

[22] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1–92.

[23] Eckstein, "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance," pp. 300–307.

The authority and durability indicators discussed above were subject to a few manipulations, described below, to facilitate hypothesis-testing.

Reduced Set of Polities: Some of the 336 political systems identified in this study ended not as a result of internal processes but as a consequence of external intervention or territorial union with another state. They were eliminated from the hypothesis-testing set *unless* they had already survived 70 years. (Any polity which endures 70 years without a major, abrupt change has demonstrated a high degree of durability whatever happens to it thereafter; less than 15 per cent of all polities ever attained this age.) Forty-two polities were eliminated on this basis; the analyses which follow are based on a maximum N of 294.

Estimated Persistence Scores: The known life-spans of historical polities are not comparable to the attained ages of contemporary polities: the latter can be expected to persist for varying, but often considerable, years into the future. So life expectancies were determined for the 69 contemporary polities, using the estimates in the first column of Table 6. For example, 15-year-old polities are shown there to have an average life span of 46 years; this estimate was used as the persistence score for the polities aged 14 to 18 in 1971. Four polities which were older than 125 in 1971 were assigned high but arbitrary persistence values of 250 or 300.[24] So the final measure of persistence includes known values for 225 historical cases and life expectancy values for 69 contemporary cases. Because the distribution of scores is strongly skewed, as shown in Figure 2, a square root transformation was performed.[25]

Durability Subsets of Polities: Subsets of especially durable and ephemeral polities were distinguished using these operational definitions:

1) *Low Durability:* Historical polities which persisted five years or less, $N=57$. All but one of these polities had 0 adaptability scores.
2) *High Durability:* Historical polities which persisted 55 years or more *and* had adaptability scores of 2 or more, $N=20$; plus continuing polities with life expectancies of 85 years or more *and* adaptability scores of 1 or more, $N=22$; total $N=42$.
3) *Middling Durability:* All other polities, $N=195$.

Note that persistence and adaptability are combined in defining the high durability subset, by making both necessary conditions for inclusion.

Authority Subsets of Polities: Three subsets of polities were distinguished based on their type-of-system scores, as in Table 4:

1) *Autocratic polities*, autocracy score 3.5+, $N=82$
2) *Democratic polities*, democracy score 3.5+, $N=57$
3) *Anocratic polities*, anocracy score 3.5+, $N=45$[26]

Three other subsets were defined using higher thresholds than these, to test the "coherence" hypothesis:

1) *Highly coherent polities*, autocracy score 5.0+ *or* democracy score 4.5+, $N=81$
2) *Anocratic polities*, anocracy score 4.0+, $N=38$
3) *Incoherent polities*, those not in the above two sets, $N=175$

Results. The bivariate relations between authority variables and durability are summarized in Tables 8 through 12. Tables 8 and 10 list the results of correlational analysis: each dimensional indicator, and system indicator, is correlated with persistence and adaptability, respectively. In both sets of comparisons no consistency is found among the clusters: durable European polities have different authority traits from Latin and Afro-Asian polities; and durable historical polities frequently have traits that are opposite to those of durable contemporary ones.

Table 9 contrasts the authority characteristics of especially durable and ephemeral polities. Generally the highly durable European and continuing polities are substantially different in structure from the less durable polities; but none of the authority dimensions makes much difference for any other clusters of polities. The polities of lowest and middling durability—more than 85 per cent of all polities—are virtually indistinguishable in their authority characteristics.

Table 11 compares the average persistence and adaptability of polities by system type. These comparisons include only the polities with relatively high democracy, autocracy, and anocracy scores, but they too manifest the kind of inconsistency of results apparent in Table 8 through 10. The durability of relatively "pure types" of polities—those with highly coherent authority

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[24] The life expectancy values for all polities are used rather than those of the regional or temporal clusters because, first, the N's for the subsets are too small, and second, because the subsets are categorical variables whose effects on persistence are to be assessed separately.

[25] A logarithmic transformation is conceptually less appropriate because too strong: it compresses the upper range of persistence valves more than is justified given this study's special focus on the determinants of longevity.

[26] Five polities are double-counted: three are above both the autocratic and anocratic threshold of 3.5, two are in both the democratic and anocratic subsets.

Table 8. Authority Dimensions as Determinants of Polity Durability: Correlations[a]

	Correlation with:	
Authority Dimensions[b]	*Persistence*[c]	*Adaptability*
Openness of Recruitment[d]		
European polities (124)	.15**	.10
Latin polities (113)	.16**	−.08
Afro-Asian polities (57)	.41***	−.15
Historical polities (225)	.33***	−.07
Continuing polities (69)	.25**	.13
Decision Constraints		
European polities	.26***	.20***
Latin polities	.16**	.15*
Afro-Asian polities	−.21	−.16
Historical polities	−.08	.04
Continuing polities	.48***	.33***
Participation		
European polities	−.01	.00
Latin polities	.08	.14*
Afro-Asian polities	−.25**	−.08
Historical polities	−.18***	−.02
Continuing polities	.23**	.18*
Directiveness		
European polities	−.25***	−.13*
Latin polities	−.12	−.04
Afro-Asian polities	.14	.02
Historical polities	.20***	−.07
Continuing polities	.20**	.16*
Complexity		
European polities	.31***	.25***
Latin polities	.04	.03
Afro-Asian polities	−.27*	−.16
Historical polities	−.07	.03
Continuing polities	.45***	.31***

* significant at .10.
** significant at .05.
*** significant at .01.

[a] Pearson product-moment r's.

[b] Authority indicator scores used in these correlations are the average of scores at polity birth and termination. The dimensions are defined operationally in Table 1.

[c] Actual and estimated persistence scores with square-root transformation.

[d] Maximum numbers of polities in each subset are shown under Openness of Recruitment; the N's actually used in each correlation are sometimes a few less because of missing authority data.

patterns, whether democratic or autocratic—is examined in Table 12 and contrasted with the durability of anarchic and "incoherent" polities. There is considerably more consistency to these results.

Tests of Hypothesis 1: The hypothesis is that the more Complex and Directive are political systems, the more likely they are to persist and adapt. These results from the comparisons in Tables 8 and 9 are needed to sustain the "complexity" part of the hypothesis:

(a) positive correlations of Complexity with persistence and adaptability (Table 8);
(b) mean Complexity scores for Low Durability polities < Middling Durability < High Durability (Table 9).

Both kinds of comparisons show that Complexity is associated with durability only in the European and continuing polities. In the Afro-Asian cluster the relationship is reversed: Complex systems there have tended to be more short lived. Most important, there is no consequential difference in Complexity between the most and least durable of historical polities—and the historical systems comprise fully three-quarters of all the cases. So significantly high levels of Complexity characterize only the more durable contemporary polities.

These results are required to support the "Directiveness" part of hypothesis 1:

(a) negative correlations of Directiveness with persistence and adaptability (Table 8);
(b) mean Directiveness scores for Low Durability polities > Middling Durability > High Durability (Table 9).

No consistent results of this sort are found for any cluster of polities. Among the continuing polities, in fact, the relation is reversed: the more durable of contemporary polities are the less (more highly-scoring) Directive ones.

Tests of Hypothesis 2: These results from the comparisons in Tables 10 and 11 would support hypothesis 2:

(a) Persistence and adaptability should correlate most strongly with degrees of democracy, less so with autocracy, and least so with anocracy (Table 10), and
(b) the average persistence and adaptability scores of democratic systems should exceed those of autocratic systems, which in turn should exceed those of anocratic systems (Table 11).

The empirical evidence in the two tables does indeed suggest that some systemic characteristics enhance durability more than others—but with great variation among clusters. The empirical tendencies can be summarized as follows, where D> symbolizes "more durable" and $\underline{\underline{D}}$ means "not significantly more durable":

European:	Democracy	D>	Autocracy	D>	Anocracy
Latin American:	Democracy	$\underline{D}$	Autocracy	$\underline{D}$	Anocracy
Afro-Asian:	Autocracy	$\underline{D}$	Anocracy	D>	Democracy
Historical:	Autocracy	D>	Anocracy	$\underline{D}$	Democracy
Continuing:	Anocracy	D>	Democracy	D>	Autocracy

In short, only the results for the European cluster support the hypothesis. In every other group of polities it is contradicted in whole or part.

Tests of Hypothesis 3: The preceding two hypotheses attributed durability to substantive authority traits of political systems. This hypothesis attributes durability to "consistency of pattern" among authority traits rather than to the traits themselves. The empirical question is whether polities of relatively coherent or "pure" authority types, whether democratic or autocratic, manifest

Table 9. Authority Dimensions as Determinants of Polity Durability: Comparison of Extreme Cases

Authority Dimensions[b]	Mean Scores by Subset of Polities[a] Low Durability (*N*=57)		Middling Durability (*N*=195)		High Durability (*N*=42)
Openness of Recruitment[c]					
European polities (25/73/26)	2.80	=	2.88	<<	3.58
Latin polities (24/79/10)	3.42	=	3.38	=	3.00
Historical polities (53/151/21)	3.21	=	2.93	>>	2.14
Continuing polities (4/44/21)	2.00	=	3.14	<<<	4.29
Decision Constraints					
European polities	1.96	=	2.37	<<<	3.10
Latin polities	1.48	<	1.80	=	2.11
Historical polities	1.78	=	2.03	=	1.93
Continuing polities	1.50	=	2.10	<<<	3.40
Participation					
European polities	3.00	=	2.86	=	3.35
Latin polities	3.42	=	3.31	=	3.80
Historical polities	3.34	=	3.16	=	2.79
Continuing polities	2.25	=	2.60	<<<	3.86
Directiveness					
European polities	4.28	=	3.92	=	3.94
Latin polities	4.50	=	4.40	=	4.45
Historical polities	4.50	=	4.62	=	4.69
Continuing polities	3.50	=	2.80	<<<	3.64
Complexity					
European polities	4.08	<<	5.00	<<<	6.10
Latin polities	3.63	=	4.01	=	4.00
Historical polities	4.02	<	4.46	=	4.26
Continuing polities	3.75	=	4.53	<<<	6.36

= Means not significantly different using a two-tailed *t*-test and pooled variance.
< Significantly different at .10.
<< Significantly different at .05.
<<< Significantly different at .01.

[a] The Afro-Asian subgroup is not tabled because of the small *N* of cases in its low and high durability subgroups (9 and 5 respectively); there are no significant differences among any of its subgroup means.

[b] Authority indicator scores used in these comparisons are the average of scores at polity birth and termination. The dimensions are defined operationally in Table 1.

[c] Maximum numbers of polities in each durability subgroup are shown under Openness of Recruitment; the *N*'s actually used in dimensional comparisons sometimes are a few less because of missing authority data.

Table 10. System Authority Types as Determinants of Polity Durability: Correlations[a]

Authority Types[b]	Correlations with: Persistence[c]	Adaptability
Degree of Democracy		
All polities	.12**	.11
European polities	.35***	.19**
Latin polities	−.04	.02
Afro-Asian polities	−.18*	−.23**
Historical polities	−.13**	−.04
Continuing polities	.35***	.20**
Degree of Autocracy		
All polities	.08*	−.06
European polities	−.01	−.03
Latin polities	−.07	−.13*
Afro-Asian polities	.31***	.11
Historical polities	.21***	.01
Continuing polities	−.31***	−.22**
Degree of Anocracy		
All polities	−.04	−.09*
European polities	−.16	−.12*
Latin polities	−.04	−.04
Afro-Asian polities	.20*	.03
Historical polities	.10*	−.09*
Continuing polities	.33***	.26**

* significant at .10.
** significant at .05.
*** significant at .01.

[a] Pearson product-moment *r*'s.

[b] System indicator scores used in these correlations are the average of scores at polity birth and termination. The system indicators are defined operationally in Table 2. For *N*'s of polities see Table 9.

[c] Actual and estimated persistence scores with square root transformation.

greater persistence and adaptability than do polities with anocratic or mixed authority patterns. The comparisons of Table 12 provide a rather persuasive answer. Without exception, the average persistence of the highly coherent polities exceeds the persistence of the other two subsets. Recall that the persistence scores are $\sqrt{\text{years}}$: thus in the all-polity comparison the highly coherent polities have a mean lifespan of $7.45^2=55$ years, compared with 21 years for anocratic polities and 24 years for "incoherent" ones. Among the historical polities, whose evidence repeatedly falsified the previous two hypotheses, the difference in persistence is also substantial, even if not statistically significant: coherent historical polities had an average lifespan of $5.59^2=30$ years, compared with 20 years for the less coherent sets.

Coherence of authority patterns predicts less well to adaptability. Four of the 11 comparisons of adaptability means show coherent polities to be significantly more adaptable than others, four other comparisons are in the predicted direction. But in the remaining three, including the very numerous "historical" polities, incoherent polities prove to have undergone more adaptations in authority than either coherent or anocratic ones. This outcome seems to support Eckstein's suggestion that social units with inconsistent authority patterns are subject to pressures to modify those patterns.[27] In these data, large and abrupt modifications in authority patterns are reflected in polity termination, hence curtailed persistence; but if such modifications are incremental, they are registered in higher adaptability scores.

Summary and Conclusion

This is a study of political persistence and change, based on the codification of some basic authority characteristics of 336 political systems—polities—as they have functioned in 91 nation-states between 1800 and 1971. The persistence and change of these polities were defined in terms of their authority characteristics. By definition, polities persist so long as they avoid abrupt, fundamental change in their authority characteristics. When such change does occur, it signals the end of a polity and, usually, its transformation into another. The persistence of polities in years is, in effect, a measure of the periodicity of abrupt, major changes of system. The structures of political systems may be transformed other than by abrupt, step changes, of course. The nature and number of gradual changes in the 336 polities were also registered in this study and used to construct a measure of their adaptability. Durability is the term employed here for the variable capacity of political systems both to persist and adapt. As might be expected, the two properties are positively correlated.

These are some of the more striking descriptive generalizations from the data:

(1) The incidence of system-transforming political change has been remarkably high and pervasive, not only or mainly in the Third World but in the European culture zone as well. The median persistence of historical Latin and Afro-Asian polities was 12.3 years; in the European nations it was 12.2.

(2) The incidence of abrupt political change has increased markedly from the 19th to the 20th century. Of the 150 historical polities in the sample which were established before 1900, half survived for 20 years; but for the 117 historical

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[27] "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance," pp. 315–322.

Table 11. Relative Durability of Democratic, Autocratic, and Anocratic Polities[a]

Clusters	Democracies		Autocracies		Anocracies
All polities, *N*'s:	57		82		45
$\overline{M}$ Persistence[b]:	6.42	=	6.17	=	5.01
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	1.54	=	1.09	=	.96
European polities, *N*'s:	37		38		7
$\overline{M}$ Persistence:	7.77	>	5.95	=	4.52
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	2.24	=	1.47	=	1.71
Latin Polities, *N*'s:	12		24		26
$\overline{M}$ Persistence:	3.80	=	4.54	=	4.13
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	.33	=	.79	=	.92
Afro-Asian polities, *N*'s:	8		20		12
$\overline{M}$ Persistence:	4.10	<	8.52	=	7.22
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	.13	=	.70	=	.58
Historical polities, *N*'s	30		54		42
$\overline{M}$ Persistence:	3.34	<<	5.74	=	4.56
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	.57	=	1.06	=	.69
Continuing polities, *N*'s	27		28		3
$\overline{M}$ Persistence:	9.84	>>>	6.99	<<<	11.37
$\overline{M}$ Adaptability:	2.63	>>	1.14	<<<	4.67

See Table 9 for explanation of symbols.

[a] Including only those polities with system scores of 3.5+.

[b] The persistence means are square roots of persistence in years.

polities established after 1900, the "half-life" was only nine years.

(3) Despite the heightened incidence of political transformation in the 20th century, the 69 polities which were operative in 1971 had already survived, on the average, longer than the full lifespan of any historical group of polities. Their median attained age in 1971 was 22. This is to say that the contemporary polities (excluding those of the post-World War II "new nations," which are not surveyed here) are *not* simply *fortuitous survivors* whose turn for political transformation will shortly come. Rather they include a substantial number of systems which have been able to adapt to their environments more successfully than their predecessors.

(4) Though there are distinct differences in the authority characteristics of polities of different regions, the most striking differences among clusters of polities are temporal. The single most substantial change in authority over time has been in Directiveness, i.e., the scope of governmental activity. These data document the generally-recognized decline of the "minimal state" which prevailed in the 19th century and the growth of "activist" polities of both autocratic and democratic form. Another expected trend of similar importance, though lesser degree, is toward institutional democratization. Marked increases were found between the 19th- and the mid-20th-century polities in the extent of "democratic" authority characteristics such as institutional constraints on chief executives and the openness of the processes by which they attained office. But levels of political participation, that other bellwether of pluralist democracy, did not change significantly over time. In short, the typical 19th-century polity was an autocracy with minimal functions. The typical mid-20th-century polity was either an activist plural democracy or, only slightly less likely, an activist autocracy.

The hypotheses tested here all derive from the literature on "political stability," with specific reference to alleged relationships between the authority characteristics and the durability of polities, rather than to the ecological and cultural variables that have attracted much recent empirical attention. "Institutionalization" arguments about the stability-enhancing effects of systems' Complexity and Directiveness received no consistent support. Conventional beliefs about democracies being relatively more durable than autocracies, or anocracies, received not much more support. The more Complex, Directive, and democratic systems did prove to be consistently more persistent and adaptable *in the European culture zone and in the 20th century*. But then this is the time and place which suggested such hypotheses, and in which those hypotheses have most often been tested. When the hypotheses are tested in other regions and in the 19th century, they not only fail to gain support but are often flatly contradicted. The most striking disconfirmation is provided by the analysis of all historical polities, for all regions combined. For them, autocratic and anocratic authority traits proved to *enhance* durability while democratic traits *reduced* it.

A basic principle of causal modelling helps make sense of these results. If specific traits of authority enhance the durability of polities in one era and region but reduce it in others, then the relationship between the traits and durability is conditional, intervening, or spurious. Diagrammatically, this kind of "causal" sequence must be rejected:

1)



Instead, one of these two causal models is likely:[28]

2)



3)



Of course, this is what the "historical determinists" and "ecological determinists" have been claiming all along: that the association of specific authority traits like democracy or Complexity with political stability is a function of particularistic developmental sequences, or certain kinds of socioeconomic class relationships, or the extent of material wealth, or high levels of literacy and communication, or the presence of cross-cutting rather than reinforcing social cleavages, or—the list could be expanded indefinitely. The problem is not a lack of specification of what "X" is but overspecification. Lack of space and data preclude reformulating and testing any of the plethora of historical and ecological hypotheses here, but Hurwitz has summarized some recent empirical evidence.[29] The search for universal linkages between authority characteristics of political systems and their durability ought not to be abandoned prematurely, either. The third hypothesis tested here attributes the durability of systems not to specific authority traits but to the internal consistency or "coherence" of those traits. In operational terms, the prediction was that highly—consistently—democratic *and* highly autocratic political systems ought to have been more durable than systems of "mixed" authority traits. Unlike the other hypotheses, this one received consistent support. Most important, the relationship was strong among the historical polities, which provided a reef of contradictory evidence on which the other two hypotheses foundered. The evidence is unmistakable that the more closely a polity resembles a pure democracy *or* pure autocracy, as defined here, the longer it is likely to have persisted.

The "coherence" hypothesis is derived from Eckstein's "congruence-consonance" theory of political performance. The theory, very briefly, is that political institutions perform—and endure—best if (a) their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of "adjacent" social institutions, and (b) their authority patterns are internally consonant.[30] The premises of congruence-consonance theory also suggest that consonance is less consequential than congruence as a condition of high performance. "Coherence" is only one facet of consonance. And the operationalization of "coherence" here is based on indicators which permit only gross discrimination among authority characteristics. Despite these conceptual and operational slippages, the hypothesis is supported. Inasmuch as the hypothesis is deduced by Eckstein from the same set of assumptions on which the "congruence" hypothesis depends, congruence-consonance theory as a whole is indirectly supported by the results.

Time and again the evaluation of the evidence summarized above led to speculation about long-term trends in "political development." A few generalizations about such trends have been mentioned in passing but most have been held in abeyance pending longitudinal analyses of the data. It may be worth outlining, however, in a tentative way, a "developmental" interpretation of the political changes surveyed here from 1800 to the present. The typical state at the onset of the

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[28] It is assumed here that the variables represented by "region" and "era" control the effects of authority traits on durability, and that there is no consistent relation between "region" or "era" and durability. If these assumptions are not warranted, then other causal sequences are also possible. See, for example, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), and Hayward R. Aiker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), chap. 6.

[29] See Leon Hurwitz, "Democratic Political Stability: Some Traditional Hypotheses Reexamined." *Comparative Political Studies*, 4 (January, 1972), 476–490; and "An Index of Democratic Political Stability: Methodological Note." *Comparative Political Studies*, 4 (April, 1971), 41–68.

[30] "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance."

Table 12. Relative Durability of Polities with Highly Coherent, Anocratic, and Mixed Authority Patterns[a]

	Mean Durability Scores for				
Clusters	Highly Coherent Polities[b]		Anocratic Polities[c]		Incoherent Polities[d]
All Polities, N's:	81		38		175
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	7.45	>>>	4.53	>>>	4.87
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	1.60	>>>	.32	>	1.16
European polities, N's:	49		5		70
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	8.06	>>>	3.01	>>>	4.31
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	2.20	>	.20	>>>	1.12
Latin polities, N's:	16		24		73
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	4.97	=	3.77	=	4.82
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	.81	=	.42	=	1.33
Afro-Asian polities, N's:	16		9		32
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	8.07	=	7.38	=	6.23
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	.56	=	.11	=	.84
Historical Polities, N's:	37		37		151
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	5.59	=	4.49	>	4.47
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	.78	=	.32	=	1.12
Continuing polities, N's:	44		(too few cases for comparison)		24
$\bar{M}$ Persistence:	9.02			>	7.40
$\bar{M}$ Adaptability:	2.30			=	1.42

See Table 9 for explanation of symbols.

[a] The persistence means are square roots of persistence in years. Note that the tests of significant difference shown under the "incoherent polities" heading are for the comparison between highly coherent and incoherent polities, not between anocratic and incoherent polities.

[b] Polities with democracy scores of 4.5+ or autocracy scores of 5.0+.

[c] Polities with anocratic scores of 4.0+.

[d] All polities not included in the "highly coherent" and anocratic subsets.

19th century was a long-lived, traditional autocracy. Some were very large, like the Spanish, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Czarist and Manchu empires. Others, like pre-Tokugawa Japan and Persia, as well as many smaller European monarchies, were rather smaller. As systems, they had distinct characteristics in common: a high degree of centralization and institutionalization of political power, but few responsibilities for social and economic activities; a lack or suppression of "modern" means of interest articulation; and a lack of adaptability. They also had a common fate: the only traditional autocracy which in 1971 remained essentially unchanged was the Empire of Ethiopia, and now it too is passing. In almost every instance one can trace the demise of these traditional states to their inability to cope with the stresses generated by socioeconomic "modernization."

Largely because of the stresses of modernization, the 19th and early 20th centuries were times of great political experimentation, not only in the "new nations" of the Americas but in older European and Asian societies. There were innumerable "experiments" in those regions, both in the establishment of new nations—120 years ago neither "Germany" nor "Italy" existed as political entities—and in devising new political systems. The very high incidence of political mortality apparent in these data reflects this experimentation. But out of this trial-and-error process, increasing numbers of viable, adaptable political systems began to emerge, so that by the 1970s it is possible to speak with some confidence about the durability of "new" systems as diverse as those of the United States and the USSR. The most salient characteristics of these "modern" systems is not their democracy or autocracy, however, but their Directiveness. The most durable political systems now are those which have responded to the stress of socioeconomic change by assuming the task of managing it, whether directly by state control of the institutions of socialization and production, or indirectly by regulation and support of allied but quasi-autonomous institutions. The "totalitarian" and "social democratic" polities, in short, seem to be variant means to the same end of political survival through managed change. The difference between them seems—at least conceptually—less great than the difference between the directive and the minimal state.

I do not suggest that socioeconomic modernization necessarily generates a process of polity selection which culminates in the establishment of durable and directive political systems. In 150 years of Latin American political independence and experimentation only one such polity, that of contemporary Mexico, has evolved, even though Latin America has undergone more substantial socioeconomic change in that span than any world region other than Europe and Anglo-America.[31] This also seems the place to raise a skeptical eyebrow about the assumption that the "durable" polity is necessarily a good thing. If durable political arrangements in the "modern" world also require a highly directive and powerful state, many people might regard frequent, abrupt political change as the lesser evil. One could speculate that Latin America has a common political culture based on that very premise.

One final comment: This speculative conclusion is not intended as a forecast that highly-directive polities are destined to prevail indefinitely where they now have a firm foothold, namely in the European culture zone and Asia. They have demonstrated a capacity to survive and adapt in periods of rapid and continuous socioeconomic change. But whether they can adapt and survive in times of stasis and decline seems now a moot question. Or perhaps it is not moot. In one of the most provocative recent books in political science, Robert G. Wesson has surveyed the rise and decline of large, powerful states across five millennia. One of his observations coincides precisely with conclusions here about the scope of power in most contemporary states: it is that "Societies suggestive more of imperial Rome than of democratic Athens largely fill history and our own world."[32] Our convergent observations can be linked to one of his principal theses and conclusions about the fate of such polities: "Imperial decay is . . . primarily a result of the misuse of power which follows inevitably from its concentration."[33] The observation is at least a forecast if not a prophecy, and it might prove to be an epitaph.

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[31] There are other activist polities in Latin America now than Mexico, of course; their ideologies and approaches are as diverse as those of Brazil, Peru, and Cuba. But they are all young, and whether they will endure and adapt as has the Mexican system is problematical; the "life expectancy" of Third-World polities at their inception is 16 years (Table 6).

[32] *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 443.

[33] Wesson, *The Imperial Order,* preface (unnumbered).

On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique of a Process*

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The history of political science is one of gradual encroachment of ideas rather than the sequential building of scientific study upon scientific study. Yet the general idea of a science of politics, or at least of an accepted general framework for political analysis, is as old as the discipline and promises to remain an enduring part of its professional ethos. Of the many general frameworks which have been advanced in recent decades few can claim the prominence of the body of ideas associated under the label of "interest-group theory."

In the early years of the postwar wave of interest in group theory, Avery Leiserson reviewed David Truman's modern classic, *The Governmental Process* (1951), predicting that political scientists would receive the work enthusiastically because of its utility as a framework for presenting "the great mass of empirical, historical, and descriptive materials that political science has accumulated about the 'realities' of political organization."[1] This prediction proved accurate and Truman's work, along with the interest-group approach to politics which it advocated, rapidly became established as a central part of what was perceived as a hopeful new period of growth within the discipline.

A decade later Robert Golembiewski could still write, "only small further innovations in method (if they imply much effort) are required to achieve a major research breakthrough in 'the group theory,' to push beyond what Bentley cannot be expected to have known and beyond his incomplete break with the restraints of the leading ideas of his time."[2] New excitement was attached to the development of interest-group studies on a comparative basis. Yet, as Graham Wootton noted recently, "the excitement engendered at Rome, Pittsburgh, and Geneva from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties has long since evaporated." This decline, Wootton noted, was associated in part "with the discovery that, in certain contexts, neither pressure groups nor lobbyists enjoyed the importance popularly or even academically attributed to them."[3]

With this ebbing of intellectual interest, group theory finds its domain intruded upon by a legion of "newer" frameworks: systems theory, role theory, communications theory, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and many others. As with other great conceptions of political process, the decline of group theory has not been due to "scientific" refutation in the ordinary sense. Rather, it has subsided amid the accretion of other ideas, other issues, other terminologies.

In many ways the "scientific" appraisal of interest group theory is less important than seeking to understand this process of encroachment of ideas itself, as illustrated in group theory. The present essay focuses on this process, using as "data" a survey of all articles and book reviews pertaining to the group theory of politics appearing in the *American Political Science Review* since its inception in 1906. Articles and reviews were considered to fall into the purview of this essay if they (1) discussed the role of groups *qua* groups in political processes; (2) treated specific organizations in the nongovernmental sector; or (3) treated classes of such organizations (e.g., labor groups, church groups, farm groups). In addition, the works of twenty frequently-cited group theorists were included. The study was limited to consideration of non-governmental groups except where a governmental body was analyzed in group-theoretic terms.

Reading of the *American Political Science Review* since its beginning gives one a unique and interesting account of American political science thinking about groups. In spite of its pervasive effect on our discipline, this history today is remembered little if at all. This tendency to neglect the history of thought within our discipline reinforces the "growth" of political science through a process of accretion in which the shifting of basic premises, questions, and terms occurs largely without explicit or even conscious consideration.

The very purpose of theory is to simplify all-too-complex reality by discarding less important information until what is left can be utilized to understand and to predict. As the evolution of group theory illustrates, what is dangerous for a discipline is not selection *per se*, but rather the making of that selection without sufficient explicit consideration of the criteria for shifting premises, questions, and terms. All too often the intellectual modes and ideological needs of the times sweep over the discipline, followed by a "scientific" reaction seeking to insulate political science from such forces. Rather than seek a wedding of theory and practice, necessarily requiring a base in normative theory, the discipline vacillates between these poles. In this process the hopes for "scientific" advance are surrendered to the gradual encroachment of ideas, each of which in turn is treated as if it were better than the last, and the fittest theories are equated with those which have survived. The history of that process with respect to group theory is the focus of the remainder of this essay.

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* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4–8, 1973. This essay represent the first of three; the second treats group theory between 1930 and 1951 and the third, the period since 1951.

[1] Avery Leiserson, rev. of *The Governmental Process*, by David Truman, *American Political Science Review* (hereinafter *APSR*), 45 (December, 1951), 1192–1193.

[2] Robert J. Golembiewski, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes on Analysis and Development," *APSR*, 54 (December, 1960), 971.

[3] Graham Wootton, "Interest Groups in Britain and the United States: Contributions to Public Policy," a paper prepared for the 68th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, September 5–9, 1972, p. 1.

Pluralism and the Critique of Formal Jurisprudence

I believe it is commonly accepted among contemporary political scientists that the turn away from "nineteenth-century jurisprudence" was an unmitigated good. Illustrative is the following excerpt from a contemporary text on interest-group theory:[4]

> The fundamental characteristic of political science at this [Bentley's] time was its preoccupation with law. This meant that the legal aspects . . . embodied in formal constitutions served as an adequate guide to the realities of politics. . . . As David Easton rightly declares, 'Most tended to act as though the study of the distribution of power as delineated in the constitution constituted the core of political research.

The authors of this text emphasize the "institutional bias" of nineteenth-century American political scientists, and in this one must agree they are right as far as they go.

But there was much more to juristic political science than simply "narrow institutionalism." While institutionalism *does* serve to differentiate early political science from its later phases and to highlight Arthur Bentley's contribution in *The Process of Government* (1908), other aspects of jurisprudence relate very directly and in theoretically important ways to the group theory of politics. Paradoxically, it is these ways which are largely ignored by contemporary group theorists, who prefer to attack the straw-man of nineteenth-century institutional focus.

This is not to belittle the constraints which nineteenth-century institutionalism placed on political science. Bentley was merely one author among a great many who recognized this more than half a century ago. Among the most influential in those years was not Bentley, who was little known, but rather James Bryce. Bryce, in his presidential address to the annual APSA meeting in 1908 stated that, "Political institutions . . . used to be treated as abstract entities, if the term be permissible: things existing *in vacuo*, like the Platonic ideal, with a definite and permanent type."

In place of this perspective Bryce called on political scientists to study not only formal institutional aspects of politics, but also (1) "the needs it was meant to meet and the purposes it actually serves;" (2) "the character of the men who work it;" and (3) "the traditional color of the institution." These approaches, which today would be called functional, social psychological, and political cultural respectively, were very broad. Bryce noted, "You may ask: Are we then to study everything in the light of everything else? and if so, what limit can be set to investigation? The answer is: No limit. Every political organism, every political force, must be studied in and cannot be understood apart from the environment in which it plays."[5]

One senses in the phrase "No limit" the sense of liberation which came with the turn away from institutionalism in political science. Yet the debate about jurisprudence and the theory of sovereignty continued in the forefront of attention for more than a decade after the writings of Bentley and Bryce in 1908. Why was this so? I shall argue that it was not because of some mere residual inertia but rather that jurisprudential theory continued as a vital center of political thought precisely because its major theoretical concerns went beyond institutionalism alone.

The reader may wonder here what relation this has to group theory. Among the most important theoretical concerns to which I have alluded was the problem of the proper relation of groups in the state. In traditional jurisprudential theory that relation was prescribed as one of subordination. Moreover, traditional theorists customarily distinguished between this relation as norm and as practice. As Theodore Woolsey noted, "The quality of sovereignty, however, does not necessarily imply unlimited power or unchecked power; much less undelegated power."[6]

On subjects such as the relation of the state to religious groups, much attention was given to comparison of normative models in relation to divergent national practice.[7] Moreover, the symbolic uses of sovereignty were recognized, as was the gap between a power unchecked in theory and that power not expressed in practice.[8] Finally, the relation of the state to various interests was discussed under the rubric of theories of representation.

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[4] L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, *Interest Groups in American Society*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 5.

[5] James Bryce, "The Relations of Political Science to History and to Practice," *APSR*, 3 (Feb., 1909), 6–8.

[6] Theodore Woolsey, *Political Science, or The State* (New York: Scribner's, 1893), I, 203.

Juristic political scientists wrestled, for example, with John Calhoun's theory of the state as based on interests. This view, Calhoun wrote, "regards interests as well as numbers, considering the community as made up of different and conflicting interests, as far as the government is concerned, and takes the sense of each through its appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense of the entire community."[9] This problem was discussed not only in terms of Calhoun's reference to the South as an interest, but also in terms of narrower groups such as the cotton interest or the sugar interest. In other contexts, even informal groups such as the family received extended treatment.[10]

Contrary to the impression given by Bryce and later political scientists, nineteenth-century authors routinely brought in historical and political evidence of a concrete nature to illuminate their normative theories, whether to support their applicability in practice or to demonstrate the divergence of theory and reality. As W. W. Willoughby wrote,

> It is thus seen that a complete system of Political Science includes three main divisions: first, the determination of fundamental philosophical principles; second, the description of political institutions . . . ; and third, the determination of the laws of political life and development, the motives that give rise to political action, the conditions which occasion particular political manifestations, the circumstances when certain forces are applicable, either for the good or for the bad.[11]

Willoughby, whom modern interest-group theorists have sometimes characterized as an extreme legalist,[12] was in no small part also an empiricist. He held, for example, that "Not until a sufficient number of facts have been observed, and the consequences of cause and effect in political life remarked, is the formation of adequate philosophical conceptions possible. When formed, however, these conceptions serve to explain and harmonize the facts that have appeared confused and contradictory."[13]

In considering the twentieth-century reaction against jurisprudence among American political scientists, one must remember that the theoretically important contrast at the time (and now) was not the shift in substantive focus (governmental bodies and political parties remained the central emphasis) nor even the rise of empirical description as a preferred style. Rather, controversy centered on the crisis of the normative theory of the state advocated by most juristic political scientists. More specifically, the crisis was precipitated by changing views about the relation of organized groups to the sovereign state.

Latham is absolutely correct in emphasizing the origins of the modern group theory of politics in the pluralist critique of sovereignty.[14] That critique, however, is less interesting for its rebuttal of the straw-man of the absolutist state into which the pluralists (and implicitly, Latham) simplified the theory of sovereignty than for its implications for the normative theories of the day. Contrary to frequent assumptions, the pluralist critique assumed importance because of its prescriptive rather than descriptive aspects, though the two were intertwined. Before turning to this subject, however, it is necessary to treat two additional, more popular intellectual currents which underlay pluralism and gave it no small part of its momentum.

Pressure Politics, Economic History, and Pluralism

With the consolidation of corporate capitalism and the rise of organized labor in the late nineteenth century, American social scientists were increasingly confronted with the contesting claims of economic groups as these vied for popular support, institutional position, and the mantle of government power. The activities of these groups seemed to contravene with some frequency the norms of political process held by political scientists and, indeed, most Americans.

Among some of the earliest works that dealt explicitly with interest groups in the pages of the *American Political Science Review* were those treating pressure politics. Although called "muckrakers" by their opponents, these authors shared many of the perspectives found in the writings of leading political scientists such as James Bryce.[15] For example, in a review of Lincoln Steffens's *The*

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[7] Woolsey, II, ch. 12.

[8] Woolsey, I, p. 203.

[9] Quoted in Elisha Mulford, *The Nation: The Foundations of Civil Order and Political Life in the United States* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1881; orig. 1870), p. 212. See also Woolsey, II, 292 ff.

[10] Mulford, ch. 15.

[11] W. W. Willoughby, *An Examination of the Nature of the State* (New York.: Macmillan, 1896), pp. 382–383.

[12] Zeigler and Peak, p. 6.

[13] Willoughby, p. 383.

[14] Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," *APSR*, 46 (June, 1952), 376–397.

[15] Louis Filler, *The Muckrakers: Crusaders for American Liberalism* (Chicago: Regnery, 1968; orig. 1950), p. 17.

Struggle for Self-Government (1906), S. E. Sparling endorsed the call for reform, noting "The value of Mr. Steffens' volume consists largely in a vivid portrayal of conditions which have made possible the work of the system—a composite of social, political, and business interests. . . . The alertness of business interests in politics, coupled with the supineness of the people, has done much to make possible the conditions pictured in this volume."[16]

The new attention given to pressure politics was not an abstract methodological change but was associated with a quite specific historic moment. In his *The American Commonwealth* (1894), Bryce had forecast that the time would come when "the chronic evils and problems of old societies and crowded countries will have appeared on this soil." In the 1910 edition of the book, Bryce felt it appropriate to add that "the demand of the multitude to have a larger share of the nation's collective wealth may well have grown more insistent." Henry Jones Ford, in reviewing this edition, drew attention to this insertion stating "The remark notes a sign of the times that portends a new pressure upon our political institutions which is already manifesting itself and which must deeply affect constitutional development."[17]

This "new pressure" soon translated itself into new perspectives on American government. By 1915 one may find a basic text such as James T. Young's *The New American Government and Its Work* (1915) starting not with the discussion on the legal framework that was nearly universal among earlier texts but rather with a discussion of the influence of business groups on political processes, contrasting actual practices with legal norms. In this shifting perspective the normative emphasis of the nineteenth century was retained, not at the level of legal philosophy, but rather at the more practical level of political reform.

In his presidential address to the 1916 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Jesse Macy called on his colleagues to reflect the new "scientific spirit in politics."[18] By this Macy meant not value-free methodology but the contrary idea of applying the knowledge of political science to the great tasks of reform, notably the attempt to control selfish interest groups. Similar views were then being expressed in sociology by Macy's contemporary, Albion Small, one of Arthur Bentley's teachers at the University of Chicago.

A more elegant theoretical framework for the study of economic pressures was presented in the work of Charles A. Beard, later a president of the American Political Science Association. Contrary to popular conceptions, Beard was neither an economic determinist nor a Marxist but instead professed belief in the views of Madison in *Federalist No. 10*, excerpted below:[19]

> The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of society into different interests and parties . . .

Beard's influential views were expressed in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (1915), *The Economic Basis of Politics* (1922) and later works. Beard interpreted party development in terms of group interests, attacking Bryce's idealist emphasis on political principles (e.g., centralism versus states' rights). He noted that parties were prone to switch rhetorical ideals when interest dictated.[20]

In addition to Beard, four other economic historians had their works reviewed in the *American Political Science Review* during this period, including Alvord, who likewise emphasized American politics as a reflection of factional interest apart from principle.[21] Finally, other related historical works not reviewed, such as Gustavus Myers's *The Great American Fortunes* (1910), achieved widespread popularity at this time and may therefore be presumed to have contributed to the intellectual climate of American political science when Harold Laski was presenting the pluralist critique of sovereignty to this audience.

At the core of the pluralist critique was the argument that the state was not sovereign as jurisprudential theory held, but rather that the state was one of many associations in society. Associations other than the state, such as the church, could be shown empirically to be sovereign over important matters in which the state could not in fact intervene, contrary to traditional theory about absolute sovereignty being vested in the state. The writings on pressure politics and economic history dovetailed nicely with pluralist theory, documenting the weakness of the state in exerting jurisdiction over economic interests.

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[16] S. E. Sparling, review of *The Struggle for Self-Government*, by Lincoln Steffens, *APSR*, 2 (November, 1908), 658–659.

[17] Henry Jones Ford, rev. of *The American Commonwealth*, by James Bryce, *APSR*, 5 (August, 1911), 476–477.

[18] Jesse Macy, "The Scientific Spirit in Politics," *APSR*, 11 (February, 1917), 1–11.

[19] Cited in Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 14–15.

[20] Charles Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* (New York: Vintage, 1957; orig. 1922), pp. 158–9.

[21] Clarence W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (Cleveland: Clark, 1917), vols. I and II.

The Rise and Fall of Classic Pluralism

Because of the intellectual currents just discussed, much of the pluralist critique of sovereignty was accepted implicitly even before Laski performed the pleasant task of rendering explicit an idea whose time had come. The pluralists portrayed the jurisprudential theorists as believing that absolutist state jurisdiction was both desirable and actual. This portrayal was an injustice, since the jurists devoted a large proportion of their attention to discussing the desirability of limited government and to the distinction between ideal and reality. Only by an unrepresentative selection from their works is it possible to portray them as advocating "a sort of mystic monism as the true path of thought."[22]

In contrast to this alleged monism, Laski presented the "pluralist theory of the state" as a more scientific view:[23]

> So I would urge that you must place your individual at the center of things. You must regard him as linked to a variety of associations to which his personality attracts him. You must on this view admit that the State is only one of the associations to which he happens to belong, and give it exactly that preeminence—and no more—to which on the particular occasion of conflict its possibly superior moral claim will entitle it. In my view, it does not attempt to take that preeminence by force; it wins it by consent. It proves to its members by what it performs that it possesses a claim inherently greater than, say, their church or trade union. It is no dry *a priori* justification which compels their allegiance, but the solidity of its moral achievement.

In reviewing Laski's work, Walter Shepard (later to become APSA president) called it "an important contribution" representing a "brilliant school of political writers" who were developing a "more satisfactory theory of the nature of the state."[24]

On the surface, pluralism was a devastating rebuttal of traditional theory. The jurists *did* claim the state was sovereign absolutely; partial sovereignty *was* considered a contradiction in terms. Yet, as Laski showed, the Hegelian concept of the omnicompetent state was abandoned in practice during nineteenth-century struggles over such matters as the independence of religious groups from state intervention.[25] Moreover, this conception of the state created a framework for interpretation of the increasingly important economic pressure groups which appeared at this time. Finally, and not least in Laski's own motivation, it provided a rationale for protecting the growth of trade unionism from the intervention of a generally conservative and unsympathetic state. Later, when progressive preferences emphasized the need for a liberal government to intervene in business affairs Laski adapted his views accordingly, abandoning the pluralist defense of group autonomy.

At a deeper level, however, the pluralist critique was premised on insufficiently examined assumptions about "absolutist" theories of sovereignty. In a relatively short space of time American political scientists recognized this and abandoned the theory, though in the process juristic political science suffered blows from which it never recovered.

The concept of "absolute sovereignty" put forward by nineteenth-century scholars was akin to what would later be called an "ideal type." It was neither a normative model nor a description. The normative theory of these scholars, not only American political scientists but also classic theorists such as Bodin and Hegel, led them to constitutionalism, not absolutism. Further distinction was made between constitutional theory and actual practice, though perhaps not to the degree scholars today would desire.

For Laski and the pluralists to say that "absolute sovereignty" was not an accurate description was to misconstrue the nature of jurisprudential theory. Moreover, what Laski presented as an accurate description was *itself* a normative model. In the passage excerpted above, for example, it is not a simple observation of fact to assert that the state gains the allegiance of and preeminence over its citizens by "consent" in a form of transaction in which it "proves" the superiority of its benefits, achievements, and performance as compared with other groups. This concept of government by uncoercive consent through the citizen's rational calculation of comparative group achievements is a sort of neo-utilitarian normative model, not an empirical description.

The normative model latent in classic pluralism suggests an important element in understanding the evolution of American political science. The jurisprudential approach had the potential for evolving the following paradigm: (1) to clarify the nature and utility of ideal types in political science; (2) to define more rigorously both alternative normative models of the state, and the role of groups within it; and (3) to compare the degree to which various social systems combined various degrees of fulfillment of the different models. Instead, after Laski, pluralism led into the search for the one accurate descriptive framework, to the obscuring of distinctions between norm and practice, and to the isolation of political theory from much of the rest of political science. The banner of empirical description was raised, frequently masking, as in Laski's case, an implicit and unexamined normative system.

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[22] Harold Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), excerpted in *Leviathan in Crisis*, ed. Walter R. Browne (New York: Viking, 1946), p. 113.

[23] Laski, *Studies*, in Browne, p. 120.

[24] Walter Shepard, rev. of *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, by Harold J. Laski, *APSR*, 11 (August, 1917), 582–583. The school to which Shepard alludes includes Figgis, Maitland, Duguit, von Gierke and others on whom Laski drew. Because of space limitations only Laski is considered here, because of his pre-eminence in interpreting pluralist theory to American political scientists.

[25] Cf. Harold Laski, "The Political Theory of the Disruption," *APSR*, 10 (August, 1916), 437–464. Laski frequently used church history for examples, generally as an analogue for the history of trade unions.

Laski Abandons Pluralism. The group theory of the classic pluralists provided a defense of associational autonomy. While pluralism was at first hailed by American political scientists as superior in its descriptive aspects, this quickly ceased to be the issue (not surprisingly, since the jurists refused to consider the pluralist description as antagonistic to their normative constructs) and debate turned to the implicit normative aspects of pluralism. Ironically, these prescriptive implications gave the controversy its depth and greatest theoretical significance.

In Laski's day, American political scientists were not generally oriented toward theories of group autonomy. Rather, they shared some version of the jurists' norm of the pre-eminence of the state over factions and groups within it, albeit constrained by vaguely defined rights of individuals and groups. In this they were in some ways closer to Bertrand Russell than to Laski, specifically Russell's emphasis on the danger of political power in the hands of undemocratic private groups.[26] The norms of scientific reform were not those of pluralism.

Thus, in reviewing Laski's subsequent work, *Authority in the Modern State* (1919), Walter Shepard posed the question, "How, it may be asked, are conflicts between opposing groups to be adjusted except upon the basis of the supreme will of the state? It is in affording an answer to this question that Mr. Laski is perhaps least convincing."[27] Not only did questions arise regarding the normative premises of pluralist group theory, but its description fell under attack as well. In an article on "The Pluralistic State" the following year, Ellen Deborah Ellis acknowledged that pluralism was "timely in that it calls attention to the present bewildering development of groups within the body politic, and to the fact that these groups are persistently demanding greater recognition in the governmental system." But then she added that pluralism as a description was inaccurate, applying only to a polity in "a very advanced state of disorganization."[28]

A sharper critique by Francis Coker appeared a year later. Coker noted that the limited status of government was beside the point: *everyone* agreed on that. To construe the theory of sovereignty as holding government to be unlimited was to misinterpret it.[29] Coker went on to find in pluralism the normative models underlying professional representation, administrative democracy, administrative syndicalism, distributivism, guild socialism, and syndicalism.[30]

The latent radical implications of pluralism had some influence in political science in the early 1920s. Group autonomy, if it were not to be the private tyranny forecast by Russell, had to be accompanied by democratization of hitherto autocratic organizations. Laski himself avoided commitment to this path, phrasing his advocacy of pluralism in more abstract terms which implied only some sort of functional democratic organization.[31] Traces of Laski's philosophy are discernible in work in this period on international law,[32] administrative democracy,[33] and guild socialism.[34] These traces of influence were few, however, compared with the general criticism of pluralism on both normative and descriptive grounds.

In this debate, George Sabine tried to stake out a middle ground, holding "The one clear lesson from these disputes is that both monism and pluralism are inescapable aspects of our world."[35] Monism was faulted for implying that conflict among groups was settled by law, while pluralism was criticised for implying such conflict was settled by negotiation, when in fact both processes occurred. "For my part, then," Sabine wrote, in 1923, "I must reserve the right to be a monist when I can and a pluralist when I must."[36] Yet this formulation clearly favored "monist" norms while finding both approaches inadequate in terms of empirical description..

The last major articles on pluralism to appear in the *American Political Science Review* (1907–

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[26] Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York: Century, 1917).

[27] Walter Shepard, rev. of *Authority in the Modern State*, by Harold Laski, *APSR*, 13 (August, 1919), 493.

[28] Ellen Deborah Ellis, "The Pluralistic State," *APSR*, 14 (August., 1920), 407.

[29] Francis Coker, "The Technique of the Pluralist State," *APSR*, 15 (May, 1921), 194–195.

[30] Coker, p. 197.

[31] Cf. Harold Laski, *The Foundations of Sovereignty* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921); Walter Shepard, rev. of *The Foundations of Sovereignty*, by H. Laski, *APSR*, 16 (February, 1922), 130–131.

[32] Baron S. A. Korff, "The Problem of Sovereignty," *APSR*, 17 (August, 1923), 404–414.

[33] Jennie McMullin Turner, "Democracy in Administration," *APSR*, 17 (May, 1923), 216–230.

[34] Niles Carpenter, *Guild Socialism: An Historical and Critical Analysis* (New York: Appleton, 1922).

[35] George Sabine, "Pluralism: A Point of View," *APSR*, 17 (February, 1923), 34.

[36] Sabine, 50.

1927) returned to Coker's linkage of pluralism to radicalism, criticizing both. Ellis, for example, noted the connection between pluralism and guild socialism, associating these ideas with discontented groups who naively seek the overthrow of the state as well as the government, not understanding the difference.[37] W. Y. Elliot also analyzed Laski's work in terms of its radical implications, concluding, "It is curious that Mr. Laski can arrive at a conclusion which strips the majesty from the law without seeing that he is rendering the very individuals helpless whom he set out to protect against the absolute sovereignty of the absorptive state."[38] With the growing anxiety over fascism and communism, Elliot returned to this theme in a later essay in 1925, castigating pluralism as "as appeal to that violence which M. Sorel has eulogized, whose only immediate issue is the reappearance of a sovereign equally despotic, whether he be blackshirted or red."[39]

By the time Elliot's second attack appeared, however, Laski himself had abandoned pluralism. In *A Grammar of Politics* (1925) Laski's focus had shifted away from the sovereignty of groups to the way groups exert "the thousand varying influences which go to shape the sovereign will."[40] Rather than advocate guild socialism, much less the revolutionary syndicalism implied by Elliot, Laski moved toward favoring government regulation of the private sector through representative councils made up of management, worker, consumer, and government delegates. The orders of these councils would require the approval of a central Ministry of Production and would be subject to the control of the parliament. In later years Laski moved increasingly toward a state planning solution to the problem of coordination of groups within the sovereign state, embracing "monist" concepts far more than most of his earlier critics.

Bentley and Descriptive Political Science

In the wake of the antiradical hysteria and intellectual disillusionment which followed World War I, the idealism of reformism and jurisprudence seemed out of place, even though their erstwhile challenger, pluralism, became discredited because of its flawed conception and, more important, its normative (radical) implications. In the prestige of science and the practicality of empirical description many saw a desirable new direction for the growth of political science.

The new concern for descriptive political science in the 1920s had roots in the comparison of practice with ideal in jurisprudence, in the practical concerns of the reformers, and in the empirical historical research of the economic historians and of the pluralists (e.g., the history of their church-state relations). Precedents could be found, for example in Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* (1885) and its attempt to de-emphasize law in order to focus on "realistic" analysis of "the most characteristic practical features of the federal system."[41]

Another forefather of descriptive science was Bentley's teacher, Albion Small. Like Beard and Laski, Small was an exacting historical scholar.[42] But where Wilson treated fragmentation in *government*,[43] Small focused on the social fragmentation of every large *society* made up of groups, each having particular ideas and feelings.[44]

Small's writings contain many of the central points of interest group theory: (1) society conceived as composed of a large number of groups; (2) no one of which can claim to represent the general will; hence, (3) the need for elections to determine a rough approximation of the collective volition; (4) determined by group forces at various stages of the political process; (5) in the context of a state characterized as a relatively neutral agency for determining and implementing collective decisions made through this process, which was seen as neutral in the sense of absence of elite or class domination.

Also prefiguring later interest-group theory was Small's contrast between normal group process and the debilitating effects of political protest outside conventionally accepted channels. Indicative is Small's treatment of labor strikes and other social movement forms under the heading of "The Pathology of Social Organs—Characteristics of Social Disease."[45] The "pathology" of labor strikes, for example, was contrasted with the "genuine reform" associated with "social amelioration," philanthropy, and specific efforts such as Civil Service reform. Small warned fellow sociologists not to become "social agitators" but to emulate the role of "scientific social reformer."[46] Although in later years Small abandoned group theory (which he had never labeled as such) in favor of a more elitist concept of America as "an aristocracy of political pull,"[47] this earlier orientation was quite similar to that of Macy and the political science reformists of the period before World War I.

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[37] Ellen Deborah Ellis, "Guild Socialism and Pluralism," *APSR*, 17 (December, 1923), 584.

[38] W. Y. Elliott, "The Pragmatic Politics of Mr. H. J. Laski," *APSR*, 18 (May, 1924), 259–260.

[39] W. Y. Elliott, "Sovereign State or Sovereign Group?," *APSR*, 19 (August, 1925), 499.

[40] Harold Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), p. 9.

[41] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971; orig. 1885), p. xv.

[42] Albion Small, *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Policy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1909).

[43] Wilson, 331–332, bk. 3, ch. 3.

[44] Albion Small and George Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York: American Book, 1894).

[45] Small and Vincent, bk. 4, ch. 4.

[46] Small and Vincent, pp. 74, 239.

A last set of writings originated in German scholarship, influencing Bentley directly. The American introduction to Ludwig Gumplowicz's *The Outlines of Sociology* (1899), written in behalf of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, described the work as "distinguished from all earlier sociological works by the character of the sociological unit upon which it is based, which is the group."[48] While this may seem unexceptional today its importance derived from two aspects of its historic context. First, group theory was a clear alternative to class analysis and its radical implications. (Gumplowicz himself incorporated major elements of class theory, but these aspects were largely ignored by his American interpreters.) Equally important, group theory was an attack on individualism in sociology. Individualism was tied both to concepts of free will, and to the reification of abstract "needs," "wills," and "feelings" as causal social "forces" difficult to define, much less observe. Either as free will or as social force, individualism seemed to frustrate the development of scientific sociology. In contrast, group theory seemed to hold the key. "The fate which befalls the individual in society," stated the introduction to Gumplowicz's volume, "is not the fate which he merits always, but it is necessarily that which his group makes inevitable."[49]

A second German scholar influencing Bentley was Rudolph von Jhering, whose work also emphasized the role of interest groups. Von Jhering argued that "Being interested in a purpose, or briefly, interest, is an indispensable condition for every action."[50] One finds in von Jhering's work a theory that (1) political change is based on social (not individual) action; (2) conditioned by individual interest; (3) grouped in associations; (4) the "social mechanics" of which determine what group theorists would today call homeostatic equilibrium.

Reasons for the Neglect of Bentley in His Own Time. Bentley was an early advocate of a descriptive political science based on a group conception of political life. He wrote:[51]

> We must deal with felt things, not with feelings, with intelligent life, not with idea ghosts. We must deal with felt facts and with thought facts, but not with feeling as reality or with thought as truth. We must find the only reality and the only truth in the proper functioning of the felt facts and the thought facts in the system to which they belong.

Statements such as "We must not deal with thought as truth" were out of touch with the mood of political science prior to World War I. The pluralist critique of juristic normative theory had not yet done its work, nor had postwar disillusion undermined the capacity of reformism to present itself as the heir to the mantle of science.

Arthur Bentley's *The Process of Government* (1908) was ignored by political scientists for some two decades before it achieved any significant recognition. Almost without exception discussion on groups in politics in the *American Political Science Review* omitted mention of Bentley until he was resurrected by modern group theorists nearly half a century later. Then, as in the 1967 edition of Bentley's work, he was praised for developing a theory of government as "a process in which interest groups are the players and protagonists. They are not individuals but groups; for the individual himself is but the product of group action and conditioning."[52]

At this point, the student of political science may well wonder what was exceptional about this viewpoint and why Bentley's contemporaries were not right in attaching to his work far less importance than was done in retrospect by contemporary group theorists. His view was unexceptional insofar as "group" was defined sweepingly as any relationship among two or more individuals, ranging from a family to a nation or a race. "Interest" was equated with "group."[53] At this basic level, Bentley's thesis was controversial only for those who wished to interpret political change in terms of the personalities of great individuals apart from their relation to family, race, class, ethnicity, religion, educational affiliation, or other "group" traits. Since virtually no one (and certainly not Albion Small, whom Bentley grossly misrepresented) defended such an extreme "great man" theory it is not surprising that political scientists of the day did not find this view controversial. Though the attack on individualism in sociology was then timely, it was not perceived as being important in a political science weighted toward institutionalism, not individualism.

The Nation found Bentley's work "critical rather than constructive," and Charles Beard, reviewing the volume for the *Political Science Quarterly*, also found the volume unoriginal in theory or argument.[54] Its tone was characterized in various reviews as "flippant," "impatient," and "unjudicial," and, as Beard noted, "unnecessarily rude to his predecessors."[55]

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[47] Albion Small, *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 285.

[48] Frederick W. Moore, intro. to *The Outline of Sociology* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899), by Ludwig Gumplowicz, p. 5.

[49] Moore, p. 6.

[50] Rudolf von Jhering, *Law as a Means to an End* (New York: Macmillan, 1913; orig. 1877), p. 40.

[51] Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government*, ed. Peter Odegard (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. orig. 1908), p. 172.

[52] Peter Odegard, intro. to Bentley, pp. xiii–xix.

[53] Bentley, p. 211.

The Process of Government did make two contributions in Beard's view: presenting an alternative to Marxist class analysis and going beyond formal descriptions of politics. While neither was sufficiently original to place the work in the mainstream of political science discussion at that time, its contemporary importance warrants a brief discussion of these two points.

In discussing the development of group theories of politics, Bentley wrote, "The starting-point for practical purposes is, of course, Karl Marx." In Marx, Bentley found "a very crude form of group interpretation."[56] Bentley considered the working class and what Marx termed the ruling class to be simply two more interest groups, ones which happened to find "unusually vehement verbal expression" in the mid-nineteenth century, thereby causing Marx to mistake them as the primary groups in the political process.[57]

Leaving aside Bentley's misinterpretation of Marx as holding all political conflict to be class conflict, one can see that the importance of this argument to later group theory lay in its view of working class and elite groups as simply other types of groups, not more deserving of discussion than families, farm organizations, racial groups, political parties, discussion societies, interest associations and other groups. Implicit is the image of government as "the steady appeasement of relatively small groups." In contrast, elite theorists have generally argued that business, for example, is a pre-eminent group whose institutional position cannot be placed in the same category with, say, voluntary associations for purposes of political analysis.

On the second point, that of going beyond formal description, Bentley's work was part of a long-standing trend away from institutionalism, preceded by Wilson and Bryce and followed by Beard and Laski. In Bentley's time this tendency was being accelerated by the work of the "muckrakers" on pressure politics. But where most political writers drew out the reform implications of this new literature on groups, Bentley ignored it. Thus it is hardly surprising that reform forces such as *The Nation* found *The Process of Government* "not constructive."

In his introduction to a reissue of Bentley's work, Peter Odegard expressed his failure to understand how Bentley could have neglected bringing the evidence of the "muckrakers" to bear on his theory of interest groups since they had already established the importance of such interests as Standard Oil and other trusts. Far from being surprising, however, this omission was a direct corollary of Bentley's rejection of prevailing definitions of the terms "interest" and "opinion."

Popular theories of governmental process emphasized the role of elites, using "interest" to refer to elite will and "opinion" to refer to popular will. This popular definition cast governmental process as interest group politics to be sure. Odegard was correct in this regard, but he neglected (as Bentley did not) that this usage cast interest groups as elite groups, viewing routine politics on important decisions to be elite conflict. Where the popular view emphasized public opinion and social reform movements as mediating instruments between the mass of active citizens and political elites, Bentley redefined "interest group" to comprehend both elite interest and public opinion blocs, social movements, the family, lobbies, etc. "Nothing turns on the distinction between interest and opinion," he misleadingly wrote.[58] Bentley's redefinition obscured important theoretical distinctions theretofore emphasized in political writing, serving its intended purpose of defining out of existence the elite theory premises of discussions of "interest groups" in that period. This obfuscation was another factor in Bentley's neglect.

Closely related were Bentley's attitudes toward social change. Where Bentley's foil, Albion Small, had linked "genuine change" to social crises, Bentley's mentor, von Jhering, had interpreted historical change in terms of laws of "social mechanics" operating through interest-based associations. The vagueness, self-contradiction, and changing views of all authors concerned warns against portraying this difference in emphasis as an unambiguous contrast, but that difference was nonetheless sufficient for Bentley to praise the "power" of von Jhering's thinking in contrast to the "confusion" of Small's thought on social psychology and social change.[59]

While Bentley was condemning research on psychological "soul stuff," the general trend in political science was in precisely the opposite direction, discovering the importance of the individual as interpreted by social psychology. In this regard, Graham Wallas's *Human Nature in Politics* (1909) was seminal. Between 1908 and 1928, twenty-five articles and book reviews on psychology and politics appeared in the *American Political Science Review*, including works by illustrious names such as Wallas, Merriam, Lasswell, MacIver, and Ellwood. Charles Merriam, in his review of "The Present State of the Study of Politics," emphasized the importance of psychological approaches and the influence of Albion Small, omitting mention of Gumplowicz, von Jhering, or Bentley.[60] Bentley's reference to psychological factors as "spooks" flew in the face of an important push toward interdisciplinary research in political science.

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[54] Rev. of *The Process of Government*, by Arthur Bentley, *The Nation*, 87 (July 30, 1908), 94; Charles Beard, rev. of *The Process of Government*, by Arthur Bentley, *Political Science Quarterly*, 23 (December, 1908), 739–741.

[55] In addition to above, see *Outlook*, 89 (May 30, 1908), 263.

[56] Bentley, p. 465.

[57] Bentley, pp. 465–467.

[58] Bentley, p. 244.

[59] Bentley, p. 56.

David Easton wrote that "Bentley stands as the watershed between the simple realism of Wilson and the more complex realism of the group approach."[61] It is difficult to see how, in turning away from the study of early social psychology or from a focus on political change in terms of periodic social crises and toward the equilibrium theory of German jurisprudence that Bentley was drawing closer thereby to "complex reality." Insofar as psychological factors, social movements and crises, and elite theory embody an important part of that "complex reality," Bentley was a force in the divergence between interest group theory and the study of collective behavior.

In itself, this evolution of group theory might not have been harmful to political science had it not become eventually the dominant political science approach to informal political processes. While undercurrents and exceptions could be cited, it is more indicative to note that within the structure of academia, courses on social movements, social change, and collective behavior fell to the departments of sociology and social psychology. It was adherents of these disciplines who developed the pertinent theories to the greatest depth. The "group" theory of politics came to focus in practice on normal lobbying processes, rarely treating social movements and crises. The period in which Bentley wrote was one of increasingly intense concern over labor, anarchist, socialist, and bolshevist movements, however, and Bentley's perspective was therefore not one whose time had come, to say the least.

Finally, the neglect of Bentley was also attributable to his position on public interest theories of the state. Bentley held that "we shall never find a group interest of the society as a whole . . . the society itself is nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it."[62] This attack on the idea of democracy as founded on what Rousseau called the general will set the stage for a redefinition of democracy. As Pateman has demonstrated lucidly, the redefinition of democracy by later group theorists gave prime importance to group processes rather than accountability to policy preferences of an electoral constituency.[63] Thus pluralist group conflict within electoral machinery and civil liberties became the defining characteristic of democracy. As Bachrach has noted, this emphasis stripped democratic theory of normative standards which might be used to judge the degree of attainment of democracy as an ideal construct.[64] Moreover, by reinterpreting democracy as a social relationship already fulfilled in normal group processes, scholars eventually came to relate democracy to the equilibriating processes of group conflict rather than to a conflict theory perspective emphasizing tensions between the state and elites on the one hand and democratic aspirations of various groups on the other.

Group Theory and Descriptive Political Science in the 1920s

Bentley's work cannot be characterized as being in advance of its time, ignored because of the shortsightedness of his contemporaries. This is so with regard to his attack on normative theory, his critique of the relevance of social psychology, his advocacy of a mechanistic equilibrium model, his discussion of the theory of public interest, and his obscuring of the issues raised in elite theory interpretations of the state.

Prior to Bentley's resurrection by modern group theorists, the only significant endorsement of his work in the pages of the *American Political Science Review* came from a sociologist, Harry Elmer Barnes, representing the quite different concerns of another discipline.[65] Moreover, Barnes's apparent enthusiasm for Bentley grew from his incorrect equation of Bentley's views on *governmental* process with Ratzenhofer's and Gumplowicz's views of *society* as a complex of competing interest groups over which the state imposed necessary restraint not deriving from the sum of conflicts among interests. Even with Barnes's high praise, Bentley remained largely ignored during this period.

Much later, Bentley was remembered less for his particular theories than for his general orientation toward the importance of groups and the methods of "empirical theory."[66] In terms of operationalization of definitions and measurement of critical variables, Bentley's work did not constitute a useful guide,[67] but political scientists such as Golembiewski have been prone to credit Bentley for his contribution to scientific orientations in political science.

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[60] Charles Merriam, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," *APSR*, 15 (May, 1921), 173–85.

[61] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 177.

[62] Bentley, 222.

[63] Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), esp. chaps. 1 and 2.

[64] Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

[65] Harry E. Barnes, "Some Contributions of Sociology to Modern Political Theory," *APSR*, 15 (November, 1921), 487–533.

[66] R. E. Dowling, "Pressure Group Theory: Its Methodological Range," *APSR*, 54 (December, 1960), 951; Robert Golembiewski, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes on Analysis and Development," *APSR*, 54 (December, 1960), 963.

Nonetheless, Bentley did not play a significant role in the development of a political science constructed around descriptive or empirical theory. Indeed, much of this credit must go to the nineteenth-century "institutionalists" such as Willoughby who spelled out the role of descriptive research in a comprehensive political science. There one finds a more sophisticated and certainly more influential view than Bentley's.

In the early years of the twentieth century, the felt need to focus empirically on groups was widely shared among American political scientists. Summarizing popular ideas on government, for example, Albert Hart noted that "more and more people tend to accept the theory that all government in America—national, state, municipal or local, springs from one source, the American people as a whole, who choose to exercise their power through a variety of organizations."[68] At the same time, a reform element felt that "individual interests without number have been built up" and "they have not been harnessed to a common cause."[69]

Given such concerns, these years were characterized by a search for the common, uniting interest. This humane orientation was sometimes coupled with a distaste for the concept of political "science," as in the writings of Woodrow Wilson:[70]

> I do not like the term political science. Human relationships, whether in the family or in the state, in the countinghouse or in the factory, are not in any proper sense the subject matter of science. . . . I prefer the term politics. . . . Know your people and you can lead them; study your people and you may know them. But study them, not as congeries of interests, but as a body of human souls, the least as significant as the greatest,—not as you would calculate forces, but as you would comprehend life.

Yet the reformers were very much advocates of empirical research, and Wilson himself is correctly cited by later group theorists as being among those who guided political science in the direction of realistic description of political process. Statements such as that quoted above are properly understood not as attacks on empiricism but as a call to link pragmatic study continually with normative concerns—a call which merely rephrased similar views of "institutionalists" such as Willoughby.

It was only with the disillusion following World War I that advocacy of a non-normative science of politics came to the fore and that the concepts prefiguring modern "value-free" empirical theory received their real development. Ironically from the point of view of those who emphasize Bentley, the push for descriptive science after World War I first became prominent in relation to the development of research on social psychology and public opinion. Later, its development was associated with such theorists as Michels, Catlin, Ellis, Munro, and Dickinson, and reflected in group studies by authors such as Herring, Odegard, and Rice.

James Mickel Williams's *Principles of Social Psychology* appeared in 1922 and was reviewed favorably for its emphasis on "the standpoint of the conflict of interests which shows itself in economic, political, professional, family, cultural and educational relations."[71] The following year, Horace Kallen's essay on "Political Science as Psychology" appeared in the *American Political Science Review*, criticizing radical pluralism and saying of behaviorist psychological analyses that "what is important is that they cannot formulate a variant conception of political society without at the same time grounding it upon a variant definition of human nature whose variant trait is established in the special group interest to be advanced, defended, and vindicated. So, then," Kallen asked, "if political science is not psychology, what is it?"[72]

In 1924, in reporting the results of a survey taken by a committee of the American Political Science Association, Charles Merriam noted that psychology seemed to hold "rich possibilities" for political analysis, writing, "As social psychology develops, the whole study will be correspondingly enriched by the addition of the analysis of groups, of group relations, and individual-group relations, and indeed the whole interlocking series of cycles in the complex social process."[73] Merriam linked this projection to an appeal to develop these promised new avenues of insight through empirical analysis, not through traditional theoretic consideration. Likewise, Ellwood's *The Psychol-*

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[67] Dowling, pp. 949–50; Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," *APSR*, 54 (December, 1960), 956.

[68] Albert B. Hart, "Growth of American Theories of Popular Government," *APSR*, 1 (August, 1907), 558.

[69] Woodrow Wilson, "The Law and the Facts," *APSR*, 5 (February, 1911), 5.

[70] Wilson, "The Law . . . ," pp. 10–11.

[71] Rev. of *Principles of Social Psychology*, by James M. Williams, *APSR*, 16 (November, 1922), 715.

[72] Horace M. Kallen, "Political Science as Psychology," *APSR*, 17 (May, 1923), 203.

[73] Charles Merriam, "The Significance of Psychology for the Study of Politics," *APSR*, 18 (August, 1924), 485–486.

ogy of Human Society (1925) presented a more detailed framework for the empirical study of "the origin, development, and structure of group life."[74] Works by Lasswell, Floyd Allport, and Sorokin added fuel to this perspective.[75]

Among the most important of the areas studied empirically was that of public opinion. Here was the empiricist's domain that corresponded to the focus of earlier theorists on the concept of the public interest or general will. Lippman's work on public opinion was most influential in spreading the newly discovered "facts" about the relative absence of rationally or intelligently held common opinion on most issues.[76] The role of imitation, suggestion, and emotions was also emphasized in Lowell's *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (1923). Bernays reported the rise of public relations as a new profession,[77] and Weeks's concerns in *The Control of the Social Mind* (1923) became generally accepted. Allport's empirical research on the convertibility and similarity of extremists further supported this orientation.[78]

This new wave of psychologically oriented empirical work on public opinion both reflected and reinforced the new pessimism about the common man, a view given further impetus by the rise of fascism in Italy. At one pole the new empiricism seemed to lead to the conclusion that political scientists must "face squarely the fact that the voice of the people is usually the voice of Satan."[79] At the other end of the spectrum were those, such as Eldridge, who sought to deal with the problem of "the phantom public" raised by Lippman through grand reform proposals for civic education.[80]

One of the outstanding political scientists of that day, George E. G. Catlin, looked toward psychological studies of opinion for a possible key to the scientific measurement of influence. "Politics," Catlin held, "must . . . be founded on the observation of some distinguishable political 'process' . . . and this, it may be tentatively suggested as a focus for convenient study, is to be detected in the recurrent situation of the relationship of wills in a fashion of control."[81] These behavior patterns were seen as " 'lines of conduct' of an individual or interest-group character, pursued in relation to other individuals or groups."[82] The scientific problem for political scientists was to find a measure of the strengths of opposing individual and group wills in any given case. After a quite modern critical discussion of the problems of measuring influence, Catlin indicated that his hope for quantification of political science lay along lines suggested by the psychological studies of opinion.[83]

By this point, Ellis could characterize political science as being "at the crossroads," turning away from law and jurisprudence toward descriptive science. In contrast to the traditional idea of "the sovereign state," the new concept of "the political state" was viewed as a scientific advance. "All that it (the concept of the political state) seeks to do," Ellis wrote," is to describe and account for political organization, leaving to the moralist the justification or otherwise of the use made of political power."[84]

When MacIver's *The Modern State* (1926) appeared, its reviewer, W. Y. Elliot, criticized it for failing to clarify that the state still retained ultimate sovereignty over the groups within it.[85] Traditionalists within political science perceived the growth of the movement for a purely descriptive science and condemned it roundly. W. W. Willoughby attacked Krabbe's *Modern Theory of the State* for its critique of the concept of sovereignty as resting on a confusion of ethical and descriptive studies of the state.[86] Sabine defended Krabbe against Willoughby, but in the process also emphasized the continuing need for normative theory.[87] Edwin Corwin pleaded that political science "must still retain its character as a 'normative,' a 'telic' science."[88] And in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Jesse Reeves defended political philosophy, holding that "each group has something to receive from the other."[89]

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[74] Charles Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society* (New York: Appleton, 1925).

[75] Harold Lasswell, "Two Forgotten Studies in Political Psychology," *APSR*, 19 (November, 1925), 707–717; Harold Lasswell, "The Study of the Ill as a Method of Research into Political Personalities," *APSR*, 23 (November, 1929), 996–1001; Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1924); Pitirim Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (New York: Lippincot, 1925).

[76] Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922); Walter Lippman, *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925).

[77] Edward Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923); Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928).

[78] Floyd Allport and D. A. Hartman, "Measurement and Motivation of Atypical Opinion in a Certain Group," *APSR*, 19 (November, 1925), 735–760.

[79] Rev. of *The Public Mind*, by Norman Angell, *APSR*, 21 (August, 1927), 695.

[80] Seba Eldridge, *The New Citizenship* (New York: Crowell, 1929). Civic education ideas are traced in G. David Garson, "Research on Policy Alternatives for America in the 1930's," *Political Inquiry*, 1 (Winter, 1973–4), 50–77. G. David Garson, "Citizenship as Ideology," *Maxwell Review*, 10 (Winter, 1973–4), 25–38.

[81] George Catlin, "The Delimitation and Mensurability of Political Phenomena," *APSR*, 21 (May, 1927), 257.

[82] Catlin, 255.

[83] Catlin, 262–268.

[84] Ellen Deborah Ellis, "Political Science at the Crossroads," *APSR*, 21 (November, 1927), 789–790.

[85] W. Y. Elliot, rev. of *The Modern State*, by R. M. MacIver, *APSR*, 21 (May, 1927), 432–434.

[86] W. W. Willoughby, "The Jurist Theories of Krabbe," *APSR*, 20 (August, 1926), 509–523.

[87] George H. Sabine, "Political Science and the Jurist Point of View," *APSR*, 22 (August, 1928), 553–575.

[88] Edwin S. Corwin, "The Democratic Dogma and

In spite of pleas for mutual tolerance on the part of men like Sabine and Reeves, the enthusiasm for descriptive science was pronounced and its practitioners were not inclined to relate their work to the more theoretical work on groups which had gone before. Citing the example of physics, Munro told his colleagues in a presidential address to the American Political Science Association that "our immediate goal, therefore, should be to release political science from the old metaphysical and juristic concepts upon which it has traditionally been based. . . . It is to the natural sciences that we may most profitably turn."[90] Similarly, in discussing how modern courses of introductory political science should be taught, Spencer warned against political scientists playing the role of reformer. Instead, he wrote, "It is the function of the political scientist to observe political phenomena and to tell what he sees."[91]

In illustration of the new descriptive approach and its relation to group theory, one may cite the brilliant work of John Dickinson. Dickinson used historical and anthropological evidence to argue that "conflict between interests is inevitable" and that order is not suppression of conflict; order is the readjustment of human relations in the course of conflict; order is a neverending process.[92] In this view, "Government, like the human will, is motivated by the very forces which it governs; its function is only to arrange them in a more orderly pattern."[93] Conflict is partially resolved through voluntary group agreements, but the inequities of unchecked application of this means alone is inadequate. Custom, therefore, plays a major role in social control, and the state is constrained by its own habits or culture. Custom and voluntarism resolve most conflicts, but authority backed up by force is held in reserve. Indeed, "an important element in the art of governing is to predict successfully whether such voluntary and natural adjustments will occur."[94]

Dickinson's work, based on theoretical inference from historical and anthropological data, presented an interpretation of politics revolving around group interests. It transcended Bentley's mechanistic model by emphasizing the role of culture and the use of authority as social control. Other important studies of a "modern," descriptive nature, focusing on groups, were Odegard's *Pressure Politics* (1928), Herring's *Group Representation Before Congress* (1929), and Rice's *Farmers and Workers in American Politics* (1924). Of these, Rice's study, with its emphasis on culture areas and psychological traits in analyzing group interests in legislation, was the most theoretically complex. As Zeigler has noted, Odegard's work was "essentially a descriptive study with little or no emphasis on theoretical problems," a characterization which applied to Herring's volume as well.[95]

In *The Science and Method of Politics*, George Catlin wrote that "politics, as a theoretical study, is concerned with the relations of men, in association and competition, submission and control, insofar as they seek, not the production and consumption of some article, but to have their way with their fellows."[96] Thus, with the rise of descriptive political science in the 1920s the study of politics came to be viewed as the study of influence and power, not the study of government and the state. The crucial distinction between the two lay in the abandonment of normative theory by the empirical students of group power.

This difference was not primarily one of institutional focus or even of emphasis on the importance of group interests in politics. Extra-institutional concerns such as the family and religion had been treated by the jurists. And few gave more importance to the role of groups in political life than the later generation of scientific reformers. To be sure, the increasing importance of organized economic groups was reflected in increasing attention to this phenomenon over the years by writers of all orientations, but the crucial shift was in the questions that were asked about these groups.

While a traditional "theory of politics" was obliged to wrestle with the question of how groups within a society ought to be coordinated, relating these models to historical origins, ethics, practice, and many other concerns, the new descriptive approach merely sought to establish what practice was. Where descriptive studies were extrapolated into a generalized description of political process, as in the work of John Dickinson, that model was so broad that virtually any normative model from monarchism to socialism could be contained within it. Since many polities in varying degrees fulfilled many different normative models of how groups ought to be coordi-

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the Future of Political Science," *APSR*, 23 (August, 1929), 591.

[89] Jesse S. Reeves, "Perspectives in Political Science, 1903–1928," *APSR*, 23 (February, 1929), 16.

[90] William Bennett Munro, "Physics and Politics: An Old Analogy Revised," *APSR*, 22 (February, 1928), 10.

[91] Richard Spencer, "Significance of a Functional Approach in the Introductory Course in Political Science," *APSR*, 22 (November, 1928), 961.

[92] John Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority," *APSR*, 23 (May and August, 1929), 299.

[93] Dickinson, 619.

[94] Dickinson, 625.

[95] Zeigler and Peak, 12.

[96] George Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1927), 210–211.

nated within the state (the "problem of order"), the search for a descriptive theory of politics in relation to interests and groups was reduced to a search for lowest common denominators, such as the universality of interest conflict or the universal relevance of custom and culture.

Of course, the descriptive orientation was inevitably violated by frequent implicit and sometimes explicit normative statements. Dickinson's work, for example, implied the desirability of the state's deferring to voluntary resolution of conflict and to custom in most matters, a model strikingly in contrast to that implied by advocates of social planning as this was developed in the decade which followed.[97] Lippman's work was deeply imbued with conservative principles. But more important than the reintroduction of relatively unexamined normative theories through the back door was the acquiescence of political science in the post–World War I mood and its shift from prescription to description. Its importance lies not only in the neglect of enduring issues and questions, but also in the theoretical setback which political science suffered by the artificial divorce of normative theory from empirical research on American politics.

Conclusion

The study of the origins of group theory is important because the shortcomings of the past recur in the present. The reasons that Bentley was ignored in his day, for example, are at the core of contemporary criticisms of group theory. For example, Rothman's critique of Truman's *The Governmental Process* emphasized the relative neglect of social movements, crises, and change and the rejection of Marxist analysis while reintroducing economic explanations standing in tension with a purely group explanation of politics, criticisms which would apply to Bentley as well as Truman.[98]

Similarly, R. E. Dowling wrote, "We can see in Truman, that is, over and above his observations about the place of groups and their pressures in the matter that comes to the political scientist, a faith in something called 'the group interpretation of politics.' This faith has had an influence on his political science which has been, if I am not mistaken, almost wholly evil."[99] Dowling observed that this appeared most clearly where Truman sought to defend interest-group theory from the charge that it "leaves something out." "He does not see that the *merit* of a 'group interpretation' of politics," Dowling wrote, "would, if it were worked out, be precisely that it does '*leave something out*'."[100] The concept of theory is lost by making "value-free" political science more "accurate" through including all considerations within it.

The purpose of theory is to simplify reality. That everything is related to everything else, and that groups are important in politics is a view which may be accurate, but it is not helpful in advancing the discipline. Bentley's mechanistic physics of group pressures was less accurate, but it was, like Marxism, a relatively strong construct. That it was not developed, like jurisprudential models, as a normative type among a set of types reflects the underlying drive in political science for the one correct theoretical framework, a drive which misunderstands the literally essential role of normative theory in social science methodology and leads to a literature which sustains a high level of generality through concentration on lowest common denominators. The effect has been less than intellectually satisfying to many, precipitating factions within the discipline which seek to reassert normative theory on methodological as well as moral grounds.

The history of political science, it was stated at the outset, has been one of gradual encroachment of ideas rather than the sequential building of scientific study upon scientific study. Jurisprudence fell to the "facts" marshalled by the pluralists and their counterparts in the 1920s not because the facts refuted their theories (the facts were largely irrelevant to the normative questions raised by the jurists), but because the new perspectives were in accordance with the more pessimistic mood and the hopes for science after World War I.

Reformism, perhaps because of its untheoretical articulation, was not so much rejected as ignored. While reformism had seemed earlier to be closely allied to science, after World War I it could be dismissed by Spencer as moralism in obvious conflict with the serious study of political phenomena. Pluralism itself fell, partly from its insecure foundations on a caricature of jurisprudence, but also from the equation of its normative implications with radicalism. With the emergence of descriptive science in the 1920s came an optimism about the vast possibilities for a science of politics now that the discipline had been freed from the fetters of metaphysics. But these possibilities went unrealized and were forgotten in the main, thereby enabling the discovery anew of "value-free" science after the next world war.

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[97] See Garson, "Research on Policy Alternatives . . ." for further discussion of social planning thought.

[98] Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," *APSR*, 54 (March, 1960), 24, 29. In a brief reply, Truman disclaimed followers who treated his work as a group theory of politics, stating the book's purpose was simply to "examine interest groups and their role," not develop a general model of politics. David Truman, "On the Invention of 'Systems'," *APSR*, 54 (June, 1960), 494–495.

[99] Dowling, p. 953.

[100] Dowling, 953.

The history of ideas inevitably conveys a greater sense of coherence and sequence than actually existed. The change is better categorized under the term "accretion" than that of "development." Development connotes either change by explicit choice, or growth in accordance with some inner telos. The change of political science was neither of these for the most part; rather the discipline spread in response to outside stimuli: the rise of economic groups, the tides of progressivism and disillusion, the birth and excitement of modern psychology, and many other factors.

This is not to deny that much may be found in the way of explicit analysis of this or that tenet or belief. But in the debates, the shift in basic premises and questions was all too often overlooked, and political science changed in accord with these unacknowledged premises. This change is not one of deterioration from a golden age of juristic political science. Much was genuine advance: increasing scope and depth of study in terms of subject matter, increasing sophistication of technique, increasing interdisciplinary borrowings from psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and other disciplines.

But the change in political science cannot be seen as simple advance; in the shifts in mood and predisposition, opportunities were lost as well—losses from which we are only now recovering. With the passing of jurisprudence, the normative debate over integration of ideal constructs of the state in relation to practice faded as a possibility. This stripped political science of carefully formulated norms by which to categorize practice, as Bachrach has shown, obscuring the critical role of ideal types in social science research.

With the turning away from reformism, not only was the discipline drained of much compassion and vision, but an implicitly dynamic focus on political change gave way to a static focus on describing political life as it existed. Though pluralism was rejected for logical reasons in part, its contribution to historical approaches to political science and its relevance to normative theory (even if from an ostensibly "descriptive" stance) tended to drop from sight with the rise of descriptive political science after World War I. This orientation too passed in turn, leaving for later political scientists the rediscovery of its contribution in scientific method, social psychology and socialization, political culture and custom, and group interest conceptions of political process.

Representatives of all orientations emphasized the role of group interests in politics in one manner or another. A group interest conception of the state, going back to Madison was a perennial problem for the jurists, especially with the consolidation of enormous economic interests toward the end of the nineteenth century. The jurists emphasized the importance of group interests in exacerbating the gap between practice and various normative models of the state. Like the social planners of the 1930s they were optimistic about the ability of the state to insulate itself from these interests and to control them autonomously when necessary.

The reformers' view of group interests was closely allied to this perspective, though often implying elitist rather than constitutionalist models of the state. The pluralists showed how the expanding center of private power posed a growing challenge to the pre-eminence of the state, reducing the state to merely one among many groups. The fact of developing private power eventually led Laski to Marxism and social planning, while other lines of influence may be traced toward advocacy of democratization of groups and guild socialism on the one hand, or to acceptance of the beneficial effects of competing private powers and laissez-faire on the other. It is more difficult to summarize the orientation of the empiricists toward groups in politics, but they shared a highly influential focus on the irrational nature of group identifications and the negative consequences of this for public opinion and democracy.

The cases for the pre-eminence of the state, for social planning, for liberal reform, for organizational democracy, for laissez-faire, or for resignation to the mixed blessings of group process may still be made. In fact, all these normatively premised perspectives are still advocated under new labels. And the actual operation of American politics displays in varying degrees the practice associated with each perspective. What has not yet come to the fore is the explicit comparison of normative models of the state and their integration with empirical study. Rather than adopt a systematically multifaceted orientation which incorporates the many strands of our discipline's past, most political scientists remain predisposed to select one or another orientation as "the most nearly correct framework."

Ethnic Voting and Political Change in South Africa*

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In the South African general election of 1970, a generation-long trend toward consolidation of power by the Afrikaner-dominated National Party was reversed as the Nationalists, while retaining a comfortable majority in Parliament, lost ground to the opposition United Party. Immediately prior to the election, the authors conducted an attitude survey among a sample of potential white voters in three representative constituencies in Cape Town. The purpose of this study was to test the cross-cultural validity of findings which have emerged from research on voting behavior conducted in the United States and to explore the way in which social-psychological factors affect voting behavior and political attitudes.

Theoretical and Historical Background

Studies of American presidential elections—particularly those conducted by Lazarsfeld and his co-workers and by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research[1]—have emphasized the nonideological, nondeliberative nature of the voting decision, along with the low level of political involvement and awareness of issues that characterizes a large portion of the electorate. This work shows, among other things, that party identification, shaped and maintained by primary group contacts, is the major determinant of electoral choice, and furthermore, that party identification can largely be predicted from knowledge of a voter's sociological background. Almond and Verba's[2] demonstration that "political culture" differs from one country to another, however, has raised questions about the cross-cultural applicability of these American findings, and a good deal of electoral research in other countries has resulted.

Cross-cultural research has pointed to a number of key dimensions along which political systems differ, and which in turn affect the nature and extent of party identification. Studies of European parliamentary systems, for example, have uncovered a variety of voting patterns, based on different combinations of ideological, class, and traditional-symbolic motivations.[3] In examining the social-psychological mechanisms underlying electoral behavior, one must obviously take into account an electorate's historical and cultural traditions, the nature of the system (whether presidential or parliamentary), the number and longevity of political parties contesting the election, and so on.

The Republic of South Africa is an interesting and useful subject for comparative political analysis, especially in view of the unique set of circumstances that have shaped its history and national existence.[4] From the unification of

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* For a more complete report of this study see Stanton Peele, "The Ethnic Basis of Voting Behavior in South Africa" (doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1973). Thanks are due to Daniel Katz and the other members of Dr. Peele's dissertation committee. The authors would like especially to thank Archie Brodsky for his invaluable help in the preparation of this manuscript. In addition, the authors would like to express their appreciation to John von Rynesveld, James Midgley, George Rabinowitz (and other graduate assistants in the political behavior bay at the Institute for Social Research), Laura Klem and Joyce Alexson for their help with various stages of this study. Financial and institutional support were provided by the Ford Foundation, the Research Division of the Harvard Business School, the University of Michigan, the University of Cape Town, and New York University.

[1] See: Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

[2] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).

[3] See: Angus Campbell and Henry Valen, "Party Identification in Norway and the United States," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 245–268; Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in *Ibid.*, pp. 269–291; David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971); Ole Borre and Daniel Katz, "Party Identification and Its Motivational Base in a Multiparty System: A Study of the Danish General Election of 1971," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 8 (October, 1973), 69–111.

[4] For historical background, see Leonard M. Thomp-

South Africa's four provinces into a British dominion in 1910, South African politics have been conditioned by two overriding facts: the need felt by the ruling white minority to protect itself against the black majority, and the continuing division of the white minority into two distinct ethnic groups—the Afrikaners, descended from the original Dutch and French Huguenot settlers of the 17th and 18th centuries, and the more heterogeneous English-speaking South Africans descended from British colonists of the 19th century and from later immigrants. Because the Afrikaners have always constituted a majority of the white population,[5] the country's leaders have all been Afrikaners, but not all have been such hard-line Afrikaner nationalists as the present leadership. Up to 1948, the government had for some years been in the hands of the United Party (UP), which was led by moderate Afrikaners who stressed cooperation between the two white groups. But in that year the National Party (NP or Nats), capitalizing on Afrikaner distaste for the UP's pro-British stand in World War II, gained control of Parliament with only 40 per cent of the popular vote. Subsequently, the NP increased its parliamentary majority and its share of the popular vote in each of four successive elections, the last of these occurring in 1966.

The party achieved these gains through its strength in rural Afrikaans areas (which are overrepresented in Parliament in comparison with urban, English-dominated districts) and by exploiting its role as the political voice of exclusive Afrikaner nationalism. As Afrikaners have moved into the cities and even some of the newer suburbs, the NP has been leaving fewer and fewer urban seats uncontested, in this way becoming a more truly national party. Against this thrust, the United Party has been unable to establish an ideological position distinct from that of the governing party. While opposing implementation of the specific Nat policy of *Apartheid* ("separate development"), the UP has been understandably unwilling to challenge the fundamental Nationalist principle of white supremacy (*baaskap*). As a result, the opposition party has not been able to reverse the tide of increasing Nationalist solidarity among Afrikaners. It has also been unable to prevent defections by some English-speaking voters to the party which was so successful in engendering national pride by, among other accomplishments, bringing about the establishment of a Republic in 1961.

When elections were called in 1970, the NP held 127 seats in the House of Assembly (which corresponds to the British House of Commons), as against 38 for the UP and 1 for the liberal, anti-*Apartheid* Progressive Party. In this election, which has been described in some detail by Henry Lever in *The South African Voter*,[6] the already overwhelming NP majority was expected to increase, although Nationalist leaders were worried by a challenge from the Herstigte Nasionale Partie (Purified National Party), a right-wing offshoot of the NP. Instead, the HNP failed to elect a single M.P., and the Nats lost 9 seats to the United Party. The Progressive Party improved its poll as well, coming close to electing a second M.P. in a liberal Cape Town constituency.

Lever's study (which also examines the 1966 election) is the first to apply American models of electoral behavior to South Africa. His data support the common wisdom that Afrikaners vote Nationalist while English-speaking South Africans vote UP. He also found that such variables as social class and education predict well the voting responses in two "marginal" constituencies in Johannesburg. These factors covary with ethnicity to such an extent, however, that they seem to account for little additional variance beyond that accounted for by ethnicity. Throughout the country, Afrikaners tend to be less well educated, of lower socioeconomic status, and more heavily concentrated in rural areas than English-speaking South Africans. Furthermore, Afrikaners almost always belong to one of the Dutch Reformed Churches, which are among the leading organs for the dissemination of National Party principles, while the English-speaking are generally (though not as invariably) Anglicans. Thus, in terms of the kinds of sociological dimensions that are used to predict voting response in America, the South African population divides along ethnic-subcultural lines, and the *independent* predictive value of all other sociological categories remains to be determined.

One focus of the present study, then, is on the determinants of party identification in South Africa. Who votes for which party, and why? Is the American demographic model for determining party identification applicable to South Africa, and, if so, are the relevant demographic categories

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son, *The Republic of South Africa* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); C. W. de Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Gwendolen M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948* (New York: Praeger, 1958); Leo Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[5] As of 1968, Afrikaans-speaking people made up 58 per cent (and Jews 4 per cent) of the 3,639,000 whites in South Africa—this against 1,912,000 Coloureds (racially mixed), 574,000 Asians (mostly Indians), and 13,042,000 black Africans of "Bantu" extraction. See Muriel Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa: 1968* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969).

[6] Henry Lever, *The South African Voter* (Cape Town: Juta, 1972).

the same? That is, do we find something comparable to the additive formula proposed in *The People's Choice*[7]—where a voter's social class, religion, and place of residence all contribute independently to his predisposition to vote one way or the other—or does the extreme ethnic polarization of the South African electorate dictate a more unidimensional representation of these sociological determinants? Beyond this, we want to explore the social-psychological meaning of party identification as a variable mediating between the voter's sociological characteristics and his voting decision. In this context, the peculiar intensity which the issue of ethnicity achieves for South Africans can be seen as an illustration of a more universal phenomenon which Borre and Katz[8] have begun to explore in the Danish context, i.e., the way party identification—and hence a vote—can be a statement about oneself, an expression of one's self-image, perceptions, and needs.

A second major focus of this study is on electoral change. The halt in National Party momentum may or may not represent a significant trend—perhaps an ideological shift away from the Nats, or else a transition from one-party emergent nationalism to stable two-party parliamentary democracy. Such trends can be demonstrated only by further elections, but the 1970 election seems worth examining for what it may reveal both about the prospects for South Africa's immediate political future and about the general process of electoral change.

American election studies have found that individuals who change their votes are less interested in and informed about political events than individuals who show a stable party preference. This avoidance of electoral politics is said to be characteristic of the "cross-pressured" voter, i.e., the voter whose inconsistent group memberships or social status positions cause him to be subjected to conflicting political pressures.[9] More recent studies, however, have challenged this formulation. Concentrating on socially mobile voters, who represent one important category of the cross-pressured, Barber[10] found levels of political interest among both the upwardly and downwardly mobile to be *intermediate* between the greater interest shown by people of high status and the lesser interest shown by people of low status. Barber's general contention is that mobile individuals have political attitudes and predispositions which lie between those of their status of origin and their current status group because new patterns of socialization are gradually coming to supplant their previous socialization.

In South Africa the issue of social mobility is at present a very real phenomenon among the politically decisive Afrikaans majority as Afrikaners move into administrative and entrepreneurial positions formerly monopolized by the English-speaking. The political significance of this movement lies in the fact that, as in the United States, political attitudes in South Africa can be observed to vary with socioeconomic status (SES). But, in contrast to the United States, higher-SES South Africans tend to be more liberal. One reason is that these people are usually English-speaking or Jewish (as well as urban). Another is that individuals who have more economic power and more information about the economy are in a better position to develop a sophisticated, internationalistic outlook. The question we are concerned with is whether Afrikaners who enter the more cosmopolitan world of business show a broadening of political perspective as well, and vote according to their economic interests (UP) rather than ethnic identification (NP).

Another group whose potential as a source of electoral change deserves close examination is the young, especially the college-educated young,[11] who elsewhere in the world have been a liberal or even a radical force. Their attitudes take on added weight in view of the American and British finding[12] that long-range shifts in party strength come about through the recruitment of new voters, not the conversion of an existing electorate. The emerging Afrikaner entrepreneur and the young seem to constitute jointly one of the only sources of possible political change in South Africa. Since some political commentators have assumed from the 1970 returns that these groups have already begun to shift to a more liberal stance, it is worth finding out how they, and other population segments, actually did intend to vote.

Procedure

A sample of 462 white[13] voters was interviewed during the two weeks preceding the parliamentary election held on April 22, 1970. The sample, stratified according to income, was selected from three election districts in the city of Cape Town. Within each district, respondents were chosen by a random procedure in which interviewers visited alternate flats or houses, starting from randomly selected intersections (and skipping corner houses), until six respondents per designated intersection had been found. At each house, an additional random procedure proposed by Kish[14] was employed to determine which occupant (among the eligible voters residing there) was to be interviewed. The refusal rate among the individuals selected was only 4.7 per cent—lower than the usual rate for American and European election studies.

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[7] Lazarsfeld et al., *The People's Choice*, pp. 25–27.

[8] Borre and Katz, "Party Identification and Its Motivational Base in a Multiparty System."

[9] Lazarsfeld et al., *The People's Choice*, p. 62; Berelson et al., *Voting*, pp. 283–284.

[10] James Alden Barber, Jr., *Social Mobility and Voting Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), pp. 165–168.

[11] Because of the country's racially based class system, South African whites have one of the highest per capita rates of university attendance in the world. As reported in Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations*, there are 68,549 university students out of a white population of 3,639,000.

[12] See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, and Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*.

[13] Only the white electorate participates in national parliamentary elections. Coloured (see Note 5) voters elect a majority of members of the essentially powerless Coloured Representative Council, as do Africans in the case of the equally ineffectual Bantu urban councils. As yet, those few "Bantustan" (African homelands) legislative assemblies which exist are made

The interview schedule, which was initially constructed in English, was translated into Afrikaans and checked by the double translation method. Interviewers were female undergraduate students at the University of Cape Town, where the junior author was a visiting lecturer. Selected for their bilingualism wherever possible (with native or at least fluent Afrikaans speakers used in heavily Afrikaans-speaking areas), interviewers were thoroughly trained in interview procedures through videotapes, training sessions, and detailed written briefings. Respondents were invited to choose whether they wanted the interview conducted in English or Afrikaans. Curiously, 102 of the 180 respondents who listed Afrikaans as their current language chose to answer questions in English. (All white South Africans must study both languages for their twelve years of public schooling.) They did this, presumably, either to make things easier for the interviewers (whom they saw as being predominantly English-speaking) or to gain their approval. In our analysis we will return to the implications of this choice for evaluating these respondents' answers to the political and attitudinal questions that formed the substance of the survey.

The survey instrument consisted mainly of closed-ended questions. Respondents were asked whether and how they intended to vote in the upcoming election, how many seats they wanted each party to hold in Parliament, how much they cared about the outcome of the election, and how they had voted in the previous (1966) election. In addition, they were asked questions designed to elicit their knowledge of political and demographic realities in South Africa, their sources of political information, their reasons for liking or disliking the various parties, their personal and family backgrounds (income, occupation and father's occupation, current and childhood language, religion, place of origin and parents' place of origin), their feelings of "closeness" toward different ethnic and racial groups in the country, including their own, and their perceptions of the various parties' ideological stances on a number of substantive political issues being debated at that time in South Africa. For the social distance questions, the "ladder" approach developed by Cantril[15] was used.

The three geographical districts surveyed were chosen so as to reflect the diverse composition of the national as well as the Cape Town electorate. Bishopscourt, falling within the constituency of Constantia, is an upper-class, English-speaking area in which the UP typically engages in a lopsided contest with the Progressives (Progs). Gardens, almost identical to the election district called Cape Town Gardens, is a heterogeneous middle-class area. As one of the older English and immigrant suburbs, it was once a solid UP constituency, but in recent years it has seen increasing penetration by upwardly mobile Afrikaners, and with them the National Party. Epping, part of the election district of Tygervallei, is a lower-class area containing many newly urbanized Afrikaans railroad workers living in mass-produced government housing projects. Along with rural Afrikaans districts, it is an example of the kind of constituency that returns the Nats to power in election after election.

The numbers of respondents allotted to each district were proportioned so as to match the socioeconomic breakdown of the voting population of Cape Town. Sampling was based on the 1960 census figures, since the 1970 figures had not yet been made public. The sample base was the total income-earning white male population of Cape Town, which we divided on an *a priori* basis into the following income and socioeconomic status categories: (1) above 5500 rands a year, (2) between 1600 and 5500 rands and (3) below 1600 rands. (One rand is equal to about $1.40, but cost-of-living differences make the correspondence between South African and American status groupings only an approximate one.) According to census statistics, 5 per cent of the sample base fell into the upper-class category, 51 per cent into the middle-class, and 44 per cent into the lower-class.

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up of a majority of appointees. For a study of the Coloured election held in 1970, see Stanley J. Morse and Stanton Peele, "'Coloured Power' or 'Coloured Bourgeoisie'? A Survey of Political Attitudes Among Coloureds in South Africa," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1974).

[14] Leslie Kish, "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection Within the Household," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 44 (September, 1949), 380–387.

[15] Hadley Cantril, "A Study of Aspirations," *Scientific American*, 208 (February, 1963), 41–45.

Table 1. Distribution of Sample by Constituency

Area	*N*	% of Total *N*	Modal Income Group
Bishopscourt	25	5.4	above R6000
Gardens	239	51.7	R3000–R5999
Epping	198	42.9	R1200–R1999

These percentages were then used as quotas for the three sampling areas.

The class breakdown of our final sample of 462 respondents closely parallels the percentage distribution of upper-, middle-, and lower-class voters in Cape Town. Table 1 shows that the desired percentage breakdown according to area was achieved. By listing the modal reported income range for each area (from the five income groups into which the total sample was eventually broken down for analytic purposes), the table also shows the accuracy of the class designations assigned the three areas, allowing for a general upgrading of income in South Africa over the last decade, especially for the working class. The sample also matched the Cape Town census on other important demographic characteristics, although the choice of Epping, an almost exclusively Afrikaans-speaking area, as our lower-class district caused the overall sample to contain a higher percentage of Afrikaans speakers than does the Cape Town population (39 per cent vs. 33 per cent). We welcomed this deviation, however, since we were more concerned with finding an area representative of the country as a whole (which is predominantly Afrikaans-speaking) than with sampling according to Cape Town's demography.

Since voting intention was to be our primary dependent variable, we compared this response as given by our three sample districts with the actual election returns. Here, too, the only problem arose in Epping. In Constantia, David Duncan Baxter of the UP won approximately two-thirds of the votes cast in a contest with a Prog opponent. Our Bishopscourt sample reported that 50 per cent intended to vote UP, 11 per cent Nat, and 39 per cent Prog. The difference (favoring the Progs as against the UP) is not very meaningful, since the small number of respondents our sample allotted to Bishopscourt made a sampling error unavoidable here. In addition, as one of the wealthiest, most exclusive sections of Constantia, Bishopscourt could be expected to be a Prog stronghold within that constituency. Gardens gave a much closer approximation of the actual vote, probably because it is more nearly coterminous with its electoral district, Cape Town Gardens. There the UP candidate, Henric Adolphe van Hoogstraten, received 58 per cent of the vote, as compared with the 61 per cent of Gardens respondents who indicated that they would vote UP.

In Epping, however, the prototypically Nationalist allegiance of the Tygervallei constituency meant that no election was held, since the Nat candidate went unopposed. Nonetheless, 55 per cent of the Epping sample reported that they intended to vote in the election; of these, 70 per cent said that they would vote Nat. Before inquiring into the lack of political awareness that produced these responses, we can review two checks on the validity of these intentions as actual indices of electoral sentiments. One is the remarkable consistency in the party preferred for national leadership (based on the number of seats respondents wanted each party to have in Parliament) by Epping respondents who did intend to vote and those who did not. In both cases, almost exactly two-thirds of respondents preferred the NP. The other was the equally strong similarity between the reported voting intention of Epping respondents (70 per cent for the NP) and the actual vote in Germiston, a similarly composed Afrikaans blue-collar district near Johannesburg (69 per cent for the NP). From these figures, we concluded that the intentions expressed by Epping "voters" offer an accurate projection of the electoral tendencies of a constituency whose disposition was all too well known to the parties which did not contest the election.

Since Epping residents who thought there would be an election were obviously misinformed, we hypothesized that Epping would show a reversal of the usual finding that people who do not intend to vote are less politically informed and involved than those who do. Table 2 lists the mean

Table 2. Level of Political Information by Constituency and by Intention to Vote

	Voting Intention	
Constituency	Intend to vote	Don't intend to vote
Bishopscourt and Gardens	3.2 (N=199)	3.8 (N=60)
Epping	4.1 (N=108)	3.6 (N=88)

F (constituency)* = 23.1, $p<.001$
F (interaction) = 23.6, $p<.001$
Cell entries are mean *errors* made on information index.

* In this and all other tables which employ analyses of variance, F ratios and levels of significance are given only for predictor variables (or factors) which are significant, and these are identified within parentheses.

general information scores[16] for respondents who did and did not intend to vote in Epping and in the other two districts. An analysis of variance does show a significant interaction effect (see Methodological Appendix for clarification of use of analysis of variance in this and other cases). That is, while those people who said they were not going to vote were *less* politically knowledgeable in the other areas, they were *more* so in Epping. There is also a significant main effect for area; i.e., Epping respondents were less well informed than those in Bishopscourt and Gardens (although the information scores for the entire sample are generally low, confirming the findings of other election studies).

The fact that a majority of the Epping electorate was unaware of the most elementary fact about the election—its nonexistence—led us to examine sources of political information for such voters. The interviewers asked respondents how much they had heard about the election from newspapers, radio, friends, family, people at work, ministers, and employers. One-way analyses of variance comparing Epping with the other two areas show that Epping respondents heard more about the election from their ministers ($F=6.2$, $df=1, 411$, $p<.05$), while those in Bishopscourt and Gardens obtained more information from the radio ($F=21.7$, $df=1, 441$, $p<.001$) and from newspapers ($F=13.9$, $df=1, 447$, $p<.001$). In addition, residents of these two districts read the newspaper with much greater frequency than did residents of Epping ($F=41.8$, $df=1, 446$, $p<.001$). These results emphasize the meaninglessness of an ideological campaign (even a campaign like that conducted by the HNP, which addressed itself to the prejudices of an Afrikaans constituency) in an area like Epping, where political information is disseminated primarily through the traditional Nat-controlled channel of the church.

Demographic Determinants of Respondent's Vote

Intended Vote. Our analysis is concerned first with the various demographic and sociological predictors of party vote, using the respondent's intended vote as the dependent variable. To begin with, age by itself makes no difference at all ($\chi^2=6.0$, $df=8$). Thus the widely hoped for movement of young voters from the Nats to the UP is not discernible in our data, although Prog support does increase in the younger age groups (up to 8 per cent of those under 25).[17] This does not, however, remove the possibility that age may be significant in conjunction with other variables, such as education. We will return to that question.

The next set of variables to be examined consists of measures of socioeconomic status. Starting with father's occupation, 34 per cent of the UP voters and 92 per cent of the Prog voters come from families in which the father held a white-collar or professional position, as compared with only 23 per cent of the Nat voters, the other 77 per cent of whom had fathers who worked as farmers, or blue-collar or unskilled workers ($\chi^2=28.8$, $df=8$, cont. coeff. $=.33$, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}}=.14$, $p<.001$). These distinctions among party supporters diminish somewhat when the respondent's own (or in the case of a housewife, her husband's) occupation is used in place of father's occupation ($\chi^2=20.6$, $df=8$, cont. coeff. $=.30$, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}}=.11$, $p<.01$). The statistical diminution from father's to own occupation is a reflection of the rapid rise of Afrikaners into the middle class.

Dividing respondents into groups according to their income and education and crossing these categories with intended vote responses does not produce strongly significant relationships. With income, we find no significant differences between UP and NP voters, although Prog voters place disproportionately into the highest category, and out of the lowest. With educational level, on the other hand, we obtain a chi-square value about as high as that obtained for father's occupation ($\chi^2=27.1$, $df=8$, cont. coeff. $=.30$, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}}=.10$, $p<.001$). Better-educated voters are somewhat more likely to vote for the UP than the NP. At the level of university attendance, we find 46 per cent of the Prog voters placing into this category as against 12 per cent of UP and 5 per cent of Nat voters.

The SES-vote relationships are summarized in Table 3, which is based on a combined SES index constructed from the component variables of occupation, education, and income. Average scores for the three measures (or two, if one question wasn't answered) were computed, and then assigned in equal numbers to the three categories so as to achieve an even distribution. The expected relationships appear unambiguously in the table, but the significance test results are disappointing.

SES, then, is only of moderate value as a predictor of voting behavior, and the relationships which do emerge from the data may well be a

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[16] This score consists of the number of *incorrect* responses to items which asked (1) the name of the respondent's current M.P., (2) the current M.P.'s party, (3) the name of the Nat candidate in respondent's constituency, (4) the total number of seats in Parliament (scored as correct if in the 150–180 range, the actual figure being 166), and (5) the total population of South Africa (scored as correct if in the 15,000,000–25,000,000 range, the actual figure being approximately 20,000,000). A score of 0 indicates all correct answers, a score of 5 all incorrect answers.

[17] The small number of Prog (and HNP) voters makes their impact on the overall statistics negligible, and the statistics regarding these parties should be regarded merely as providing a descriptive profile of their supporters.

Table 3. Voting Intention by SES Level

	Intended Vote		
SES	NP	UP	Prog
High	26%	41%	73%
Middle	40%	38%	27%
Low	34%	21%	0%
	100% (117)	100% (122)	100% (11)

$\chi^2 = 14.2$, $p < .01$
c.c. = .23, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}} = .11$

function of the covariance between SES and ethnicity. To explore this possibility, we must turn to other demographic variables which appear to offer a closer approximation to ethnicity. One such variable is the urban-rural dimension. While everyone in our sample now lives in an urban environment (Cape Town), respondents split decisively in their intended votes according to their having had a rural or urban birthplace, as shown in Table 4. In this table, the contingency coefficient and lambda are higher than those for any of the SES indicators. Religion, which ties in even more closely with ethnicity than does birthplace (since almost all Afrikaners are members of the Dutch Reformed Churches) shows an even stronger relationship to vote. DRC members are overwhelmingly Nats, while Anglicans, Catholics, and Jews are overwhelmingly UP partisans (with the Jews also giving the Progs heavy support), and non-Anglican Protestants show a slight UP preference ($\chi^2 = 92.7$, $df = 12$, cont. coeff. = .50, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}} = .39$, $p < .001$).

The importance of religious differences as a mirror, and possibly a determinant, of political differences suggests that the religiosity of a respondent may have something to do with his political preference. We would expect supporters of the more conservative (National) political party to attend church more frequently, especially since the staunchly Calvinist Dutch Reformed Churches demand a more total involvement of their members than do any other religious bodies in South Africa. In fact, Nat voters do attend church more frequently ($\chi^2 = 14.8$, $df = 60$, cont. coeff. = .23, $\text{lamda}_{\text{attendance}} = .16$, $p < .05$). These results characterize the Nat voter as a participant in what is more a cultural than a merely religious institution. As Thompson comments, all of the three branches of the DRC

> have been intimately associated with the rise and triumph of Afrikaner Nationalism and have always propagated the ideal of an exclusive Afrikaner nation with a divine mission. . . . Consequently, the typical Dutch Reformed Church congregation is as much a racial corporation as the Afrikaner family or school: a racial corporation with the special function of invoking the awe-inspiring rituals and sanctions of fundamental Calvinism in support of the separation of South African society into racial units.[18]

With this link between the Church, the Afrikaner ethos, and Nationalist politics, we should expect childhood language (as the closest approximation of ethnicity) to be the best predictor of voting behavior. Table 5 shows this to be the case. The lambda for childhood language is the highest we have yet found. More important, childhood language is a better predictor of vote than the respondent's *current* language (the lambda for current language predicting intended vote is .36). If we can tell better how a person is going to vote on the basis of his father's occupation rather than his own, and on the basis of the language he spoke in childhood rather than the language he speaks now, then it is his *ethnic background*, rather than his *current status in society*, that most strongly determines his party preference.

We have seen that we can use childhood language as a good approximation of ethnicity. In addition, we can improve it for this purpose by eliminating people who spoke foreign languages as children, and by assigning childhood bilinguals to either the Afrikaans or English-speaking category on the basis of which social distance questions they choose to answer (i.e., do they answer "How close do you feel to other Afrikaners?" or "How close do you feel to other English-speaking South Africans?"). With these adjustments in the predictor variable, the contingency coefficient rises to .48 and the lambda to .45. In addition, the lambda value for the vote predicting the social category (.48) is now higher than that for the social category predicting the vote—something that was not true of any of the other variables we tested. In other words, we are just as able to predict a person's ethnic background from the party he votes for as vice versa. These data enable us to

Table 4. Voting Intention by Rural-Urban Background

	Intended Vote			
Background	NP	UP	Prog	Total
Urban	34%	60%	6%	100% (152)
Rural	70%	29%	1%	100% (87)

$\chi^2 = 30.8$, $p < .001$
c.c. = .34, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}} = .29$

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[18] Thompson, *The Republic of South Africa*, p. 103.

term our revised predictor variable "ethnicity" rather than childhood language. (The resulting placement of the Jews and other non-British immigrants with the "English" accurately reflects these groups' identification with the English-speaking subculture.)

Intended Vote with Ethnicity Controlled. If other predictor variables achieve significance only because they are related to ethnicity, then the tables for these variables can be read as simply providing descriptive profiles of the supporters of each of the parties—e.g., that three-quarters of the Prog voters, but only one-quarter of the Nat voters, come from the highest socioeconomic class. By controlling for ethnicity and looking at the operation of other ostensible predictor variables *within* ethnic groups, we can test whether they have any independent impact on voting behavior, and we can also isolate some significant phenomena which occur only for one of the two ethnic groups.[19]

We can begin by returning to age, which proved insignificant as a predictor of vote over the entire sample. Since political change in South Africa must come from the Afrikaans majority, it is instructive to see whether the intended vote responses of younger Afrikaners reveal any disillusionment with the NP. Our data show no such trend. We get a different picture, however, when the effects of education are added to those of age. (Age itself is not related to income, and there is only a small negative relationship between age and education: $r = -.26$.) For Afrikaners under 35 years of age, the suggestive results in Table 6 point to a possible scenario for electoral change. It appears that the young Afrikaner is lured away from total commitment to the National Party when he has a chance to expand his outlook through formal education.

Table 5. Voting Intention by Childhood Language

Childhood Language	Intended Vote NP	 UP	 Prog	 Total
English	23%	68%	9%	100% (134)
Afrikaans	76%	24%	0%	100% (112)
Bilingual	32%	63%	5%	100% (19)
Other	47%	47%	6%	100% (19)

$\chi^2 = 73.0$, $p < .001$
c.c. = .45, $\text{lambda}_{\text{vote}} = .40$

Table 6. Voting Intentions of Afrikaners Under 35 Years Old by Educational Level

Educational Level	Intended Vote NP	 UP
Standard I–V	6% (2)	0% (0)
Standard VI, VII	28% (9)	18% (2)
Standard VIII, IX	41% (13)	27% (3)
Standard X	19% (6)	37% (4)
University	6% (2)	18% (2)
	100% (32)	100% (11)

c.c. = .28.

Without the age control, education alone does not produce significant results for the Afrikaner sample. The slight trend for the English ($\chi^2 = 16.1$, $df = 8$, cont. coeff. = .32, $p < .05$) is really distinct only for Prog supporters. The other SES measures (income, father's and respondent's occupation), with the ethnic control, are even less meaningful, as is evident from Table 7, which employs the combined SES index that was used for the overall sample in Table 3. Once respondents have been stratified according to ethnicity, further variations in their voting intentions cannot be explained by the independent operation of socioeconomic factors.

Nonetheless, one finding of consequence does emerge from these data. On all of the SES measures the contingency coefficients are considerably higher for the English than the Afrikaans subsample. This consistency is reflected in the overall contingency coefficients for Table 7. The same relationship holds for the influence of area. With ethnicity controlled, there is still a significant variation in the vote produced by constituency (Bishopscourt, Gardens, or Epping), but it is much stronger among the English-speaking than the Afrikaners (for English, $\chi^2 = 29.3$, $df = 4$, cont. coeff. = .40, $p < .001$; for Afrikaners, $\chi^2 = 3.8$, $df = 1$, cont. coeff. = .18, $p < .05$). The fact that both SES and area influence the English-speaking person's vote more than the Afrikaner's says

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[19] A statistical caveat: The very effectiveness of ethnicity as a predictor makes for small *N*'s in some cells of the controlled data. Only 33 of the 149 English respondents who answered the voting question said they would go Nat. And only 28 of the 117 Afrikaans *R*s who gave their intended vote reported that it would be for the UP. In the tables presented in this section, actual *N*'s will accompany percentages so that no mistakes about the extent and significance of a trend can occur. (For further comments, see also the Methodological Appendix.)

Table 7. Voting Intention by Ethnicity and SES Level

	Intended Vote (Afrikaners)		Intended Vote (English)		
SES	NP	UP	NP	UP	Prog
High	20%	25%	37%	45%	64%
	(17)	(7)	(10)	(38)	(7)
Middle	35%	39%	52%	39%	36%
	(29)	(11)	(14)	(33)	(4)
Low	45%	36%	11%	16%	0%
	(37)	(10)	(3)	(14)	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(83)	(28)	(27)	(85)	(11)

c.c. (Afrikaners) = .08
c.c. (English) = .18

something important about the flavor of South African politics. This is that ethnicity is more nearly an all-powerful force in determining voting behavior among the Afrikaners. It must be reiterated, though, that the difference between them and the English in this regard is only one of degree.

Applying the ethnic control to demographic predictor variables which are themselves closely associated with ethnicity, such as birthplace and religion, seems almost a futile gesture. Nevertheless, some findings are of interest. The urban-rural birthplace comparison is meaningless with the overwhelmingly urban-born English respondents, but for Afrikaners the results approach significance ($\chi^2 = 3.3$, $df = 1$, cont. coeff. = .18, $p < .10$). Four times as many rural-born Afrikaners vote for the NP as the UP, while the corresponding ratio for urban-born Afrikaners is only 2 to 1. This means that urbanization may lessen the Afrikaner resistance to voting UP, though it is probably safer to say merely that of those Afrikaners who turn to the UP, a disproportionate number were born in urban settings.

With religion, the few Afrikaans respondents who are Anglican or Catholic, and the few English respondents who are members of the Dutch Reformed Church, split evenly between the Nats and the UP. Affiliation with a church traditionally associated with the other ethnic group is clearly the kind of basic cultural change that brings with it political deviation as well. The numbers of respondents showing this ethnic-religious conflict, however, are too minuscule to be of either statistical or political significance.

A more substantial illustration of the phenomenon of the "ethnic mobility" implied by membership in an ethnically atypical church is provided by examining current language as a predictor of vote, controlling for ethnicity. Since our ethnicity variable is based primarily on childhood language, we are in effect comparing the political behavior of people who have changed their language since childhood with that of people who have not. Hardly anyone, of course, who speaks English as a primary language in childhood shifts later to Afrikaans, and political change among English-speaking South Africans does not occur by a process of ethnic assimilation. Rather, an Englishman's voting for the Nats is probably a more purely political gesture. The winds of cultural assimilation in South Africa blow almost always in the direction of Afrikaners assimilating themselves to English culture. And Table 8 shows that a majority of Afrikaans respondents who now speak English also vote for the UP. This is far and away the most significant table produced with the control for Afrikaans ethnicity. Unlike more superficial, external measures of sociological change, the current-language variable (the wording of the question was "What language do you speak at home now?") does locate the Afrikaner who has, to some extent, internalized the press of the surrounding English culture, the Afrikaner whom we might label as "conflicted."[20]

The importance of linguistic self-identification as an index of ethnic self-identification recalls the fact that a majority of respondents who listed Afrikaans as their current language still carried out their interview in English. Since 31 per cent of Afrikaans-speaking respondents who answered in English, as against only 8 per cent of those answering in Afrikaans, indicated an intention to vote for the UP ($\chi^2 = 6.7$, $df = 1$, cont. coeff. = .26, $p < .01$), we might ask whether these respondents were tailoring their actual answers to questions, along with their choice of language for the interview, to suit the English interviewers. That is,

Table 8. Voting Intention of Afrikaans Respondents by Current Language

	Intended Vote		
Current Language	NP	UP	Total
English	46%	54%	100%
	(6)	(7)	(13)
Bilingual	79%	21%	100%
	(11)	(3)	(14)
Afrikaans	81%	19%	100%
	(72)	(17)	(89)

$\chi^2 = 10.8$, $p < .01$, c.c. = .29.

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[20] Many writers have attributed great psychological and political significance to a shift in home language for the Afrikaner. Cf. Edwin S. Munger, *Afrikaner and African Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

were their responses shaped by "interviewer effect"?[21]

We have two reasons for thinking that this was not the case. One is the close correspondence, reported earlier, between the intended vote responses and the actual election results in the same districts. The second is that Afrikaans-speaking respondents who answered in English were significantly younger, better educated, more urbanized, wealthier, and therefore presumably less purely malleable, than those who did not (using the summary SES index, $\chi^2 = 29.2$, $df = 2$, $p < .001$). These are Afrikaners who would be susceptible to the immediate influence of an English interviewer only because of their larger involvement with English culture, and the overall psychological pressures leading them to act like the English, as by actually voting UP.

Conflicted Voters—the Ambiguous Afrikaner. To delve more deeply into the motivational and behavioral makeup of the conflicted Afrikaner, we performed a median split on Afrikaans respondents according to their answers to the question, "How close do you feel to English-speaking South Africans?" Our prediction was that those who felt closer to the English would be better prepared psychologically to support the UP. Disappointed at the insignificant results, which involved a large number of cases with no response to the closeness question, we found that many Afrikaans respondents who had not answered this question had answered the questions, "How close do you feel to *other* English-speaking South Africans?" and "How close do you feel to Afrikaners?" rather than "How close do you feel to other Afrikaners?" and to "English-speaking South Africans?" as we had intended. In other words, we had uncovered a group of respondents who regarded themselves as English even though our best objective ethnic indicator placed them in the Afrikaans category.

We have labeled these respondents "ambiguous Afrikaners." For this group, a small majority of whom support the UP, subjective ethnic label is slightly better than objective label in predicting to vote—which is what the authors of *The People's Choice*[22] found for subjective versus objective SES measures in America. Table 9 shows that Afrikaans respondents who identify themselves as English are far more likely to vote for the UP than those with a consistent (Afrikaans) objective and self-identification. That ethnic self-identification is a more successful predictor than current language is not surprising, since it more directly embodies the social-psychological process which is involved in a change of language. The nearly even UP-NP split among ambiguous Afrikaners shows, however, that we still cannot specify which voters of Afrikaans extraction will desert to the UP. And there is no immediately obvious way to subdivide the ambiguous Afrikaner category so as to achieve this prediction, since the NP and UP voters within this group show similar distributions on such key dimensions as current language and feeling of closeness to Afrikaners. Furthermore, we cannot decisively distinguish the group as a whole from other Afrikaners on such dimensions as SES (where they are almost evenly spread among the three categories), religion (three-quarters still belong to the DRC), or language (less than half use English exclusively). It is particularly worthy of note that the ambiguous Afrikaners' self-identification as English refers to something deeper than current language usage. We will return to these questions when we analyze the data on respondents' political and social attitudes. But it should be apparent that the mere existence of this group of Afrikaners who give up their ethnic identity,[23] together with its size (numbering 43 out of 210 Afrikaans respondents in our study), looms as a social fact of major importance for South Africa.

Table 9. Voting Intention of Afrikaans Respondents by Ethnic Self-Identification

Subjective Ethnic Placement	Intended Vote NP	 UP	 Total
Afrikaans	85% (76)	15% (13)	100% (89)
English	44% (12)	56% (15)	100% (27)

$\chi^2 = 17.3$, $p < .001$, c.c. = .36

Ambiguous Afrikaners are one focus of the cross-pressures hypothesis as applied to South Africa. Along with them, we can look at voters who actually express ethnically atypical choices (Afrikaans UP supporters and English NP supporters), and those who appear to be in a sociologically "conflicted" position (especially urban or high-SES Afrikaners), for signs of cross-pressure conflict. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to examine some of the usual signs of such conflict. Abstention from voting, for example, is ruled out as an indicator by the altered significance of the nonvoting response in Epping. As for partisan instability, only 21 English-speaking respondents and 9 Afrikaners reported that they would vote differently from the way they had in 1966. These *N*'s are too small to work with statistically, but there was a trend for greater electoral change to take place among the English, and (as the cross-pressures hypothesis would predict) among voters of both ethnic groups who broke away from ethnically determined voting. Changers do not appear differentially by SES within either ethnic category, which again suggests that social mobility, as it is usually defined, is not operating to cause political change in South Africa.

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[21] Daniel Katz, "Social Psychology and Group Process," in *Annual Review of Psychology*, ed. C. P. Stone (Stanford, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1951).

[22] Lazarsfeld et al., *The People's Choice*.

[23] Afrikaans sociology characterizes such individuals as having the same self-hate that some blacks in the United States and Jews in Europe are said to exhibit. S. Pauw, in *Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad* (Stellenbosch: Pro Ecclesia, 1946), speaks of the "spiritual slavery" which Anglicization meant for Afrikaners who sought admission to the English economic, cultural, and educational elites.

On the whole, our results do not provide much substantiation of the cross-pressures hypothesis. Out of a number of possible tests measuring information avoidance and reduced interest in the election, only a few yield significant results, and these at low levels of significance. Within the English sample there is no evidence whatever of cross-pressure conflict, which is just what we would expect from the less highly charged cultural implications of deviant voting among the English-speaking. Even among Afrikaners there is no overall pattern of information avoidance in high-SES or UP-supporting respondents, although there are a few significant instances of avoidance of information from particular sources. Afrikaans UP supporters get somewhat less information from the family than NP supporters do ($F=3.6$, $df=1$, 114, $p<.10$), which is revealing since party supporters over the entire sample do not differ on this dimension. That nonconforming Afrikaners rely less on the family for political information is consistent with the Lazarsfeld-Berelson emphasis on family disagreement as an important manifestation of cross pressures.

A finding of even stronger significance is that Afrikaans Nat voters care more about the election than do UP voters ($F=6.3$, $df=1$, 114, $p<.05$). Again, this finding does not hold for the two parties' supporters in the overall sample. Finally, urban-born Afrikaners are significantly less concerned about the outcome of the election than the English urban-born ($F=5.0$, $df=1$, 199, $p<.05$). Since Afrikaners as a whole are slightly *more* concerned about the election than the English are, this could be a sign of psychological withdrawal because of cross-pressure conflict. These are the strongest indications we have of such conflict, and by themselves they are not conclusive.

Party Preferred. The respondents' party preference at the national, parliamentary level can be used to supplement voting intention as a dependent variable. Information on this variable was obtained by asking respondents, "How many seats would you like the ________ Party to have in Parliament?" the question being repeated for each party. Responses to this series of questions yield two different measures of party preference—which party the respondent wants to see gain the most seats, and the strength or degree of his preference as indicated by the percentage of seats he assigns to each party.

Because the anomalous character of the intended vote response in Epping does not carry over to party preferred, and because abstainers in every district usually had an opinion about which party they wanted to control Parliament, a much larger percentage of respondents could be coded on this measure than on intended vote. Also, the interval data generated by the desired percentage breakdowns make it possible to use correlations to gauge the strength of party allegiances and to relate attitudes and perceptions to party preference. Beyond these methodological advantages, party preferred has distinct substantive implications. In a parliamentary system such as South Africa's, the voter does not express his preference directly for national leaders. By presenting the respondent with the hypothetical issue of control of the national government, the party preferred question can tap a range of feelings and beliefs which go unexpressed under the constraints of a concrete (and limited) electoral choice in a particular constituency. Such attitudes may include inchoate discontents and desires for change that are submerged under the reality of National Party dominance.

An observer might well suppose that the party preferred dimension would show cracks forming in the Nationalist façade. But the results of comparing the actual vote and preferred party responses, as shown in Table 10, suggest just the opposite. Of course, the increased Nat total derives at least in part from the full representation of Epping voters (45 per cent of whom abstained from giving an intended vote response) on this question. And the larger vote for the minor parties (especially the Progs) is a natural consequence of the fact that potential supporters living in districts where these parties do not run candidates, or do not stand a chance of winning, can only indicate their support in some hypothetical form. But it still appears that the UP, the official opposition party, does not benefit from a shift from the real to the hypothetical plane.

The significance of these figures is made more apparent by Table 11, which shows how those intending to vote for each party stand in terms of their preference for which party they would like to control Parliament. Twenty-nine per cent of the UP voters defect on the latter question, as

Table 10. Comparison of Intended and Preferred Voting Profiles for Overall Sample

	NP	UP	Prog	HNP	Total
Intended Vote	46%	49%	5%	0%	100%
	(134)	(142)	(13)	(1)	(290)
Preferred Vote	52%	34%	13%	1%	100%
	(203)	(135)	(50)	(3)	(391)

against 16 per cent of the Nats and only 8 per cent of the Progs. Owing to the infusion of Epping respondents, a majority of the nonvoters is now seen actually to prefer the Nats, but it is the Progs whose potential support comes in greatest proportion from nonvoters, as well as from those voting for other parties. It is not surprising that the highly sophisticated, nonconformist Prog voters are the most resolute in backing their votes with an expressed preference for their party. But what is truly informative here is the confirmation of Lever's[24] finding that UP voters are less firm supporters of their party than Nat voters. It seems that many people vote for the UP without any real desire that it overthrow the Nationalist regime, while others fall back on the UP as a substitute for their real choice, the Progressive Party.

It is most meaningful to compare actual versus preferred NP and UP support in Gardens, the one district included in our survey in which both parties ran candidates in a reasonably close contest. Here again, as shown in Table 12, the UP loses more of its voters on the party preferred question than do the other two parties. More strikingly, twice as many abstainers prefer the Nats as prefer the UP, so that this ratio in the overall sample is not merely a function of the Epping effect.

Table 11. Preferences for Control of Parliament by Voting Intention

Intended Vote	Party Preferred NP	UP	Prog	HNP	Total
NP	84%	10%	4%	2%	100% (116)
UP	18%	71%	11%	0%	100% (123)
Prog	8%	0%	92%	0%	100% (13)
No Vote	58%	26%	15%	1%	100% (139)

Row entries indicate expressed national preferences of respondents intending to vote for a given party.

Table 12. Preferences for Control of Parliament by Voting Intention in Gardens

Intended Vote	Party Preferred NP	UP	Prog	Total
NP	84%	14%	2%	100% (56)
UP	18%	69%	13%	100% (91)
Prog	0%	0%	100%	100% (5)
No Vote	50%	26%	24%	100% (50)

$\chi^2 = 8.8$, $p < .01$.

When these data are examined from the other direction (that is, percentaging by column), a chi-square test shows that respondents who preferred the Nats were significantly less likely to vote for the Nats than those who preferred the UP were to vote for the UP (combining appropriate rows, $\chi^2 = 8.8$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$). In particular, many people who regard themselves as Nat supporters apparently did not vote at all in this election. Lever[25] hypothesizes that these abstentions were precipitated by the HNP campaign, which created in some right-wing Nats a conflict between their historical allegiance to the NP and their agreement with the HNP platform. This seems implausible on several grounds. One is that the abstentions significantly affected the election results in relatively liberal NP-UP swing districts, such as Gardens, where the HNP did not run candidates. In addition, our data show that a majority of the Nat-preferring abstainers in Gardens were English-speaking people for whom the HNP would have no appeal, but who were passively expressing an acceptance of Nat rule while being unable to bring themselves to vote for this traditionally Afrikaans party. Finally, the abstentions are tied up with the related phenomenon of self-proclaimed Nat supporters voting for the UP or the Progs—a kind of disaffection which could be interpreted as being liberal or possibly nonideological, but not reactionary. We can conclude that the Nat-preferring abstainers represent two phenomena—a disillusionment of traditional Nat voters, and a reversion to the UP by those converted in previous elections. On the other hand, many of these people could be counted on to return to the Nats if the party were under any real electoral pressure.

With the interval data of percentage distributions of desired seats for the various parties, we move further into the realm of hypothetical party preferences. Comparing the percentage of seats

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[24] Lever, *The South African Voter.*

[25] *Ibid.*

Table 13. Correlations Between Percentage of Seats Desired for Each Party by Ethnicity

	(Afrikaans Respondents)					(English Respondents)			
	NP	UP	Prog	HNP		NP	UP	Prog	HNP
NP					NP				
UP	−.77				UP	−.65			
Prog	−.51	−.02			Prog	−.43	−.35		
HNP	−.43	−.18	.50		HNP	−.03	−.15	−.05	

Correlations reported here are Pearson product moment correlations; *N*s are all around 400, so that any $r>.10$ is highly significant.

the voters for each party want to see their *own* party capture in Parliament, we find that Nat voters want the NP to gain more seats than UP voters want the UP to have (66 per cent versus 57 per cent, $p<.01$). This supports our previous finding that Nat voters are stronger in their party loyalty. Table 13 gives the results of a correlational analysis of the relationships between percentages of seats desired for each of the parties by respondents in the two major ethnic categories. The highest correlation for both ethnic groups is the predictable negative one between Nat and UP seats desired. The negative correlation between the UP and the Progs for the English only, and between the Nats and the HNP for the Afrikaners only, can be explained by the fact that Afrikaners for the most part choose within the HNP-Nat-UP range, the English within the Nat-UP-Prog range. Thus the Prog-UP choice is meaningful only for the English, the Nat-HNP choice only for the Afrikaners. The strong positive correlation between the Progs and HNP for Afrikaners makes no sense ideologically, but turns out to reflect an underlying trend for high-SES Afrikaners to desire fewer seats for both the Progs and the HNP than do low-SES Afrikaners. We will have more to say about this paradox in the following section on political attitudes, though we can note here that support for the HNP is almost entirely a lower-class phenomenon, cutting across ethnic boundaries to some extent. The negative relationship between SES and HNP seats desired is highly significant for both English ($F=12.1$, $df=2$, 139, $p<.01$) and Afrikaners ($F=5.3$, $df=2$, 176, $p<.01$).

Attitudes and Perceptions

The previous section of this paper was concerned with a behavioral question—who votes for which party? Data on the political attitudes and perceptions of our respondents can in some cases help explain the voting behavior we have observed, and in other cases show evidence of beliefs and perceptions which are *not* expressed behaviorally.

Party Perceptions, Party Vote and Political Ideology. To examine the political attitudes of respondents supporting each party, and perceptions of the political stance taken by each party, respondents were presented with fifteen 6-point Likert-type attitude statements dealing with topics of current political concern in the country such as "A great deal of money should be spent to develop the Bantu homelands" and "Blacks should only be allowed in White areas to work." (For the remaining items see the Methodological Appendix.) To construct a measure of political liberalism, those items which seemed on an *a priori* basis to fall unambiguously along a liberal-conservative continuum were coded so that a high score always indicated a more liberal position. Mean scores over all these statements were then computed for respondents' own positions on the issues and the positions they attributed to each political party.

As Table 14 shows, our respondents as a whole perceived the parties to lie on our liberalism scale in their commonly assumed order of liberalism. This is so despite the fact that the UP, with its amorphous and ideologically inconsistent policies, is not necessarily more liberal than the Nats in reality. It is quite likely that the UP's perceived liberal position vis-à-vis the Nats is a symbolic one, based on the UP's role as the opposition to an admittedly conservative ruling party. Table 14 also suggests one reason for the failure of the HNP's campaign—the electorate's inability to distinguish the HNP's ideological stance from that of the Nats. In general, the orderly arrangement of the parties on this scale helps validate our

Table 14. Mean Perceptions of Party Liberalism for Overall Sample

HNP	NP	UP	Prog
2.7	2.8	3.7	4.2

The higher the number, the more liberal the response.

attitudinal measures. Thus the mean self-attitude score of 3.5 (hardly more conservative than the perceived UP position, and about as close to the Progs on the left as to the Nats on the right) can be given some credence as an indication that the South African electorate, at least in the Cape, is more liberal than the party it helps maintain in power. Less liberal regions might show less of a discrepancy, but the ability of Cape voters to tolerate the discrepancy only illustrates the South African's readiness to vote on other than ideological grounds.

The mean attitude scores by party vote show that this discrepancy extends across the board, with supporters of each party in the Cape being somewhat more liberal than the total sample's perception of that party. (The mean self-attitude liberalism scores for Nat voters is 3.1, for UP voters 3.8, and for Progs 4.8, $p<.001$.) The discrepancy is larger for Nat supporters than for UP supporters ($p<.05$). Supporters of all three parties, however, resolve this discrepancy by perceiving their own party to be more liberal, and thus closer to their own position, than does the total sample. For example, supporters of the NP give that party a score of 3.0, as compared with the total sample's judgment that the party stands at 2.8. At the same time, respondents bring *all* parties closer to their own position, with Nat voters, for example, seeing the Progs as being *less* liberal than any other group does. Nat voters give the most conservative ratings to all parties *except* their own (thereby drastically minimizing the differences between their party and the others), and Prog voters give the most liberal ratings to all parties *including* their own. Perceptual distortion thus takes the form of a general liberal bias together with a standard assimilation effect.

Having found that party supporters differ ideologically in a direction consistent with the conventional images of the parties, we can note that attitudes follow along ethnic lines in a predictable way as well. The mean liberalism score for English-speaking people is 3.9; for Afrikaners, 3.1 ($p<.001$). But which is the better predictor of attitudes—ethnicity or party vote? Table 15 shows the relationship between party vote and political attitudes within each ethnic group. As the F ratios show, *ethnicity* is a more powerful predictor of attitudes than is party vote. This indirectly reaffirms that for the bulk of the electorate, ethnicity has more to do with party choice than do attitudes (see Methodological Appendix).

Table 15. Self-Attitude Scores by Ethnicity and Voting Intention

Intended Vote	Attitude Scores (Afrikaners)	Attitude Scores (English)
NP	3.0 (82)	3.2 (30)
UP	3.4 (24)	3.9 (95)
Prog		4.6 (13)

Two-way analysis of variance
F (ethnicity) = 60.3, $p<.001$
F (intended vote) = 17.9, $p<.001$
One-way analysis of variance (within ethnic groups)
F (Afrikaners) = 5.3, $p<.05$
F (English) = 14.1, $p<.001$

For the ethnically nonconformist minority of voters (e.g., Afrikaans UP supporters), however, Table 15 shows that the behavioral divergence is associated with a corresponding *attitudinal* divergence from the ethnic mean. This finding is reinforced by a correlational analysis relating political attitudes to percentage of seats desired for each party. The expected correlations (i.e., positive correlations between liberalism and UP seats desired, negative correlations between liberalism and NP seats desired), while significant in almost all cases, are higher for the UP among Afrikaans respondents and for the NP among English respondents. This is because attitudes are more salient when Afrikaners consider the UP and when the English consider the Nats, since these are politically rather than culturally motivated preferences.[26] These correlations, for the two ethnic groups separately, are summarized in Table 16.

Returning to Table 15, we learn from one-way analyses of variance that this phenomenon of ideologically based nonconventional voting operates more strongly in the English subgroup than in the Afrikaans. The attitude-party preferred correlations are also considerably more powerful for the English than the Afrikaners (except, as already noted, with the UP). This picture of the

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[26] At first sight, this finding would seem to contradict recent characterizations of the "floating voter" as less informed and involved than the stable voter, and even to reaffirm traditional notions of vote changers as rational and discriminating. But as Converse points out, the "floating voter" hypothesis comes from the American *presidential* elections, during which all but a handful of isolated (and hence politically stable) individuals are blanketed with political news. In off-year congressional elections, which do not receive much coverage from the media, we can observe "the least involved being more likely to follow normal behavior patterns than the more involved who do manage to pick up some new information from the weaker flow" (Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order,* pp. 136–157). South Africa, with no television and a poorly informed electorate, and with its mass of stable voters choosing on the basis of tradition and religious instruction, would seem to fit the American congressional model.

Table 16. Correlations between Liberalism and Percentages of Seats Desired for Each Party by Ethnic Group

	Afrikaners	English
NP	−.23	−.27
UP	.13	.02
Prog	.25	.42
HNP	.08	−.28

Correlations in each row are between liberalism and the party listed in that row.

English as being more deliberate, purposeful voters is further supported by a curious finding about the party perceptions of Afrikaners. NP and UP voters do not differ within either ethnic group in the extent to which they perceive a difference between NP and UP attitudes. English supporters of both parties consistently see the UP as being more liberal than the NP. Afrikaners, however, consistently see *no* attitudinal difference between the two parties. Apparently Afrikaners who vote UP do not do so because they see that party as being more liberal than the Nats, despite the fact that Afrikaans UP voters (like English UP voters) are *themselves* more liberal than Afrikaners who support the Nats.

A related finding is that there is generally greater attitudinal correspondence in Nat voting than in UP voting. For the entire sample, the correlation between liberalism and Nat seats desired is −.38 ($p<.0001$), while the correlation between liberalism and UP seats desired is lower, though still significant, at .20 ($p<.001$). Thus the anomaly of Afrikaners deserting to the UP without distinguishing between its positions and those of the NP reflects not only the Afrikaners' relative inability to tell the difference between the parties, but the entire electorate's inability to discern what the UP stands for.

Responses to open-ended questions asking what respondents liked and disliked about the parties corroborated that those who cast ethnically deviant votes as well as those who changed their votes between 1966 and 1970—in both directions—were acting on the basis of their feelings about the Nats more than their feelings about the UP. Unfortunately, the numbers of respondents in these categories were small to begin with, and those who volunteered responses about parties and issues were so few that we cannot present these findings in statistical form. But they do at least suggest that the NP is a more salient reference object in the voting decision than the UP is, and that voters who desert the Nats are casting protest votes against the government rather than making any attributions whatever about the UP. All this helps explain why the UP does better in actual votes than in the party preferred measure. The Nats do stand for a more coherent set of beliefs and policies than does the UP, even if neither party's support is primarily ideological. And Afrikaans defectors from the governing party, while not necessarily expressing a real preference for the party for which they vote, do see themselves in some sense as moving in a liberal direction. The difference in the mean attitude scores of Afrikaans Nat and UP voters, however moderate, is a real one.

The abstainers in Gardens, whose self-reported party preference for the Nats was discussed in the previous section, are likewise more liberal than actual Nat voters in the district. This group, which is more English than Afrikaans, has a mean attitude score of 3.6, compared with 3.1 for Nat-preferring Nat voters in Gardens and 3.5 for Nat-preferring UP voters. (A t-test comparison between the first two groups is significant at the .05 level.) Among Gardens respondents who list the Nats as their preferred party, abstainers—both English and Afrikaans—are more liberal than UP voters, let alone actual Nat voters. This decisively disconfirms Lever's hypothesis that abstainers in 1970 were primarily Afrikaners wavering between the Nats and the more conservative HNP.

Where the attitude-party preference correlations break down altogether is with Afrikaner minor party support. The ideological sophistication of Prog supporters (mainly English) gives that party the highest overall correlation (.44, $p<.0001$), but among Afrikaners the attitudinal extremes of liberalism and conservatism do not find outlets, as they ideally might, in support for the Progs and HNP respectively. In the case of the Progs this is because the ethnic bias makes an allegiance to such a predominantly English (and perhaps Jewish) party psychologically impossible for an Afrikaner. The HNP (for which the Afrikaans attitude-preference correlation is not even significant, at .08) did not succeed in establishing a distinct ideological image. The poor showing of a party so attitudinally congenial to some substantial portion of the Afrikaans electorate testifies to the National Party's successful exploitation of its monopoly of salient communications channels (especially the church), as well as its emotional hold on its constituency.

SES and Attitudes. The complete lack of attitudinal correspondence among Afrikaners in Prog and HNP voting also stems from a lack of political knowledge among lower-class Afrikaners. Among Afrikaans respondents, mean estimates of the HNP's position become increasingly conservative as SES level increases (means are 3.2, 2.9, and

2.2, $p<.001$), while mean estimates of the Prog position become more liberal as SES level increases (means are 3.6, 3.9, and 4.7, $p<.001$). Low-SES Afrikaners do not really know what either of these parties stands for, judging from the fact that they see such a small difference between them. This is why they show a greater preference for the Progs, and less for the HNP, than would logically follow from their conservative beliefs. English respondents, too, see greater ideological differences among the various parties as SES increases.

Respondents' own attitudes also vary significantly with SES. Within both ethnic groups they are more liberal in the higher SES categories, although this is more conclusively true for the English. (For the English, means are 3.2, 3.7, and 4.3, $p<.001$. For the Afrikaners, means are 3.0, 3.0, and 3.4, $p<.01$.) This suggests that political evolution may be occurring at the attitudinal level as a function of social mobility. But this phenomenon has no immediate political significance, since these attitudes have no direct bearing on voting behavior, for which the predictive power of ethnicity is close to total.

Feelings Toward Racial and Ethnic Groups. Given that ethnicity predominates over purely political attitudes in determining party preference, what other attitudes are there which mediate between ethnicity and vote? Can we isolate *any* attitudes which (1) vary significantly by ethnic group, and by party support within each ethnic group, and (2) reveal the psychological mechanisms by which a person's ethnic identity leads to a particular political choice? In this regard, specific issue orientations tell us no more than overall ideological orientations do. The reasons given by respondents for liking or disliking the various parties are largely nonissue-oriented, although the racial issue is mentioned most prominently in about one-quarter of both the like and dislike responses for the Nats. While a large plurality (42 per cent) of respondents regard the racial question as "the most important issue facing South Africa today," this belief does not entail any recognizable voting pattern, and many people who switched to the Nats in this election did so *in spite of* their expressed disapproval of NP racial policies.

On the racial closeness questions,[27] there are no significant differences according to party vote, which lends support to the opinion of many observers that the UP's constituency is no more favorably disposed to the nonwhite races than is the party of *Apartheid.* In line with this (given the relationship between party vote and ethnicity), there are no significant differences in racial closeness by ethnicity. (There is, however, a significant difference by SES, with lower-SES respondents feeling more distant from Africans at the .001 level.) In the 1950s, Pettigrew[28] found a relationship between negative feelings toward nonwhites and authoritarianism in South Africa. He also found that more prejudiced people prefer the National Party (a finding no doubt mediated by the fact that Afrikaners are more prejudiced). But Orpen's[29] more recent work disputes the connection between prejudice and authoritarianism and concludes that racial feelings are politically irrelevant. Orpen argues that since prejudice is a norm of Afrikaans culture, it cannot be understood within that culture as a function of an individual psychological configuration such as authoritarianism. Our data support this interpretation, since we find racial attitudes even less closely connected with political attitudes for the Afrikaners than for the English. (Correlations between liberalism and positive feelings toward the Coloured, Indians, and Africans average .26 for the English, .10 for Afrikaners.) But regardless of ethnicity, attitudes toward the nonwhite races have no more bearing on electoral behavior than do political attitudes.

To find the attitudes that *are* politically salient, we must examine the way white South Africans look at *themselves*, as expressed in the ethnic closeness variable and in that of closeness to whites in general. Table 17 gives the mean closeness ratings which the two ethnic groups assign to themselves and to each other. (Ambiguous Afrikaners have been removed from this tabulation, and will be treated later.) Not only is the Afrikaans self-rating higher than the English self-rating (yielding a t significant at .001), but the Afrikaners hardly separate themselves affectively from the English the way the English do in return. In fact, Afrikaners say they feel closer to the English than the English say they feel toward themselves. These findings, at first sight astonishing, are plausibly explained by the different cultural-historical situations in which the two groups find themselves. English-speaking South Africans

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[27] Responses to these questions for the overall sample show a clearcut pattern. Indians are the least liked racial group, followed by Africans and the relatively benign-seeming Coloureds. (Means are 2.7, 3.2, and 4.4 respectively, with a higher score indicating greater closeness.) A probable explanation for the more intense dislike of Indians than blacks is that Indians are economically and socially more challenging to the white population.

[28] Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 2 (March, 1957), 29–42.

[29] Christopher Orpen, "Authoritarianism Within an 'Authoritarian' Culture" (doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1970), and Christopher Orpen, "The Effect of Cultural Factors on the Relationship Between Prejudice and Personality," *Journal of Psychology,* 78 (May, 1971), 73–79.

Table 17. Mean Feelings of Closeness to Ethnic Groups by Ethnicity

	Group Being Rated	
Rating Group	Afrikaans	English
Afrikaans (168)	9.0	8.6
English (193)	6.3	7.8

Based on a 0 to 10 scale, with higher numbers indicating greater closeness.

have an established worldwide culture to identify with, and are commonly described as smug. Afrikaners, seeing themselves as isolated and perpetually threatened, feel a stronger dedication to their own ethnic group together with a greater acceptance of fellow members of the white South African minority.

In general, but especially for the Afrikaner, there is an emphasis on racial self-preservation which minimizes any potential concern with the ethnic division.[30] This is reflected in the all-important dimension of felt closeness toward "whites" in South Africa. As the ethnic closeness responses would lead us to expect, Afrikaners report feeling closer to South African whites than do the English (8.2 vs. 7.6, $p<.01$). Since there is little difference between the two groups in feelings of closeness to the nonwhite races, Afrikaners also feel significantly closer to whites than nonwhites relative to the English (4.8 vs. 4.0, $p<.01$). Not surprisingly, the Afrikaans word *blanke* (white) connotes far more than its English equivalent, encompassing a notion of civilization that is seen as contrasting with black barbarism.

But the explanatory power of the closeness to "whites" variable extends beyond ethnic differentiation. Among Afrikaners (although not at all among the English), this is the social distance measure which best differentiates Nat and UP voters (8.5 vs. 7.0, $p<.005$). The feeling of solidarity with other South African whites thus emerges as a major cognitive-affective dimension of Afrikaans Nationalist support and a key to the identification of actual and potential defectors from the Nats. The importance of this finding is underscored by the fact that *English* as well as Afrikaans Nat voters feel closer to their own ethnic group than do supporters of the other parties. For Afrikaner ratings of other Afrikaners, means are 9.2 for Nat voters and 8.3 for UP and others ($p<.05$), while for English ratings of other English, means are 8.4 for Nat voters, 7.9 for UP voters, and 6.6 for Prog voters ($p<.05$). For both ethnic groups the feeling of closeness to one's co-ethnics is part of a larger ideological orientation emphasizing in-group solidarity and expressing itself politically as Nationalism. Ethnic and racial solidarity, then, are key links in the attitudinal chain which leads to Nationalist voting.

A measure of the perceptual distortion which goes with these attitudes is that white South Africans overestimate the number of whites and Coloureds in the country and seriously underestimate the number of Africans. Our respondents estimated that Africans comprise 44 per cent of the country's population (the actual figure is 69 per cent). This can be seen as a defense mechanism stemming from fear of the blacks, as well as an evasion of the moral implications of complicity in white minority rule. And it is the Nat supporters whose estimates are the most out of line. They give the highest estimates of both English and Afrikaner populations ($p<.05$); they also give the lowest for Africans ($p<.001$). Afrikaner and English percentage estimates for Africans exactly match those of Nat and UP supporters respectively.

Ambiguous Afrikaners give mean ethnic closeness ratings of 8.0 with Afrikaners and 8.3 with the English. Comparing these figures with Table 17, we find that they are intermediate between the high Afrikaans ratings and the low English ratings. In other words, ambiguous Afrikaners feel closer to *both* ethnic groups than the English do, thus retaining something of their old identity while asserting their new one more forcefully than do those who have always possessed it. As with their political preferences, which are also intermediate between those of the Afrikaners and English, this may be an aggregate phenomenon masking intra-group divergence. A striking finding which enables us to break down the aggregate, and also to suggest a social-psychological analysis of this enigmatic population segment, is the strong negative correlation between the ambiguous Afrikaner's degree of political liberalism and his feeling of closeness to both Afrikaners (−.35, $N=44$) and English (−.22). It seems that the ambiguous Afrikaners may comprise, at the extremes of the spectrum, two very differently motivated subgroups—those who adopt the English identity as a mark of enlightenment and liberalism, and those who do so from a feeling of status insecurity, which goes with heightened provincialism and racism. We were not, however, easily able to identify these groups in terms of SES.

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[30] Hendrik W. van der Merwe and J. J. Buitendag, "Political, Ethnic and Structural Differences Among White South Africans," in *ASSA, Sociology Southern Africa 1973* (Durban: University of Natal), pp. 106–121, have observed a unifying trend within the white South African elite over the past decade, with the government de-emphasizing traditional English-Afrikaans differences in the interest of broadening the Afrikaner ethos into a South African national ethos.

Summary and Discussion

This study shows that ethnicity is the major determinant of party vote in South Africa. Afrikaners vote for the National Party, English-speaking South Africans back the United Party, and the Progressive Party depends heavily upon Jewish support. Party vote also varies with other demographic categories (SES, religion, place of origin), but this is largely because these factors covary with ethnicity. When ethnicity is held constant, therefore, all these variables lose their predictive power.[31] In other words, while the American model of voting behavior, which stresses sociologically conditioned political predispositions, holds true for South Africa, there is nothing in that country comparable to the Lazarsfeld Index of Political Predispositions, which postulates three *separate* demographic determinants of electoral behavior. Following from the finding of a single powerful voting motivator (i.e., ethnicity), there is little evidence to support the "cross-pressures" hypothesis in South Africa, either with regard to actual voting patterns or information avoidance and other signs of withdrawal.

In a more fundamental way, however, South Africa corroborates hypotheses about electoral behavior which have grown out of American presidential elections, rather than hypotheses based on issue-oriented parliamentary systems, such as Norway's.[32] In South Africa, as in America, party labels are primarily symbolic and evocative, rather than standing for substantive policy disagreements. What they evoke is the different ethnic identities that make up the white electorate, as well as different degrees of attachment to the South African white minority's collective identity. Political attitudes in the ideological (liberal-conservative) sense do not differentiate well between party supporters, especially with ethnicity controlled. Feelings about Africans and other nonwhite races in the country are even less relevant. The attitudes which *do* relate significantly to voting behavior are (1) the feeling of closeness to whites in South Africa, which differentiates both between Afrikaners and English and between Nat and UP voters, and (2) the feeling of closeness to one's own ethnic group, which is greater for Nat voters than for UP voters *within* each ethnic group. These findings speak to the basic social-psychological question which Borre and Katz[33] have raised in their study of a Danish election—the question of what the act of voting means to the voter. In varying degrees, the South African citizen is voting for the white man, or for himself as a white man (and as an Afrikaner or an Englishman). Paradoxically, while an Englishman's vote for the UP is an expression of ethnic identification, those English who are most preoccupied with the issue of ethnic identity vote for the Nats.

Ethnic solidarity, racial solidarity, and Nationalist allegiance are mutually reinforcing notions which form the conceptual basis for political decisions within the Afrikaner ethos, and to the extent that they rub off on the English-speaking, within the South African national ethos as well. The government has used its control over salient communications channels to create a psychological identification between party loyalty and ethnic and national pride. And in a country where the electorate is generally poorly informed, one of the most important channels for the dissemination of political information to the Afrikaans majority is the Dutch Reformed Church. If American voters make up their minds more from ingrained habit and traditional symbolism than from current information received from the news media, the same is even truer of South Africans. This is why the right-wing HNP's challenge to the Nationalists, which generated great concern in the media and among Nationalist leaders themselves, failed so totally. A measure of its failure is that the voters to whom the HNP most sought to appeal—conservative, lower-class Afrikaners—were *least* able to distinguish the HNP's position from that of the Nats. The HNP's fate suggests that a mystical lower-class movement (as opposed to one based solely on pocketbook issues) must offer its followers a whole way of life, as Nazism and Peronism did, rather than appealing through ideological statement.

Since issue orientations and economic status are secondary to more basic questions of self-conception in determining party allegiance, it follows that theories of social mobility, such as Barber's,[34] do not as yet have much relevance to the South African political scene. Higher-SES respondents do have more liberal attitudes, even with ethnicity controlled, but these differences do not translate themselves into votes. Only an unimpressive minority of those Afrikaners who are exposed to more "English" environmental influences vote for the UP. In particular, two groups which are being looked to as potential vanguards of electoral change—young voters, and newly emerging Afrikaner businessmen in the cities—do not yet show any significant movement in that direction (although there are minor trends for some groups of young people). A third group, however, discovered serendipitously in the course of this study, may turn out to be equally important as a focal point for change: these are the voters whom we have labeled "ambiguous Afrikaners," since they answered the social distance questions as though they were English even though they qualified as Afrikaans by our childhood language criterion.

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[31] The major limitation of Lever's *The South African Voter* is his failure to apply statistical controls for ethnicity, and other factors. See the review of Lever's book by Stanley J. Morse in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12 (1974), 141–143.

[32] For the Norwegian case, see Campbell and Valen, "Party Identification in Norway and the United States."

[33] Borre and Katz, "Party Identification and Its Motivational Base in a Multiparty System."

[34] Barber, *Social Mobility and Voting Behavior.*

Both in their attitudes and voting intentions, ambiguous Afrikaners take a position intermediate between the Afrikaner and English poles. This suggests that in a country where ethnic identification dictates a person's vote, a deliberate, self-proclaimed change of ethnic identity may bring about a change in political disposition even though a mere change in economic status does not. Barber's thesis that mobile individuals take political positions intermediate between those characteristic of their status of origin and their present status holds true for the ambiguous Afrikaners, if this group is seen as having moved from an "Afrikaans" to an "English" ethnic status. Thus the Barber hypothesis can be said to be applicable to South Africa, as long as "ethnic mobility" rather than socioeconomic mobility is under consideration.

The presence in such large numbers of ambiguous Afrikaners in our sample calls into question once again the typicality of an election study conducted in the Cape Province of South Africa. The Cape was primarily an English settlement in the nineteenth century, and is now a notably liberal region of the country. It might be thought, therefore, that Afrikaners in the Cape would feel much more tempted (and pressured) to assume an English identity than would Afrikaners elsewhere. However, a more common setting for Afrikaner conversions has probably been the large industrial areas around the Witwatersrand in the predominantly Afrikaner Transvaal Province, where some Afrikaners have taken up a different life-style after moving to the English- and Jewish-dominated commercial center of Johannesburg. As a result, we have no reason to believe that our findings are atypical in this and other respects. The agreement of our data with Lever's[35] Johannesburg data—as far as he takes his analysis—is another sign of their generality.

This survey was conducted just before the Parliamentary election of 1970, in which the Nats suffered minor, though distinct, losses. Analyzing the results, Lever finds a return to the UP on the part of English voters who deserted to the Nats in the 1966 election, when the Nats achieved their greatest majority, along with a shift from a pattern of English abstentions in 1966 to Afrikaans abstentions in 1970. From this he infers that the hope of capitalizing on a growing Nat schism (embodied by the HNP defection) brought English voters back to the polls, and back to the UP, after their having come by 1966 to despair over the prospect of outvoting the Afrikaner majority. At the same time, the appeal of the HNP (along with a series of blunders by government ministers) created an emotional conflict in Afrikaners which led to increased abstentions on their part. Our data do not permit us to evaluate this thesis fully, since we do not have a companion study of the 1966 election (as Lever does), and since we have too few respondents indicating a change of party since 1966 to draw any reliable conclusions about them. But we do find a decisive pattern of abstentions by those who favor the Nats in our swing district (Gardens), and our data confirm Lever's claim that shifting voters were mainly English.

Where we differ from Lever is in interpreting the motivation of Nat-supporting abstainers in 1970, who are also mainly English and, being more liberal than the Nat voters in their district, are unlikely to have been attracted to the HNP. In addition, our study population is considerably more liberal than it perceives the NP to be. It thus seems reasonable to believe that most discontent with the government is not reactionary, and that there is a substantial constituency in South Africa which would support liberal change. Nonetheless, while Afrikaans UP voters are ideologically more liberal than Afrikaans Nat voters, the moderate mean attitudinal divergence between the two groups implies that only some of those with more liberal views actually dissent at the polls. Political loyalty is one of the most deeply entrenched features of cultural identification in South Africa, and one of the last to be discarded.

Another factor impeding the electoral expression of deviant attitudes is that the political parties from which the voter must choose do not offer a range of ideological alternatives. While ethnically nonconforming voters do vote in a direction consistent with their beliefs, these votes cannot really be rationalized on such grounds, given the alignment of the parties. To vote Prog is psychologically impossible for an Afrikaner, while the UP does not have, and is not seen (by Afrikaners, even those voting for the UP) as having, an ideological position distinct from that of the Nats. This is why so much liberal Afrikaans dissent takes the form of abstention or mere protest votes for the UP. A vote for the UP does not imply a real preference for UP control of Parliament as much as a vote for the NP implies a preference for NP control of Parliament. On the other hand, a preference for the NP does not result as predictably in a vote for the NP as a preference for the UP results in a vote for that party. As the governing party, the NP stands for a more coherent set of policies to which the voters can react, while votes for the UP stem from a more diffuse set of political motivations.

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[35] Lever, *The South African Voter.*

Under these conditions, if there is to be a breaking down of the Nationalist ideological consensus, it probably will not be expressed through electoral change within the present party structure. Rather, political change in South Africa must come from movements arising within the Afrikaner Nat majority, possibly within the NP itself. Developments since the 1970 election are in line with this projection from our data. The national-cultural ideology of the NP has all along masked a great diversity of opinion within party ranks, and now this diversity is being more openly expressed, with an increasingly apparent split between the *verligte* (outward-looking, progressive) and *verkrampte* (inward-looking, reactionary) wings of the party.

Meanwhile, recognizing the difficulty in overcoming decades of NP tradition, some *verligte* Afrikaners have been joining liberal English-speaking South Africans in their attempt to take control of the UP as a vehicle for reform, while other Afrikaners are working through a variety of nonpartisan organizations such as the university-based "*Verligte* Action." There is even a new political party, the Democratic party, founded by Theo Gerdener, formerly a liberal NP leader. Most of these efforts have not yielded substantial results. Gerdener's party faces the seemingly insoluble problem of how to draw Afrikaans voters away from the NP, while the agitation within the UP has only exacerbated that party's internal confusion. Policy shifts alone will not change overnight the fact that the UP stands for a cultural and political tradition alien to the Afrikaans majority. And there seems little likelihood of changing the National Party's policies as long as its leaders can count on a substantial constituency which approves of those policies and a larger constituency which supports the party regardless of policy.

Since electoral change is so unlikely, the nonpartisan approach to substantive reform seems most promising, especially when it is carried out through labor and business organizations which have a real place and function in the society. Labor unions, once co-opted by the Nats, have been taking a more independent line, in some cases accepting the unionization of black workers. And business leaders are becoming more insistent about the need to consider worldwide economic and political trends. But even these groups have little direct political power, except insofar as they can bring about changes in public consciousness. For the comfortably well-off National Party, the crucial issue is, perhaps, whether it should strive to expand its majority by recruiting the English-speaking with a more broadly nationalistic appeal, or whether it should emphasize Afrikaans exclusiveness in order to prevent an accelerating erosion of the ethnic consciousness which maintains its current majority.

Postscript

Since the completion of this study, another general election was held in South Africa, in April of this year. With 5 new seats at stake, the NP and the Progs each gained 5 seats while the UP lost 5 seats. This left the new Parliamentary lineup at 123 seats for the NP, 42 for the UP, and 6 for the Progs. In this election, the Nats were seemingly able to reassert their hold on the Afrikaans electorate, in part because of ideological dissension within the UP. But the Prog success was unprecedented, especially when coupled with the capture of 5 seats by a dissident liberal UP faction in the Transvaal province (all around Johannesburg). In addition, the Democratic Party made a good initial showing, with Gerdener coming within 400 votes of beating his UP opponent in Pietermaritzburg. Although all the districts won by the Progs were in relatively well-off English-speaking suburbs of the country's two major cities, the party improved its poll in all four provinces, thus approaching for the first time the status of a national party. The election results support our finding of growing liberal discontent with the two leading parties, and raise the possibility of a liberal coalition embracing the Progs, the left-wing UP bloc, and the Democratic Afrikaners. But for such a coalition to challenge the Nats for national leadership—a prospect which is still far in the future—it will have to give a leading role to the *verligte* Afrikaners whom the Democratic Party is only beginning to mobilize.

Methodological Appendix

A. Statistics

1. *Analysis of variance* is used in this paper in a number of ways, including some where its results can only be considered of heuristic value. For example, on questions comparing the amount of information respondents obtained from one source versus another, within-subject tests would normally be called for. But since we were interested in *patterns* of preference for certain information sources over other sources among groups of respondents, analysis of variance served as a convenient indicator of contrasting trends in the different groups (see also Table 1).

F ratios can be helpful indicators of relative strengths of relationship in cases when this is not a strictly legitimate deduction from a multivariate analysis of variance. For example, in Table 15, the deduction is made that ethnicity is more important than are political attitudes in determining voting, although the dependent variable is actually attitude, while vote is an independent factor. Still, the overwhelming predictive value of ethnicity in the analysis clearly makes it the dominant element in this configuration of variables.

Where analysis of variance is used despite the fact that subjects are not randomly assigned to different categories, analysis proceeds on the basis of evaluating possible explanations for significant variations other than the explanations provided by the predictor factor(s). Incorporating such plausible artifacts as controls, we could more safely accept our original findings as valid when they remained significant through further analysis.

2. *Nominal statistics* used in this paper include the contingency coefficient and lambda, along with chi-square. Lambda tests do not appear in the tables run with controls. Because of the power of ethnicity as a predictor in tables run with ethnicity controls, the majority of responses in all categories of predictor variables fell under the party appropriate to the language group being examined (UP for English, NP for Afrikaners), and thus none of the categories could distinguish between voting responses.

These statistics are appropriate for nominal data, yet we frequently use them where one of the variables is ordinal, or even interval. When the data are ordinal, there is an added benefit in that explanations of trends that occur along distinct directions in the order become much more meaningful and understandable, even though only nominal-level statistics are being employed.

B. Attitude Measures

1. *The items* were as follows (those items followed by R were reversed in coding):

1. The border industries—the industries built near the Bantu reserves—should be developed at a much faster rate.
2. The Blacks and Whites should be encouraged to mix socially.
3. The pass laws should be abolished.
4. A great deal of money should be spent to develop the Bantu homelands.
5. The Bantu should be given complete independence in their homelands.
6. Non-whites should represent their own people in Parliament.
7. People of all races should be considered South African citizens.
8. The Immorality Act should be abolished.
9. Non-whites should be represented in Parliament, but they should be represented by Whites only.
10. Blacks should only be allowed in White areas to work. R
11. Whites should not be allowed any rights in the Black homelands. R
12. No inter-racial sports teams from other countries should be admitted to play in the Republic, unless we have traditional sporting relations with the country. R
13. Blacks should not be allowed any political rights in White, urban areas. R
14. In order to protect the country, the Bureau of State Security should be given more power. R
15. English-speaking South Africans should be encouraged to adopt the "Afrikaner's way of life." R

2. *The scale* was based on an *a priori* notion of a liberal-conservative dimension in South African politics. Thus, two items were eliminated from the scale because of their ambiguous content. Statement 9 patently cuts both ways, and Statement 1 is also equivocal since the border industries provide employment for Africans while serving the policy of *Apartheid.*

Intercorrelating the remaining 13 statements, all of which figured in the average attitude scores, we find that two others should have been omitted as well—Statements 5 and 11. We had thought that statements emphasizing African prerogatives in the black homelands would be construed as liberal, but the lack of any consistent trend in the correlations involving these statements indicates that people were responding as well to the suggestions of *Apartheid* they contained. But on the basis of the correlations for the remaining 11 statements, the attitude scale does show some construct validity. Only four of these 55 correlations are negative, only one of which exceeds .05 in magnitude. Most of the 51 positive correlations are significant, though not overwhelming. Forty-two reach the .05 significance level with an r of .11 ($N=323$), most of these being significant at .01 ($r \geq .15$). But only three correlations exceed .40, with five more exceeding .30. In general, responses to a given attitude statement are in line with responses to the others, but do not come near exhausting the variance in the other responses. There is a liberal-conservative dimension in South African politics, but it does not totally explain the alignment of the issues.

3. *Factor analysis* was performed in order to uncover the salient cognitive dimensions underlying responses to the attitude items. A principal components varimax rotation was used, with Kaiser's criterion determining the number of factors to be extracted. Since in South Africa, as we have shown, the crucial attitudinal distinctions occur along ethnic lines, we examined the attitude structure for each ethnic group, taken separately, as well as for the overall sample.

Accepting factor loadings of .50 as a criterion for including an item in a factor, the three analyses yielded essentially the same four factors. (Since the Afrikaans factor structure was more diffuse than the other two, a limit of four factors had to be set in that analysis and the loading criterion reduced to .475.) These factors, with the items they subsume (over all three analyses) in parentheses (see Note B-1 above) are (a) "social *Apartheid*" (8, 3, 2, 7), (b) "economic *Apartheid*" (4, 1), (c) "Afrikaans way of life" (12, 15, 14, 9), and (d) "political separatism" (13, 11). As a check of just how similar the English and Afrikaans factors are, interclass and product moment correlation coefficients comparing the two structures both measure .86. Three of the factors, however (b, c, d), are inverted, as indicated by extreme negative correlations. In other words, the two ethnic groups show different affective reactions to almost identically organized cognitions.

Hobbes and His Audience: The Dynamics of Theorizing*

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Political theory has for many years been subject to severe criticism for its failure to substantiate the claims it makes for itself. It has been attacked by both philosophers and scientists, and denied any standing in either discipline. Its claims for truth have been unmasked as mere assertions of ideology or individual biases. Its arguments have been exposed as either manipulation by "persuasive definition," or dismissed as guilty of the "naturalistic fallacy."[1] It appears that political ideas, no longer philosophically respectable nor scientifically tenable, have been relegated to the intellectual limbo of "personal preferences." While this line of attack is most often associated with T. D. Weldon's *Vocabulary of Politics* (which may be dated in many respects), it has, in fact, continued to be quite strongly held by many analytic philosophers and social scientists.[2] Thus it would seem that the contemporary student of political theory is in need of a new defense or justification, if his discipline is to be saved from virtual dismissal or severe curtailment.

While no attempt will be made here to refute the many attacks on political theory, it will be suggested that a different and more fruitful understanding of political theory is possible, and that many of the failures and errors attributed to political theory are, in fact, consequences of a rigid and mistaken conceptualization of the activity of theorizing about politics. Moreover since the great works in the tradition of political theory still remain challenging, forceful, and often persuasive, even to analytic philosophers, it is worth our while to try to understand the nature of that attraction, a task which the analytic school has not well performed. The first part of this paper will present an approach to understanding political theory; the second will discuss Hobbes as an example of such a challenging theorist.

The argument of T. D. Weldon has received such wide circulation, that it is often assumed that his is the only view to be found among contemporary analytic philosophers. But in fact there have been a number of philosophers who are concerned with ethical questions and whose work provides the basis for an understanding of political theory very different from that of Weldon.[3] What these philosophers have in common is the use of the jurisprudential analogy; that is, ethical or political argument is seen as very similar to the type of argument employed by lawyers in a courtroom. For Margaret MacDonald, ethical statements are neither statements about facts nor emotive statements; they are rather like records of decisions or positions taken, which we support or defend, much as a lawyer would defend a client. They are like decisions which are rationally, not arbitrarily, made, in that we do try to defend them; similarly they are unlike mere expressions of emotion, for we do not feel called upon to defend a cry or a shout. We do not prove (inductively or deductively) an ethical statement, as we do a scientific proposition, for a decision can never be true or false, though it may be forcefully or poorly defended. While we try to "prove" the law of gravity, we do not refer to J. S. Mill's "proof" of liberty, but to his "magnificent defence" of it.[4]

That assertions of values are not supported by inductive or deductive methods should not be taken to mean that they are illogical or irrational, but only that another sort of reasoning process is involved. According to Wisdom, "The process of [legal] argument is not a chain of demonstrative reasoning. It is a presenting and representing of those features of the case which severally cooperate in favor of the conclusion, in favor of saying what the reasoner wishes said. . . . It has its own sort of logic and its own sort of end—the solution of the question at issue is a decision. . . "[5] A

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* I am deeply indebted to Richard Ashcraft and Blair Campbell for their very helpful criticism and suggestions.

[1] See, for example, Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); Richard S. Peters, *Hobbes* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967) pp. 166–167.

[2] According to Anthony Quinton, *Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), "the works that make up the great tradition of political thought are methodologically very impure. They are only to a small . . . extent works of philosophy in the strict sense." Statements of values he classifies as "affirmations of ideology" not "analysis" (pp. 1,3); cf. Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge, 1965) pp. 37, 290n.

[3] See Margaret MacDonald, "Natural Rights" in *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, First Series, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956); John Wisdom, *Paradox and Discovery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), and *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953); Stephen Toulmin, *Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

[4] MacDonald, "Natural Rights," pp. 52–55; cf. B. Barry, pp. 53–54.

[5] *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis*, p. 153; Toulmin, p. 2, suggests that the methods we use in everyday life

good lawyer does not simply present the facts, for often the facts are not in question, but "marshals them so as to emphasize those which favor his client. . . . He chooses language which does not merely state, but impress: he uses voice, gesture, facial expression, all the devices of eloquence and style in order to influence the decision of the jury in favor of his client."[6]

This view is not suggesting that fraudulent advocacy be taken as the model of moral or political discourse, for lawyers are not all frauds, nor needthey be. The point is that we defend our values much as lawyers do, who use their material to impress and convince, but not to prove. The difference in the kinds of arguments employed corresponds to the difference in purpose: "the function of scientific judgments is to alter one's expectations; that of ethical judgments, by contrast, is to alter one's feelings and behavior."[7] In other words, the validity of a political or ethical statement is inseparable from its communicative power;[8] an assertion which convinces no one has no value in political discourse. Thus while assertions of values cannot be true or false in any objective sense, decisions and choices can be better or worse, defenses can be powerful and persuasive, or weak and unconvincing. It is in terms of these judgments that we can develop evaluative criteria for political theory.

Once it is recognized that political theory involves making arguments much as a lawyer might, it becomes relevant to know to whom an argument is addressed, what kind of jury is it that must be convinced. Since a major function of ethical and political judgments is to alter feelings and behavior, we must necessarily seek to understand such argument in relation to its audience. To assume that all argument is addressed to some abstact "universal man" would be to misunderstand the dynamics of political argumentation. For example if we wish to convince someone of the value of democracy, we might present him with an attractive picture of a free and democratic society, and if he already values independence, experimentation, mutual trust, etc., he may agree that these values are realized in such a society and so may accept democracy. But if he holds other values (that is, if we have misjudged our audience), he may call independence, insolence; experimentation rash meddling; and our argument will have failed.[9] Thus knowing the character of the audience addressed can serve as a useful guide in an examination of a work of political theory.

It is a commonplace that great political theory has often been written during periods of great political upheaval, in which consensus regarding the modes of legitimizing and understanding the political order has broken down. In a crisis involving conflicting groups and ideologies one can no longer base ones political position on traditional assumptions, for they have been called into question by the crisis. In such a situation the effective theorist must go beyond a narrow defense of a particular position (since the grounds for such a defense might have dissolved) in order to present a more comprehensive picture of the political world. That is, since one can only defend a particular value within a shared context of belief, the theorist attempts to present a new or reformulated world-view to replace the now discredited old one, through which the political order can again be made intelligible. The resulting world-view can vary immensely in philosophical grandeur (compare Hegel and Machiavelli) but it must result in a comprehensive and satisfactory picture of the world. It is precisely through the construction of such a new scheme of intelligibility that the aspiring theorist expresses his persuasive power.

The task confronting the political theorist is to build a case for his political and moral position that will appeal to the broadest possible spectrum of politically relevant groups. Unlike the lawyer in the courtroom he has no voice in the selection of his audience. The theorist must deal with the political situation as it is. Thus he must present as many arguments for his positions as there are relevant audiences. J. S. Mill, for example, presented two different arguments for liberty, each aimed at a different set of readers.[10] In fact, one mark of a great work of political theory may be its ability to appeal to a great many different people, including those with opposing political ideas. Thus a good political theory differs from

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to make and assess arguments do not conform to the canons of the science of logic because formal logic has become a theoretical study unrelated to practical activity.

[6] MacDonald, "Natural Rights," p. 53.

[7] Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of The Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) p. 130.

[8] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), p. 27: "the validity of an idea cannot be divorced from its effectiveness as a form of communication."

[9] MacDonald, p. 54.

[10] "The presence of an individualist and a social justification of liberty in the essay *On Liberty* is not the product of a divided mind or confusion or lack of the necessary courage, but rather of design. There are two justifications because there are two audiences." Richard B. Friedman, "A New Exploration of Mill's Essay *On Liberty*," *Political Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 (September, 1966), 303–304. Leo Strauss has suggested that Rousseau, in *A Discourse on The Arts and Sciences*, presents two distinct arguments addressed to two different audiences. "On The Intention of Rousseau" in *Hobbes and Rousseau*, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972) pp. 263–64.

the mediocre not in transcending political bias (i.e., its commitment to certain political values), but rather in its communicative power and range of appeal. Indeed a mediocre argument is perceived as sectarian or ideological because it lacks those very qualities: it seems persuasive or cogent only to a few people, only from within a single viewpoint. The arguments or the picture of the world presented by a great theorist may be so impressive, appeal to so many, that the theory remains interesting and challenging well after the political crisis that occasioned it is forgotten.

One advantage of examining political theory in terms of its communicative power is that it allows us to view a theory as a complex and subtle work, involving many methods of persuasion, a persuasive scheme not limited to the strictly logical (demonstrative) level, to which the analytic school restricts its attention. From the latter perspective many facets of a theory may be regarded as unessential, or even irrelevant to the argument.[11] The approach used here, in contrast, does not dismiss any aspect of a work of political theory; it presumes that every facet of a work has some purpose, is designed to appeal to some particular mentality. If this view of political theory is valid, it should be possible to look at the work of a "great" theorist and find there various styles of argument and dimensions of persuasion by which he tried to appeal to his contemporaries.

In the following sections we will examine the political theory of Hobbes from this perspective. Hobbes is a particularly appropriate subject for assessing the merits of this approach since he is unquestionably a great political theorist; great in terms both of the durability of interest in his work and of his impact on his contemporaries.[12] If we are able to show that Hobbes's theory does, in fact, conform to the pattern of argument we have suggested, we will have begun to account for his great impact on his contemporaries, as well as providing support for our general view of political theory as argument aimed at persuading a specific audience.

The Ideological Setting

In order to understand to which of his contemporaries Hobbes was addressing himself, and of what he was trying to persuade them, we must look at the political position Hobbes himself held. He is usually seen as an authoritarian advocate of law and order: the author of a doctrine so extreme that neither royalists nor parliamentarians would accept it. Because neither side in the civil war would acknowledge Hobbes as a friend it has often been assumed that he was, in fact, aligned with neither side. Yet the explanation that Hobbes gave his own activity is very different; it puts him firmly in the royalists' camp: he wrote *De Cive* so that "all nations" should know what the rebels were doing in England, and so detest them; in that work he endeavored "to gain a belief in men that monarchy is the most commodious government," a point which he confessed he had not "demonstrated, but only probably stated." "*Leviathan* was written in defense of the king's power, temporal and spiritual, [and] in the behalf of those many and faithful servants and subjects of his majesty, that had taken his part in the war, or otherwise done their utmost endeavor to defend his majesty's right and person against the rebels. . . . That book now fights for all kings and for all those under any title who exercise the rights of kings."[13] Hobbes's royalist credentials receive additional confirmation from his history of the civil war, *Behemoth*, which is clearly and strongly royalist in its sympathies. Finally, in his autobiography, Hobbes characterized himself as "one who strove with his pen to defend kingly power."[14]

Even if we accept Hobbes as a defender of the king, the question still remains why he was such an unorthodox royalist? Why did he not articulate a doctrine that the king's supporters would embrace? The answer lies in the very crisis that was the object of Hobbes's concern. Clearly the society was divided into conflicting ideological camps well before the civil war actually broke out.

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[11] E.g., F. S. McNeilly, *The Anatomy of Leviathan* (London: Macmillan, 1968), views the argument of *Leviathan* in such narrow terms that several prominent aspects of the book are dismissed as irrelevant: ". . . although the notion of a universal fear of death is constantly mentioned, it does not perform any actual, still less any indispensible, part in the argument" (p. 250). Hobbes's "pessimistic view of human nature" and his idea of the desire for precedence are similarly treated.

[12] Cf. Richard Ashcraft, "Hobbes's Natural Man: A study in Ideology Formation," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 33, no. 4 (November, 1971), 1077–79; Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. viii, 147; Quentin Skinner, "The Context of Hobbes's Theory of Political Obligation," in Cranston and Peters, *Hobbes and Rousseau*, pp. 109–119.

[13] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth (London: J. Bohm, 1839–45), IV, 415, 407, 420–21. (Hereafter cited as *E.W.*); *De Cive or The Citizen*, ed. Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 17; "Autobiography" in *Rationalist Annual* (1958), p. 27.

[14] "Autobiography" p. 28; cf. *Leviathan*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (London: Basil Blackwell, 1955) pp. 122–125; Royce Macgillivray, "Hobbes's History of the Civil War," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 31, no. 2 (April-June, 1970), 179–198. Very little is known of Hobbes's life, but those few facts that are known support the idea that he was a royalist. Hobbes spent most of his adult life as a member of the aristocratic and royalist family of the Cavendishes. Prior to the Civil War he was a member of a circle of royalist intellectuals. (See Irene Coltman, *Private Men and Public Causes* (London: Faber, 1962), pp. 135–192). Later, in exile, he tutored the future Charles II.

For Hobbes merely to have restated the well known royalist arguments would have meant that he would be speaking only to the already convinced; he would have had no chance to persuade the opposition since it had long before rejected the royalist arguments. Hobbes could have written as an orthodox royalist only at the price of being condemned to ineffectiveness, as just another sectarian, ideological propagandist for the king. In other words it is precisely because Hobbes was a great theorist that he rejected the conventional royalist arguments.

The royalist world-view by the middle of the 17th century not only had been rejected by the king's opponents, but had become quite questionable, if not untenable, from any perspective; it could no longer provide a sound basis for political argumentation. This world-view, which has been appropriately termed the "philosophy of order," envisioned society and indeed the universe at large as a hierarchically ordered structure based God's reason. Looked at vertically the universe was a great chain of being, beginning with the noblest and descending to the meanest things of creation; horizontally it consisted of a number of planes of existence, arranged one above another in order of dignity, but unified by the fact that they "corresponded" in their internally hierarchical structure. In each plane there was a single "primacy" which was supreme over all the other members of that level: the eagle among birds, the lion among animals, gold among the elements, God among the angels, the soul in the human body, etc. Within this world-view the basic form of reasoning was by "correspondencies" or analogies. Such reasoning consisted of reviewing the similarities between things, taking a known fact or situation in one plane and inferring that a corresponding fact or situation existed in another plane. For example because God was sovereign in the universe, and the soul sovereign in the body, therefore there had to be a similar unified and absolute power in the body politic.[15] This style of argument, resting on the philosophy of order, was used by royalists to justify absolute monarchy.

James I, for example, elaborated on analogies between a king in his kingdom and God in the universe, a father in his family, and the head of the human body, in order to support his claim of absolute power.[16] This was not a novel or an outlandish argument, for it had been used frequently during the previous century and was still being used by supporters of the king during the civil war.[17] Even after the defeated king was the captive of the parliamentary forces one of his supporters denied the right of parliament to hold the king, saying that "as in Bodies Natural, so in Politick, King Charles is the essential head of our Politique Body," and so above all other men.[18] While such arguments may appear unconvincing or ridiculous, they were, in fact, considered quite reasonable and forceful within the philosophy of order.

The philosophy of order fell prey to attack from every direction. First the Reformation upset the ordered picture of the universe, replacing God's reason with his will, and offering an egalitarian view of man which clashed with social and political hierarchies. Second the new physics and astronomy, in establishing the heliocentric view of the universe, made untenable the older picture which had provided the basis for argument by correspondence. The hierarchical view of the political order was also being threatened by contemporary social change, for the new social forces and patterns of behavior broke up the rigidly hierarchical social structure, which had "corresponded" to and confirmed the hierarchy of the political order.[19] The emerging commercial class held attitudes and goals which were particularly disruptive of the royalist view of the political order. Thus the combined impact of the Reformation, the revolution in science, and the developing commercialism on the philosophy of order was such that the royalist was left in a much weakened, vulnerable condition.

The royalist historical arguments, which supplemented their philosophical ones, were also being attacked; parliamentary historians offered different versions of both English and ancient history, which supported their political position. While Tudor historians had been able to rely on the legends of King Arthur and a Trojan geneology to support the monarchy, competing historians discovered the "Ancient Constitution" in England's past, which supported Parliament's claims to power.[20] While Parliament's case was never established beyond question, the royalist version was discredited to the point that it was increasingly less convincing as a powerful defense of the monarchy. Thus we can see that Hobbes would have stood on shaky ground had he chosen to defend the king in the conventional manner. Hobbes himself acknowledged the weakness of the royalist case in *De Cive*, where, after referring to several royalist arguments, he dismissed them, saying, "although, I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they do it by example and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will pass them over."[21]

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[15] See W. H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism, and Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 47–53; E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (New York: Vintage Books, n.d.).

[16] Francis D. Wormuth, *The Royal Prerogative* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1939), p. 7; Greenleaf, pp. 61–63.

[17] E.g., Robert Grose, *Royalty and Loyalty* (London, 1647).

[18] Quoted in Greenleaf, p. 49.

[19] Greenleaf, pp. 143–146.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 114–124, 179–187; cf. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and The Feudal Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Quentin Skinner, "History and Ideology in The English Revolution," *The Historical Journal*, vol. 8, no. 2 (June, 1965), 151–178.

In addition to the anachronistic qualities of the royalist world-view, Hobbes found their specific political arguments to be inadequate to the defense of the king; in fact their arguments virtually justified the Puritan opposition to the king, while weakening the resolve of his defenders. Asking himself "whether the doctrine taught by those divines which adhered to the king, be such . . . as may justify the Presbyterians that incited the people to rebellion," Hobbes answers that such preachers "would go near to be found not guilty" by that doctrine.[22] The royalist doctrine argued that when a king commands something contrary to God's will, his subjects ought to obey God, and give the king only passive obedience. This doctrine encourages rebellion, according to Hobbes, since rebels will always be able to claim that they acted in obedience to God. The notion of passive obedience is itself unworkable since it requires that a subject resist his ungodly king and yet not try to avoid being punished for his resistance—a virtual impossibility according to Hobbes: "Do not we see that all men, when they are led to execution, are both bound and guarded, and would break loose if they could, and get away? Such is their passive obedience."[23] By justifying an impossible passive obedience, the royalist doctrine actually undermined the foundations of the argument against rebellion.

By the time of the civil war, the royalist confusion or misunderstanding of its own position had contributed further to the erosion of the king's authority. The king's advisors shared the "fault, which was generally in the whole nation, which was, that they thought the government of England was not an absolute, but a mixed monarchy; and that if the king should clearly subdue this parliament that his power would be what he pleased, and theirs as little as he pleased: which they counted tyranny." By 1642 even the king himself was defending only a mixed monarchy and rejecting absolute monarchy as tyrannical.[24] Thus Hobbes found himself in the position of having to be, in effect, a better royalist than the established royalists, for their position was both philosophically and historically questionable, and it offered the king only a weak and limited protection.

Hobbes's Multiple Audiences

The problem faced by Hobbes was how to defend the king's position while appealing to, and persuading, a heterogenous opposition. His situation demanded that he go beyond the established patterns of argument (in which each side was speaking past the other) and speak to the various groups on their own terms, invoking, if possible, their own accepted authorities and styles of argument, thus disarming or redirecting their viewpoints to support rather than to attack, the political order. In this situation we would expect that Hobbes would attempt to assimilate the viewpoints or styles of thought of all relevant groups, so that his argument would appear familiar and congenial, and thus forceful, to all sides. There were, as indicated above, three points of view that had done most to undermine the royalist position, and these therefore would be the natural objects of Hobbes's persuasion: the new scientific mentality, the emerging commercial class, and the Puritan dissidents (who were the most serious and immediate political threat, from Hobbes's perspective).[25] Thus we should be able to find in Hobbes arguments or persuasive devices aimed at all three groups.

It is truistic that Hobbes presents his political argument in a thoroughly scientific form. Although scholars disagree about whether there is a logical connection between his scientific propositions and his political theory, no one disputes that Hobbes presents his case in the most scientific terms.[26] And it is equally truistic that there are aspects of Hobbes's doctrine which betray a distinctly bourgeois orientation. Without accepting Macpherson's analysis in its entirety, one can scarcely deny that much in Hobbes's picture of a rightly ordered political system would appeal to a commercial mentality: not only does the Leviathan allow great scope for economic activity, but self-interest as a rationale of individual behavior is relied upon frequently.[27] The scientific and bourgeois aspects of Hobbes's theory are sufficiently established so that we need not discuss them any further. What has received much less attention, however, is the question of Hobbes's appeal to his third major audience—the Puritans.

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[21] *De Cive*, p. 116, and also 66; *Leviathan*, pp. 111, 463.

[22] *Behemoth*, ed. Ferdinand Toennies, second edition (London: Cass, 1969) p. 47.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 114; Leviathan, p. 119; Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) pp. 248–249; for a discussion of Hobbes's criticism of moderate royalists, see Irene Coltman, pp. 135–192.

[25] *Behemoth*, p. 47.

[26] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) argues that the basis of Hobbes's view of human life is nonscientific. R. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968) argues for the close connection between Hobbes's scientific and political ideas. Strauss, however, says that Hobbes used the language of science to justify his view as the only true and universally valid one.

[27] C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

The Puritans must have presented an especially difficult case for Hobbes since they were the most politically active group among the royalist opponents.[28] Hobbes's situation required, first, that he persuade them to reject their own political ideas, and subsequently, that he convince them to accept his. Such a change would involve not only a complete reversal of their theoretical position, but also a sacrifice of the actual political standing and power of their leadership (Presbyterian preachers). Effecting such a complete reversal would obviously be difficult under the best conditions, but with respect to political issues, it would be virtually impossible since, in Hobbes's view, most people reason very poorly about politics. The biases and interests of men outweigh their reason, when they consider political ideas.[29] Moreover, according to Hobbes, the Puritans, of all the groups on the political scene, were probably the least given to reason for their religious doctrine emphasized nonrational faith, and downgraded the role of human reason. In fact Hobbes considered the Puritans' belief that they were directly "inspired" by God to be evidence of their "madness."[30] While Hobbes did present rational arguments against both Puritan religious and political doctrines, he could have had little confidence that, by themselves, they would be effective. After all, Hooker many years, earlier had rationally devastated the doctrine of Puritanism, without having any apparent impact upon the Puritans.[31] Thus the only course left open to Hobbes, in appealing to the Puritans, would be to supplement his logical arguments with a mode of persuasion more congenial to the religious mentality.

In dealing with the Puritans it would seem reasonable for Hobbes to have followed his same basic mode of persuasion, that of trying to co-opt the opposition by speaking to them in their own terms, appropriating, if possible, some of their own notions.[32] For such a strategy to succeed, it would have to be applied subtly and indirectly, since any explicit use of Puritan authorities would be likely to have evoked a hostile response. Hence his optimal strategy would be to appropriate not so much their actual language or formal terminology, but rather some of their basic ideas. Moreover explicit use of Puritan language would be detrimental to Hobbes's appeal to his other audiences. This strategy would best apply directly to their religious beliefs and not to their derivative political beliefs.

While this approach may appear to conflict with Hobbes's geometrical-scientific method, in fact, it is a necessary supplement to it. Hobbes's scientific method was seriously limited in its capacity to communicate his doctrine, for, according to Hobbes very few people understood science. Though "the most part of man . . . have the use of reasoning a little way . . . as for *science* . . . they are so far from it, that they know not what it is." Hobbes's use of scripture to support his position is an obvious example of his not limiting himself to his scientific method. He clearly recognized that the acceptance of his doctrine rested, not just on its scientific rigor, but also upon the reader's finding it true to himself. Thus Hobbes openly stated that the only "demonstration" of his doctrine lay in the reader's introspection.[33] Clearly an argument dependent upon introspection for its persuasive force is not strictly scientific in character. In any case, with regard to the Puritans, Hobbes would have had to go be-

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1962); Harold Laski, *The Rise of Liberalism* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), pp. 91–180; Leo Strauss, p. 121; Christopher Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution* (New York: Schoken, 1964), pp. 275–291.

[28] *Behemoth*, pp. 57, 63, 82, 89–90. Clearly it would be easier to persuade those whose ideas were merely disruptive of the established order than those who had deliberately rebelled and developed a justifying political doctrine.

[29] *Leviathan*, pp. 29, 67–68. This problem does not confront Hobbes as severely in dealing with the other two groups since the language of science and self-interest can make its appeal on nonpolitical levels.

[30] *Leviathan*, p. 47; *Behemoth*, p. 24; *E. W.*, IV, 418–419.

[31] Richard Hooker, *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, preface. From Hobbes's perspective, Hooker's reliance on Aristotle and the philosophy of order was a major defect in his political theory, since it prevented him from affecting his Puritan audience which held different metaphysical assumptions. That is, Hooker would have presented Hobbes with an excellent example of intelligent yet ineffective political theorizing.

[32] Perhaps the outstanding example of Hobbes's co-opting the opposition is his use of the idea of representative government. The doctrine of representative government, popular with many opposition groups, was, of course, rejected by Hobbes: "What bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for the Multitude?" (*De Cive*, p. 9). Yet Hobbes took the concept and interpreted it in such a manner as to make it politically innocuous: the representative (sovereign) had total freedom of action, while the represented (the subjects) had all the obligations. Thus Hobbes was able to turn a politically dangerous opposition doctrine into a defense of absolute sovereignty. See Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 14–37. Similarly Hobbs co-opted the idea of government based on consent. But in his version, even a government based on conquest, in which the defeated subjects submit out of fear for their lives, is interpreted as an example of voluntary consent. *Leviathan*, pp. 129–133.

[33] *Leviathan*, pp. 29, 6.

yond a purely scientific method since the Puritans were not reasoning people.

In appealing to Puritan beliefs, Hobbes would be following the advice of Aristotle, who in his *Rhetoric* (a work Hobbes much admired and twice translated)[34] suggested that "before some audiences not even the possession of the exactist knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody." Clearly, in Hobbes's view, the Puritans were people who could not be instructed about politics, and so could only be approached by the use of notions "generally admitted or believed" by them.[35] Thus if Hobbes did adopt this mode of persuasion with his Puritan audience, we should be able to find in his argument notions or ideas which the Puritans already believed or were predisposed to accept; there should be some similarities between Hobbes's argument, and that with which the Puritans were familiar.

In developing his argument, Hobbes would not have had to concern himself with every Puritan sect, but only with those Puritans who were the most politically significant, i.e., in Hobbes's analysis, the Presbyterians. Since it was the Presbyterians who both incited the people to rebel, and gave rise to the other rebellious, but less important, sects, it would be to the Presbyterians that Hobbes would have to address himself.[36] Of all the English Puritans, the Presbyterians were the most strictly and thoroughly Calvinistic; many had resided in Calvin's Geneva during the period of the Marian exile, and returned imbued with Calvin's doctrine. Hence it was in Calvinism that Hobbes would have to find ideas and arguments on which to base his persuasive case.[37] Thus we should be able to find Hobbes using certain notions "generally admitted or believed" by Calvinists.

Hobbes and Calvin

In the following section we will show that Hobbes appropriated much of the Calvinistic doctrine and constructed an argument that so closely paralleled Calvin's that Presbyterians might be expected to feel quite at home with it.[38] Basically Hobbes constructed a secularized, rationalized version of Calvin's religious argument. Hobbes begins with a description of man's nature that is virtually identical to Calvin's view of man; in both doctrines man exists in a difficult, hostile, insecure condition, continually threatened by death, out of which he can escape only by covenanting into a community ruled by an all-powerful sovereign whose word is law. In other words Hobbes follows Calvin in presenting man in very similar terms, and in offering him the same two alternatives: a life of insecurity, conflict, and death, or a life of security and order in a community, subject to the will of an absolute sovereign ruler.[39]

The most prominent similarity, and the one most often commented on, is that between Calvin's description of "natural" man, and Hobbes's picture of man in the state of nature.[40] Calvin, like

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[34] Though Hobbes rejected most of Aristotle, calling him "the worst teacher that ever was," he approved of his *Rhetoric:* "but his Rhetoric and discourse on animals was rare." Quoted in Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes,* p. 35. For a discussion of the similarities between Hobbes's work and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* see Strauss, pp. 30–43.

[35] Aristotle, *Basic Works,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1947) pp. 327–28, 1331. According to Hobbes's own translation, "in rhetoric the principles must be common opinions, such as the judge is already possessed with. . . . the end of rhetoric is victory, which consists in having gotten belief. . . . belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to persuade or dissuade in matter of state." *E.W.,* VI, 426, 436.

[36] Hobbes does refer to other groups, including Catholics, as causes of the civil war, but they play a very minor role in comparison with the Presbyterians. See *Behemoth,* p. 20; Macgillivray, "Hobbes's History of The Civil War," p. 190.

[37] That Hobbes was familiar enough with Calvin to have adopted this approach is very likely; he attended the strongly Puritan Magdalen Hall, Oxford, where students normally read Calvin. For comments on Hobbes's interest in religious issues see Doyle, "The Contemporary Background of Hobbes's State of Nature," *Economica* 7 (December, 1927), 336–355; Willis B. Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes" in Keith C. Brown, ed., *Hobbes Studies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 142.

[38] In constructing his parallel argument Hobbes was perhaps subtly employing his "good fancy", i.e., the ability to observe "similitudes . . . as are but rarely observed by others," a skill which he recognized was sometimes necessary in order to achieve understanding: "In demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment does all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy" (*Leviathan,* pp. 43–44). Hobbes might have expected that the Puritans' political understanding would be opened by the apt similitude he presented them.

[39] Since this paper is concerned with Hobbes's political theory and not with his statements on religion, it will not deal with Bks. III and IV of *Leviathan.* Hobbes's discussion of religion follows the same pattern as his political theory; it is an argument aimed at the two religious groups most politically disruptive, the Puritans and the Catholics. See *Leviathan,* p. 452; J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes" in his *Politics, Language and Time* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 179, 180–7.

[40] Walzer, *The Revolution of The Saints* (New York: Atheneum, 1968) pp. 26, 34, 41, 42, 47; Sanford Lakoff, *Equality in Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) pp. 70–79; Willis B. Glover,

Hobbes, saw men living in a disagreeable, insecure, warlike condition in which death was an ever present danger: "Human life is beset by innumerable evils, and threatened with a thousand deaths. . . . Now withersoever you turn, all the objects around you are not only unworthy of your confidence, but almost openly menace you, and seem to threaten immediate death. . . . Amidst these difficult times, must not man be most miserable, who is half dead while he lives, and is dispirited and alarmed as though he had a sword perpetually applied to his neck."[41] Calvin also found man to be vain, proud, and desirous of power and preeminence: "I say that the nature of man is such that every man would be a lord and master over his neighbors and no man by his good will would be a subject . . . men are of so perverse and crooked a nature that everyone would scratch out his neighbor's eyes if there were no bridle to hold them in. . . . Subject, then, to so many forms of wickedness, they drag out their lives in ceaseless tumult and disquiet."[42]

Hobbesian man is proud, vain, contentious, desirous of power, and dominated by his passions. Hobbes finds a "natural proclivity of men to hurt each other, which they derive from their passions . . . chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves." They are so inflated with self-love that they refuse to acknowledge their equality, but rather hold themselves superior to others. Hence from birth, men are involved in "a perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority," and "scramble for everything they covet and would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them." Out of desire for gain, reputation, or their own safety, men continually quarrel and threaten each other. Consequently the condition in which such men exist, being without government or order, is a "war of all against all," in which they experience "continual fear, and danger of violent death"; and their lives are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[43]

Calvin further characterizes man as a being who, though not totally without reason, is dominated by his impulses and passions: "man neither rationally chooses . . . nor takes the advice of reason, nor duly exerts his understanding; but without reason, without reflection, follows his natural inclination like the herds of the field." Even when his reason is not dominated by his passions it accomplishes little, for it is debilitated and deformed. Man's understanding can be of two kinds, that of terrestrial matters, including politics and domestic economy, and that of celestial matters, such as God and his kingdom, true righteousness, and the blessedness of a future life. Because of man's sin, his ability to understand the former has been corrupted, while he has been totally deprived of his ability to comprehend the latter (i.e., faith). In other words, by the Fall, man lost the only means by which he can know God (for faith consists in the knowledge of God and divine will) and on which rested his hope for salvation.[44]

In this condition, suggests Calvin, man is not only miserable but is not even on the same level as the rest of brute creation: " . . . men, because by their own fault, they are fallen to that degree of fatuity, that now they approach more nearly to beasts than to true man . . . men entirely destitute of religion not only do not excel the brutes, but are in many respects far more wretched. . . . The worship of God is therefore the only thing which renders men superior to brutes." Thus it seems that even with his reason, man may fall as low as the beasts. Yet impressed upon the mind of man is the idea of the deity, and no matter how much man may deny or ignore it, there remains an innate impression of the divine existence. While this faint impression is not true knowledge or worship of God, it offers the potential for faith, and thus a truly human existence.[45]

Corresponding to Calvin's argument, Hobbes pictures man, in his brutish condition of "mere nature," existing in a manner almost indistinguishable from that of animals. The only ability man has naturally is prudence, which is based on experience. But prudence by itself does not put man above animals, rather it seems that man is worse off: "it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There are beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten."[46] Since man is not distinguished from beasts naturally, i.e., from birth, it must be by something he achieves. The unique human achievement is the use of reason.

> Man excelleth beasts only in making rules to himself, that is to say, in remembering and reasoning aright upon that which he remembereth. They which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. . . . So that it is not merely the nature of man, that makes him worthier than other living creatures, but the knowledge

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"Human Nature and the State in Hobbes," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. IV, no. 4 (October 1966) 294–311; Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism* (New York: Schocken, 1967) p. 242; Francis C. Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), pp. 2–3, 66.

[41] *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. John Allen (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1949) I, xvii, 10.

[42] Quoted in Walzer, pp. 31, 33; Calvin, *Works*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1844) p. 94.

[43] *De Cive*, p. 29; *Leviathan*, p. 460; *E.W.* VII, 73; see also *Leviathan*, pp. 80–82, 111, 118.

[44] *Institutes*, II, ii, 26; II, ii, 12–13; III, ii, 2, 6–7, 14–15.

[45] *Works*, I, 243; *Institutes*, I, iii, 3.

[46] *Leviathan*, p. 16, also p. 43; *De Cive*, p. 13.

that he acquires by meditation and by the right use of reason in making good rules of his future actions.[47]

Although reason is not a natural ability like prudence, Hobbes sees the potential for reason existing in every person. Thus for example, although children are not endowed with reason, they are "called reasonable creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in the time to come." Unlike prudence, however reason does not develop automatically with growth or experience but requires effort and assistance. According to Hobbes those faculties which are "proper to man only," such as reason and science, are "acquired and increased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of words and speech."[48] Since speech is not born with man, but must be invented, there is always the possibility that it will be misused so that men are caused grief, and are unable to communicate or cooperate.[49] Clearly the state of nature is such a situation, since the freedom of each person to define words as he wishes, results in an anarchy of meaning. On the other hand, if speech and reason are used correctly, man's "faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures." Hobbes sees the process as follows: ". . . the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; *reason* is the *pace*; increase of *science*, the *way*; and the benefit of mankind, the *end*."[50] The correct use of reason, which refers to, as already noted, the making of good rules for one's future actions, implies the creation of some system of rules or order in which man can live. Only within a system of order can consistent and intelligible speech be maintained, the growth of reason and science be possible, and mankind benefited. The next step in the argument, for both Hobbes and Calvin, is the establishment of that condition in which man realizes his potential for a truly human existence.

Central to Calvin's argument is his insistence that only by the grace of God could man be saved from his miserable, brutish condition. God's grace is given to man through the covenant with Christ in the church. This "covenent of grace" is totally the work of God, for "grace is not merely offered by the Lord to be either received or rejected according to the free choice of each, but that it is grace which produces both the choice and will in the heart." Even though God accomplishes all by his own power, grace is given in the form of a covenant, which implies two participating and responsible parties. It is "as if God had said, 'see how kindly I indulge thee: for I do not require integrity from thee simply on account of my authority, which I might justly do; but whereas I owe thee nothing, I condescend graciously to engage in a mutual covenant'."[51]

Thus through the concept of a covenant of grace, Calvin is able to combine two things: man's moral obligation to obey God, based on his having agreed to the covenant, and God's absolute sovereignty in his dealing with man. The relationship between God and man is thus one of simple command and obedience. Regenerated by God's grace, men become "serviceable" to God, but they do not at all limit divine sovereignty. In other words, the covenant is a way of activating man into obedience, but not of controlling God.[52]

The emphasis of the covenant is on the community formed by it, not on the individual, for it is the same covenant made with the Jews, which was national and social. While God's grace is given to individuals, a community of the elect is formed through the covenant with Christ. Moreover as the church consisting of the whole body of the elect blurs into the church as a social institution with powers of compulsion, the covenant becomes "a social commitment to obey God's law . . . a social act and subject to social enforcement in God's name."[53] Thus it becomes clear that it is by covenanting into the community of the church that man is saved from his brutishness.

For Hobbes, a system of rules, i.e., civil society, can only be established by individuals covenanting among themselves to set up an absolute sovereign authority to rule over them. Since men are naturally equal and not subject to any authority, it is only on the basis of consent that an artificial system of rules can be established. In addition, only if all rights to act according to private judgment are surrendered to an absolute authority, can the burden of fear, conflict, and brutishness be removed. That is, given the nature of Hobbesian man, the "war of all against all" can only be ended and order established by submitting to a common reason:

> When there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows or be undecided . . . so is it also in all debates of what kind so ever.[54]

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[47] *E.W.*, V. 186.

[48] *Leviathan*, pp. 29, 17; also pp. 46, 80.

[49] *Leviathan*, pp. 19, 30, 111.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 29–30.

[51] *Institutes*, II, iii, 1; II, iii, 13; II, iii, 7; *Works*, I, 444.

[52] *Works*, I, 443; Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints*, p. 167.

[53] *Institutes*, II, iii, 1; Walzer, pp. 56–57; Ernest Troeltsch, *The Social Techniques of the Christian Churches*, two vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960) II, 586.

[54] *Leviathan*, p. 26.

Thus we can see that by the same means by which men move "up" from the level of beasts to a distinctively human existence, men also move "out" of the dangerous, violent state of nature. That is, men rightly and beneficially use their reason to make rules for their future actions, by covenanting together to create a commonwealth ruled by an absolute sovereign. That man cannot be fully human, "worthier than other living creatures," outside civil society, should be clear in two ways. First what reason men are able to muster in the state of nature would lead them out of it, since "reason suggesteth covenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement," which when joined to the fear of violent death, would lead men to covenant into civil society.[55] Second, since reason and science can only develop on the basis of consistently defined words, and since most men can only acquire the use of reason "by instruction and discipline," civil society must already exist for them to be able to do so. Hence, man who is not recognizably different from other living creatures by nature, becomes so by creating and living in civil society.

While reason (or faith) is the distinctive human quality realized by covenanting, it is not what motivates man to covenant. Calvin, when he is not emphasizing God's power and grace in the making of the covenant, attributes to man the motive of fear. For example, the "pious man" in his natural state is oppressed by "extreme anxiety and dread," and "as he justly dreads fortune, so he ventures securely to commit himself to God." Reflecting "that he is in imminent danger of death," despairing of his strength, "the man terrified with the apprehension of eternal death, which he sees justly impending over him for his unrighteousness, betakes himself entirely to the Divine mercy as to the only port of salvation."[56]

Fear of death is the most appropriate motive for covenanting, since what is offered to man is life. The fall of Adam was a fall from life to death in that the spiritual life of Adam consisted in union with his maker, so alienation from him was the death of his soul. "Under the name of death is comprehended all those miseries in which Adam involved himself by his defection . . . the life of man without God [is] to be wretched and lost, and therefore differing nothing from death." But the life which had been lost by Adam is recoverable in Christ, through the covenant of grace.[57] In other words the covenant with Christ is the means by which the elect leave a condition threatening "eternal death," and enter into a community in which their spiritual lives are secured.

Clearly fear of violent death plays a fundamental role in the actions of Hobbesian men. While reason shows them how to leave the state of nature, it is their fear that pushes them out. In the case of a "commonwealth by institution" men covenant out of fear of one another, while in the case of a "commonwealth by acquisition" they covenant out of fear of their conqueror. "In both cases they do it for fear." The Hobbesian man will agree to the setting up of an absolute sovereign only when fear of violent death shocks him into recognizing the precariousness of his situation, and motivates him to curb his vanity and illusions of superiority and power, so that he takes those steps necessary for his own preservation.[58]

To sum up the arguments, we can see that the structure of Hobbes's argument follows that of Calvin, with the change that religious faith has been replaced by reason. Both begin with "natural" man who, vain, contentious, driven by his passions, exists in a threatening, brutish condition. Left to his own resources, or natural abilities, he is unable to secure his life or his future, and risks sinking to the level of beasts. Yet man has the possibility of escaping his insecure state since he has the potential for that quality (faith, reason) which makes him truly human, able to live above the level of beasts. Driven by the fear of death, man will overcome his pride, recognize the truth of his condition, and covenant into civil society. Thus it is clear that for both Hobbes and Calvin an original brutish condition, man's pride, the fear of death, and the concept of the covenant are basic components of their arguments, which both culminate in man's entering a community. The structure of those communities will be examined below.

The Structure of Community

Calvin holds that the community of the church which the elect enter by covenanting is not the product of the elect, but of God alone. Since the unity of the church consists in the elect's close relationship to God (or more precisely Christ as the mediator between man and God), and since all of man's knowledge of God, as well as man's strength and salvation, are the gifts of God's grace, it is impossible that man be able to determine the form of his church. Each man, on his own, would ignorantly adulterate the "pure religion" and fantasize his own idol instead of God thereby separating himself from God and dissolving the church. Thus "it is not surprising if the Holy Spirit reject, as spurious, every form of worship which is of human contrivance."[59] In other words the community exists only insofar as the members neither act nor judge on their own but submit to divine will and providence.

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[55] *Ibid.*, p. 84; see also p. 242.

[56] *Institutes*, I, xvii, 11; II, vii, 3; II, viii, 3.

[57] *Works*, I, 127; *Institutes*, II, i, 5–6; II, vi, 2.

[58] *Leviathan*, pp. 129–130; also *De Cive*, p. 24n; Oakeshott, *Leviathan*, intro. p. xxxvi.

[59] *Institutes*, I, v, 13; I, iv, 1–3. Wolin points out that Calvin insisted that interpretation of scripture be limited

While the elect accept their community as given to them by God, Hobbesian men, using their reason might appear to create their own commonwealth. Yet this is not so, according to Hobbes, for men use their own reason only so far as to agree upon a sovereign; after that "right reason" is the reason of the sovereign. Ironically men use what reason they have in the state of nature only in order to submit to the reason of another: " . . . in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each subject for the right." What Hobbes attempts to demonstrate is that it is the conclusion of reason that the individual's right to make crucial moral and political decisions must be given up. That is, the commonwealth cannot survive unless individual reasoning (so far as conduct is concerned) from the moment of covenanting is replaced by the reasoning of the sovereign.[60] In giving up his original reason, Hobbesian man gives up the power to determine the actual form his commonwealth will take.

The sovereign, by being sovereign, necessarily has a free hand in setting up and ruling the commonwealth. Arguing that whoever has the right to an end, has the right to the means to that end, Hobbes points out that since "the sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and defense, he is understood to have power to use such means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge . . . to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done. . ."[61] In other words, Hobbes's subjects covenant into they know not what, creating their commonwealth only insofar as they consent to another's creating it. "We make a commonwealth," says Hobbes, by "the act of our submission."[62] Thus it is clear that for Hobbes men must accept their community as given to them, just as much as Calvin's elect accept theirs.

A fundamental aspect of Calvin's thinking is his emphasis on God's omnipotence and sovereignty.[63] Just as God actively regulates the whole universe, relying solely on his own power, so he rules over the community of the elect. Though God often works indirectly, using animate and inanimate objects as his instruments, they do not share in, or detract from, his power. Even angels, which God made the ministers of his power and glory, have no independence of Him, they do not share in his glory or power. Nor is God limited by the laws of nature, for they are only the result of his will. Similarly the moral law which God laid down for man is not binding on God himself, since he is above the law and what he once commanded, he may also reverse.[64]

The Hobbesian sovereign is, in many respects, very similar to Calvin's God. The sovereign, called by Hobbes, a "mortal god," is above the civil law, with unlimited power and authority. Hobbes pictures the sovereign as so great and powerful, that like a god, "the power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of the power soverign." Again like the Calvinistic God, the sovereign simply wills or commands the law, while remaining unhindered by it. Justice is obedience to the law, while the law, defining good and evil, is the public conscience; just as righteousness, for Calvin, is obedience to the word of God. Hobbes, in fact, explicitly compares the sovereign to God in this respect, for just as "God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no sin," sovereigns "make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust by forbidding them."[65]

For Hobbes the commonwealth is held together by the civil laws, which tie the subjects to the sovereign. Emphasizing the "top down" character of the commonwealth, Hobbes refers to the laws as "artificial chains" which are "fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears." The equivalent link in Calvin is God's word, which unites the community by tying each member to God. In both cases there is a demand and need for a uniform public truth, set down by the sovereign, without which the community would dissolve.[66] In Calvin's community nothing happens but by God's command or permission, while in the Leviathan, whatever happens is either com-

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to the appropriate officers of the church, who presumably would be among the elect, thereby avoiding the disintegrating effects of private visions in the institutional church as well. Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p. 180.

[60] *DeCive*, p. 32n; also *Leviathan*, pp. 174, 176. The reason which men have in civil society is the creation of, and dependent on, that society. See Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 257 ff; Blair Campbell, "Prescription and Description in Political Thought, The Case for Hobbes," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 382–384.

[61] *Leviathan*, pp. 118, 116.

[62] Quoted in Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas*, p. 74. See Harvey C. Mansfield, "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 100–101.

[63] Calvin's use of political language in describing God (e.g., "divine government", "sovereignty", "ruling") allows for, if not encourages, a political interpretation of his doctrine.

[64] *Institutes*, I, xvi, 1–4; I, xvii, 6; I, xiv, 12; *Works*, I, 82–3.

[65] *Leviathan*, pp. 112, 119, 120; *E.W.*, IV, 250; *De Cive*, p. 129.

[66] *Leviathan*, p. 138.

manded or "pretermitted" by the sovereign: a subject's freedom to do as he pleases in a given area of activity is contingent upon the sovereign's not having laid down any rules for that area.[67] Thus for both Hobbes and Calvin the community is structured in such a way that the sovereign stands at the center, uniting the whole, by tying each member to him through his commands.

While knowledge of God's will is essential to the community, it is not sufficient in itself to sustain the community, even with God's paternal love. Fear is equally necessary ". . . for wherever the fear of God does not reign, men rush onward to every kind of wickedness; so that they neither spare human blood, nor restrain themselves from rapine, violence and contumelies . . . it is the fear of God alone which unites us together in the bonds of our common humanity . . . otherwise we should devour each other like wild beasts."[68] In other words the church exists, in part, because the fear of death which motivated man in his "natural" condition has been replaced by the fear of God.

The role of fear is virtually the same in Hobbes's argument: man's condition in the state of nature is one of fear; it is fear that drives man to covenant; and it is essentially fear that holds the commonwealth together. Just as Calvin recognized that love was insufficient to make men behave civilly, Hobbes saw that unless men "be restrained through fear of some coercive power" they "distrust and dread each other," and their passions carry them to "partiality, pride, revenge, and the like." Moreover once men realize that the only alternative to complete submission to the sovereign is to be thrown back into the anarchic state of nature, they will want to behave civilly out of fear of that possibility. That is, it is not so much the difficulty but the danger of rebelling that keeps men civil for Hobbes.[69]

A prominent characteristic of Calvin's God is that he is incomprehensible to man. Although man knows God through faith, man still does not understand God or his providence. "When in defining faith we call it knowledge," Calvin explains, "we mean not thereby a comprehending, such as man use to have of those things that are subject to man's understanding." God rules by his secret and incomprehensible wisdom; thus while faith brings knowledge of God's word, his purposes remain inscrutable. According to Troeltsch, Calvin's God is irrational in the sense that he is not to be measured by the standards of human reason or logic.[70] The incomprehensible, irrational nature of God cannot be a pretext for disregarding or ignoring his word, for that can only lead to death as it did for Adam. The divine word "is the will of God, therefore it must be endured, not only because resistance is unlawful and in vain, but because he wills nothing but what is both just and expedient."[71] God's will is always just and good, regardless of how it appears to man, and must always be obeyed.

While Hobbes does not present his sovereign as incomprehensible, he may be unintelligible to his subjects for there is no requirement that the reason of the sovereign be reasonable in any conventional sense. In setting up the sovereign's reason as the "right reason" the subjects commit themselves to abide by his judgments, and to give up the right to judge the reasonableness of the sovereign's actions. Thus Hobbes's sovereign is *inscrutable in the same sense as Troeltsch found* Calvin's God irrational: he is not to be measured or scrutinized by the standards or reason of his subjects. The subjects have no alternative but to accept on faith the belief that their sovereign's actions are rational and beneficial.

Although it is likely that the sovereign would be more or less rational in setting up his "system of rules," yet were his word to become irrational or unintelligible, the subjects, still obligated to obey and not criticize, could only "captivate their understanding." Hobbes explains: "We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forebear contradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is trust and faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken."[72] Thus we can see the element of faith in Hobbes's commonwealth. The subjects' reason becomes (at least in the public realm) as dependent upon the sovereign, as is the elect's faith in God, for both rest on acceptance of the sovereign's word. While Hobbes's sovereign may be inscrutable only procedurally (legally), and not ontologically, as is Calvin's God, this distinction matters very little viewed from the perspective of their subjects.

Hobbes's use of Calvinism becomes quite clear in his discussion of the causes of the dissolution of civil society. Since, according to Hobbes, "it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil," it is appropriate that the major cause of disorder is (following the religious analogy) the doctrine "that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man."[73] In stressing the dangers of political opposition, Hobbes refers his

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[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 138–139, 143.

[68] *Works,* I, 529.

[69] *De Cive,* p. 11; *Leviathan,* p. 109, also pp. 86, 89, 138; *Behemoth,* p. 144.

[70] *Institutes,* III, ii, 14–15; Troeltsch, II, 585.

[71] *Institutes,* II, i, 4; I, xvii, 2; I, xvii, 8.

[72] *Leviathan,* p. 243, also p. 41.

[73] *De Cive,* pp. 129, 128; also *Leviathan,* p. 211.

Puritan audience to the fact that original sin consisted of a disobedient and presumptuous desire to judge good and evil:

> But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings, which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God's commands is, (Gen. ii, 7); *Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil;* and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii, 5): *Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.*[74]

Moreover Hobbes also alludes to a prelapsarian time of innocence when "it was peace and a golden age." In this time, there was no disorder for there was no questioning of the right of rulers to command. Princes exercised their supreme power, "not by arguments, but by punishing the wicked, and protecting the good. Likewise subjects did not measure what was just by the saying and judgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm"; subjects also "reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in a council, as a certain visible divinity." These "ancients" were able to sustain this idyllic state by keeping "the science of justice wrapped up in fables," not exposed to public disputation. But once "the science of justice" was made available to everyone, princes were exposed to the questioning and judgment of private men, and their subjects joined "themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the utter ruin of their state," falling thereby into the state of nature.[75] In other words Hobbes supported his case for political absolutism and the prohibition of political dissent by drawing on the story of the Fall, specifically on the Puritan "epic of the two Adams": the "old Adam" who fell from God's grace because of his sin, followed by the "new Adam," Christ, with whom the faithful are united in a new community, overcoming that sin.[76] The state of nature, the equivalent of the condition of fallen man, can be escaped only by overcoming that sin (the private judging of good and evil) which originally caused man to fall from the peaceful, orderly state. Clearly Hobbes intended that his own writings, by definitively explaining the "science of justice," would dissuade people from ever again committing that sin, and thereby restore the prince's power and authority and peaceful civil society.

As a consequence of Hobbes's use of Calvinism, we would expect to find some notion of community in his political theory, since Calvin had a strong sense of community. Yet it is a commonplace that Hobbes's extreme individualism precludes the notion of community.[77] It has been said that the unity of Hobbes's commonwealth is nothing more than a rationalistic, legalistic fiction, and that the active support and participation in a community by its members, which is essential to its life, is totally absent from Hobbes's understanding of the political order. On the basis of Hobbes's theory of language, it has been said that Hobbesian men can hardly communicate with each other, let alone participate in any community.[78] Moreover it has also been argued that as a consequence of Hobbes's failure to incorporate any kind of political activity in his system, the sovereign, lacking any popular support, is not the powerful, dominating figure Hobbes claims him to be. In the face of private sources of power, such as money or property, he is a mere "spitfrog."[79] Yet against these criticisms, we can place the fact that Hobbes himself thought he was discussing a real community. He insisted that genuine unity rather than a mere collection of individuals was created by the covenant: "A multitude of men are made *one* person. . . . This is more than consent or concord: it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person. . . . "[80] In the light of Hobbes's insistence on the reality of his community, the failure of Hobbes's readers to find any sense of community in his theory may be due to his having relied on a religious rather than a political model of community. Thus if we looked at the Leviathan as if it were modeled on the Calvinist community of the elect, united in Christ, we might gain a new understanding of its dynamics and unity.

While Hobbes does speak of uniting the strength of the subjects in the will of the sovereign it is never clear how this is accomplished. Rather it seems that the sovereign acts on his own, while the subjects simply "step aside," and that consequently the unity is without substance. Through covenanting, subjects are said to transfer their rights to the sovereign, but this transferring of rights appears to have only a negative meaning since "the conveyance of right consists merely in not resisting."[81] Yet there may still be real unity in the Leviathan if the strength and life of the commonwealth is seen as originating not with the subjects, but with the sovereign. As with the elect united in Christ, all life and strength may actually flow from the head to the body, not the reverse; the members of the community depend upon the sovereign for their life and motion. "It is true," argues Hobbes, that subjects "cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the soul of the commonwealth, which failing; the commonwealth is dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as cohering to another, for want of a common dependence on a known sovereign; just as the members of the natural body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul to hold them together."[82] Here Hobbes seems very close to Calvin's understanding of the unity of the community of the elect, who are united by their common dependence on God, and " . . . as soon as the Lord takes away his *spirit, all things return to their dust and vanish* away."[83]

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[74] *De Cive*, p. 129.

[75] *De Cive*, p. 9; cf. Lakoff, p. 73.

[76] See William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 152–160.

[77] E.g. Glover, "Human Nature", p. 304.

[78] According to Watkins, *Hobbes's System of Ideas*, p. 101, "Each of us is condemned to solitary confinement within his body. We can transmit and receive signals through the walls of our cells, and we may even work out and execute a common plan. But our minds never meet."

[79] Harrington's term, quoted in Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 285.

[80] *Leviathan*, pp. 107, 112.

[81] *De Cive*, p. 33.

The use of the religious term "soul" to describe the sovereign seems out of place for a materialist like Hobbes. One would expect Hobbes, following his comparison with the natural body, to have called the sovereign the head or heart of the commonwealth, for according to his own theory, the body is mind dependent, and the mind, heart dependent.[84] Moreover the dependence relationship Hobbes employs, which appears to have a religious origin, may explain the lack of participation and activity in his commonwealth. The Calvinistic God, being totally self-sufficient, does not need to mobilize the support of the members of his community; he is lacking in nothing. Similarly Hobbes seems to have envisioned a community which did not need participation or the mobilization of popular strength, since the Leviathan was by himself so powerful that he gave support, indeed life, to his subjects. Perhaps it was because his community followed a religious pattern that Hobbes described the sovereign in such dramatic, awe-inspiring language, and called him a "mortal god"; a community so structured would need a self-sufficient, god-like being at its center in order to survive.

That the subjects do not seem to cooperate or work together in the public sphere is not a problem for the commonwealth; indeed, it is an error, argues Hobbes, to say that the members of a commonwealth "depend one of another."[85] Just as in Calvin's community, the essential relationship is the strong tie between the individual member and the sovereign. While it may be true that the subjects do not really communicate, they are united together, by all being tied to the same sovereign authority. The lack of involvement and activity usually associated with the idea of community thus is due not to Hobbes's lack of any sense of community, but to his relying on a particular conception of community. If Hobbes failed to create real political power and unity, and if his sovereign turned out to be only a "spitfrog," it was because his community required a god to sustain it and Hobbes had only men.

In summary of the above discussion, Hobbes presented man with the same two alternatives as had Calvin: a deadly, brutish, "fallen" condition of disorder, versus an orderly secure, moral community ruled by an absolute sovereign. Relying on fear to motivate man, as did Calvin, Hobbes uses the device of the covenant to establish his civil society. At times Hobbes even compares his covenant to a religious one, stressing that, in his civil society, as "in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the sovereign, by pact with the people."[86] Hobbes's commonwealth is itself comparable structurally with Calvin's community; in both cases the sovereign stands at the center, sustaining and uniting the members of the community. Hobbes even co-opts religious terminology, calling his commonwealth a "church."[87] Similarly the Hobbesian sovereign is much like Calvin's God, having absolute power and authority, and being the source of all morality. Thus it is clear that both in the process of man's moving from his natural condition into civil society, and in the actual commonwealth set up, Hobbes follows Calvin's religious doctrine.

Conclusion

We can now see how Hobbes structured his defense of the king and order to appeal to what was, politically, his most important audience, the Puritans. By drawing on the logic of Calvinism, Hobbes attempted to persuade his Puritan audience of the need to support, rather than to attack, the political order. Following a pattern of argument with which Puritans were familiar, he hoped to provide for the political order the kind of obedience and loyalty that the Puritans had felt only for their religion. By replacing the church with the political order as the civilizing, humanizing, institution, Hobbes was, in effect, saying to his readers that the dangers of political rebellion and disorder were as great and immediate as they had hitherto believed were only associated with the abandonment of religion: to fall to fearful depths of brutishness, suffering, and death.[88] And just as it would be inconceivable for there to be moral grounds on which resistance to God could be justified, so Hobbes destroys the possibility of legitimate political opposition by making his "mortal god" the source of all morality and justice. In other words, the political absolutism desired by Hobbes, hitherto defended only anachronistically on the basis of the philosophy of order, Hobbes now justified by working from a Calvinist notion of man to a Calvinist notion of community, an argument which supports the king's authority far more forcefully than a conventional royalist ever could.

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[82] *Leviathan,* p. 379, also pp. 5, 218.

[83] *Works,* I, 74.

[84] Watkins, p. 103. Cf. Christopher Hill, "William Harvey and the Idea of Monarchy," *Past and Present,* 27 (April, 1964), 54–72.

[85] *Leviathan,* p. 379.

[86] *Ibid.,* p. 463.

[87] *Ibid.,* pp. 255, 305, 306.

[88] See Ashcraft, "Hobbes's Natural Man," pp. 1089–90, 1109–1111.

Our discussion of Hobbes, beyond providing an interpretation of certain aspects of his theory, should provide support for our general view of political theory. Taking Hobbes as an example, it should be clear that political theorizing can be fruitfully seen as a form of persuasive argument aimed at a specific audience. It is clear that Hobbes, a strong partisan, was trying to convince his countrymen of the folly of their action and of the need to support their king in all matters. Success in this task clearly rested on his ability to communicate to, and persuade his audience. Unlike a lawyer arguing his case in a courtroom, Hobbes had no control over the makeup of his audience; rather it was given to him by the existing political situation. That situation affected the kind of arguments Hobbes employed in two ways. First the fact that the conventional royalist arguments had been discredited, demanded that he (to be effective) justify his royalist position on new grounds, with new arguments. Second, those groups or developments which had done most to undermine the old royalist position determined the audiences to which he had to address himself, and the terms in which he structured his argument. We have seen that Hobbes did present his case on several levels, each designed to appeal to a distinct audience. While the "scientific" Hobbes and the "bourgeois" Hobbes are already well known, this paper has explored Hobbes's "Puritan" argument. (In so doing, I have not presumed, of course, to have exhausted all the levels of Hobbes's argument.) The greatness of Hobbes's work, and what distinguishes it from other political writings, rests on his ability to leave behind the conventional and ineffective arguments of his day, and to create a new world-view, which provides strong support for his political position, and appears powerful and persuasive to a very heterogeneous audience.

This view of political theory has several implications for the study of past political theorists. It should be clear that no part of a work of theory can be ignored or assumed to be irrelevant, if we are to comprehend it in its entirety. If we examine theory only from the perspective of the logician, we may miss some of the ways in which the theorist tried to convey his message, as well as aspects of the message itself. Since a theorist may be addressing himself to more than one audience, his theory may contain more than one argument. By assuming that there is only a single argument, one may mistakenly conclude that various aspects of a work are inconsistent or irrelevant, while they may, in fact, be parts of different arguments. Since a work of political theory may contain several arguments, the attempt to extract a single logic from it would be, in many cases, a mistaken effort. For example, many commentators on Hobbes have argued about his theory of obligation without apparently considering the possibility that Hobbes was presenting several justifications for political obedience. Finally it will be necessary to study the context in which a theorist wrote, for without knowing the issues, arguments, participants, etc. on the political scene, one may not recognize all aspects of a theorist's argument, especially those aspects addressed to an audience with which we today have little in common. Moreover, the significance of an argument for either the theorist or his audience will not be evident without some familiarity with the context in which he wrote. In this study I have tried to show that by taking a broader, historical approach to the study of political theory, one may come to a more comprehensive and dynamic understanding of the activity of political theorizing.

Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis*

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"The suburb is the Northern way to insure separate and unequal. It has the advantage of being legal. If housing, education, jobs, and matrimony are to remain a charmed circle among formally equal citizens in an era of public goods, there is a powerful logic behind the existing fragmentation and the basis for considerable resistance to the creation of really general governments."[1]

Introduction

Political incorporation by class and status into municipal enclaves is an important institutional mechanism for creating and perpetuating inequality among residents in metropolitan communities in the United States. The salience of governmental inequality has been increasing. In a laissez-faire, capitalist society the distribution of valued commodities among urban residents is largely governed by the distribution of "effective demand" among consumers engaging in price competition in the private market place. With the rapid growth in the public sector of the economy in recent decades, however, there have been vast increases in the consumption of public goods.[2] Concomitant with growth in the public sector, the segregation of public goods consumption through suburbanization has become a central part of the structure of inequality among urban residents.[3] The municipal segregation of class and status groups tends to divorce fiscal resources from public needs in the metropolis. As one student of the problem has recently noted:

> Because the political subdivisions of a metropolitan area are largely autonomous in matters of local finance, differentials in per capita income create inequalities in both fiscal capacity and public service needs between municipalities. And because we entrust local government to effect substantial redistribution of real income through local public services, a serious problem follows from the divorcing of income from need.[4]

This paper presents an exploratory analysis of factors associated with inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources—the capacity to generate public goods—among municipal governments in metropolitan areas in the United States. I commence by outlining a conceptual framework which then serves to organize the analysis of empirical findings. I conclude with a brief discussion of important directions for further research.

Urban Stratification

The student of metropolitan political structure can draw upon a number of conceptual models to organize an empirical investigation. For example, urban-oriented political scientists have viewed the metropolis as a world arena in miniature in which "municipal nation-states" conduct delicate negotiations[5]; as a market in which municipal corporations compete for the allegiance of fickle citizen-consumers[6]; as an ecological coliseum housing recurrent games played by evanascent political teams[7]; as a system of specialized, incorporated groups seeking to promote life-styles and protect values through municipal balkanization[8]; and the list goes on.

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* This research was supported by grants from the University of Wisconsin Graduate Research Committee and the Institute for Research on Poverty. I would like to thank Robert Lineberry for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Robert Alford and Michael Aiken who allowed me to use data from the Wisconsin GUA data file.

[1] Norton E. Long, "Political Science and the City," in *Urban Research and Policy Planning,* Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin, editors (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1967), p. 254.

[2] Total expenditures by all levels of U.S. government rose from 12.8 per cent of GNP in 1945-1950 to 22.4 per cent in 1966–1970. State and local government spending almost doubled, increasing from 5.9 per cent of GNP in 1946–1950 to 11.5 per cent in 1966–1970. See James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), p. 97.

[3] Norton Long, "Political Science and the City", pp. 253–255.

[4] Wilbur Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 105–106.

[5] See Matthew Holden, "The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy," *Journal of Politics,* 26 (August, 1964), 627–647; and Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963).

[6] See Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *The Journal of Political Economy,* 64 (October, 1956), 416–424; Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," *American Political Science Review,* 55 (December, 1961), 831–842; Robert Warren, "A Municipal Services Model of Metropolitan Organization," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners,* 30 (August, 1964), 193–204; and Robert L. Bish, *The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas* (Chicago: Markham, 1971).

[7] Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology,* 44 (November, 1958).

[8] Oliver Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas," *Social Science Quarterly,* 48 (December, 1967), 299–310. This

At the cost of contributing another image to this conceptual mélange, I would like to argue the benefits of approaching the metropolitan complex as a system of social stratification. A number of central issues in urban politics center upon inequality among social groups. Basic urban problems emanate from the differential access of urban residents to scarce economic, social, and political resources. In order to deal effectively with these issues it is necessary to conduct research within a conceptual framework which explicitly focuses upon the causes and consequences of inequality in the distribution of the surplus product among social groups in the metropolitan community. This framework should generate testable hypotheses as well as provide insight into potential sources of change in the urban system. Such an approach is particularly useful in an investigation of sources of inequality in the distribution of resources among local governments in metropolitan communities.

As Lenski has recently noted, virtually all the major theorists in the field of social stratification have sought to answer one basic question: who gets what and why?[9] In this study urban stratification refers to the institutionalization of social arrangements that generate and perpetuate intergenerational inequality in the distribution of scarce economic, political, and social resources among collectivities in the metropolis.[10] Institutional arrangements connote the principles, procedures, and policies governing and structuring the relationships between groups in the metropolitan community. An urban stratification system consists of a bounded set of individuals, groups, and organizations whose structured interactions culminate in the allocation and distribution of scarce resources among urban residents.

A basic assumption underlying this investigation is that the distribution of symbolic and material advantages among individuals is largely a function of the distribution of power among social groups. Imbedded in the principles, procedures and policies governing and structuring the relationships between classes, and among status groups in the metropolitan community is a "mobilization of bias": a set of institutional rules of the game variously resting upon authority, influence, and force which benefit some at the expense of others.[11]

Intergroup conflict in the metropolis resides in the attempt of group members to gain access to, or control over, those institutions which govern the distribution of symbolic and material advantages.[12] The social relations among classes[13] and among status groups,[14] imbedded in the means of economic production and exchange in the metropolis, structure differential access to income and economic goods and services. The unequal distribution of income and social status among groups fosters an unequal system of social relationships in the urban housing market and local government institutions resulting in differential individual access to housing, neighborhood and "municipal life style." Residential segregation by class and race shapes interaction patterns, friendship ties, marital selection, and social consciousness. The distribution of income and residential location shapes political relationships between collectivities with discordant interests and creates differential access to public goods and services. Access to public goods and services—in particular, education and cultural facilities—controls access to jobs and income.[15] In this manner an interdependent set of local in-

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idea is developed somewhat further in Oliver Williams, *Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

[9] Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 3.

[10] This is a modified version of the definition of stratification provided by John Pease, William H. Form and Joan Huber Rytina, "Ideological Currents in American Stratification Literature," *The American Sociologist*, 5 (May, 1970), 128. It is worth noting that this definition emphasizes the institutional bases of structured inequality among collectivities in contrast to the more "individualistic" opportunity structure approach characterizing much of the current research on social stratification in the United States.

[11] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 71.

[12] Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 25.

[13] According to Weber we may speak of a *class situation* when: "(1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commondity or labor markets." The term *class*, according to Weber, refers to any group of people in the same class situation. See Max Weber, "Class, Status and Party" in *From Max Weber*, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 182. Within a mature capitalist society there are essentially two *class-based* sources of inequality. First, inequality is associated with the differential ownership and control of property. Second, within the broad structure of property relations, inequality is associated with the division of labor. Differential possession of services offered in the labor market gives rise to inequality associated with occupational positions.

[14] Following Weber, we view status as a mode of domination predicated upon the distribution of social honor among collectivities distinguished from one another by dress, speech, social conventions, values—in essence, by styles of life. See Max Weber, "Class, Status and Party," pp. 186–194.

[15] See Norton Long, "Political Science and the City" for a lucid discussion of the interlocking components of the structure of urban inequality and the failure of political science to fully address the issues stemming from "social politics" in the metropolis, pp. 254–256.

stitutions gives rise to the structure of inequality in the modern metropolis.

From the perspective of urban stratification the metropolitan city is composed of a set of interlocking institutional arrangements and interacting organized interest groups whose relationships form the structural framework within which metropolitan citizens attempt to improve the quality of their lives. Elucidating the nature of these institutions and organized interests and the substance of their relationships is the primary task of urban stratification theory and research.

The Role of Municipal Government. Residential location is an important resource in the urban stratification system. As Anton and Williams have argued:

> Because social values are unevenly distributed across urban space, the location of a housing unit determines as much about the opportunities available to residents as does the sheer physical quality of the unit itself. Depending upon where it is located, a house or an apartment may "carry" with it more or fewer public services, better or worse schools, more or less access to commercial activities [and employment opportunities], more or less interaction with people who are prized, or people who are shunned.[16]

Advantaged classes and status groups in the metropolitan community seek to maximize control over scarce resources and maintain life-style values through homogeneous and complementary residential groupings. In the context of a fragmented system of governments in the metropolis, municipal government becomes an institutional arrangement for promoting and protecting the unequal distribution of scarce resources. As Wood has noted, modern suburbs often use their political boundaries to "differentiate the character of their residents from their neighbors" and wield their government powers—zoning, residential covenants, taxation, selective industrial development—"to promote conscious segregation."[17] Within the suburbs, segregation by class and status has been enhanced as different builders have produced new one-class communities containing houses falling entirely within a narrow price range. Because of the high cost of providing public services for new residents, many communities have made use of zoning and other land development controls to hold down population growth and to price out lower- and middle-income families whose housing and lots would not yield enough in property taxes to cover their service costs. In addition, racial discrimination on the part of builders, real estate brokers, and mortgage institutions has reinforced economic segregation with direct policies of racial exclusion.[18]

Thus, a decentralized, fragmented metropolitan government pattern facilitates the maintenance and perpetuation of class and status group privilege. The more status-homogeneous the suburb, the easier it tends to be, politically, to maintain the primacy of prized values. Municipalities come to be characterized by specialized service packages and recruit residents according to the dictum, "All those who like the kind of life symbolized by these services come and join us, if you can afford it."[19] Conflict over the production and distribution of values which depend upon location for their realization (e.g., land use, education, housing, recreation, cultural facilities) resides at the center of metropolitan politics.[20]

The Roots of Urban Problems. As Fusfeld has argued, fundamental urban problems are deeply rooted in three long-term trends in the urban stratification system: (1) the persistence of poverty and income inequality in metropolitan areas; (2) the persistence of racial discrimination in the fabric of urban institutions; (3) the continuing decentralization of economic and governmental activities away from the urban core into outlying areas of the metropolitan community.[21]

Each basic source of urban problems reflects an underlying struggle among collectivities in the metropolis. The persistence of widespread poverty and income inequality reflects a division between the poor and the relatively affluent: a struggle between the less and the more privileged classes in the metropolitan economic order. The persistence of institutional racism reflects a struggle among racially demarcated status groups over the distribution of commodities, symbols of status, jobs and valued ways of living in the metropolis. Spurred by increases in population and advances in transportation and communication technology, and shaped by government subsidy, the decentralization of economic and governmental activities has given rise to structured conflicts between inner cities and suburbs over the distribution of public goods and services within the metropolitan political order.

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[16] Thomas Anton and Oliver P. Williams, "On Comparing Urban Political Systems: Residential Allocations in London and Stockholm," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 7–11, p. 1.

[17] Robert C. Wood, "Metropolitan Government: 1975: An Extrapolation of Trends," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (March, 1958), 117.

[18] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 4.

[19] Oliver P. Williams, "Life-Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas," in *Community Politics, A Behavioral Approach*, Charles Bonjean, Terry Clark and Robert Lineberry, eds. (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 59.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Daniel R. Fusfeld, "The Basic Economics of the Urban and Racial Crisis," *Conference Papers of the Union for Radical Political Economics* (December, 1968), pp. 55–66.

With the progressive decentralization of manufacturing, high-wage industries are deserting central cities and and locating beyond the reach of low-income inner city residents. The central city has increasingly become the center for administration, finance, recreation and other types of services, as well as the location for low-wage industries attracted by surplus labor in crowded slums. Decentralization has also had the effect of reducing the financial resources of central cities as capital has progressively followed high-wage industries and the more affluent population to the suburbs.[22] Thus, as the concentration of the low-income working class and the unemployed in the central city and inner ring suburbs has increased, the fiscal resources necessary to meet their needs have progressively drained to the suburbs and the war chest of the federal government.

The structural contradiction between expanding public needs and declining fiscal resources was greatly intensified with the transformation of southern agriculture during the early and mid-'fifties which dispersed millions of agrarian workers to central cities at a time when mass-production industries were automating and not hiring, economic expansion was slowing down, and high-wage growth industries were decentralizing to "lily-white" sanctuaries at the periphery of the metropolitan areas outside the reach of black and low-income families. In the late 'fifties this wave of migration was followed by a population boom among deprived groups in the central cities of older metropolitan areas which further intensified the problems. A rapid growth in social needs in central cities and inner ring suburbs, accompanied by a corresponding drop in employment opportunities and fiscal resources, produced a deterioration of public services in such crucial areas as education, health, housing, and police and fire protection.[23] This contradiction stimulated the outbreak of ghetto disturbances in the middle and late 'sixties.

In recent decades we have witnessed a greater intermingling of all these conflicts as increasingly nonwhite, impoverished inner cities abrasively bump borders with the more advantaged suburban populations. This struggle seems likely to persist, and may intensify, for while the black migration to the cities has slowed down considerably in recent years, the natural increase in population is continuing. The first generation of children born to the migrants of the early 1950s has been starting the second round of the population explosion in the ghettos and impoverished neighborhoods of the central cities. Residential segregation by race appears to have been increasing,[24] while at the same time "there has been little or no break in the oppressive forces of overcrowded and deteriorating housing, bad education, poor transportation facilities, and inadequate employment opportunities."[25]

Thus, governmental inequality occupies a central position in the urban stratification system. Yet even the most casual survey of census data reveals marked variations in the degree of governmental inequality among metropolitan areas in the United States. The rest of this study is devoted to an empirical analysis of sources of variation in the degree of inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipalities in a sample of metropolitan areas.

Methods and Data

Measuring Governmental Inequality. Comparative research on inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among governments in metropolitan areas involves three basic issues of measurement. First, how are *units of government* to be defined and aggregated? Second, what is the appropriate *indicator of fiscal resources*? Third, what *measure of inequality* is to be employed? These issues are discussed in turn.

Considering the importance of the issue, there has been relatively little comparative research on governmental inequality among metropolitan areas in the United States. The principal exception is the body of research devoted to explaining socioeconomic and fiscal differences among central cities and suburbs in urban areas.[26] In this type of investigation suburban characteristics are averaged together and compared to central city characteristics. Level of governmental inequality is measured by the ratio of central city to suburban characteristics and an attempt is made to explain variations in the city-suburb ratio through the comparative analysis of urban areas. While these studies have advanced our knowledge of factors associated with city-suburb disparities in urban areas, they share a weakness in conceptualization and measurement.[27]

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[22] David L. Birch, *The Economic Future of City and Suburb* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1970).

[23] Fusfeld provides a striking illustration of this process at work in the inner city of Detroit. In the census area surrounding conflict-ridden Twelfth Street, the number of families and unrelated individuals counted by the census fell by about 4,700 between 1950 and 1965. But the number of children of school age increased by 20,900 in the same period. As Fusfeld notes (pp. 55–56): "Even with all the good will in the world, in the absence of vastly increased resources the school authorities could do little but watch the quality of education deteriorate. Unable to provide the funds needed, school officials have presided over the breakdown of the educational system of the central cities. The people who needed the best got the worst."

[24] See Reynolds Farley and Karl E. Taeuber, "Population Trends and Residential Segregation Since 1960," *Science,* 159 (March 1, 1968), 953–956.

[25] Daniel R. Fusfeld, "The Basic Economics of the Urban and Racial Crisis," p. 56. For evidence on these issues for the late 'sixties see *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968).

[26] There are essentially two threads in the research on city-suburb socioeconomic differences. One line of research grows out of the attempts of human ecologists to test and build upon Burgess's concentric zone theory

An assumption underlying research on city-suburb inequality is that suburbs are basically similar to one another in socioeconomic and fiscal characteristics; or at least sufficiently similar to justify an aggregated suburban comparison with the central city. Yet urban research has amply demonstrated the inaccuracy of the image of suburbia as uniformly white-collar and high income.[28] There have, of course, always been working-class suburbs. But as industry has been leaving the central city for the suburbs, blue-collar workers have been following and working-class suburbs have been multiplying. In a recent poll, it was found that almost half of all union members live in the suburbs, and that "suburbanites account for about three-fourths of unionists under age 40."[29] As an indicator of the increasing *embourgeoisement* of blue-collar workers, however, this statistic can be highly misleading. Working-class suburbanites tend to live in older, low-to-moderate income residential and industrial suburbs on the borders of central cities.[30] Manufacturing decentralizes as suburbs compete for industrial firms to alleviate property tax burdens. Yet few suburbs will permit public or low-cost housing to be built near the factories they entice to locate within their borders. The decentralization of manufacturing into middle-class municipal enclaves is likely to foster the further development of relatively low-income, low-tax-base suburbs in areas adjoining the new industrial sites. This development, in turn is likely to exacerbate income disparities between municipalities in the metropolis.

As the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has recently noted,

> Of growing significance are the fiscal disparities among rich and poor suburban communities in many of the metropolitan areas—disparities that often are even more dramatic than those observed between central cities and suburbia in general. Many of the older suburban communities are taking on *the physical, social and economic characteristics of* the central city. This type of community is especially vulnerable to fiscal distress because it lacks the diversified tax base that has enabled the central city to absorb some of the impact of extraordinary expenditure demands.[31]

Therefore, while the city-suburban disparity approach to metropolitan governmental inequality appropriately emphasizes the frequent plight of central cities, it tends to gloss over an increasingly class- and status-differentiated suburban governmental structure. It seems appropriate to go beyond the central city-suburb dichotomy when conducting research on governmental inequality. What appears to be required is the development of hypotheses and measurement procedures addressed to inequality in the distribution of resources among all municipalities in the metropolitan area.

Turning to the second issue, there are a number of possible indicators of level of fiscal resources—capability to produce public goods and services—none of which seems fully satisfactory. Sources of municipal revenue vary by regions within the nation, by states within regions, by metropolitan areas within states, and by municipalities within metropolitan areas. Local governments frequently derive the major share of their revenue from taxes on mercantile, manufacturing, residential and personal property. Assessed valuations of property, however, are notoriously un-

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of urban growth. See Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); and Leo F. Schnore, *Class and Race in Cities and Suburbs* (Chicago: Markham, 1972). The second line of research focuses more explicitly on intergovernmental relations in the metropolis and grows out of the interest of political scientists and others in the growing fiscal disparities between central cities and suburbs. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967); Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

[27] In a series of empirical studies Schnore and his colleagues have found that older, larger, more urbanized areas with high levels of manufacturing activity, high percentages of unsound housing in the central city and low rates of annexation activity tend to have higher status populations in the suburbs relative to the central city. See Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene*.

[28] See Bennett Berger, *Working Class Suburb* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); Leo F. Schnore, "Satellites and Suburbs," *Social Forces*, 36 (December, 1957), 121–129; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the Federal System*, vol. 2, p. 6.

[29] "Where the Votes Are: Unions' Political Arm Joins Trek to the Suburbs," *Wall Street Journal* (August 29, 1967).

[30] For evidence bearing on this point see Richard Hamilton's insightful discussion of the residential location of blue-collar workers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in his recent book, *Class and Politics in the United States* (New York: John Wiley, 1972), chapter three.

[31] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, volume 2, p. 6.

reliable indicators of the actual level of fiscal resources available to a municipality. Municipalities also derive revenue from sales taxes on commodities, from payroll and personal income taxes, and from other sources.

In this investigation the median level of family income in a municipality is employed as the indicator of level of fiscal resources or capacity to produce public goods and services. As Riew has noted, "When the local government relies principally on property as its tax base, personal income as a fiscal resource may seem to be unimportant. But it may be an important potential tax base. Furthermore, since all taxes are paid out of income, that is ultimately what measures best the ability to pay taxes."[32] Median family income provides a very rough indication of the fiscal capacity and the level of service needs in the municipality and is a crude indicator of the class composition of the local government. In contrast to most indicators of fiscal resources, median income retains roughly the same meaning across regions, states, metropolitan areas, and municipalities.

While there are some extremely homogeneous suburbs, normally municipal boundaries do not operate as sharp demographic, economic, or social dividing lines. As Williams has noted, any municipality can absorb a degree of internal diversity while maintaining a dominant life style. Scanning the range of mean values of a characteristic among municipalities in a metropolitan area quickly establishes the existence of diversity and inequality.[33] The standard deviation is the measure of inequality in the distribution of family income among municipalities in the metropolitan area adopted in this study.[34]

The standard deviation is a measure of variability about the mean of a given characteristic. In this case the standard deviation in median municipal family income for a metropolitan area indicates the extent to which municipalities in the metropolis deviate in median income from the average for all municipalities in the area. For example, a metropolis with a standard deviation in municipal income of zero would be a metropolitan area in which each component municipality has the same median family income. The larger the standard deviation, the greater the deviation of the wealth of some municipalities from the average income of all municipalities in the metropolitan area. Under the assumption that the distribution of median family income over all municipalities in the metropolitan area is "normal" the standard deviation assumes a specific meaning. One standard deviation from the mean encompasses two-thirds of the municipalities in the metropolitan area—one-third of the municipalities above and one-third of the municipalities below the mean. Therefore, a standard deviation of say, $1000, indicates that roughly two-thirds of the municipalities in that metropolitan area deviate from the average municipal median income by $1000 or less. As the numerical size of the standard deviation increases, the extent to which some municipalities have very high incomes and some have very low incomes, relative to the average, increases. The larger the standard deviation, the greater the governmental inequality in the metropolis.

In summary, the measure of inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among governments in the metropolis is the *standard deviation in median family income among municipalities in the metropolitan area.* This is a measure of inequality among municipalities treated as corporate units and is not a measure of inequality among the total population of individuals residing within those municipalities in the metropolitan area. It should be further noted that median family income only captures part of the real tax base of municipalities. Because it fails to take account of industrial and commercial property values directly, this measure probably understates the severity of governmental inequality in the metropolis.

The Data. The following procedure was adopted to construct a measure of municipal income inequality in the metropolis. Income data were collected on all municipalities with *populations of 2500 and above* in standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the United States in 1960. The SMSA includes a central city or cities of 50,000 population or more; the county in which the city is located; and adjoining counties which by various social and economic criteria reflect a dependence on the central city or cities.

The population census provides income data only for municipalities of population size of 2500 and above. This was an important constraint on the data collection and a caveat to ponder in interpreting these findings. Under ideal conditions income data should have been collected on all incorporated municipalities for each SMSA. Although one-half of the municipalities in metropolitan areas have populations under 2500, these municipalities account for only 3 per cent of the total metropolitan population.[35] Yet this is an important 3 per cent of the population to the extent that it includes a disproportionate share of the very wealthy and/or the very poor members of the metropolitan area. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that this measure of municipal income inequality based upon municipalities with populations of 2500 or above is an accurate reflection of income inequality among all municipalities in the metropolitan areas in this study.

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[32] John Riew, "Fiscal Disparities in the Milwaukee Area," in *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System,* vol. 2, p. 296.

[33] Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization", p. 62.

[34] The standard deviation consists of the square root of the average squared deviations from the mean of a frequency distribution. As a measure of inequality it suffers from one basic weakness; it is unusually sensitive to values lying at the extremes of a frequency distribution so that the presence of a few extreme values may have a somewhat disproportionate impact on the size of the standard deviation. See Howard R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "Indices for Comparing Inequality", in *Comparing Nations,* Howard R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 356–357.

For each metropolitan area, data on median family income were coded for each component municipality of population size 2500 and above. Then for each metropolitan area containing *three or more* municipalities of 2500 population and larger, a standard deviation was computed from the component municipal income data.[36] Metropolitan areas in the New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were not included in this analysis, however. The pattern of local government in New England is one of towns and townships rather than municipalities and counties. The population census provides data only on those New England towns with populations of 10,000 and above. Since the governmental structure and available data for New England metropolitan areas is not strictly comparable with the metropolitan areas in other regions of the country, New England SMASs were omitted from this analysis.

In summary, our population of metropolitan areas consists of SMSAs outside of New England with three or more municipalities containing populations of 2500 and above in 1960. In 1960 there were 66 metropolitan areas with less than the required number of municipalities of appropriate size. Eleven New England SMSAs were omitted from the analysis and eight metropolitan areas were dropped for lack of sufficient data. This left a population of 127 metropolitan areas as a base for analysis.

Because the independent variables analyzed in this study were drawn from a wide variety of sources, there are rather marked fluctuations in the number of cases underlying various analyses of specific empirical relationships. For this reason, this study is best viewed as an exploratory investigation of an important political phenomenon. If the findings from this investigation prove suggestive, more refined research efforts will be in order.

Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, and range in governmental income inequality among the 127 metropolitan areas in this study. The standard deviation in municipal income averages $920 among the 127 metropolitan areas in this investigation. The SMSA with the least inequality had a standard deviation in municipal family income of $14. The metropolitan area with the greatest governmental income inequality had a standard deviation of $3128. There is a vast range in inequality in the distribution of income among municipalities in this sample.

What are some of the factors associated with variations in governmental inequality among this sample of metropolitan areas? The remainder of this study is organized according to a sequence of empirical findings presented in the form of empirical propositions, each with a brief rationale. We conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the empirical findings and the conceptual framework prefacing this analysis.

Hypotheses and Findings

(1) *Metropolitan areas in the South tend to have greater inequality among municipalities than metropolitan areas located in other regions of the country.* A number of studies have revealed that economic and social inequality in metropolitan areas varies markedly between the northern and southern United States. If our argument is correct, family income inequality and racial discrimination are two of the principal factors fostering

Table 1: Mean, Standard Deviation and Range in Municipal Income Inequality for 127 SMSAs, 1960

	Municipal Inequality[a]
Mean	$ 920
Standard Deviation	583
Range:	
Minima	14
Maxima	3128
Number of SMSAs	127

[a] Standard deviation in median municipal family income computed over all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in the metropolitan area.

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[35] John C. Bollens and Henry Schmandt, *The Metropolis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 104.

[36] The following sources of data were utilized in constructing the standard deviation: (a) the list of names of all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in metropolitan areas is provided in the *1962 Census of Governments,* Table 14 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office); (b) the income data for each municipality were coded from the *1960 Census of Population, vol. 1: Characteristics of Population,* Tables 32–34 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).

Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations Between Regional and Demographic Characteristics and Municipal Income Inequality for 127 SMSAs, 1960

	Municipal Inequality[a]
Region:	
1. Metropolitan presence in the South[b]	.132
Demographic Characteristics:	
1. Population size of SMSA	.392
2. Population density of SMSA: number of persons per square mile	.124
3. Per cent of SMSA population residing in urbanized area	.267
4. Age of SMSA: year central city reached 25,000 population	−.230

[a] Standard deviation in median municipal family income computed over all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in the metropolitan area.

[b] 0 = absence, 1 = presence, of a metropolitan area in the South.

governmental inequality in the metropolis. Southern metropolitan areas tend to have higher levels of income inequality among families[37] and among racial groups than northern metropolises.[38] Southern metropolitan areas also tend to have more marked residential segregation by race[39] and social class.[40] There is reason to suspect, therefore, that southern metropolitan areas may display higher levels of governmental inequality as well.

The evidence presented in Table 2 gives a small measure of support to these speculations. The zero-order correlation between the dummy variable, absence or presence of a metropolitan area in the South,[41] and municipal income inequality, is $r = .132$. It would seem that governmental inequality is less strongly related to the historical and cultural features imbedded in the region concept than at first surmised.

(2) *Older, larger, and more densely populated metropolitan areas tend to have greater inequality among municipalities.* Williams has suggested that the degree of differentiation among municipalities increases with age and size of the metropolitan area. First, neighborhood and municipal identities become crystallized over time. Moves are made with a greater awareness of the life style of each place. In younger, expanding metropolitan areas, growth may take place so rapidly that the visibility of the life style remains low and the local political structures are not sufficiently stable to employ effective screening policies over entering residents. Second, suburban specialization in a small metropolitan area is likely to be rudimentary. Larger metropolitan areas are likely to contain many gradations of class- and status-homogeneous residential suburbs as well as suburbs with highly specialized economic bases.[42] Ecological research and theory seem to imply much the same hypothesis. From this perspective, increases in population size and density foster increased competition for scarce resources, resulting in increases in the division of labor as individuals seek new means of sustenance. As specialization increases, spatial segregation among individuals with similar social traits becomes a mechanism of social integration in a highly complex urban world.[43]

Data presented in Table 2 indicate that there is a tendency for older ($r = .230$), larger ($r = .392$), more urbanized ($r = .267$) and more densely populated ($r = .124$) metropolitan areas to have higher levels of inequality among municipal governments. On balance the evidence seems to support the ecological hypothesis that population size, age and density provide a demographic potential for increased inequality among governments in the metropolitan community.

(3) *The larger the relative size of the nonwhite population in the metropolitan community, the greater the inequality among governments.* It has been suggested that status rivalry operates along with purchasing power to structure the residential location and segregation of residents in the metropolitan city. Since members of nonwhite minorities have disproportionately lower income,[44] and since they are frequently denied access to neighborhoods and housing they could otherwise afford because of their racial status,[45] we would expect

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[37] Richard Child Hill, "Urban Income Inequality" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1973).

[38] Robert Jiobu and Harvey Marshall, "Urban Structure and the Differentiation between Blacks and Whites," *American Sociological Review*, 36 (August, 1971), 638–649.

[39] Karl Taeuber and Alma Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1965), pp. 39–41.

[40] Richard Child Hill, "Residential Segregation in the Metropolis: The Ecology of Class" (unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1973).

[41] In this analysis the South includes metropolitan areas in the following states: Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

[42] Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization," p. 62.

[43] See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); and Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life", *American Journal of Sociology*, 44 (July, 1938), 11.

[44] See U.S. Department of Commerce, *The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1970* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 36–37; and Herman Miller, *Rich Man Poor Man* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), pp. 75–79.

[45] See William H. Brown Jr., "Access to Housing: The Role of the Real Estate Industry," *Economic Ge-*

that as the relative size of the nonwhite population increases, governmental inequality in the metropolis will increase.

This hypothesis is supported by the data presented in Table 3. Governmental inequality varies directly with the nonwhite percentage of the metropolitan population ($r=.206$) and the nonwhite percentage of the central city ($r=.352$). It would appear that status group exclusion should be added to the distribution of purchasing power as a basic element of the set of forces fostering inequality in fiscal capacity among municipal governments in the metropolis.

(4) *The greater the inequality in the distribution of income among families in the metropolis, the greater the inequality among municipalities.* As Thompson has argued, the unequal distribution of fiscal capacity among governments is rooted in the unequal distribution of income among families in the metropolis. Family income inequality is translated through the dual mechanisms of residential segregation and political incorporation into inequality in the distribution of wealth, and hence, the capacity to produce public goods and services, among governments in the metropolis.[46] Data provided in Table 3 offer support for this argument.

Among the sixty-three metropolitan areas for which we have combined income and government data,[47] we find that inequality among municipalities is directly related to family income inequality ($r=.234$) in the metropolitan community. At the same time, the size and level of income of the upper-income groups in the metropolis appear to be even more important for government inequality. The larger the percentage of families with incomes of $10,000 a year and above, the greater the inequality among municipalities ($r=.419$). Similarly, as the average median earnings of professional and manager occupations increases, governmental inequality increases ($r=.419$). On the other hand, there is essentially no relationship between the level of poverty, or the median earnings of blue-collar workers, and governmental inequality in the metropolis. It would appear that as the size and wealth of the upper income groups rises, the structural potential for the development of upper-status political enclaves within the metropolitan area increases.

Table 3. Zero-Order Correlations Between Racial Composition, SMSA Income Characteristics, and Municipal Income Inequality in SMSAs, 1960

	Municipal Inequality[a]
Racial Composition:[b]	
1. Per cent of SMSA population, nonwhite	.206
2. Per cent of central city, nonwhite	.352
Income[c]	
1. Median family income	.239
2. Per cent of families with incomes at or below $3,000 a year	−.043
3. Per cent of families with incomes at or above $10,000 a year	.419
Median Earnings:[c]	
1. Professionals and Managers	.419
2. Craftsmen and foremen	.202
3. Operatives	.030
4. Laborers	.085
Income Inequality:[c]	
1. Gini coefficient: family income	.234
2. Racial income inequality[d]	.126

[a] Standard deviation in median municipal family income computed over all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in the metropolitan area.
[b] $N=127$.
[c] $N=63$.
[d] Median nonwhite family income divided by median white family income. Reflected to read the higher the score, the greater the inequality.

(5) *The greater the residential segregation by social class in the metropolis, the greater the inequality among municipalities.* Income is unequally distributed among social classes. As residential segregation by social class increases, inequality in the distribution of income by neighborhood increases. When class and status homogeneous neighborhoods come to coincide with municipal boundaries, inequality in the distribution of fiscal capacity among municipal governments arises.

(6) *The more segregated the distribution of housing by quality in the metropolis, the greater the inequality among municipalities.* The distribution of social classes by residential area also depends upon the distribution of housing by quality in urban territory. If all housing in the metropolitan area were of the same quality and price, and assuming this price was in reach of even the lowest income groups, the residential distribution of classes would not be mediated by ability to pay for housing. Or, if low, medium, and high priced housing were randomly distributed among neighborhoods in the metropolis, and if the qual-

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ography 48 (January, 1972), 66–67; and Rose Helper, *Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 277–301.

[46] Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics,* pp. 105–106.

[47] In essence these are the metropolitan areas in 1960 with five or more municipalities with populations of 2500 and above, outside of New England, with metropolitan populations in excess of one quarter of a million people.

ity of a family's housing were directly related to level of family purchasing power, we would expect that income would be fairly equally distributed among neighborhoods and local governments in the metropolitan community. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that the greater the segregation of housing by quality, the greater the government inequality in the metropolis.

Avery M. Guest, in a recent study of patterns of urban ecological organization, collected 1960 data from the census of housing on a variety of social characteristics of families by census tracts for seventeen metropolitan areas.[48] For each metropolitan area, Guest coded data on the proportion of families with white-collar heads of household and the proportion of sound dwelling units with all plumbing installed in each census tract. From this detailed information on census tracts, he computed the standard deviation in percentage white-collar and percentage of sound housing across census tracts for each metropolitan area. The greater the standard deviation, the greater the segregation. Combining Guest's data with our own yields fourteen metropolitan areas for which joint data are available.

As revealed in Table 4, the residential segregation of white-collar families is directly related to governmental inequality ($r=.356$) as is the segregation of sound housing ($r=.452$) in the metropolitan community. While findings from such a small sample of cases can hardly be more than suggestive, the evidence does support our expectations.[49]

(7) *The larger the number of municipal governments in the metropolitan community, the greater the inequality among municipalities.* Suburban governments tend to function as corporate representatives of the class and status groups interests of their resident populations.[50] Through political devices like zoning ordinances, selective industrial development programs, and building regulations, suburban enclaves that are homogeneous in class and status pose barriers to social and economic "undesirables" and maintain control over the composition of their incorporate fiefdoms.[51] The degree of municipal fragmentation would appear to indicate the governmental potential for fiscal inequality among municipalities in the metropolis.

Table 4. Zero-Order Correlations Between Class Segregation, Housing Segregation, Number and Density of Governments, and Municipal Income Inequality in SMSAs, 1960

	Municipal Inequality[a]
Class Segregation:[b]	
1. Standard deviation: per cent white collar[c]	.356
Housing Segregation:[b]	
1. Standard deviation: per cent housing sound with all plumbing[c]	.452
Government Fragmentation:[d]	
1. Number of municipalities in SMSA	.359
2. Number of municipalities per capita in SMSA	−.212

[a] Standard deviation in median municipal family income computed over all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in the metropolitan area.

[b] $N=17$.

[c] Computed over all census tracts in the SMSA.

[d] $N=127$.

Data presented in Table 4 support these speculations. The concept of government fragmentation seems to refer to both the absolute number of governments and the density of governments in a metropolitan area.[52] The data indicate that metropolitan areas with large numbers of municipalities tend to have greater inequality among municipalities ($r=.359$).[53] On the other hand, the density of governments, indicated by the number of governments per capita, is inversely related to governmental inequality ($r=-.212$). However, as noted below, when other salient variables are held constant, governmental density is positively related to inequality among municipalities in the metropolis.

A Multivariate Analysis. Thus far we have surveyed a number of empirical hypotheses and partial explanations of variations in municipal inequality in fiscal capacity among metropolitan areas. A number of questions naturally arise. To what extent is the impact of any particular independent variable independent of its relationship to other independent variables under discussion? What is the combined predictive power of the independent variables? Multiple correlation and regression analysis help provide answers to these questions. Joint data are available on all of the variables, except class and housing segregation, for sixty-three metropolitan areas—the data base for the regression analysis.

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[48] See Avery M. Guest, "Retesting the Burgess Zonal Hypothesis: The Location of White Collar Workers," *American Journal of Sociology,* 76 (May, 1971), 1094–1108.

[49] In research not reported here I found that as white-collar groups and sound housing becomes more decentralized—as larger proportions of white-collar groups and sound housing become located at increasing distances from the center city—inequality among municipalities tends to increase.

[50] Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization," pp. 58–59.

[51] Morton Grodzins, *The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 7–9.

[52] Number of governments and density of governments are quite different properties of the government structure of metropolitan areas. The concept of government fragmentation requires elaboration and refinement to take account of it's several component dimensions.

[53] The same pattern of correlations exists for other forms of government in the metropolis. Number of school districts ($r=.261$), number of special districts ($r=.171$) and number of governments of all types ($r=.228$) are all positively associated with inequality among municipalities in the metropolitan community.

Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 5. With the exception of region and number and density of municipalities, the variables in the regression model retain the predicted relationships to municipal inequality. The relationship between metropolitan presence in the South and government inequality reverses direction when other salient variables are held constant. Number of municipalities has little predictive power independent of other variables in the model, and governmental density becomes positively associated with inequality among municipalities ($rp = .317$).

The relative size of the nonwhite population has the strongest independent influence on government inequality ($rp = .511$), followed by per cent of families with incomes of $10,000 a year and above ($rp = .420$), number of municipalities per capita ($rp = .317$) and family income inequality ($rp = .277$). Overall, the variables in this model account for a not insignificant 58 per cent of the total variation in inequality among municipalities in the metropolis.

Summary and Conclusions

The political incorporation and municipal segregation of classes and status groups in the metropolis tend to divorce fiscal resources from public needs and serve to create and perpetuate inequality among urban residents in the United States. Williams has suggested that much of urban politics consists of conflict over the production and distribution of scarce resources, like education and housing, which depend upon location for their realization.[54] And, as Long has noted, if the increased demand among urban residents for public goods and services continues in the future, as it has in the past two decades, the governmental allocation of values may become as important as the private marketplace.[55] Thus, inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in metropolitan areas occupies an increasingly important role in the urban stratification system.

Considering the importance of the issue, there has been relatively little comparative research on governmental inequality among metropolitan areas in the United States. Past research on governmental inequality has largely been devoted to the investigation of city-suburban differences and has directed little empirical attention to an increasingly class and status differentiated suburban government structure. With this in mind, this study has measured inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources (capacity to generate public goods and services) among governments by the standard deviation in median family income among municipalities in the metropolitan area.

This exploratory investigation of data collected for a large number of metropolitan areas in 1960 revealed a number of variables associated with

Table 5. Multiple Regression of Municipal Income Inequality on Salient Independent Variables for 63 Metropolitan Areas, 1960

	Municipal Inequality[a]		
	Partial Correlation	Beta Weight[b]	Level of Significance[c]
1. South	−.268	−.313	<.044
2. Population size of SMSA	.146	.167	<.280
3. Per cent of families with incomes at or above $10,000 a year	.420	.466	<.001
4. Gini coefficient: family income	.277	.289	<.037
5. Per cent of SMSA population, nonwhite	.511	.601	<.001
6. Number of municipalities	.054	.068	<.690
7. Number of municipalities per capita	.317	.342	<.016
$R = .761$ $R^2 = .579$ $N = 63$			

[a] Standard deviation in median municipal family income computed over all municipalities with populations of 2500 and above in the metropolitan area.

[b] Standardized regression coefficient.

[c] Level of statistical significance of the regression coefficient using the t-test, two-tailed.

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[54] Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization," p. 58.

[55] Long "Political Science and the City," pp. 255–256.

inequality among municipalities in the metropolis. The empirical findings appear to be consistent with the urban stratification framework outlined in the introductory discussion. First of all, the data support the thesis that governmental inequality is rooted in income inequality among families in the metropolis. Family income inequality is translated through the dual mechanisms of residential segregation and political incorporation into inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in the metropolis. Thus we find that inequality among municipalities varies directly with level of family income inequality, the residential segregation of social classes, housing segregation by quality, and government fragmentation in the metropolis. Our second thesis—that racial discrimination is a basic component of the urban stratification system and underlies governmental inequality—is consistent with the data. Inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipalities varies directly with level of nonwhite concentration in the metropolis indicating status group exclusion operating in the urban housing arena and in the policies of local governments. Finally, consistent with Williams's ideas,[56] inequality tends to be higher in older, larger and more densely populated metropolitan areas which indicate a demographic potential for municipal differentiation in urban space.

By way of conclusion, a number of caveats are in order. First of all, because the independent variables analyzed in this study were drawn from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, there are marked fluctuations in the number of cases underlying various analyses of specific empirical relationships. As a result, it is not possible to generalize from these findings to all metropolitan areas in the United States. Second, the measure of level of fiscal resource and median municipal family income, only captures a part of the phenomenon in question, and needs to be supplemented with other indicators of the capacity to produce public goods and services. Finally, the standard deviation as a measure of inequality is open to the criticism of being highly sensitive to values lying at the extremes of a frequency distribution. Future research needs to consider alternative measurement procedures. On the positive side, it is worth noting that the empirical results revealed in this study are largely consistent with theoretical expectations. Further research is required to establish the generality of the findings and the accuracy of the interpretations offered here.

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[56] Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization," p. 62.

Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation*

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During recent decades, power and differences in power resources between parties have often been neglected in the study of conflict.[1] In a review of twelve years of conflict research, Converse[2] observes "that power frequently is handled as a factor to be dropped out by assuming that two conflicting parties are roughly equal in 'power.'" Instead, explanations of conflict in terms of motivation, i.e., in terms of the subjective states and desires of the parties in conflict, have gained considerable vogue among social scientists.[3] According to this theoretical approach, conflicts like revolutions and collective violence are primarily responses to an intolerable gap between normative expectations and actual achievements created by cumulated experiences of hardship in a collectivity, i.e., as a result of an increase in relative deprivation.[4]

This expectation achievement approach to conflict theory is obviously insufficient to the extent that it puts exclusive emphasis on the motivation or wish for improvement among the potential participants as the central factor in conflict and overlooks the actual possibilities for achieving the desired change, the latter being determined primarily by the differences in power resources between the parties concerned. In many situations where the desire for change in a collectivity increases with increasing relative deprivation or hardship, the actual possibilities for alleviating the situation may at the same time be decreasing as a result of the changing balance of power among the parties.

The expectation achievement approach to conflict has recently been attacked on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds. Its critics have proposed power resources, the mobilization of power resources, and the struggle for power as the central features in an alternative approach to conflict theory and in explanations of conflicts like revolutions and collective violence.[5] In this alternative political process approach, manifest conflicts like collective violence or revolutions are seen as closely related to and produced by the central political process, in which a collectivity within a population makes claims for certain privileges and this claim is resisted by another collectivity. The process of acquiring control over power resources is seen as a necessary condition for the capacity to contend for privileges. Conflicts are assumed to be most frequent in periods

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* This paper is part of a research project on labor unions and industrial conflict supported by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund. I wish to thank Robert Erikson and Olof Frändén, who gave thorough and valuable criticism of the manuscript; Bengt Abrahamsson, Kerstin Bohm, Christina Skogsberg, Georg Karlsson and participants in the Sociology Seminar at the University of Umeå as well as anonymous referees for helpful comments.

[1] For exceptions see Hubert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967); Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956) and *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968); Allen D. Grimshaw, "Interpreting Collective Violence: An Argument for the Importance of Social Structure", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 391 (September, 1970), 9–20; John Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961); and Herman Schmid "Peace Research and Politics," *The Journal of Peace Research*, 5, No. 3 (1968).

[2] Elizabeth Converse, p. 489 in "The War of All Against All: A Review of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957–1968", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 12 (December, 1968), 471–532.

[3] Another theoretical approach has been based on the concept of "strain," see Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1963). For critiques of this approach cf. Elliot Currie and Jerome H. Skolnick, "A Critical Note on Conceptions of Collective Violence", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 391 (September, 1970), 34–45, and Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 19–24.

[4] Sources on this approach include James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, 27 (February, 1962), 5–18; "The J-curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion" and Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns" in *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969); Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[5] Presentations and discussions of this theoretical approach can be found in David Snyder and Charles Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960", *American Sociological Review*, 37 (October, 1972), 520–532; Charles Tilly "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?", *Comparative Politics*, 5 (April, 1973), 425–447; Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* and Abdul Q. Lodhi and Charles Tilly, "Urbanization, Crime and Collective Violence in 19th-Century France", *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (September, 1973), 296–318.

when parties acquire or lose control over power resources.

The proponents of the political process approach tend summarily to reject motivational concepts like relative deprivation in theories of conflicts as being theoretically unfruitful or empirically unsupported.[6] I am in basic agreement with the proponents of the political process model of conflict on the primacy of power resources and the mobilization of power resources in the explanation of conflicts like collective violence and revolutions. Yet, it seems worthwhile to analyze the role of relative deprivation in the development of conflict. This is because any theory of conflict that focuses on mobilization of power resources will at least implicitly have to come to grips with motivational concepts like relative deprivation, since motivational factors are generally accorded a central place in theories of mobilization.[7] An analysis of the role of relative deprivation in the development of conflict can also help to clarify in what respects the expectation achievement approach to conflict is inadequate. More fruitful theories of conflict can be constructed if the notion of relative deprivation is incorporated into models of conflict, where differences in power resources and mobilization of power resources play the central role.

The purpose of the present paper is to develop a model of conflict which incorporates the central concepts from both the expectation achievement approach and the political process approach. In this model, which might be called a power balance model of conflict, relative deprivation as well as differences in power resources between the parties are thus included. The difference in power resources between parties is used as the central independent variable. Utility of reaching the goal, expectancy of success and relative deprivation are introduced as intervening variables to relate the effects from changes in the balance of power between the parties to the probability of manifest conflict between them.

Background, Concepts and Some Assumptions

The conflict situations that are of central concern here are those which in one way or another relate to the struggle over how the surplus in society is to be distributed among different parties, i.e., how goods and services which are not necessary for keeping producers alive and productive are to be distributed in the society.[8] The basic view taken here is that conflicts of this type are essentially bargaining situations.[9] In such bargaining situations the strategy of conflict adopted by the parties generally involves the use of rewards as well as of punishments over a period of time. This implies that conflict should be analyzed as interaction over time. Both short-term and long-term effects of changes in the balance of power between the parties need to be considered.

The term conflict here refers to manifest conflict, i.e., to interaction between parties with incompatible interests[10] which primarily entails punishments. For conflict to occur, *both* parties have to resort to the use of punishments. If one party turns the other cheek or returns good for bad, no conflict becomes manifest in the present sense of the word. Conflict need not, however, involve violence. The parties or actors entering into conflict can be individuals or collectivities. Actors are assumed to be rational and to be satisficing rather than maximizing.[11]

For simplicity the analysis here is limited to conflict situations with only two parties. This is of course a simplification since conflicts between two parties often are affected by third parties and other environmental factors. The introduction of third parties would, however, bring up two so far unreconciled theoretical traditions in conflict theory. According to the "crisscross" or "crosscutting cleavage" theories, introduction of a third party may decrease the probability of conflict.[12] Another contemporary theoretical tradition, "coalition theory," deals with the process by which three or more actors combine into two opposing camps in the conflict situation.[13] Since for the present purposes it is not necessary to attempt to connect them, third parties will be left outside the discussion.[14]

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[6] See Oberschall, pp. 37–38 and Snyder and Tilly.

[7] See John W. Atkinson, *An Introduction to Motivation* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964) and Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations*, chap. 4. One should also remember that the classical concept related to mobilization in conflict, the class consciousness of the working class, includes relative deprivation as an integral part. See John C. Leggett, *Class, Race and Labor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 34–42.

[8] See Gerhard E. Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), chap. 3.

[9] For similar conceptions see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 4–5; Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, p. 123 and Martin Patchen, "Models of Cooperation and Conflict: A Critical Review", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 14 (September, 1970), 389–408.

[10] See Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham, 1970); Lars Bergström, "What is a Conflict of Interest," *Journal of Peace Research* 7, No. 3 (1970), 197–218; Clinton F. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 12 (Dec., 1968), 412–460.

[11] See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 196–206.

[12] For treatments and contributions to this theory see Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict;* James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society;* and Johan Galtung, "Rank and Social

Viewing conflicts as a part of bargaining situations suggests the possibility of carrying out the analysis within the framework of an exchange approach and of utilizing some of the concepts from exchange theory. The parties entering into exchange or conflict must, however, not be assumed to have equal access to power resources, an assumption which is often made in exchange analysis.[15] Instead the difference in power resources is used as the central independent variable in the present analysis. Power resources are the properties of an actor which provide the ability to reward or punish another actor.[16]

Exchange between two actors can be characterized by a going rate of exchange according to which the transactions of the parties are executed.[17] Each actor is also assumed to evaluate the outcomes (the going rate of exchange) in the relationship according to his normative expectations (level of aspiration), which indicates what outcomes in the relationship he evaluates positively and considers to be fair and just. An actor's aspiration level in a particular exchange relationship is assumed to be determined by the outcomes known to him by personal or by vicarious experiences in similar relationships.[18] The difference between the level of aspiration and the going rate of exchange of an actor defines the degree of relative deprivation he experiences in the relationship.[19]

We will assume further that in the long run the going rate of exchange is determined primarily by the difference or balance in power resources between the parties. This implies that also the availability of power resources other than those directly concerned in the exchange can affect exchange rates.[20] The going rate of exchange is usually arrived at through some kind of explicit or implicit bargaining between the parties. If bargaining fails to bring the going rates close enough to the aspiration level of an actor, exchange may still take place, but the result might also be a termination of the relationship or a conflict.[21] In the latter case the use of punishments can be viewed as an attempt by one of the parties to change the going rate of exchange. Conflict is thus the continuation of bargaining by other means. As in the political process approach, conflict here becomes a natural byproduct of the bargaining processes and of attempts to alter exchange rates.

Since the outcomes in exchange relationships known to an actor through personal or vicarious experiences have resulted from the prevailing balance of power in these relationships, we can assume that through a process of learning the actors will also have their aspiration levels strongly influenced by the perceived difference in power resources between them. In the long run the weaker actor will, through internal psychological processes, tend to adjust his aspiration level towards the going rates of exchange in the relationship.[22] We can also assume that the stronger actor will use his power to "engineer consent" and to influence the weaker party to accept as legitimate the going rate of exchange

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Integration" in *Sociological Theories in Progress,* ed. Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr. and Bo Anderson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

[13] See Theodore Caplow, *Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968) and William A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation", *American Sociological Review,* 36 (June 1961), 373-382.

[14] Some points of departure for such a connection and comparison can be suggested, however. The basic idea in the cross-cutting cleavage theories is that if the possible lines of cleavage in a society are not superimposed but rather cut across parties, the probability of manifest conflict will decrease and, "society is sewn together by its inner conflicts." This theory thus apparently assumes that each party is internally heterogeneous and has internally opposed interests. Therefore mobilization of power resources incurs costs which makes coalition formation and conflict less likely. In coalition theory on the other hand, it is apparently assumed that parties are homogenous with respect to interests. Mobilization of power resources is therefore easy and does not incur high costs, something which facilitates coalition formation and conflict.

[15] For an exception see Edmund Dahlström, "Exchange, Influence and Power", *Acta Sociologica,* 9, No. 3-4 (1966), 237-284. Even in exchange analyses where inequalities in power resources are recognized, the consequences of such inequalities are often not assumed to be crucial for the result of the exchange, see George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), pp. 77-78 and Peter M. Blau, *Power and Exchange in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 157-158.

[16] See Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations,* pp. 118-119.

[17] See Blau, pp. 151 ff.

[18] For parallel assumptions see John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 81-83.

[19] This paper adheres to the sociological convention of defining relative deprivation in terms of the perceived discrepancy between on the one hand the actual position or state of the actor with respect to some good or value dimension, and on the other hand the level of aspiration or the normative expectations of the actor with respect to the dimension, i.e., what he believes he is justifiably entitled to. Gurr (pp. 23-30) defines the concept somewhat differently to include both present and future connotations. It would appear, however, that for the present discussion this difference in definitions is not crucial.

[20] This assumption is similar to the proposition by Lenski, *Power and Privilege,* p. 44, that "power will determine the distribution of nearly all of the surplus possessed by the society."

[21] Albert O. Hirschman discusses similar issues in his *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[22] See Thibaut and Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups,* chap. 6.

in the relationship.[23] In the short run however, aspiration levels may often deviate from the going rates of exchange. It is also important to remember, as for example Dahrendorf[24] has pointed out, that if there is a latent conflict of interests between actors, the legitimacy of authority must always be precarious and authority potentially illegitimate.

The term mobilization of power resources has two distinct meanings which are often not separated. Mobilization has thus been used to refer to the process whereby a party acquires control over power resources which it did not previously have,[25] to the process whereby a party invests or uses the power resources already under its control,[26] or to both these processes.[27] In the present context it is important to keep these aspects separate. Here the term mobilization is used to refer only to the process of investing or using power resources already under one's control.[28] The equally important process by which a party acquires control over new resources or loses control over some of its resources, affects the difference in power resources or the balance of power between the actors concerned, i.e., the basic independent variable in the present model. The consequences of acquiring or losing control over power resources, that is, the changes in the difference in power resources or in the balance of power between the parties concerned, is thus a central aspect both in the political process approach and in the balance of power model of conflict. The balance of power model does, however, attempt to refine the political process model of conflict by specifying the mechanisms through which changes in the power balance between parties affect the probability of conflict between the parties.

A Power Balance Model of Conflict

In order to facilitate the presentation and understanding of the power balance model discussed here, the variables assumed to affect the probability of mobilization of an actor's power resources are outlined in Figure 1. The causal relationships assumed to exist among these variables are indicated by arrows in the figure. In the following presentation and discussion of these hypothetical causal relationships, each hypothesis is numbered serially in the order of presentation and the corresponding arrow can be located in the figure by this number. Plus signs (+) on the arrows indicate positive relationships between the variables, whereas minus signs (−) indicate negative relationships.

As stated above, the basic independent variable here is the actual difference in power resources between the parties. We assume that before taking action, a rational actor will attempt to assess the difference in power resources between himself and his opponent. Let us further introduce a probabilistic element into the perception of the difference in power resources, but make the assumption that on the whole the actual difference in power resources tends to be correctly perceived by the parties.[29] Thus when the balance of power between two actors, A and B, changes to the benefit of actor A, the probability that A will perceive himself as the stronger party will increase monotonically (*Hypothesis 1*).

Following Atkinson[30] and Blalock[31], we will assume here that the degree to which power resources are mobilized is a *multiplicative* function of the perceived probability of achieving the goal (expectancy of success) and of the utility to the actor of achieving the goal. Now if actor A perceives his power resources as larger than those of his opponent, actor B, his expectancy of success will naturally be higher than if he perceives himself to be the weaker party. We can thus assume a positive relationship between the difference in power resources an actor perceives between himself and his adversary and his expectancy of success (*Hypothesis 2*). *Ceteris paribus*, the higher an actor's expectancy of success, the higher is the probability of mobilization (*Hypothesis 3*), and, further, the higher his utility of reaching the goal, the higher is the probability of mobilization (*Hypothesis 4*).

The utility to an actor of reaching the goal is here assumed to be a function of his expected costs in reaching the goal and of the degree of his relative deprivation with respect to the goal. In a situation of potential conflict the anticipated costs of reaching the goal will to a large extent

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[23] Rex, *Key Problems in Sociological Theory*, pp. 181–182.

[24] Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, p. 176.

[25] Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, p. 98, Snyder and Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960", p. 526 and Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" p. 437.

[26] Blalock, *"Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations,"* p. 110.

[27] Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, p. 28.

[28] The use of power resources by collectives has also been termed "collective action"; see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and James S. Coleman, "Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions" in *Social Choice*, ed. Bernhardt Lieberman (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1971).

[29] Such probabilistic relationships allowing for influences from variables not included in the model are also assumed among the other variables in the model.

[30] Atkinson, *An Introduction to Motivation*, p. 242.

[31] Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations*, p. 127.


Actual difference in power resources, A−B
(1)+
Perceived difference in power resources, A−B
(2)
+
Expectancy of success
(3)
+
(6)
−
Expected costs of reaching goal
(5)
−
Utility of reaching goal
(4)
+
Probability of mobilization of actor A
(10)
(11)
+
Going rate of exchange
(9)
−
Relative deprivation
(7)
+
Other factors
(12)
+
Level of aspiration
+
(8)

Figure 1. Causal relationships between main variables assumed to affect probability of mobilization of actor A in a situation of potential conflict with actor B.

depend on how the other party is expected to react. The relevant costs of power here are the costs to actor A of attempting to influence actor B by pressure resources and the costs to B of attempting to resist A's influence attempts, both defined in terms of the value of the opportunities foregone in choosing to attack the other party or to resist his influence.[32] The higher the expected costs to an actor are, the lower his utility[33] is assumed to be (*Hypothesis 5*). Expected costs for reaching the goal are assumed to be negatively related to the perceived difference in power resources. Thus the larger the difference to his advantage an actor perceives, the smaller are his expected costs (*Hypothesis 6*).

The relative deprivation of an actor was defined above as the difference between the going rate of exchange and the actor's level of aspiration. The higher an actor's relative deprivation with respect to the goal, the higher is his utility of reaching the goal assumed to be (*Hypothesis 7*). *Ceteris paribus*, the higher an actor's level of aspiration, the higher is his relative deprivation (*Hypothesis 8*) but the higher or better his going rate of exchange, the lower is his realtive deprivation (*Hypothesis 9*).

We have assumed above that the actual difference in power resources between actors will in the long run determine the going rate of exchange. Thus the more advantageous to an actor the balance of power is, the better is his going rate of exchange in the relationship (*Hypothesis 10*). Now we have assumed that the actual difference in power resources between two actors determines both the perceived differences in power resources and the going rate of exchange in the relationship, and that the level of aspiration depends primarily on previous experiences of outcomes in similar exchange relationships. Therefore we can expect that through a process of learning, an actor's level of aspiration will to a large extent be influenced by the perceived difference in power resources in his present exchange relationship (see above).

Thus the more an actor perceives that the balance of power is to his favor, the higher is normally his level of aspiration in the relationship (*Hypothesis 11*), since by personal and by vicarious experiences he has learned to expect that in similar situations the stronger actor will strike the better bargain and will tend to get "the lion's share" of the goods to be distributed.[34] This conclusion is generally overlooked in discussions of factors determining levels of aspiration, where usually other factors are seen as the most important ones.[35] Of course we must also here assume that such other factors may increase or decrease an actor's level of aspiration (*Hypothesis 12*).

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[32] See John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-person Bargaining Games", *Behavioral Science*, 7 (Jan., 1962), 67–80; and also A. Baldwin, "The Costs of Power", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 15 (June 1972), 145–155.

[33] Atkinson, p. 242, assumes utility or value of achieving the goal to be a multiplicative function of an actor's motivation (need) to achieve the goal and of incentives (objective rewards or punishments associated with the goal). The costs associated with reaching the goal should be deducted from its objective incentive value to find the "net" value of reaching the goal. Utility is thus here regraded as "net" utility derived from different types of outcomes as, for example, costs of reaching the goal and improved exchange rates.

The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the more advantageous to him an actor perceives the balance of power in the relationship to be, the higher is his utility of reaching the goal. Since actors are here assumed to be satisficing rather than maximizing (see above), the effects on utility of further improvements in the balance of power of an already stronger actor will however gradually decrease. Now a change in the actual difference in power resources between two actors, which is to the favour of A but to the disadvantage of B, will increase the expectancy of success as well as the utility of actor A. From this follows that, *ceteris paribus*, such a change will increase the probability that actor A mobilizes power resources (but decrease the corresponding probability of actor B).

We have assumed that the probability of manifest conflict betweeen the two parties depends on the probability that they both mobilize power resources at the same time. For manifest conflict to occur, one of the parties has to initiate conflict through a punishing move against the other party, who has to retaliate. When the difference in power resources between the actors is very large, the probability that the stronger party makes a punishing move against the weaker is high, as is the probability that the stronger party will defend himself against an attack from the weaker party. Since, however, the probability that the weaker party will retaliate to the attack from the stronger party is low as is the probability that the weaker party himself will attack, the probability for manifest conflict remains low. When the difference in power resources between the actors begins to decrease, the probability of mobilization of the stronger party decreases while the probability of mobilization of the weaker party increases. This will increase the probability for manifest conflict.

The above discussion therefore indicates that we can expect a *curvilinear relationship between on the one hand the difference in power resources between the parties and on the other hand the probability of manifest conflict between them.* The probability of manifest conflict is thus low when parties have greatly unequal power resources but will normally increase when the difference in power resources begins to decrease. In contrast to other models of conflict, which usually assume maximum probability of conflict at the point of parity in power resources between the parties,[36] a bimodal distribution of the probability of manifest conflict on the difference in power resources between the two actors is predicted here. The probability of manifest conflict is thus assumed to be low when the power resources of the parties are greatly unequal, to increase up to a point with decreasing differences in power resources but to drop around the point of parity in power resources.[37] An increase in the difference in power resources between actors with unequal power resources is assumed generally to decrease the probability of conflict.

Once the parties have mobilized their power resources and entered into conflict, the outcome of the conflict may affect not only the perception of the difference in power resources between the parties but also the actual balance of power. In this way feedback mechanisms are introduced into the model.

Time, Relative Deprivation and the Rate of Change in Power Resources.

The effects of the time dimension are incorporated into the power balance model through an assumption that a change in the balance of power between actors affects the going rate of exchange and the aspiration levels of the actors with different degrees of delay. We assume that the aspiration level of an actor is slow as it moves downward but that it moves upward more easily. When the balance in power resources between two actors changes, the most immediate effect of this change is assumed to be an increase in the aspiration level of the actor who benefits from the change. If the new balance of power remains stable, the going rate of exchange in the relationship will tend to change accordingly as a result of bargaining or conflict or both. With time the aspiration level of the losing actor will then also approach the new going rate of exchange in the relationship.

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[34] To the extent that power resources overlap with investments, this assumption is a parallel to the "rule of distributive justice" proposed by Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*, chap. 12, but has different implications.

[35] See Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, chap. 4.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 234 and 277.

[37] The prediction of some degree of decrease in the probability of manifest conflict around the point of parity in power resources derives from an assumption that changes in the difference in power resources have somewhat different effects on the probability of initiation or attack and on the probability of retaliation or defense in a conflict situation. This aspect of the power balance model of conflict is not of immediate significance for the present discussion and is developed in another paper by the present author, Walter Korpi, "Conflict and the Balance of Power", *Acta Sociologica*, 17, No. 2 (1974), 99–114.

We have assumed above that changes in the difference in power resources between two parties will affect the aspiration level of the gaining party before the going rate of exchange becomes modified. This indicates that not only the actual size of the difference in power resources but also the rate of change in power resources may have effects on relative deprivation. If the originally weaker actor experiences a rapid improvement in his power position, he will feel greater relative deprivation than after a slower increase, which gives time for a gradual readjustment of the going rate of exchange.

The above assumptions imply that increases as well as decreases in the difference in power resources between the parties will increase the relative deprivation of the actors in the period immediately following the change. If the new balance of power becomes stable, however, relative deprivation will decrease with time. This makes for an intricate relationship between relative deprivation and the probability of conflict, which we shall now consider.

Relative Deprivation and the Probability of Conflict

Relative deprivation has been assumed to increase according to three basic patterns. Decremental deprivation occurs in a situation where men's expectations remain stable but where they receive less and less. If men's expectations rise while their achievements remain stable, aspirational deprivation is created. The third type is progressive deprivation, which occurs when a relatively steady improvement in men's social and economic conditions generates increasing expectations but is followed by a sharp reversal in the trend of improvement.[38]

Decremental deprivation is usually the result of an increase in the difference in power resources between the actors. An increasing difference in power resources will change the going rate of exchange to the disadvantage of the weaker actor. Since aspiration levels are assumed to be slow in moving downward, a decrease in achievements will lead to decremental deprivation for the weaker actor. The probability for conflict can, however, be expected to decrease in such a situation since the deteriorating balance of power will decrease the expectancy of success of the weaker party and increase the expected costs of reaching the goal, which will decrease the probability of mobilization.

A common cause of hardships experienced by many groups in society is probably that their command over power resources relative to that of other groups in society is slipping. In spite of their high motivation to achieve improvements and a high degree of relative deprivation, collectivities losing power are less likely to enter into conflict. The assumption that mobilization is a multiplicative function of utility and expectancy of success implies that if expectancy of success is low, a high utility or desire for change will normally not lead to a high probability of mobilization.[39]

The power balance model of conflict allows for increases in relative deprivation of an actor even when the difference in power resources and the going rate of exchange remain stable, i.e. for aspirational deprivation. Aspirational deprivation will increase the utility of mobilization of an actor. Since the balance of power between the actors can be assumed to be stable, expectancy of success will not increase, however. Also expected costs for reaching the goal will remain unaffected. Because of the multiplicative relationship assumed between expectancy of success and utility, aspirational deprivation will have relatively small effects on the probability of mobilization of an actor and thus on the probability of conflict. Progressive deprivation has been assumed to occur in connection with a rapid improvement in the social and economic conditions of the lower social strata.[40] To the extent that this improvement is the result of a more equal distribution of the surplus in society, we can assume that the power differences between higher and lower strata have decreased.[41] Progressive deprivation thus generally occurs in situations where the difference in power resources between actors is decreasing.

A decrease of this kind in a large difference in power resources between two parties is expected to increase the probability of conflict. This increase in the probability of conflict is primarily the result of the assumptions made in the present model of conflict that the probability of conflict between two parties is higher if the difference in power resources between them is small than if the difference is large. The rate of change in power resources may however also have some effect on the probability of conflict. A rapid improvement in the power position of the weaker party will increase his level of relative deprivation more than a gradual improvement will; it will thus bring about some additional increase in his utility of reaching the goal and to some extent also in the probability of mobilization. When a formerly large difference in power resources between two parties begins to decrease, the probability of conflict is therefore expected to be especially high. In contrast to the other forms of relative deprivation, progressive deprivation is thus assumed to be associated with, albeit not the major cause of, an increase in the probability of conflict.

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[38] Gurr, pp. 46–58. More complex varieties of these basic patterns are discussed by Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold in "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns."

[39] A very high utility can of course sometimes offset the effects of decreasing expectancy of success. Utility, being a multiplicative function of motivation and incentives (Atkinson, *An Introduction to Motivation*, p. 242), can be very high in situations which are of vital concern for the actor and where incentives thus are exceedingly high. For example, where extermination is threatened, mobilization can be expected in spite of very low prospects for success.

[40] Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution."

[41] Improvements in the social and economic conditions of the lower strata in the society can occur also when the going rates of exchange remain stable if the total surplus in the society increases. The improvements achieved by the lower strata in the industrial societies during the last hundred years is presumably an effect of improved exchange rates as well as of increasing surplus.

If the new balance of power between parties with formerly large differences in power resources becomes stable, the probability of conflict can be assumed to decrease with time, since through bargaining or conflict the going rate of exchange will change in favor of the party gaining in power, and since the aspiration level of the losing party will gradually move towards the new going rate of exchange. The probability of conflict, however, will remain higher than it was when the more unequal balance of power prevailed between the parties.

Discussion and Conclusions

In contrast to the expectation achievement approach to conflict, the power balance model of conflict outlined here indicates that we can not expect a generally positive correlation between relative deprivation and conflict. Let us compare the present model in this respect with two well-known examples of the expectation achievement theories of conflict, those proposed by Davies and by Gurr.

The basic proposition stated by Gurr[42] is that variation in relative deprivation strongly affects the potential for collective violence and thereby also the potential and magnitude of political violence. Increases in relative deprivation will thus, *ceteris paribus*, be associated with increases in conflict.[43] Davies's theory deals only with progressive deprivation and states that it is the decisive factor behind the outbreak of revolutions.

Gurr's theoretical tenet that increases in relative deprivation will lead to increases in the probability of conflict, does not make a distinction between different types of relative deprivation. Apparently Gurr assumes that all three types of relative deprivation have roughly the same effects on the probability of conflict. In this respect his theory is inadequate. As the analysis above indicates, only increases in progressive deprivation will be associated with a strong increase in the probability of conflict. Increasing aspirational deprivation will only add a little to the probability of conflict, while increasing decremental deprivation tends to be associated with a decreasing probability of conflict. These diverse trends, when taken together, would make us expect that the overall correlation between relative deprivation and probability of conflict will be insignificant.

The difference between the predictions made by Gurr and those derived from the present model is the result of the different role given to the balance of power between the actors in these two theoretical models. In the power balance model outlined here, the difference in power resources is assumed to affect an actor's achievement as well as his aspiration level and thereby also his degree of relative derpivation. Gurr introduces the balance in pressure resources between the parties at a later stage in the causal chain only to account for the extent to which relative deprivation finds expression in political violence.[44]

Like Davies's theory of revolution, the power balance model predicts that progressive deprivation will be associated with a high probability of conflict. This correlation, however, is not primarily a result of a rapid increase in the relative deprivation of the weaker party but rather an effect of the decrease in the power differences between the parties.

One of the basic similarities between the power balance and the political process models of conflict is that both see conflicts as natural byproducts of the normal political or bargaining processes. Another basic similarity is the central role accorded to the changes in power differences between actors. In the political process model of conflict, the acquisition or loss of power resources by the parties—mobilization and demobilization—are seen as the central variables in the development of conflict,[45] since they affect the capacity of the parties to make claims for privileges and advantages which, if resisted, lead to conflicts. The power balance model of conflict takes the difference in power resources as the central independent variable.

It appears, however, that in the political process model of conflict, acquisition and loss of power resources are assumed to have roughly the same effects on the probability of manifest conflict. Thus Tilly[46] states that conflicts such as collective violence tend to be especially frequent not only when groups are gaining in power relative to others but also when they are losing power resources. Such a prediction does not follow from the power balance model of conflict, which makes a distinction between situations where the difference in power resources increases and where it decreases.

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[42] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* p. 320.

[43] The magnitude of political violence is also assumed to be affected by legitimacy, coercive potential and social-structural facilitation (Gurr, chaps. 6–9).

[44] *Ibid.,* chap. 8.

[45] Snyder and Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1969," p. 527, and Tilly "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?", p. 437.

[46] Tilly, pp. 438–439.

It is true as Tilly[47] observes that both parties gaining and parties losing power resources relative to others will "have a special propensity to articulate strongly moral definitions of their situations" and thus to suffer from relative deprivation. According to the present analysis, however, we would not expect parties losing power resources to contend for privileges as often as parties gaining in power. In a situation where an already weaker party is losing power resources the probability for conflict is therefore normally expected to be lower than in a situation where the weaker party is gaining power resources. In this central respect, then, the power balance model can modify the predictions of the political process model. Also when it comes to the change in the probability of conflict over time, the power balance model can help to clarify the political process approach by specifying what mechanisms will modify the propensity of the actors to contend for privileges.

Testing the Models: Industrial Conflict as an Illustrative Case

Needless to say, the empirical testing of theories of conflict like the power balance model and the political process model presents formidable problems. The scope of such an undertaking as well as its possibilities and difficulties are illustrated by the massive efforts of the Michigan group.[48] One of the intervening variables in the power balance model, the concept of utility, is difficult to measure indeed and is used here as a heuristic to arrive at predictions concerning the nature of the relationship between changes in the power balance between parties and the probability of manifest conflict.

In the empirical testing of models of conflict like the ones discussed here, over-time data are of course preferable to crossectional data, but are harder to come by. The Michigan group has shown how over-time indicators on collective violence and the causal factors in the expectation achievement and in the political process models can be produced and utilized. Time-series of official statistics in different countries should provide some possibilities. One can note, for example, that the size of the national budget used by Snyder and Tilly as an indicator of the repressive capacity of the government can also be taken as an indicator of the balance of power between the governmental authorities and other groups contending for power. Snyder and Tilly find that this variable is to some extent related to the incidence of collective violence in France from 1830 to 1960, a result which agrees with the power balance model of conflict.

For other examples of the possibilities of confronting some hypothesis in the power balance model of conflict with empirical data, we can turn to studies of industrial relations. Changes in the level of unemployment can be taken as an indicator of changes in the balance of power between the two parties on the labor market, i.e., employers and labor. When unemployment decreases, the power position of labor can generally be expected to improve, while it can be expected to decline in periods of increasing unemployment. The wage rate can be taken as an indicator of the going rate of exchange on the labor market. The power balance model of conflict predicts a direct relationship between the balance of power and the going rate of exchange (*Hypothesis 10*). This hypothesis receives strong support from the well-known Phillips curve, which refers to the negative relationship between level of unemployment and the rate of change in wages. Wages have thus been found to increase considerably faster when unemployment is low than when it is high, and the change in the level of unemployment appears to be the best predictor of the rate of change in wages.[49]

The central prediction of the power balance model of conflict is that between parties with unequal power resources, decreases in the difference in power resources will increase the probability of conflict, while increases in the power difference will decrease the probability of conflict. Data on industrial conflict are consonant with this prediction. In several countries it has thus been observed that the frequency of strikes shows a cyclical variation, which tends to be positively related to the trade cycle and negatively to changes in the level of unemployment.[50] Thus when the trade cycle shows an upward swing and unemployment decreases, the frequency of strikes tends to increase, while the reverse tends to occur when the trade cycle declines and unemployment increases. These observations are thus consonant with predictions made according to the power balance model of conflict.

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 438.

[48] See Snyder and Tilly: also Lodhi and Tilly, "Urbanization and Crime in 19th-Century France."

[49] The original findings in A. W. Phillips, "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957," *Economica*, 25 (November, 1958), 283–299, have since been replicated in many studies. See, for example, Lars Jacobsson and Assar Lindbeck, "Labor Market Conditions and Inflation—Swedish Experiences 1955–67," *The Swedish Journal of Economics*, 81, No. 2 (1969), 64–103.

[50] See K. G. J. C. Knowles, *Strikes—A Study in Industrial Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 143–150; Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business

While the power balance model of conflict predicts that the probability of conflict is higher when the difference in power resources between parties is decreasing than when it is increasing, in the political process approach these situations appear to be viewed as equally conflict-prone. Rees[51] and O'Brien[52] report empirical data from the United States for the period 1915–1961 on the relation between the cycle of general business activity and the frequency of strikes beginning each month in the consecutive stages of the business cycle, which provide information of relevance for this issue. The general finding of Rees and O'Brien is that the frequency of strikes reaches its peak before the peak in general business activity is arrived at and remains relatively high also in the period immediately following the peak in business activity. In these studies the frequency of strikes is unfortunately not related to the changes in unemployment. Unemployment is highly correlated, however, with general business activity although unemployment tends to continue to decrease also somewhat after the peak in general business activity is reached.[53] These findings would thus appear to give support to the power balance model of conflict over the political process model on the issues whether declines and gains in power resources have similar effects on the probability of conflict.

Fluctuations," *Journal of Political Economy*, 60 (October, 1952), 371–382; Walter Korpi, *Vilda Strejker inom Metall- och Verkstadsindustrin* [Wild-cat Strikes in the Metal Working Industry], (Stockholm: Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm, 1968); Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies" (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973. Mimeo.); F. Stephen O'Brien, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations: A Comment," *Journal of Political Economy*, 73 (December, 1965), 650–654.

[51] Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations."

[52] O'Brien, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations: A Comment."

[53] Rees; O'Brien.

The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents

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Introduction[1]

A common assumption made by students of socialization is that the family is the major source of cultural transmission in society. The child is said to mirror his parents on a wide variety of social and political values. Ernest Campbell, writing in the 1969 edition of the *Handbook of Socialization*, claims that "we would be exceedingly surprised were we to discover, in research on any factor whatsoever, that a knowledge of the parents' position or score on a factor did not predict positively to the score of the adolescent."[2] This general conception is reflected in works concerned specifically with political socialization. Roberta Sigel asserts, "The similarity of views between parents and children on such issues as foreign affairs, civil rights, economics and many other vital topics of the day is truly phenomenal."[3] Herbert Hyman, in a general review of the empirical research related to the transmission of political attitudes (pre-1960), finds this research to ". . . establish very clearly a family correspondence in views that are relevant to matters of political orientation. Over a great many such correlations from different studies, the median value approximates .50."[4]

Recently, however, the effectiveness of the family, notably the parents, in the transmission of certain political values has been called into question. R. W. Connell, referring explicitly to Hyman's review, asserts that almost all investigations which report high correlation coefficients between parent-child attitudes have a "self-selection" bias in their sampling procedure. This bias, he argues, artificially inflates relationships, leading to an overestimate of the influence parents have on the political attitudes of their children.[5] Post-1960 empirical evidence lends support to this contention. Based on the University of Chicago socialization study, Robert Hess and Judith Torney assert that the family has little, if any ability to transmit idiosyncratic attitudes. Rather, its influence is limited to partisanship and to reinforcing those attitudes consensually held.[6] The same inference can be drawn from the family socialization project carried out by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. In the currently most influential intergenerational study, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi report relatively low correlations between attitudes held by parents and those held by their adolescent children. Over a range of issues, excluding party identification, the highest coefficient of association was found to be .34, and most coefficients were considerably lower.[7]

But even in this critical light, it is apparent that parents do influence the attitudes of their children. Negative correlations, in any study, are almost nonexistent. It seems probable that bivariate (uncontrolled) correlations between parent-child attitudes in any reasonably stratified sample, drawn in the early 1970s, are going to be positive and moderately low. Perhaps in a different time period (for example, the Depression, when many of the investigations reviewed by Hyman were conducted) correlations, even in the case of unbiased samples, would have been positive and moderately high.

But if concern is with building cumulative knowledge, the population parameter is only of passing interest. The real interest lies in specifying conditional universal propositions. Regardless of the issue, time-frame, and population, under what conditions do parents influence the political

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[1] Financial support for this project was provided by a National Science Foundation Grant for Doctoral Dissertation Research made to Donald J. McCrone (Grant #GS 34218), and by a research grant from the Graduate College of the University of Iowa. I would like to thank Professor Donald McCrone, for his sound substantive advice, and George Woodworth, Assistant Professor of Statistics, University of Iowa, for his advice on the general linear hypothesis. Thanks also to John C. Wahlke for a number of helpful suggestions, and to Susan Brantley and John Tatlock for many stimulating discussions relevant to this research.

[2] Ernest Campbell, "Adolescent Socialization," in *Handbook of Socialization*, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 827.

[3] Roberta Sigel, *Learning About Politics* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 104.

[4] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 72.

[5] R. W. Connell, "Political Socialization and the American Family," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Fall, 1972), 326–327.

[6] Robert Hess and Judith Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Anchor Press, 1967), p. 113.

[7] M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 172–176.

attitudes of their children? What, if any, are the general principles involved?

Criteria for Studying the Transmission of Political Attitudes and Values

Studies of family attitude transmission should clearly demonstrate at least three points: (1) the nature and extent of the attitude correspondence between parents and children,[8] (2) the degree to which this correspondence is a function of parental transmission as distinguished from other social forces, and (3) the factors that affect the success of transmission.

The Nature of Parent-Child Attitude Correspondence

There are three possible types of attitude correspondence between parents and children, which we may call "relative pair," "absolute pair," and "group" correspondence.[9] Relative pair correspondence, usually indicated by some type of correlational statistic, is the measure used in most studies. All correlations, whether based on intervals or ranks, determine the extent to which one distribution is a function of another. If a correlation coefficient is high, it means, for example, that the most conservative fathers will usually have the most conservative sons. It does not mean that the absolute scores of the sons on a scale of conservatism are at all close the absolute scores of their fathers. Correlation coefficients are not measures of absolute agreement. On a scale ranging from one to fifty, all the sons could be in the one-to-twenty range and all the fathers in the thirty-to-fifty range, and there could still be an extremely high correlation between their attitudes.

Absolute pair correspondence is the extent to which the scale scores of the sons are exactly the same as the scale scores of their fathers, e.g., twenty-five per cent of the father-son dyads have a score of two on the scale or item in question. This correspondence is usually measured, as just indicated, by percentage agreement.

Group correspondence is the extent to which the opinion distributions of each generation are similar, regardless of the pair relationships between parents and their own children. For example, fifty per cent of a student sample and forty-five per cent of a parent sample might favor socialized medicine, a case of close group correspondence. But this says nothing about the correspondence between parents and their *own* children. Group correspondence is usually measured by means and standard deviations, or percentages as in the example.

Distinctions among the types of correspondence are not always properly made in the literature. Hyman, for example, interprets at least one case of group correspondence as relative pair correspondence.[10] While pair comparisons are most often made with correlation coefficients, terms like "transmission," "similarity," or "congruence" are often used simultaneously in ways that imply absolute pair correspondence. In the following discussion the term "congruence" will be reserved for absolute pair correspondence. Group correspondence will be used as defined above. The terms "transmission" and "influence" will indicate relative pair correspondence.

Direct Parental Influence vs. Other Social Influences

Direct parental influence is only one possible explanation for parent-child attitude correspondence. An alternative explanation holds that parents and children have similar attitudes because each individual family member is exposed to the same social influences. Both group and pair correspondence could be spurious. Another alternative holds that the political attitudes of children are influenced by parents indirectly.[11] Tests for these possibilities have been extremely infrequent in past research.

Spurious Relative Pair Correspondence. The problem of spurious relative pair correspondence will be illustrated by assessing the possibility that it is social class which is causing parent-child attitudes to covary. It can be argued that by belonging to the same social class, parents and children are exposed to similar media, have friends and acquaintances with like attitudes, have the same "class interests," etc. This possibility can be diagrammed as follows:



Social class is leading parents and children to have similar attitudes in an absolute sense. This may have little meaning for correlation analysis, particularly if the "third" variable is constant or has little variance. Arguments which claim that correlations are artificially high because the sample is "all of one social class," or "all from one atypical community" are almost certain to be false.[12] In the case of the example, social class would have to be fairly heterogeneous before it would affect the parent-child correlations. The logic would be something like: the lower the family's social class, the higher both parent and child would score on some scale relative to their own group. The spurious relationship hypothesis is usually tested by partialing for the third variable.[13]

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[8] The discussion here will be limited to the *nature* of attitude correspondence.

[9] Connell discusses relative pair and group correspondence, but neglects the third possibility—absolute pair correspondence. Connell, pp. 324–325.

[10] Connell, p. 325.

[11] For example, many investigators believe that strict child-rearing patterns lead to authoritarianism in child. This authoritarianism could, in turn, "structure" policy attitudes. For a discussion of indirect socialization see Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 65–73; for a critique of the structuring principle see Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (June, 1973), 415–432.

Spurious Group Correspondence. In many circumstances group correspondence will be affected by common environmental variables. For example, religion may affect both parent and child attitudes toward legalized abortion. If the environmental factor varies, the possibility of a common effect on the two groups can be tested with a difference-in-means statistic. Often, however, there is no variance on these factors. An example would be a common community effect when the sample is drawn entirely from one community. There is no way to reject the hypothesis that group means are similar because parents and children live in the same place. But if the research concern is with parental influence, commonly affected mean values may be of little interest, as long as there is ample variance in parent-child attitudes. The research question remains: "To what extent are deviations from the child mean scores influenced by deviations from the parent mean scores?"

Direct Parental Influence and the Magnitude of Correlation Coefficients. While the procedures just outlined may be used to reject the spurious alternative to parental influence, another method is better for testing the extent to which correlations between parents' and children's attitudes support the direct parental influence hypothesis. The method involves varying certain conditions which might be expected to affect the strength correlations. One condition might be issue salience to the parent. If an issue is salient to a parent, we would expect attitude transmission to be more successful than if the parent is not concerned with the issue. Another condition might be the accuracy of the child's perception of the parent's attitude. If parents are directly influencing their children, an important prerequisite would seem to be some knowledge of the parent's attitude by the child. But if correlations are spurious, or influence is indirect, it should make no difference whether or not an issue is salient to a parent or whether the child knows or does not know the parent's attitude. Variance in these conditions should not affect the magnitude of correlation coefficients.[14]

Specifying Conditions of Parental Influence

Correlation coefficients indicating the success of attitude transmission vary greatly from issue to issue and from one study to another. However, attempts to explain these variations, i.e., to specify the conditions of influence, have been notable only for their lack of success. Jennings and Niemi, for example, did not find a single variable having any significant impact on successful transmission.

Some have suggested that the content of an attitude, the attitude object, is consequential for the success of transmission.[15] More plausible, in my view, is a failure to specify all conditions relevant to successful transmission. What might these conditions be? Some insight can be gained by analyzing those attitudes successfully transmitted on a consistent basis. Of particular interest is party identification. The influence of parents on the partisanship of their children has been well documented. This attitudinal predisposition is surrounded by a somewhat unusual set of circumstances. Party identification is subject to considerable discussion in many families at regular intervals, i.e., elections. In addition, many parents convey to their children quite early that "we" are Democrats or "we" are Republicans.[16] Party identification is different, then, from most other attitudes in its *visibility* to the child and its *salience* to the parents. The important point to note is that these are population parameters. They are not inherent characteristics of the attitude object.[17] The influence of these variables can be moved to the table marginals and controlled.

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[12] A constant will not usually inflate correlations. One instance, however, in which it would inflate correlations is when the constant causes a large percentage of both parent and child scores to fall into one rank or interval. It is important, therefore, to check the distribution of the attitude scores for both parents and children.

[13] A reduction due to partialing does not, of course, necessarily mean a spurious relationship exists. A reduction also occurs when a developmental sequence is present.

[14] This methodology is discussed by Frank F. Furstenberg, "The Transmission of Attitudes in the Family" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 1967), chapter 3.

[15] Stephen Wieting, "Family Factors and the Religious Belief Systems of Adolescents" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, 1971), p. 87.

[16] Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 71–72.

[17] There are, however, differences between party identification and issues which are inherent in the attitude

Perceptual Accuracy. At some point in any study of social influence it would seem imperative to determine if the person who is believed to be influenced is aware of the attitudes and values of the person or group believed to be exerting influence. This point is often overlooked in studies of social influence. Parents may be exerting considerable influence on the attitudes of youth, but it may be of the subjective sort. That is, children are identifying with what they think or perceive are their parent's attitudes.[18]

Perceptual accuracy can strongly influence successful transmission. In Furstenberg's study of mobility aspirations, the parent-child correlation for the group in which student respondents were uncertain of (didn't know or misperceived) parental attitudes was actually negative (tau-b-.183). But when perception was accurate, the coefficient was a positive .480.[19] There is a strong possibility that parent-child attitude correlations, for all issues, are highly dependent on the marginal distribution of perceptual accuracy for the attitude in question.

Issue Salience. The finding of Jennings and Niemi that the level of political interest had little or no effect on the success of value transmission surprised many observers. This failing, and the failure of other specification variables, seems rooted in a research assumption which has seldom been questioned—the idea that some families are more successful than others in transmitting attitudes. Investigators have ignored the cognitive and emotive factors surrounding specific issues and have instead focused on all-encompassing variables like parent-child affect, parental authoritarianism and, in the same intellectual tradition, political interest. Successful transmission, rather than essentially being a family characteristic, may essentially be issue specific. That parents are "politically interested" does not mean they necessarily have interest in any particular given issue. The reverse is also possible; parents may find some political issues quite important without having any general interest in politics. To the extent that the general level of political interest and the salience of any one issue diverge, the effect of political interest on the successful transmission of the attitude toward that issue is likely to be reduced.

Family Interaction. Most family interaction variables, such as parent-child affective relations, have been found to have either a slight positive effect or no effect on successful parental attitude transmission. Family interaction, not being specific to issues, may be too general to have much impact. It is conceivable that the influence of family variables is severely attenuated by a child's inaccurate perception of the parental attitude. All the family conditions necessary for parental influence could be present, and the child may in fact want to identify with the parent attitude. When questioned, he may give a response he believes similar to the attitude of the parent. But if the parental attitude is misperceived, the child's response is treated as an "error." According to theory, he should have shared the parent attitude, but did not. There is no reason to believe that there is any consequential relationship between variables like parent-child affect, parental authoritarianism, and accurate perception. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when positive effects are reported for a family variable, the attitude object is almost invariably one that is highly visible, like party identification.

The study on which the following discussion is based was designed to investigate the transmission of attitudes from parents to children in light of the above considerations. I shall proceed by first examining the extent and character of the attitude similarity between parents and children in terms of relative pair, absolute pair and groud correspondence. Next will be an analysis of the extent to which covariation between parent and child attitudes (relative pair correspondence) is due to direct parental influence as opposed to other factors. Finally, I shall attempt to elaborate, as generally as possible, the conditions requisite to successful transmission.

The Sample and Measurement

The Sample

The sample for this analysis consists of 322 parent-child dyads. The "children" are recent high school graduates. Recent graduates were selected because at the time of the interview most were fully enfranchised members of the political community, and almost all would be eligible to vote in the 1972 presidential election. This procedure avoids the common criticism of social-

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objects. For example, "independent" for party identification is not equivalent to "undecided" in the case of issue attitudes. This point will be discussed again later in the paper.

[18] Richard Niemi reports that adolescents in the Michigan socialization study perceived themselves as attitudinally closer to parents by an average of .10 (tau-b) than they were in actuality. He suggests that this misperception serves an important psychological function for the youthful respondents by reducing whatever tension may arise from asymmetry in parent-adolescent political attitudes. Richard G. Niemi, "Collecting Information about the Family: A Problem in Survey Methodology," in *Socialization to Politics,* ed. Jack Dennis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 480.

[19] Furstenberg, p. 172.

ization research that the subjects are too young to participate in the political process, and that by the time they come of age the attitudes and values they learned as children may have completely changed.[20] Another reason for choosing recent high school graduates is that these new adults are soon to leave the family permanently, and further family socialization will be minimal.

The data were collected by means of personal interview in Iowa City, Iowa (population 47,000), between June 1 and September 1, 1972.[21] The sampling universe consisted of all graduating seniors from the city's largest high school (who gave Iowa City addresses) and their parents. Eighty per cent of the adolescents and at least one parent in each case were successfully interviewed.[22] The sample, quite obviously, is not randomly drawn from a finite population. But this is of limited importance since the purpose here is not in describing population parameters, but in developing "conditional universal propositions." When the purpose of research is testing conditional universals, a random sample is not necessarily more useful than a nonrandom sample.[23] A defensible and financially more practical procedure for building cumulative knowledge involves testing hypothesized relationships under a variety of conditions. In this paper, hypotheses will be tested using a basically white, urban, middle-class sample. Demonstration of the generalizability of the findings entails replication using, for example, a rural sample, a black sample, or possibly a non-American sample. The hypotheses can, of course, never be confirmed; they can only be disproved.

Measurement

Attitudes were measured by responses to closed-ended, Likert-type items in a personal interview situation. The questionnaires were designed to secure information about the young adult, his parents, his best friend, and his perception of certain attitudes of his parents and best friend. This information consists basically of party identification, attitudes toward three issues, evaluation of eight public figures, and a series of questions relating to adolescent/parent/best friend interactions. This paper will be limited to an analysis of parents and adolescents with respect to party identification, the three issues, and certain interaction variables.

Selection of the issues and their indicators was made only after numerous pretests, first on college students, then on college students and their parents, and finally on a small sample of high school seniors and their parents. The issues finally chosen were: (1) racial integration of the public schools, (2) United States policy toward Communist China, and (3) laws concerning the use of marijuana (these questions are reproduced in the appendix). The attitude toward each issue was measured by a scale consisting of four opinion items, which were scattered throughout the measuring instrument to minimize any tendency to respond to the items in a blanket fashion. Control of response set was effected by wording some of the items negatively and some positively.

The reliability and validity of the scales derived from these questions is, of course, crucial. Fortunately, these estimates can be made with some confidence. Since each scale is used three times (once for the adolescent, once for the adolescent's perception of the parent's attitude, and once for the actual parent attitude), there are three opportunities to check on scale properties.

Reliability (defined as internal consistency) was estimated using Cronbach's alpha.[24] Nine coefficients were computed. All were above .70, which is satisfactory. As for validity, a good argument can be made for the *content* validity of the scales used here. They are composed of specific opinion items measuring attitudes toward concrete relatively well-defined concepts (issues). More important is the assessment of *construct* validity—the extent to which relationships between items are isomorphic with the relationships predicted by the nominal definition of the concept. This form of validity can be estimated by factor analysis, which will indicate those items measuring the same concept, and how successful they are in this measurement.[25]

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[20] See David March, "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned," *British Journal of Political Science,* 1 (October, 1971), 460–464.

[21] Interviewers consisted of eight male political science and sociology graduate students between 25 and 32 years old.

[22] The sample consists of 183 adolescents (54 per cent male, 46 per cent female) and 322 parents (45 per cent male, 55 per cent female). Data on both parents were obtained for 139 of the adolescents. Twenty-six adolescents came from one-parent homes. In the case of the remaining eighteen adolescents, the second parent was not home at the time of the scheduled interview or call-backs.

I shall not, in this report, distinguish between mothers and fathers. Therefore, to make maximum use of the sample size each adolescent is paired with both the mother and the father (when both are present). This procedure renders tests of statistical significance based on F-ratio's inappropriate. See footnote 43 for a further discussion.

[23] David Willer, *Scientific Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), chapter 6.

[24] George W. Bohrnstedt, "Reliability and Validity Assessment in Attitude Measurement," in *Attitude Measurement,* ed. Gene Summers (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1970), pp. 87–88.

[25] Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 453–455.

Table 1. Product-Moment Correlations between Parents and Adolescents on Three Issues and Party Identification

Attitude Objects	Correlation	Means[a] Parents	Means[a] Adolescents
Racial Integration	.32	8.8	7.4
China Policy	.27	6.4	5.4
Marijuana Laws	.40	9.2	6.9
Party Identification	.48	4.4	3.9

[a] For purposes of issue description, a scale ranging from 1–17 was computed by the additive method. The higher the scale value, the more conservative the respondent. For party identification (measured by the standard SRC seven-point scale), the higher scale values indicate Republican preference.

All twelve opinion items were factored together, once for the adolescents, once for the adolescent's perception of the parent's attitudes, and once for the actual parent attitudes. It was hypothesized that three distinct factors would emerge, with all the racial integration items loading on one factor, all the China policy items on another factor, and all the marijuana items on a third factor. The results supported the hypothesis. The analysis revealed an extremely clean factor structure, with only one of the predicted thirty-six loadings (four items, three factors, three administrations) falling below .50.[26] The actual scale values for each individual respondent were computed with factor scores.[27]

Bivariate and Within-Category Relationships

Bivariate Relationships

The product-moment correlations between parent and adolescent attitudes, presented in Table 1, are as high as or higher than one might expect on the basis of recent literature. The correlations for party identification and racial integration are comparable to those found by Jennings and Niemi (.59 and .34, respectively).[28] These authors also report a number of very low-correlations, but for attitude objects which lacked immediacy at the time of the interview (1965). When immediacy is comparable, the relationships reported here and those reported by Jennings and Niemi are similar.

In terms of group correspondence, the adolescents are in all cases more liberal than the parents but the differences indicate no great generation gap. The standard deviations (data not presented) on each issue for the two groups are almost identical. Absolute congruence between parents and adolescents can best be described as moderately high. This information was computed by subtracting the adolescent's scale score on each issue (computed by the additive method) from the complementary parent's score. These difference scores had a possible range of ±16, with zero indicating perfect agreement. The means of these difference scores for the race issue, China policy, and the marijuana issue were 1.3, 1.0 and 2.2, respectively.[29] Given this information, the correlation coefficients can be interpreted as indicating a functional relationship between attitudes that are reasonably similar in an absolute sense. There exists no large gap between parent and adolescent attitudes in either group or congruence terms.

Conditions for Parental Influence (Within-Category Relationships)

Having established the magnitude of the parent-adolescent attitude correlations, I shall now attempt to specify the conditions which are conducive to successful transmission. There are two reasons for this analysis. First, it is consequential for determining whether parent-adolescent attitude correlations are due to parental influence or due to other social forces.[30] If attitude correlations between parents and adolescents are spurious, it should make no difference for the magnitude of coefficients if certain specification variables are manipulated. Beyond demonstrating or failing to demonstrate direct parental influence, the analysis is designed to uncover conditional universal propositions concerning parent-child attitude transmission.

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[26] The common factor model was used with communalities estimated by squared multiple correlation coefficients. The rotation was oblique. The item falling below .50 was the first racial integration item (see appendix) which loaded at .38.

[27] The factor scores were estimated by multiple regression following the procedures outlined in Harry Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 350–354.

[28] Jennings and Niemi use the product-moment coefficient for party identification, and tau-*b* for the issues.

[29] Positive scores mean adolescents are more liberal than parents, negative scores mean the reverse. The distribution of these scores approximates a normal curve. The standard deviations for the race issue, China policy and marijuana laws are 4.1 3.7, and 4.3, respectively.

[30] The most plausible hypothesis, alternative to direct parental influence, is that parents and children have similar attitudes because each individual family member is exposed to the same social influences. The example used earlier was social class. Variables of this type may determine the position of the parent and child within their respective groups thus producing a spurious correlation. One test of the spurious relationship hypothesis is controlling for a third variable. Controls were introduced for education, social class, and religion; at no point, for any issue or party identification, was the bivariate correlation reduced by more than .02.

Perceptual Accuracy. Accurate perception of the parental attitude by the child has been shown by Furstenberg to have a very significant effect on the success of attitude transmission—at least in the case of mobility aspirations. The same should be true of political attitudes, with those parental attitudes most accurately perceived by adolescents being those which are the most successfully transmitted.

> *Hypothesis 1:* The more accurate the adolescent's perception of the parent's attitude, the more influence the parent will have on the adolescent's attitude.

Perceptual accuracy for party identification was operationalized by asking each adolescent to report the party identification of his parents. This report was collapsed into three categories (Democrat, Independent and Republican) and compared with the actual parent party identification (also collapsed into three categories). If the two were congruent, perception was classed as accurate. If they were not congruent or the adolescent responded "I don't know," perception was classed as uncertain. The situation for the issues is a bit more complicated. These attitudes were measured with four opinion indicators. Adolescents were asked to report parent opinions for all four items using a five point agree-disagree scale. A sixth option was an "I don't know" response. These items and the corresponding parent items were collapsed into three categories—agree, undecided, disagree—and a comparison was made to determine the accuracy of perception. It is possible for adolescent respondents to manifest uncertainty on all four indicators at one extreme, or to perceive the parent's opinions correctly on all four items at the other. The result is a scale ranging from zero to four, the higher score indicating the greater accuracy.

Some analysts assume that party identification is an attitude intrinsically different from those toward issues or public figures, believing it is this difference which accounts for its successful transmission. Connell, for example, sees a difference in social patterning—the objects of opinion being institutions, and the choice among them being a relatively simply dichotomy. Jennings and Niemi, in discussing the successful transmission of party identification, note the low correlations observed in other domains of political life and assert that there is no ground for any "general thesis" explaining attitude transmission.[31] It was observed earlier that there are inherent differences between party identification and other attitudes. But there are also noninherent differences which are controllable. One of these is perceptual accuracy. Children are simply more likely, for reasons already discussed, to perceive parental party identification more accurately than they perceive attitudes toward current issues. Table 2 shows that while 72 per cent of the adolescents have a correct perception of their parent's party identification, not more than 12 per cent have a completely accurate perception of their parent's attitude toward any one issue. Even when the two categories indicating the most accurate perception are collapsed together, not more than 36 per cent could be classed as having an accurate perception of any one parental attitude.

These observations lead to the second hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2:* Parents will have equal influence on the party identification and issue attitudes of adolescents when perceptual accuracy is held constant.

The correlations necessary to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 3.

The effects of perceptual accuracy on parental influence are very strong and offer substantial support for hypothesis 1.[32] The data, in addition, support the direct parental influence explanation for parent-adolescent attitude correlations. For all four attitude objects there is a linear increase in parental influence as perception becomes more accurate. As predicted, adolescents uncertain of parental attitudes are subject to almost no parental influence.

Hypothesis 2 also receives support from the data presented in Table 3. Within categories of perceptual accuracy, the coefficients for the issues compare quite favorably with those for party identification. This correspondence suggests the operation of a general process, with the principles involved in the transmission of attitudes toward issues being the same as those involved in the transmission of party identification. Note also that the attitude toward marijuana laws does not deviate from the overall pattern. If there exists, as claimed by some sociologists, a youth culture exerting countervailing influence to that of parents, it should at this point be manifested.

Issue and Partisan Salience. Jennings and Niemi found that political interest had no effect on the success of attitude transmission. The same pattern, using the same operational indicator, is

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[31] Connell, pp. 329–330, Jennings and Niemi, p. 169.

[32] Perceptual accuracy was collapsed into three categories to insure that each category had an adequate sample size. The linear patterns was, however, even more pronounced in the five-category case, although the N's were small. In the five-category breakdown, the correlations in the category exhibiting the greatest perceptual accuracy for the race issue, China policy, and the marijuana issue were .66, .72, and .61, respectively (based on 30–35 cases).

Table 2. Distribution of Perceptual Accuracy for the Issues and Party Identification

Attitude Objects	Perceptual Accuracy Zero	One	Two	Three	Four	Total[a]
Racial Integration	11%	23%	30%	24%	11%	100% ($N=318$)
China Policy	24%	19%	20%	24%	12%	100% ($N=318$)
Marijuana Laws	15%	23%	28%	24%	09%	100% ($N=317$)
Party Identification[b]	28%	72%	—	—	—	100% ($N=319$)

[a] May not total to 100%, because of rounding.

[b] Perceptual accuracy for party identification is a dichotomy. The adolescent either knows (one) or does not know (zero) the parent's attitude.

found in the data employed here.[33] The parent-adolescent correlations within categories of political interest appear to be randomly distributed (data not presented).

The next step is to substitute issue and partisan salience for political interest. Salience of party identification to the parent was operationalized by breaking parental partisanship into three categories—independents, weak partisans, and strong partisans. A scale of parental issue salience was constructed using three items: (1) how important is the issue to the parent, (2) how often do the parent and adolescent talk about the issue, and (3) would it make any difference to the parent if the adolescent adopted an attitude on the issue different from that of the parent. The scale ranged from one to seventeen with the median scores for the race, China, and marijuana issues being 7.8, 6.8, and 11.4, respectively. It is obvious that the marijuana issue is considerably more salient to parents than are the other two issues. Since the distribution of perceptual accuracy did not differ on the three issues, we immediately suspect that the reason for the higher parent-adolescent correlation on the marijuana issue, as opposed to the other two issues, is the greater issue salience to parents.

> *Hypothesis 3:* The greater the issue and partisan salience to the parent, the more influence the parent will have on the adolescent attitude.

Table 4 indicates clear support for the hypothesis, although the relationship in the "strong partisan" category for party identification is somewhat greater than the "high salience" category for the issues. It must be noted, however, that salience for the issues and salience for party identification are not exactly comparable. The term "Independent" for party identification does not have the same connotations as the term "low" for issue salience. It is possible for independents to be highly concerned and interested in partisan politics, while "low" issue salience necessarily entails low "interest" in that issue. Finally, Table 4 like Table 3, offers strong support for the "direct parental influence" explanation for parent-adolescent attitude covariation. While we cannot rule out all explanations alternative to parental influence, the direct influence hypothesis seems at this point the most plausible.[34]

Table 3. Parent-Adolescent Product/Moment Correlations Within-Categories of Perceptual Accuracy

Attitude Objects	Perceptual Accuracy[a] Uncertain	Medium Accurate	Accurate
Racial Integration	−.15 (107)	.30 (96)	.56 (115)
China Policy	−.08 (139)	.21 (65)	.51 (116)
Marijuana Laws	.12 (122)	.25 (90)	.60 (106)
Party Identification[b]	.01 (90)	—	.57 (229)

[a] Based on Table 2 (for the issues), the scores of zero and one for perceptual accuracy were combined for the uncertain category; the score of two equals the medium accurate category, and the scores of three and four were combined for the accurate category.

[b] Perceptual accuracy for party identification is a dichotomy.

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[33] The question is: "How often do you discuss politics with your son or daughter?" (1) never, (2) a few times a year, (3) several times a month, (4) several times a week.

[34] It is possible that adolescents are influencing parents. But if this were the case, correlations should not be so strongly affected by adolescent perceptual uncertainty, unless there is a functional relationship be-

Table 4. Parent-Adolescent Issue Attitude and Partisan Correlations Within-Categories of Issue and Partisan Salience to the Parent

Attitude Object	Parental Issue Salience		
	Low	Medium	High
Racial Integration	.00 (64)	.27 (127)	.48 (125)
China Policy	.03 (73)	.25 (142)	.44 (100)
Marijuana Laws	−.21 (35)	.35 (71)	.48 (211)
	Parental Partisan Salience		
	Independent[a]	Weak Partisan	Strong Partisan
Party Identification	.28 (163)	.31 (73)	.68 (83)

[a] Includes both "pure" Independents and Independents who "lean" toward either the Republicans or the Democrats.

Family Interaction. Family interaction variables were criticized earlier as being too general to have much impact on successful transmission.

Hypothesis 4: Conditions of family interaction will not affect the success of attitude transmission.

I have chosen for analysis two of the most frequently used family variables—family authoritarian ideology and parent-child affective relations. Many students of the family believe that authoritarian as opposed to permissive child-rearing will affect the success of attitude transmission. Empirically, Jennings and Niemi, as well as Middleton and Putney, report a curvilinear relationship between parental authoritarianism and successful transmission.[35] Other investigators, however, have reported no relationship.[36] The measure of family authoritarian ideology used here is a five-item scale taken from Ernhart and Loevinger.[37] The data support hypothesis 4. The within-category correlations display no patterned distribution, either linear or curvilinear.[38]

It is also commonly thought that warm parent-adolescent interpersonal relations should lead to a desire by the adolescent to adopt the values and attitudes of the parent. Jennings and Niemi found parent-adolescent affective ties had no influence on the success of transmission. Middleton and Putney, on the other hand, report a positive effect.[39] The parental "attractiveness" scale employed here is operationalized by items in-

Table 5. Parent-Adolescent Product/Moment Correlations Within-Categories of Authoritarianism for the Issues and Party Identification

Attitude Objects	Parental Authoritarianism			
	High	Med-High	Med-Low	Low
Racial Integration	.32 (62)	.31 (85)	.24 (93)	.38 (66)
China Policy	.16	.23	.31	.35
Marijuana Laws	.55	.32	.32	.36
Party Identification	.31	.58	.40	.46

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tween adolescent uncertainty over parental attitudes and parental uncertainty over adolescent attitudes. Any conclusive test would require longitudinal data. Another nonrejectable alternative is the possibility that parents and peers have attitudes which are strongly related. If this were the case, it could be argued that the adolescent's attitude is due to peer influence.

[35] Jennings and Niemi, p. 181, and Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 532–533.

[36] Philip Nogee and Martin Levin, "Some Determinants of Political Attitudes among College Voters," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (Winter, 1958–1959), 460.

[37] Claire B. Ernhart and Jane Loevinger, *Authoritarian Family Ideology: A Measure, Its Correlates, and Its Robustness* (Austin, Texas: Society for Multivariate Experimental Psychology, 1969).

[38] A four- as opposed to three-category breakdown is reported because any curvilinear pattern is more likely to be evident in the former. The results with three categories reflect the same pattern.

[39] Jennings and Niemi, p. 181, and Middleton and Putney, pp. 532–533.

Table 6. Parent-Adolescent Correlations Within-Categories of Parental Attractiveness for the Issues and Party Identification

	Parental Attractiveness		
Attitude Object	Low	Medium	High
Racial Integration	.17 (76)	.36 (167)	.42 (67)
China Policy	.14	.26	.41
Marijuana Laws	.46	.37	.46
Party Identification	.24	.58	.52

quiring into how "close" the adolescent feels to the parent, and how much the adolescent "admires" the parent.

It is apparent that, contrary to hypothesis 4, attractiveness does in some instances have an effect on successful transmission. But the pattern is unstable. The transmission of attitudes toward marijuana laws seems impervious to changes in attraction. On the other hand, there is a moderately strong effect on the other two issues and party identification (although there is a mild reversal in the case of the latter).

Multivariate Models

Statistical Methodology

Both issue salience[40] and perceptual accuracy, taken by themselves, have effects on successful transmission as strong or stronger than any variable reported in past research. In this section it shall be determined how these variables, along with "attractiveness," operate together. This will require a multivariate statistical model. The model employed is a test of the general linear hypothesis for multiple covariance. The specific form of the model used is somewhat complex going a step beyond the analysis of covariance. Conceptually, the dependent variable is parental influence. Operationally, this is not a single variable, but a relationship between two variables. Its indicator is the regression of the adolescent attitude on the parent attitude. Analysis of covariance would test the effect of a categorical variable on the regression intercept. First order statistical interaction, or nonadditivity, exists if the slope of the relationship between parent and adolescent attitudes is dependent on a second (or *n*th) independent variable. Clearly, the hypotheses predict this interaction. That is, within categories of a second independent variable—for example, issue salience—the slope of the parent-adolescent attitude relationship should increase as issues become more salient to parents. Consequently, the first-order interaction will be built into the statistical model. This model is the summary analog of comparing relationships within categories of a specification variable or variables—the method used to test hypotheses in the previous section.[41] The procedure might be thought of as a two-way analysis of variance, but instead of means, the cell entries are regression coefficients.[42] As in all tests of the general linear hypothesis, a maximally predictive equation is fitted to the data, and against it are tested less complex equations. If the F-ratio resulting from a comparison of these models is statistically significant, it means the additional terms in the more complex model make a difference.[43] The procedure, in addition, yields multiple correlation and partial regression coefficients.

Issue Salience and Perceptual Accuracy

The effect of issue salience and perceptual accuracy on parental influence are combined in a number of models, presented in Figure 1, which are consistent with my conceptual assumptions. I am assuming parental influence to be the de-

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[40] From this point forward, the term "issue salience" will be used to refer to partisan salience as well as issue salience.

[41] The general form of model is:

$$Y = a_o + \mathrm{a}_i + b_o\mathrm{X}_j + \mathrm{b}_j\mathrm{X}_j + e,$$

where a_o represents the grand mean, a_i represents the deviation of the grand mean from the kth category, $b_o\mathrm{X}_j$ is the regression of Y on the interval independent variable which is common to all categories, $\mathrm{b}_j\mathrm{X}_j$ represents the deviation of the optimum regression function in the kth category from the common slope. The question of interest is whether or not the common regression is parallel to the within-category regression. If they *are* parallel, it means that categorizing the parent attitude (by, for example, issue salience) has no effect. If the common regression slope and the slope computed within categories *are not* parallel, it means the regression within categories provides the line of best fit. The sums of squares due to fitting the line within the categories will thus be greater than the sums of squares due to the common regression. The explained variance and the correlation coefficient will increase because of this nonparallelism. See John E. Overall, "Multiple Covariance Analysis by the General Least Squares Regression Method," *Behavioral Science*, 17 (May, 1972), 313–320.

[42] Most readers are no doubt aware that two-way analysis of variance computed by standard methods requires equal cell frequencies. Unbiased estimates are usually obtained, when cell frequencies are not equal, by using the weighted squares of means approximation. The multiple covariance linear model is the mathematical equivalent of this approximation. James Fennessey, "The General Linear Model: A New Perspective on Some Familiar Topics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (July, 1968), 4.

[43] Tests of statistical significance based on *F*-ratio's are not appropriate for these data because the least squares assumption of "independence" in independent random samples is not met (183 adolescents are paired with 322 parents). This means that the degrees of freedom for the residual sums of squares cannot be estimated in an unbiased manner. Consequently, the mean square residual (the denominator in the *F*-ratio) cannot be computed. The sums of squares, the cross-products, and the degrees of freedom for the numerator are, however, unaffected.

pendent variable, and that issue salience is antecedent to perceptual accuracy. These assumptions are not unreasonable. It is difficult to imagine parental influence as a determinant of the other two variables.[44] Also, conditions in which perceptual accuracy on the part of the adolescent might lead to issue salience for the parent are difficult to fathom.

One intuitively suspects that perceptual accuracy is largely a function of issue salience. If an issue is important to the parent, it will be discussed or commented on within the confines of the family, and other family members will become aware of that particular parental attitude.



Figure 1. Models of Interrelationships Among Issue Salience, Perceptual Accuracy and Parental Influence

I = Parental Issue Salience
P = Adolescent Perceptual Accuracy
Z = Parental Influence on the Adolescent Attitude

Model 1: This model posits I with a direct effect on Z, and a spurious relationship between P and Z. The two latter covary only because of the common influence of I.

Model 2: Model two posits no relationship between I and P, but with each having an independent, additive effect on Z.

Model 3: The developmental sequence. I leads to P which in turn leads to Z.

Model 4: The developmental sequence, but with I having an independent effect on Z in addition to its effect through P.

Model 5: I and P act on Z in a nonadditive manner.

Table 7. Product-Moment Correlations Between Parental Issue Salience and Adolescent Perceptual Accuracy for the Issues and Party Identification

Attitude Object	Correlation Between Issue Salience and Perceptual Accuracy
Racial Integration	.25
China Policy	.22
Marijuana Laws	.25
Party Identification	.23

Hypothesis 5: The greater the issue salience to the parent, the more accurate the adolescent perception of the parental attitude.

The data only marginally support hypothesis 5. There is unquestionably a relationship, but it is obvious that factors other than issue salience are responsible for a considerable amount of the variance in the perceptual accuracy of the adolescent. Nevertheless, while the correlations between issue salience and perceptual accuracy can best be described as modest, they are consistent across all three issues and party identification, and are strong enough to warrant rejection of Model Two.

The multiple covariance model will now be used to analyze the independent and combined effects of issue salience (I) and perceptual accuracy (P) on parental influence (Z), where $Z=a_0+b_0X$ (the regression of the adolescent attitude on the parent attitude).

Hypothesis 6: $Y=a_0+\overset{3}{a_i}+\overset{3}{a_p}+\overset{9}{a_{ip}}+b_0X+(\overset{3}{b_i}+\overset{3}{b_p}+\overset{9}{b_{ip}})X+e.$[45]

With the additive effects of issue salience and perceptual accuracy held constant, parental influence is affected by a nonadditive combination of issue salience and perceptual accuracy.

Hypothesis 7: $Y=a_0+\overset{3}{a_i}+\overset{3}{a_p}+b_0X+(\overset{3}{b_i}+\overset{3}{b_p})X+e.$
With issue salience held constant, parental influence is affected by perceptual accuracy.

Hypothesis 8: $Y=a_0+\overset{3}{a_p}+\overset{3}{a_i}+b_0X+(\overset{3}{b_p}+\overset{3}{b_i})X+e.$
With perceptual accuracy held constant, parental influence is affected by issue salience.

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[44] If, however, parental influence were indirect (for example, overprotected adolescents being conservative on China policy) it is possible that this indirect influence could lead to adolescent perceptual accuracy. Adolescents, because they are influenced, could be motivated to learn the parent's attitude. But if parental influence is direct, as is argued for the attitudes studied here, it is very unlikely that parental influence could be antecedent to adolescent perceptual accuracy.

[45] In these equations the a's are the intercepts and the b's are the regressions. The a's are necessary for unbiased estimates of the within-category slopes (their effects on Y are partialed out). The numerals above the a's and b's are the number of categories used in constructing the dummies and the first-order interaction terms (although perceptual accuracy for party identification has two categories rather than three).

Table 8. Effects of Issue Salience and Perceptual Accuracy on Successful Parent-Adolescent Attitude Transmission

	Explained Variance (Explained S.S./d.f.)	Multiple Correlation.
Racial Attitude		
Parent Attitude	228.0	.32
Test of Hypothesis 7: Effect of Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience		
Issue Salience	37.5	.38
Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience	99.5	.48
Test of Hypothesis 8: Effect of Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy		
Perceptual Accuracy	113.0	.44
Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy	24.0	.48
Interaction	15.0	.51
China Attitude		
Parent Attitude	97.0	.27
Test of Hypothesis 7: Effect of Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience		
Issue Salience	21.5	.32
Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience	67.5	.45
Test of Hypothesis 8: Effect of Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy		
Perceptual Accuracy	73.5	.41
Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy	15.5	.45
Interaction	7.0	.46
Marijuana Attitude		
Parent Attitude	411.0	.40
Test of Hypothesis 7: Effect of Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience		
Issue Salience	48.0	.44
Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience	47.0	.48
Test of Hypothesis 8: Effect of Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy		
Perceptual Accuracy	62.0	.45
Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy	33.0	.48
Interaction	8.0	.49
Party Identification		
Parent Attitude	165.0	.48
Test of Hypothesis 7: Effect of Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience		
Issue Salience	9.5	.50
Perceptual Accuracy, Control Issue Salience	27.0	.54
Test of Hypothesis 8: Effect of Issue Salience, Control Perceptual Accuracy		
Perceptual Accuracy	32.0	.52
Issue Salience	7.0	.54
Interaction	0.5	.54

The information necessary to test these hypotheses and reject the remaining models is presented in Table 8.[46]

Hypothesis 6 and the accompanying Model Five can first be rejected. This model posits interaction, but it is apparent from Table 8 that the effects of *I* and *P* are strongly additive. When these effects are controlled, the increase in the multiple correlation coefficient due to the second-order interaction is quite small.

Examining the variance explained by issue salience and perceptual accuracy, it is obvious that the latter has the far greater impact on parental influence. Model One would be consistent with the data only if a control for issue salience very sharply reduced the effect of perceptual accuracy. One can see this is definitely not the case. With issue salience controlled, perceptual accuracy retains a strong impact.[47] The arrow between *P* and *Z* cannot be removed, and Model One must be rejected (hypothesis 7 is supported).

Remaining is Model Three, a developmental sequence, and Model Four, the same but with *I* having an independent effect in addition to being part of a developmental sequence. Both issue salience and perceptual accuracy, taken by themselves, have a strong influence on successful transmission. Controlling for perceptual accuracy reduces by 26–36 per cent the variance explained by issue salience. This is evidence for the operation of a developmental sequence, as depicted in Model Three.

Finally, it can be asked whether issue salience has an independent as well as a developmental effect. If controlling for *P* substantially wipes out the variance explained by *I*, we know there can be no arrow between *I* and *Z*. The data show that with *P* controlled, *I* accounts for at least seventeen and as much as thirty-five per cent of the explained variance. While not high, it seems to me that this impact, being present for all three issues and party identification, is large enough to attribute an independent effect to issue salience (hypothesis 8 is supported).[48] It is concluded, therefore, that Model Four best fits the data. In this model, issue salience, which is conceptualized as being antecedent to perceptual accuracy, accounts for approximately twenty-five per cent of the explained variance (through both independent and developmental effects) and perceptual accuracy accounts for the remaining approximately seventy-five per cent (although the split for the marijuana issue is about fifty-fifty).[49] With all the terms in the maximally predictive equation, the multiple correlation coefficients are quite similar for all attitudes.

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[46] The information presented in Table 8 will be used to test hypotheses 6, 7, and 8, and to partition the explained variance between issue salience and perceptual accuracy. Total explained variance for the partitioning analysis is that variance explained by issue salience and perceptual accuracy. It is important to note that by the terms "issue salience" and "perceptual accuracy" is meant the parental attitude categorized by these two variables, or the effect of the two variables on the parent-adolescent regression (parental influence).

[47] Using the race issue as an example, entering perceptual accuracy immediately after the parent attitude increases the correlation coefficient from .32 to .44. Entering perceptual accuracy after the parent attitude and issue salience (issue salience controlled) increases the correlation from .38 to .48.

Direct Effects of the Parental Attitude. A comparison can now be made of the individual, direct effect that parental party identification and parental attitudes on race, China, and marijuana have on the same adolescent attitudes when issue salience and perceptual accuracy are held constant. This requires computation of the partial regression coefficient. Reported in Table 9 are the unstandardized coefficients (b's) which, according to Blalock, are generalizable across populations.[50] Since the issues and party identification are measured with different scales, the standardized coefficients (beta weights) are also reported. These latter coefficients, which will be interpreted, represent the change that would occur in the adolescent attitude if the parent attitude were to change by one standard unit, with issue salience and perceptual accuracy controlled. The beta weights (see table 9) for the effect of the parent attitude on the adolescent attitude, with issue salience and perceptual accuracy held constant, are similar enough for all issues and party identification to warrant the assertion of a rough general explanation for the successful transmission of political attitudes from parent to child.

Table 9. B's and Beta Weights for the Effect of the Parent Attitude on the Adolescent Attitude with Issue Salience and Perceptual Accuracy Controlled[a]

	Beta	*B*	Std. Error
Racial Integration	.52	.52	.10
China Policy	.46	.45	.09
Marijuana Laws	.55	.58	.09
Party Identification	.54	.45	.04

[a] Additive effects only.

Table 10. Multiple Correlation with Attractiveness Added to the Equation for Hypothesis Seven

Attitude Object	Multiple Correlation
Racial Integration	.49 (+.01)[a]
China Policy	.47 (+.02)
Marijuana Laws	(Not computed due to lack of linear progression within categories)
Party Identification	.57 (+.03)

[a] Increase in the multiple correlation coefficient when attractiveness is added to the equation for hypothesis 7.

Parental Attractiveness

Finally, parental attractiveness can be added to the equation for hypothesis seven.[51] Operating by itself, attractiveness was found to have moderately strong effects on two issues and party identification. Because of its inconsistent impact and because its proves to be only weakly related to either perceptual accuracy or issue salience,[52] attractiveness was excluded from the model until the combined effects of issue salience and perceptual accuracy had been completed. Nevertheless, when added to the equation, it may explain enough additional variance to warrant substantive interpretation.

Hypothesis 9: $Y = a_0 + \overset{3}{a_i} + \overset{3}{a_p} + \overset{3}{a} + b_c X$

$$+ (\overset{3}{b_i} + \overset{3}{b_p} + \overset{3}{b_a}) X + e.$$

With *I* and *P* held constant, parental influence is affected by attractiveness.

The data reveal that, with a reservation, hypothesis nine can be rejected. Attractiveness has no impact on the successful transmission of the attitude toward marijuana laws. The impact it has on attitudes toward the race issue, China policy and party identification[53]—while small—prevents dismissing this variable or others like it (nonissue specific) as being completely inconsequential.[54]

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[48] In the case of the race issue, entering issue salience immediately after the parent attitude increases the correlation from .32 to .38. Entering issue salience after the parent attitude and perceptual accuracy (perceptual accuracy controlled) raises the correlation from .44 to .48.

[49] The variables are entered in the order called for by the equation for hypothesis seven.

[50] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1967), 130–136.

[51] If the variable "attractiveness" is added to the equations for either hypothesis 7 or hypothesis 8, the results will be statistically identical.

[52] The correlations between attractiveness and perceptual accuracy for the attitudes toward racial integration, China policy, marijuana laws and party identification are .08, .09, —.05 and .05, respectively; for attractiveness and issue salience they are .01, .00, .12, and —.05, respectively.

Conclusion

In recent years, students of political socialization have downplayed the family as a source of attitudes toward public policy issues. This conclusion is not unwarranted given the data. But it would seem not to be an inherent characteristic of parent-child attitude transmission. Rather, quite the opposite appears to be the case. Parents have an inherent potential for successful transmission. Whether this potential is realized depends basically on the distribution within the population of (1) issue salience to the parent, and (2) adolescent perceptual accuracy of the parent attitude. These variables are *specific* to the individual attitude objects, as opposed to variables of the family interaction variety or "political interest" which are *general* to all attitude objects. Selected for analysis were attitude objects different enough to allow a fairly stringent test of any general thesis. One was party identification, to which some investigators have attributed unique transmissible characteristics. The others were substantive issues. One of the issues (marijuana laws) was deliberately chosen with the idea that it would be susceptible to countervailing peer-group influence. But when issue salience and perceptual accuracy are held constant in a multiple covariance equation, the beta weights indicating the success of transmission are very similar for all the attitudes that were studied. It may be tentatively concluded, therefore, that the influence of parents on the party identification and public policy attitudes of their children can be explained by a general equation; and that the level of parental influence, at any one point in time, will be highly dependent on the distribution of issue salience and perceptual accuracy for the particular attitude object in question.

Appendix

Opinion Items Measuring Attitudes Toward Issues

Racial Integration of the Public Schools

1. It is desirable to have racially integrated schools in the United States.
2. The Government should stay out of the question of whether blacks and whites go to the same school.
3. In places where both blacks and whites live, the Government should make sure that there are both black and white children in all the public schools.
4. Busing should be used to integrate the public schools.

United States Policy toward Communist China

1. The United States is getting too friendly with Communist China.
2. The United States Government should have more firmly opposed letting Communist China into the United Nations.
3. The United States should send ambassadors to Communist China and give the Chinese diplomatic recognition.
4. The United States should engage in greatly expanded trade with Communist China.

Laws Regulating the Use of Marijuana

1. The Government is too easy on those caught with possession of marijuana.
2. The laws dealing with those caught with possession of the marijuana are too tough.
3. Anyone caught with possession of marijuana should spend some time in jail.
4. The use of marijuana should be made legal.

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[53] It should be noted from Table 6 that there is a reversal for the within-category progression for party identification. The statistical model will make no adjustment for this fact. If we assume conceptually that the progression must be linear, then the model overestimates the impact of attractiveness on the transmission of party identification.

[54] It should be kept in mind that what is being discussed is the independent effect of attractiveness on successful transmission *after* the effects of issue salience and perceptual accuracy have been partialed out.

Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives*

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Students of congressional behavior are interested in party leadership, leadership management strategies, and the committee system.[1] Such themes are the concerns of this paper. Party leadership strategies and the committee system of the House are examined in concert to provide a very elementary, yet explicit, theory about one strategy of the majority party leaders with respect to a simple but largely ignored phenomenon, change in size of the standing committees of the House.[2]

The theory deals with the use of the committee system as a resource by the party leaders. Briefly, the argument is that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. That is, the leaders attempt to accommodate member demands for committee positions in order to gain leverage with the members. To gain leverage the leaders must guarantee a steady supply of resources—i.e., party positions on committees.

The theory builds on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, and scarcity. The resulting argument orders and provides an interpretation for some elementary observations of leadership behavior. Furthermore, it is shown that distinguishing between the short-run and the long-run is useful theoretically, i.e., short-run decisions have long-run consequences.

Theory

Consider the majority party leaders.[3] What part do they play in the establishment of the sizes of the standing committees? Formally the task of making committee assignments falls to the respective party committee-on-committees. Since the Democrats, by virtue of their majority status, organized most of the Congresses in the period we shall examine, the responsibility for majority party assignments has most often fallen upon the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee.[4] In practice the literature on committee assignments suggests that the position of the party leaders determines the outcomes (the assignments) should they, the leaders, choose to exercise their influence.[5] Their position is prominent particularly in assignments to the better committees. Very little, however, is known about the process of determining party ratios on committees and committee size.[6] Therefore, we are forced to infer from the literature on committee assignments that the majority party leaders also make the decisions about the sizes of the committees. That is, leaders of both parties may negotiate about the establishment of party ratios and size,

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* I would like to express my gratitude to James W. Davis, Adam Przeworski, Robert Salisbury, Kenneth Shepsle, and John Sprague for their advice and helpful comments. In addition, I owe a very special and substantial debt to John Sprague who gave freely of his time and insight throughout this project. And while none of these individuals may wish to be associated with the arguments and interpretations of this paper, much of what may be useful is the result of their efforts. Finally, I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their suggestions.

[1] See, for example, Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in The House of Representatives* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967); Charles O. Jones, *The Minority Party in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Randall B. Ripley, *Majority Party Leadership in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); and Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63.

[2] Gawthrop is one of the few scholars to point out this phenomenon. However, his primary concern was to describe the changing patterns of multiple committee assignments in the House. See Louis C. Gawthrop, "Changing Membership Patterns in House Committees," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 366–373.

[3] For the purposes of this paper, "majority party leaders" will mean the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Majority Whip.

[4] Their decisions are voted on by the Democratic Caucus. This final approval, however, is most often a *pro forma* action. See David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Committee Assignment Process: A Case Study of Social Choice" (paper presented at the 67th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1971).

[5] Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (June, 1961), 345–357; Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives*, pp. 57–61; Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work As He Sees It* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 183–212; and John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 24.

[6] On the temporal sequence of the assignment process, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "A Model of the Congressional Committee Assignment Process: Constrained Maximization in an Institutional Setting" (paper presented at the 69th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1973).

but the positions of the majority party leaders are pre-eminent and decisive.[7] Consequently, assume:

> The majority party leaders are decisive in decisions about committee size.

This assumption is a necessary condition for the remainder of the argument. To be sure, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides guidance about matters of committee size and the party ratios on committees. But the sizes of committees may be altered and still satisfy the condition that a division on committees should reflect the party ratio in the chamber. Furthermore, the argument will be evaluated in terms of a long time series, a substantial part of which predates the 1946 reorganization.

Our theory has congressmen in it, and we must specify what they want, i.e., provide a motivation for the actors. Since we are dealing with majority party strategy, the universe is the members of the majority party in the House. We partition these members into two groups, the party leaders and the rank-and-file members. What is it, then, that these actors want? We shall impute the following motivation to the followers:

> The members want "good" assignments. Because the demand for "good" assignments most often exceeds the supply, these resources are scarce. The members want these scarce resources.

This assumption provides a motivation for the members which establishes an economic condition: "good" positions are scarce; the demand for these positions exceeds the supply. The status of this assumption, and of the other assumptions of the theory as well, is that of a statement asserted to be true for the purposes of the argument. However, these assumptions of motivation are plausible and correspond to what is known from the literature.[8] (The crucial shortage of desirable positions will be considered more fully later in the text.)

With respect to this first assumption, Masters's study of the committee assignment process can aid intuition. In discussing the Democratic Committee-on-committees, he observes that committee positions are indeed scarce: "The volume of work before the Committee varies, depending chiefly on the changes resulting from the preceding election. Almost always, however, there are more applications than vacancies; in the 86th Congress 124 applications were made for 75 places to be filled."[9] Thus, there is evidence for assigning to committee positions an economic quality, namely scarcity.

We also furnish the majority party leaders with a motivation:

> The majority party leaders want compliant behavior on the part of the members. They perceive that by accommodating the followers (dispensing "good" assignments) they, the leaders, can reward past loyalty or encourage such behavior in the future.

We elect to deal with party leaders in terms of their perceptions because we are not concerned at this point whether, in fact, this strategy does lead to compliant behavior on the part of the members. Nor are we concerned with the strategies the members might pursue to gain desirable assignments. True, a motivation is provided for the followers, but the theory is one of strategies of the party leaders. Therefore, we merely assume the leaders believe in such a strategy and act on the basis of this belief. (It should be emphasized that this argument treats the goal of the party leaders as general control over the members or at least over a large number of members and not policy specific control.) Once more Masters's study is instructive, for it asserts that bargaining and rewards for compliance characterize the assignment process: "Party leaders, working in conjunction with their committee-on-committees, use assignments to major committees to bargain with the leaders of party groups or factions, in order to preserve and fortify their leadership positions and conciliate potential rivals, as well as to reward members who have cooperated."[10] Randall Ripley, sorting out the Democratic committee assignments in the 88th Congress, reaches much the same conclusion.[11] Thus, this motivational assumption also is plausible and it accords with what is known from the literature.

One qualitative distinction has been posited for the political actors and a motivation provided for each—the leaders and the followers. In this argument committee positions are given the status of a currency, a basis of exchange between the leaders and followers. The leaders desire compliant behavior on the part of the members. By dispensing committee assignments the leaders believe they encourage compliance. Thus, having resources to allocate benefits the leaders; indeed, more resources provide more opportunities to gain leverage with the members. Furthermore, the perceived marginal cost of increasing the supply of seats is always less than the perceived value of the expected increase in compliance. That is, there is always some committee which if increased in size would increase expected compliance for some members.

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[7] Democratic vacancies on Ways and Means are filled by the Democratic Caucus. Ways and Means has been included as a committee to be observed because we assume the pre-eminent position of the leaders also applies to this committee.

[8] The intent is not to raise the issue of the "realism" of the assumptions. Two classic statements by Friedman and Koopmans take opposite positions on this issue. See Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3–43; and Tjalling C. Koopmans, *Three Essays on the State of Economic Science* (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 129–166.

[9] Masters, p. 346. On scarcity of positions also see Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Table 2.8 at p. 64; and Charles S. Bullock, III, "Committee Transfers in the United States House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics,* 35 (February, 1973), footnote 39 at p. 101.

[10] Masters, p. 357.

[11] Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives,* p. 60. Also, see Manley, *The Politics of Finance,* p. 24.

What, then, are the consequences of these premises? First consider the supply of seats. Recall that the majority party leaders can increase their resource base, i.e., they can fix the size of the standing committees. Therefore:

> PROPOSITION I: The leaders expand their resource base by increasing the number of committee positions they can dispense.

Empirically, then, we are interested in the time path of the total number of committee seats in the House. Given the theory, this time path will be some monotonically increasing function of time. This theoretical relationship is displayed in Figure 1.

Evaluation

Are the data consistent with the theory? The data consist of the number of committee positions during the period 1927–1971.[12] We begin with 1927 because the number of standing committees in the House remained relatively unchanged from that date until the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. And except for the creation of the Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1959, the number of committees remained unchanged from 1947–1971. (The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is excluded.)

Now let us evaluate this theory first for the period following the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Figure 2 displays the time path of the total number of committee seats for the period 1947–1971. Even if the twenty-five seats created by the establishment of the Committee on Science and Astronautics are removed, the pattern is clear. The number of committee positions has increased since 1947 as an increasing function of time.[13]



Figure 1. Representation of the Supply of Committee Seats: Dynamic on Time

Looked at from a slightly different perspective, the data again show a systematic pattern. The total number of committee seats at any point in time is obtained by aggregating over committees. The product of the number of committees at a point in time and the number of Congresses observed in a time period provides the total number of "opportunities" to observe a change in the size of each committee. Of the total "opportunities" in the period 1947–1971 there were less than a dozen instances (3.8 per cent of the total "opportunities") of a reduction in size of a standing committee. Furthermore, only one committee, Veterans' Affairs, experienced a net loss of seats during this period. Thus, aggregation does not obscure the results. The interpretation is straightforward; the data are consistent with the argument.[14]

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 forces us to deal separately with the period 1927–

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[12] All the data come from the available *Congressional Directory,* closest to the opening of each Congress, which lists committee assignments. In some cases it was necessary to use the *Congressional Directory* for the second session of a Congress. Since the committee system was reorganized in 1946, beginning with 1927 also provides two distinct time periods of approximately the same length. A list of the standing committees and their respective sizes may be found in *Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives,* 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935), 8–9. The Congresses listed there include the 60th-73rd Congresses. The Committee on Memorials (3 seats) was created in the 70th Congress. The Committee on Un-American Activities has been excluded from the period preceding the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Prior to 1927, the number of positions grew even in the midst of periodic adjustments in the committee system.

[13] It is worth noting that alteration of committee size occurred prior to the time period examined in this paper. "In making committee assignments for Republicans in the Fifty-ninth Congress, Cannon was faced with a problem of too few choice seats for too many Republicans. He finally reached an agreement with the Democratic Minority Leader, John Sharpe Williams of Mississippi, that would increase the size of the committees and leave the Democratic representation undisturbed" (Ripley, *Majority Party Leadership in Congress,* p. 28).

[14] One potential source of measurement error can be disregarded. The sizes of the committees may be altered during a Congress. However, the committee rosters for the second session of each Congress indicate that generally the size of committees is not altered within a Congress. And where an increase or decrease does occur, the committee is not changed to its former size at the beginning of the next Congress.



Figure 2. Increase in Seats of the Standing Committees of the House: 1947–1971

1945. But for the purposes of this analysis the reorganization is advantageous. We can extend the observations back in time and examine two distinct periods. Intuitively this earlier period should provide a much more difficult test of the argument. We know that there were a great many more committees and committee positions in the system during this period. Indeed, more than 830 positions existed in 1927 as opposed to slightly more than 480 in 1947. And with a large number of positions already in a system we might expect to find no evidence to support the argument.

Figure 3 displays the time path of the total number of committee seats for the period 1927–1945. Note again that the number of committee seats is an increasing function of time.[15] Thus, even in the midst of an abundance of positions, the leaders increase their resource base. And consider the "opportunities" to observe a reduction in committee size during this period. Again, there were less than a dozen cases of such reductions (1.4 per cent of the "opportunities"). Moreover, no committee experienced a net loss of seats during this period. Taking the two periods together, we note that there were less than twenty instances of reduction in the number of seats on committees; these cases represent 2.3 per cent of the total "opportunities."

An elementary economic argument about one leadership strategy has been constructed. The demands of the theory have been compared with observations for the two periods of time, and the data were found to be consistent with the argument.

Differential Valuation and the Distribution of the Increase in Seats Across Committees

Suppose the members prize assignments to some committees more than others. While the currency remains committee assignments, we now introduce *explicitly* the notion of differential valuation of committees.

The differential prestige of committees is established by at least two conditions: (1) formal rules and (2) the transfers of members from one committee to another. Transfers of members from one committee assignment to another have been used frequently to establish the hierarchy of committee prestige. And, as Bullock and Sprague

[15] There is an interesting interpretation to be made from the data of Figure 3. Note the rate of change in the interval 1931–1933. A party, long out of power and suddenly gaining majority status with an overwhelming numerical advantage may have strong incentives to expand rapidly the number of rewards early in the game. Were the Republicans suddenly to achieve majority status by a large margin the same phenomenon may occur. Note, however, that this interpretation does not fall out of the argument. The argument presupposes only a weak condition (an increasing function of time) on the time path of the total number of committee positions.



Figure 3. Increase in Seats of the Standing Committees of the House: 1927–1945

point out, the formal rules dealing with privileges of committees and restrictions on multiple committee assignments recognize at least ordered classes of committees.[16] That committees are stratified in terms of prestige or desirability is significant because the leaders can be expected to add positions to committees in some nonrandom fashion. What is the advantage to the leaders of creating new positions on those committees which are not valued by the members? Having desirable assignments to allocate is what brings leverage to deal with members. Thus, we move from the consideration of aggregate change (the time path of the total number of committee positions) to an examination of the distribution of the increase in positions across the hierarchy of committee prestige.

First, some method of ordering the standing committees in terms of desirability or prestige is required. In order to produce such an ordering conveniently, we shall adopt the convention of Bullock and Sprague.[17] Their measure expresses the number of transfers to a committee relative to the number of departures plus transfers. Since desirable committees draw members from other committees and lose few members to other committees, the higher the value of the index, the more prestigious the committee. Bullock, using this method, provides a measure of committee prestige for the period 1947–1967.[18] This same method can be employed to produce a committee prestige ordering for the earlier period. Only the prestige ordering for the majority party during each period will be used, because this theory accounts only for accommodation within the majority party.[19]

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[16] Charles Bullock and John Sprague, "A Research Note on the Committee Assignments of Southern Democratic Congressmen," *Journal of Politics,* 31 (May, 1969), 493. For one example of the use of committee transfers, see George Goodwin, Jr., *The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp. 114–115. And the positions on desirable committees are scarce. See footnote 9 above.

[17] Bullock and Sprague, pp. 496–501.

[18] Charles Bullock, "The Committee Assignments of Freshmen in the House of Representatives, 1947–1967" (dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, 1968), p. 35.

[19] As we have noted, the Democrats controlled most of the Congresses during this time period. Hence, for our purposes, the majority party empirically will mean the Democrats. Furthermore, the prestige rankings of committees for Democrats and Republicans are empirically distinct. See Bullock and Sprague, pp. 496–501. Although theoretical reasons dictate the use of majority party rankings, use of rankings for Repub-

Table 1. Prestige Ranking of Committees for House Democrats: 1947–1967[a]

Ways and Means	1.000	Government Operations	.371
Rules	1.000	District of Columbia	.273
Appropriations	.983	Education and Labor	.250
Foreign Affairs	.852	House Administration	.243
Armed Services	.750	Interior	.241
Commerce	.743	Banking and Currency	.231
Judiciary	.708	Merchant Marine	.222
Agriculture	.541	Veteran's Affairs	.075
Public Works	.485	Post Office	.050
Science and Astronautics	.480	Un-American Activities	.000

[a] From Charles Bullock, "The Committee Assignments of Freshmen in the House of Representatives, 1947–1967" (Ph.D. dissertation Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, 1968), Table 3 at p. 35.

The prestige rankings for the two periods are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. Although there may be some quarrel with the ranking of several minor committees in the earlier period (Printing and Library, for example), these rankings correspond to other evaluations of committee prestige.[20]

Therefore, assume the following:

> A single ordering of committee prestige can represent the "average" preferences of the members, and this measure generally will be stable through each time period.

This assumption presupposes two conditions: (1) "average" preferences of the members can be assigned and (2) the "average" committee prestige ranking will be stable over time. It is clear that

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licans or House members as a whole, both distinct from Democrats alone, will not dramatically alter the results reported below. This occurs because there is a correspondence between the rankings for the more desirable committees, the ones I shall argue take up most of the overall expansion in seats.

[20] For the modern period see Goodwin, pp. 114–116. For the earlier period see George B. Galloway, *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1955), p. 128; Floyd M. Riddick, *Congressional Procedure* (Boston: Chapman and Grimes, 1941), pp. 115–116; Chang-Wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 69; and George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1946), p. 90.

Table 2. Prestige Ranking of Committees for House Democrats: 1935–1945[a]

Ways and Means	1.000	Immigration	.259
Rules	1.000	Coinage	.250
Appropriations	.989	Labor	.250
Agriculture	.915	Flood Control	.222
Commerce	.877	Accounts	.200
Naval Affairs	.867	Irrigation	.192
Judiciary	.841	Expenditures	.174
Banking and Currency	.836	Insular	.174
Military Affairs	.800	Indian	.167
Printing	.750	Territories	.167
Foreign Affairs	.588	Enrolled Bills	.143
Election of President	.556	Public Lands	.130
Rivers	.550	Elections #1	.111
Executive Papers	.500	Pensions	.105
Library	.500	Civil Service	.100
District of Columbia	.440	Elections #2	.100
Merchant Marine	.421	World War Veterans	.069
Memorials	.333	Public Buildings	.031
Patents	.333	Claims	.000
Roads	.333	Elections #3	.000
War Claims	.333	Invalid Pensions	.000
Post Office	.317	Mines	.000
Census	.292	Revision of Laws	.000
Education	.263		

[a] Source: *Congressional Directory*. 73rd through 79th Congresses (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various dates).

partitioning the members of the House into various groups will produce somewhat different prestige orderings. Nevertheless, the correspondence between committee prestige rankings of various groups of House members is quite high.[21] Therefore, it is assumed that a single ordering of committee prestige can represent the "average" preferences of the members.

The second condition, in effect, eliminates any consideration of change in preference over time. Of course, the longer the time period the more dubious is the standing of this assumption, for the probability of obscuring changes in preference surely increases as the time period lengthens. In practice this assumption demands the stability of each ordering over approximately a twenty year period, 1927–1945 and 1947–1971. The prestige measure for the 74th–79th Congresses will represent the ordering in the former period, and the measure for 1947–1967 will represent the prestige hierarchy in the latter period.

We now need to specify the particular set of members for whom the measures are said to hold. Because this is a theory of majority party leadership behavior, we assume the following:

> The leaders of the majority party are concerned, first and foremost, with the committee preferences of their party members.

This assumption seems quite reasonable and needs little further comment. To be sure, the leaders may consider the needs of their colleagues in the minority party, particularly on a case by case basis. Still, we offer as a rule the notion that majority party leaders are more interested in the desires of their party's rank and file.[22]

One final assumption is required; it specifies the amount of information in the system:

> The majority party leaders know the committee preference ordering of their party members.

The leaders, though most often not the most senior members of their party, nevertheless have accumulated many terms of service and generally have had ample opportunity to learn the relative desirability of the various standing committees. Thus, we demand of the leaders of the majority party the ability to reproduce the "average" committee prestige ranking of their party members.

As we have seen, reductions in the sizes of the standing committees have been most infrequent. Thus, given the notion of differential valuation of committees by the members, we can now examine the distribution of the total increase in committee positions across the prestige ranking of committees.

Suppose the leaders estimate expected compliance on the part of a member as a function of the prestige of the *new* seats to be created. We can suppose that expected compliance varies directly with prestige of the new seat. That is, the leaders expect greater compliance as the prestige of the new seat to be created increases. But increasing the number of positions reduces the total value of seats as resources. Specifically, the total value of these resources declines as a function of the prestige of the newly created seat. Adding seats to the very best committees reduces the value of total resources more than does adding positions to somewhat less prestigious committees. Thus, benefits (member compliance) increase with the expected prestige of the new position. But costs (depletion of seat value) also increase with the prestige of the new seat to be created. The economic interpretation, involving exchange and scarcity, is crucial. If the currency (the assignments) were not scarce and if anyone could have the assignment he desired, then seats would not constitute leadership resources.

On this argument, then, we can anticipate where the growth in committee positions will occur:

> PROPOSITION II: The leaders, in expanding their resource base, will concentrate the increase in the middle to upper range of the committee prestige ordering.

Empirically this means that a relative frequency distribution of the total increase in seats across committees will take the form displayed in Figure 4. This form results from the preceding argument and from the process of aggregating over a number of leaders and members. That is, a leader's estimate of the average minimum price in prestige to secure minimally acceptable expected compliance varies from one member to another. And one leader's estimates are likely to differ from those of another leader. Rayburn's estimates may not be the same as Albert's estimates. Hence the empirical distribution should have a mean at the higher prestige level with values distributed around that mean.

The interpretation is straightforward. Why increase the number of positions on committees that are not valued by the members? After all, such committees earn their low prestige standing through their inability to hold current members and attract new members from other committees. Moreover, why dispense more of the most prized positions? Expanding only the very best committees rapidly depletes the value of these leadership

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[21] See Bullock and Sprague, pp. 496–501.

[22] It is impossible to reconstruct the particular circumstances of the creation of each new seat. For example, a new minority position might be created to reflect a new party ratio and to prevent a reduction in majority positions. Such an action is consistent with the argument.



Figure 4. Expected Distribution of the Total Increase in Committee Seats

resources. In short, the leaders try to buy cheap and sell dear.[23]

Figure 5 displays the empirical distribution of total seat additions for the period 1947–1971. Notice that the bulk of the increase does occur at the higher prestige levels. Moreover, at the highest level of prestige the distribution does indeed tail off. At the other end of the distribution, however, several low prestige committees have gained seats. Still it seems fair to conclude that the data are consistent with the argument.

Figure 6 displays the distribution of committee seat additions for the earlier period, 1927–1945.



* Veterans Affairs suffered a net loss of one seat during this period; it has been counted as a zero increase in size.

Figure 5. The Distribution of the Total Increase in Committee Seats: 1947–1971*

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[23] One might suppose there is interdependence here. That is, adding positions to a committee may increase the number of transfers to that committee and hence affect the prestige measure. But prestige is also influenced by departures from a committee. Therefore, in principle it is possible to observe low prestige committees increasing in size.



Figure 6. The Distribution of the Total Increase in Committee Seats: 1927–1945

It is clear that the distribution takes the general form specified by the theory. In this case the fit is much closer to the theoretical prediction. It may be that the propensity to limit the increase in seats to the best committees is particularly strong when there already are substantial numbers of committee positions in the system.

In this period, however, the distribution does not tail off at the high prestige level as the theory demands. Undoubtedly this is due in large part to the confounding influence of the size of the Appropriations Committee. For both time periods, this committee consistently has been one and one-half to two times the size of the other committees in the House. An increase of five seats on a large committee probably does not have the same substantive meaning in terms of the argument as an increase of five positions on a much smaller committee of comparable prestige. Therefore, let us re-examine the increase in committee size. We will look at the increase in positions on a committee relative to the size of that committee.

Figure 7 contains the data for the modern period; Figure 8 displays the data for the period 1927–1945. With the data ordered in this way note the tendency for the increases in size to tail off at the very high prestige level. The effect of taking into account the size of the Appropriations Committee is particularly noticeable in Figure 8. Therefore, both the time path of the total number of committee seats and the distribution of the increases in size across committees are consistent with the theory.

A Long-Run Consequence of A Short-Run Strategy

In evaluating the argument to this point we have confined our attention to the supply of committee positions, which is a directly observable variable. This leadership strategy, however, is likely to have other important consequences. Indeed, these decisions to expand positions at particular points in time have a cumulative effect. This consequence can be best examined by turning to the expressed demand for additional positions and considering the relationship between the supply of and demand for positions through time. We ask, in other words, what does the theory tell us about the long-run consequence of this particular leadership strategy?

Scarcity makes committee positions valuable leadership resources. The preceding argument provides an interpretation for the growth in the number of committee seats. But as the supply of committee positions increases, scarcity declines thereby altering the relationship between the demand for and the supply of positions, i.e., the gap between demand and supply decreases. Thus, as currency becomes more and more plentiful, the basis of exchange is impaired. The leaders must revalue the currency or turn to another medium of exchange.[24] This reasoning leads to a third proposition:

> PROPOSITION III: In time the currency (committee positions) will be devalued to the point

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[24] The crucial notion of this argument is the *relative* time rate of change of supply and demand. We might consider the demand for positions to be fixed and constant over time. Alternatively, we may assume that interests proliferate as social, political, and economic systems become more complex thereby increasing the demand for positions. Or demand for positions may decline through time. As long as the time rate of change of supply is greater than the time rate of change of demand, the basis of exchange between the party leaders and followers is impaired.



* Veterans Affairs suffered a net loss of one seat during this period; it has been counted as a zero increase in size.

Figure 7. Increase in Size of the Standing Committees: 1947–1971*

where the system of resources must be overhauled.

The interpretation is straightforward.[25] Short-run decisions designed to gain leverage with the members in time seriously erode the value of the leadership's resource base. Clearly the argument



Figure 8. Increase in Size of the Standing Committees: 1927–1945

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[25] Clearly this proposition, the long-run consequence of a leadership management strategy, cannot be evaluated empirically in the same manner as the earlier portions of the argument. It takes time for the process to work itself out. Nonetheless, this argument can easily be formalized. Specific rate of change assumptions for D_t (demand) and S_t (supply) would make it possible to estimate at what point the committee system would be under stress, i.e., at what point conditions favorable to reorganization are likely to occur.

provides an economic interpretation for periodic readjustments in the committee system or committee reorganization. Short-run decisions do indeed have long-run consequences: inflation brings impairment of the leadership resource base. Thus, another major reorganization of the committee system similar to that of 1946 should come as no surprise, i.e., there is a theoretical prediction that it will occur and a theoretical interpretation for its occurrence.[26]

Conclusion

An elementary theory of leadership expansion of committee positions has been presented. The data, the time path of the total number of committee positions, and the distribution of the increase in seats across the prestige hierarchy of committees are consistent with the argument. (And more than a dozen *new* committee positions were added at the opening of the 93rd Congress.) Furthermore, it has been shown that quite reasonable short-run decisions have a significant long-run consequence.

Possible alternative explanations of this phenomenon have not been examined. One such explanation, however, can be rejected. The House relies extensively on an elaborate division of labor, in committees and subcommittees, to conduct its business. The volume and technical complexity of legislation has increased through time. With this growth in workload has come an increase in the legislative budget.[27] Congressional staffs have grown as have funds for committee operations. To cope with the increased burdens on the work groups (the committees), one might suppose that increasing the number of committee members would be an appropriate management response: more members to deal with the increasing work load. Such a response might account for the growth in committee positions after World War II. But prior to 1946 an abundance of positions existed. And surely the volume and technical complexity of legislation from the 1920s to the 1940s was less than after 1946. Yet, even with a large number of positions in this earlier period, the leaders continued to create additional committee positions.

But is the creation of additional positions to meet an increasing work-load a reasonable management strategy? Adding staff positions and funds for committee operations may be. But additional positions for the members must be filled from a constant membership base.[28] More positions, then, require more multiple memberships, more demands on a member's time and energy. And although members with multiple assignments have some freedom to choose where to concentrate their committee efforts, surely some committee responsibilities must suffer in the process. Thus, increasing committee positions as an organizational management strategy to cope with a growing work load seems to be neither a plausible nor compelling alternative explanation.[29]

Finally, although the phenomenon examined in this paper is but one aspect of congressional behavior, the argument presented is not at odds with other research on Congress. Indeed, it is quite reasonable in light of the discussions of the institutionalization of the House.[30]

With the rise of the seniority system, a committee position in practice has become a property right of the individual member. That is, leaders cannot arbitrarily move members from one committee to another. A member, as long as he remains in the House, is entitled to retain his present assignment. And as House service becomes more attractive and House turnover declines, a rigidity develops in the committee system. The leaders are constrained in the use of assignments as a resource, a means to gain leverage with the members. Vacancies alone determine the size of this leadership resource base. Hence, the leaders, quite plausibly, can be expected to make their resource base more flexible, larger and more responsive to their needs. Resorting to "manufacturing" committee positions, then, is a not surprising leadership response to the conditions of the modern House.

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[26] The leaders may also increase the size of a committee in order to reshape its composition for policy reasons. A good example would be the expansion of the Rules Committee. See Milton C. Cummings and Robert L. Peabody, "The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: An Analysis of the 1961 Vote," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 167–194. In such cases the leaders' desire for compliance is directed at a work group rather than a specific individual. Although this theory consists of assertions at the level of individuals, leadership decisions directed at work groups are not at odds with the argument. As long as scarcity of positions is important in the relations between leaders and followers the argument holds.

[27] See Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 158–160.

[28] As we have seen new positions on some committees are not matched by a reduction in size of other committees. In the period examined prior to 1946 almost half the members held multiple assignments. And the number of multiple memberships has steadily increased since 1946. See Gawthrop, "Changing Membership Patterns in House Committees," pp. 366–367.

[29] There are other data which suggest the process discussed in this paper may be a general leadership management strategy, i.e., not confined solely to the House of Representatives. From 1927–1945 the time path of the total number of Senate committee positions is an increasing function of time. And this growth took place in the midst of an abundance of positions; the ratio of the number of seats to the number of senators was more than four to one. After the Reorganization Act of 1946, the number of positions once more steadily increased. After 1969 the time path begins to oscillate slightly. But some departure from the House pattern is not surprising. Inflation of seats has been much more pronounced in the Senate; even after 1946 the ratio of seats to members exceeded two to one.

[30] See Polsby, pp. 148–168; Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 787–807; and Michael Abram and Joseph Cooper, "The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives," *Polity*, 1 (Fall, 1968), 52–85.

We might also speculate about the particular conditions under which the leaders would choose to add to the existing supply of committee positions. One such condition involves the magnitude of House turnover. Presumably there is little need to increase resources available for allocation when House turnover produces a number of vacancies. Rather it is when there is little House turnover, when deaths, retirements, and decisions at the polls do not produce a number of vacancies, that the leaders need to *create* vacancies, i.e., add positions. Thus, all other things being equal, the level of House turnover should vary inversely with the number of newly created positions. And, for the periods examined in this paper, this negative relationship does occur. More new seats are created when House turnover itself fails to produce the needed vacancies. (See appendix.) The leaders are free from dependency on House turnover alone to produce committee vacancies for resource creation to gain leverage with the members is possible. In sum, this additional datum is consistent with the argument of this paper which, in turn, complements other research on Congress.

Appendix

The relationship between the creation of new seats and the magnitude of House turnover can be shown in the following manner. Resources (committee seats) can be expressed as the ratio of committee positions to the number of House members at the beginning of each Congress. Call this measure L_t. The change in resources, ΔL_t, may be defined as $\Delta L_t = L_t - L_{t-1}$. ΔL_t then represents short-run leadership decisions to alter the supply of positions. House turnover can be measured by the common convention, the proportion of 1st term House members. Call this measure H_t. Committees frequently have been partitioned into three classes, Top, Service, and Duty. This partitioning generally coincides with the prestige hierarchy of committees. The most prized committees fall into the Top Committee class. Service Committees are somewhat less prized than Top Committees but are more prestigious and desirable than Duty Committees, the least valued positions. Since we have seen that the number of positions on the least prized committees is seldom increased, we can confine our attention to the Top and Service Committees. The regression of ΔL_t on H_t illustrates that more new seats are created when House turnover itself fails to produce the needed vacancies:

New Seat Creations and House Turnover:
The Regression of ΔL_t on H_t

Top Committees	Intercept	Slope	R^2
1935–1971	.038	−.140	.163
1949–1971	.044	−.177	.149
Service Committees			
1935–1971	.030	−.121	.342
1949–1971	.033	−.133	.317

The modern period has been considered separately to take into account the effects of the vastly greater number of committee positions prior to 1946. By the criterion of fit, substantial variation remains statistically unexplained; the correlations range between −.39 and −.58. Yet the relationships are in the expected direction and easily interpretable. They are consistent with the argument of this paper.

Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case*

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Given the political authority and economic resources of public bureaucracies, a major goal of ethnic[1] politics is to affect the criteria of bureaucratic recruitment. Ethnic groups seek access to administrative positions in government as opportunities for individual mobility and as a means of presenting group interests in the decision-making process.

The basic argument for a bureaucracy that draws from all segments of society for its personnel assumes that individual civil servants will articulate the values and interests of their social background and thus influence the content and the implementation of policy.[2] Few efforts have been devoted to the task of determining whether in fact an individual's social identity affects his behavior as an administrator. This essay examines the Zambian situation in order to assess the effects of ethnic politics on the composition and the performance of public bureaucracy.

The major argument here is that the representative character of government is more important as an issue of ethnic politics than as a determinant of how administrators pursue economic development. In pursuing this argument, we will first examine the nature of regional, ethnic, and class cleavages in Zambian politics. This discussion will be followed by an analysis of the interrelationships of ethnicity, national politics and development administration. Here the evidence is that economic and technocratic considerations and the perceptions of what is necessary for personal career advancement, rather than ethnic parochialism, provide the major guidelines for development decision making.

The Bases of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnically based loyalties and groups do not in themselves pose a threat to the integrity or stability of a political system.[3] What is important for political order and political conflict is the degree to which ethnicity represents both subjective images and objective differences.

There is a wide variety in the patterns of congruence between ethnic identity and other traits. In the United States, ethnicity is correlated with occupations, income, and the geographic areas of some cities and states. Politics in Malaysia offers an example of interaction between an ethnic group that has a predominance of political power and another ethnic group that has a predominance of economic wealth.[4] In South Africa there is a tight and institutionalized congruence between race and levels of economic wealth, political power, and social status.[5] Zambia, like many other African states, provides a case of ethnic differences that coincide with distinct geographic areas.

What, in the political arena, are referred to as "tribes" in Zambia are basically divisions in the society that group people according to regional background, language and subjective stereotype. Anthropologists would find little justification for the groupings. Politically, however, they make sense.[6] Linguistic affinity provides a ready vehicle of communication and mobilization in a country with no widely-used *lingua franca* and with a high rate of illiteracy. Regional differences encompass variations in natural resource bases, levels of economic development, and supplies of educated manpower. When articulating regional demands, spokesmen can use stereotypes to simplify the issues and rally constituent support. The fact that all these divisions coincide with one another intensifies and reinforces the cleavage and the conflict.

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* This essay is based on research conducted in Zambia from 1967–69 and again in 1972. Financial support was provided by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for the earlier visit and by the Center for Development, University of Wisconsin, for the later one. Helpful comments were provided at various stages of the development of this work, and I would here like to express my gratitude to Fred M. Hayward, Michael F. Lofchie, Robert Molteno, Ira Sharkansky, George K. Simwinga, Richard L. Sklar, and M. Crawford Young.

[1] The term "ethnicity" conveys only imperfectly the intended meaning. This term is certainly less pejorative and more useful than "tribalism" or "race," but it is not more precise in describing the nature of the cultural and political bonds that provide a basis for group identity. Ethnicity may coincide with class, occupational, sectional or other differences, but the use of a term like "sectional" by itself neglects the affective component that ethnic labels and stereotypes bring to the dynamics of politics. When describing the Zambian situation, I will use the term "ethno-regional" to refer to the most salient political divisions.

[2] A review of the relevant literature is available in V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (December, 1967), 1010–1019.

[3] For the emergent consensus on this point, see Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (December, 1970), 1112–1113.

[4] Cynthia H. Enloe, *Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia,* Research Monograph No. 2 (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asia, University of California, 1970).

[5] Pierre van den Berghe, *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

[6] Zambia is not unique in this regard. See Melson and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism" 1123 and 1124; Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa: Studies in Incorporation Processes* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing, 1970), and Victor A. Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa*

Four major Zambian political groups that can be identified on an ethnic-linguistic-regional basis are: Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi and Tonga. The name of each unit refers to the major ethnic community and the major language spoken within each grouping. There is a high level of congruence between the homelands of these groups and the administrative boundaries of Zambia's provinces. The obvious exceptions to this geographical distribution are the urban areas, where all ethnic categories are represented. Bemba, for instance. refers to the Bemba and to the Bisa, Mambwe, and other small groups in Northern and Luapula Provinces. The Nyanja include Chewa, Tumbuka, Ngoni, and other Nyanja-speaking peoples who are primarily from the Eastern Provinces. The Tonga are from Zambia's Southern Province, and the grouping also includes the Ila and a number of rather small communities in the area. Lozi are actually outnumbered by the peoples in Western Province that they used to govern. In contemporary Zambia, however, the term Lozi is used to refer to almost everyone from Western Province.

In addition to these four major political groups, there are a large number of small communities, the most prominent being the two Lunda groups, one in Luapula Province and one in Northwestern Province. It is notable that despite language affinity and common historical origins,[7] the Lunda in these two provinces have neither formed any alliance nor pooled their energies in any political contest since the establishment of colonial rule. They are separated by the Zaire pedicle and by very different ecological bases. They have found little in common to struggle for. Until 1971, in fact, the Lunda in Luapula Province were very close allies of the Bemba.

Importantly, none of the major urban centers in Zambia are located in the area of any of these ethnic groups. This means that people were recruited and attracted from all over the country to the urban areas. As in other societies, there was a clustering together of those of similar language, culture, and region and the emergence of ethnic stereotypes.[8]

Regional imbalance in economics and education, as well as cultural differences, contribute to the formation of the subjective images of different peoples. The Nyanja peoples were advantaged by educational facilities provided by the Church of Scotland missionaries in the Eastern Province and neighboring Nyasaland/Malawi. Nyanja, as a result, filled most of the clerical and white-collar jobs open to Africans during the colonial period. The Tonga, on the agriculturally rich plateau of the Southern Province, took advantage of their land and their position near the single railway line in the country and established a tradition of farming and ranching. In contrast, the Bemba were located on land with a low agricultural potential. Given this disadvantage, along with their relative proximity to the copper mines that began operating in the late 1920s, Bemba formed the bulk of the non-clerical, African labor force in the mines. The Lozi, too, had rather poor land and provided many of the laborers in the mines of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Barotse National School, established by the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society in the early 1900s, provided the Lozi with a small, very well educated group of men. The stereotypes of each group emerged from these different backgrounds and resources. The Nyanja are viewed as methodical and clerical, the Tonga as rural and conservative, the Bemba as tough and hard-working, and the Lozi as proud and intelligent. Needless to say, there are as many exceptions to these stereotypes as there are to those that exist in other societies.

Table 1 summarizes some of the important differences between the major ethno-regional groups.

The Politicization of Ethnicity

In the process of competing for votes, Zambian leaders have appealed to geographic constituencies and thereby politicized the real and significant linguistic, economic, and other sectional differences that already existed in Zambia. These appeals were prominent during the period of most intense political mobilization—the struggle for independence from the United Kingdom.[9]

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972). These horizontal differences do not connote any particular hierarchical order, but they do define the actors involved in establishing which group will have a preponderance of wealth and power.

[7] C. M. N. White, "The Ethno-History of the Upper Zambezi," *African Studies*, 21 (1962), 10–27 and Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 70–97 and 160–173.

[8] For a discussion of identity and integration of Africans in urban areas, see Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1 (January, 1960), 55–70, and Clyde Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1956).

[9] For an analysis of the Zambian independence movement, see David C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957–1964* (London: Oxford Univer-

Table 1. Ethno-Regional Differences in Zambia

Ethnic Group	Province(s)[a]	Language	*Dominant* Type of Traditional Agriculture	Primary Staple Crop	Predominant Soil Type	*Denomination* of Missionaries in the Area	*Dominant* Cash Economic Activity	Commonly Held Stereotypes	*Shifts in* Political Party Allegiances[b] (1964–1972)
Bemba	Northern, Luapula	Bemba	Fishing and Bush-Fallow (Chitemene)	Finger Millet	Ferrallitic	White Fathers	Labor Supplied to Copperbelt	Tough hardworking	UNIP ↓ UPP
Lozi	Western	Lozi	Transitional Ash-Culture (Northern and Southern Kalahari)	Bulrush Millet	Sands	Paris Evangelical Missionary Society	Timber, Labor to Urban Areas	Proud, intelligent	UNIP ↓ United Party ↓ ANC
Tonga	Southern	Tonga	Pastoral and Hoe and Plough	Maize	Lithosols	Primitive Methodist and Jesuit	Cattle Maize	Rural, conservative	ANC
Nyanja	Eastern	Nyanja	Hoe and Plough	Kaffir Corn, Maize & Finger Millet	Vertisols	Church of Scotland	Tobacco, Cotton, Groundnut, Labor to Urban Areas	Methodical, clerical	UNIP and ANC ↓ UNIP

[a] All are represented in the urban areas along the railway that runs through Southern, Central and Copperbelt Provinces.
[b] UNIP = United National Independence Party (the ruling party since Independence),
ANC = African National Congress (the initial party of the independence movement from which UNIP splintered),
UPP = United Progressive Party

Sources: D. Hywell Davies, ed., *Zambia in Maps* (London: University of London Press, 1971), pp. 26, 27, 38–41, 46, 47, 52–55, 58, 59 72–79, and George Kay, *A Social Geography of Zambia* (London: University of London Press, 1967), p. 52.

A dramatic and highly visible example of the effects of administrative boundaries on politics is the case of the Western Province (formerly Barotseland Protectorate). The Lozi Kingdom had a separate legal status with the colonial government that distinguished it from the rest of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia. During the independence struggle, the issue of the status of the Lozi area within independent Zambia emerged. Some efforts to secure independence as a separate state were defeated in favor of legal integration with Zambia, but in the process of settling this issue the Lozi identified themselves in national politics as a separate group with rather distinct problems.

The split within the major nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia provided the basis of postcolonial ethnic conflict for the rest of the country. When the militant nationalists left the African National Congress (ANC) and formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the incumbent ANC President, Harry Nkumbula, retained the support of his home area, the Southern Province, and allied himself with conservative traditional leaders who felt threatened by the rhetoric and leadership in UNIP. UNIP, on the other hand, had its most firm base of allegiance in Northern, Luapula, and most of Copperbelt provinces, the homes of many of the Party's founders. Eastern Province was, for a long time, a battleground between UNIP and ANC. Most of the ANC leadership in the province defected to UNIP when the split occurred, but ANC worked closely with traditional leaders and retained a strong grass-roots following. From 1960 onward, the struggle between the two parties in the east was cast almost entirely in terms of who would best represent regional interests.[10] It was not until 1968 that UNIP, through a combination of persuasion and intimidation, established clear dominance in the Eastern Province.

Zambia, in short, provides support for one of the theoretical propositions of Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe: "In a culturally plural society, the participation of the masses in the political process encourages aspirant politicians to make appeals to the most easily mobilized communal loyalties, and to define themselves primarily as the representatives of communal interests."[11] The congruence of objective and perceived differences between the various ethnic-linguistic-regional groups provides a ready base of potential support for those engaged in political competition.

Class Formation and the Public Bureaucracy

An alternative perspective for political analysis is to emphasize socioeconomic class, rather than

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sity Press, 1967), Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Richard Hall, *Zambia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965).

[10] Mulford, *Zambia*, pp. 121–131 and 327–330.

[11] Melson and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism," 1122.

ethnic identity or geographical region, as a basis for group and individual behavior. This has been the most prevalent approach for those interested in representative bureaucracy.[12] Zambia, however, presents a case of class formation without a high level of class consciousness. There are objective differences among the population in levels of income and types of occupation that provide the basis for distinct sets of vested interests among the Zambian population. These objective differences, however, have not been accompanied by subjective identity or by political organization and articulation. No political party has emerged to represent or further class interests. Instead, parties have had strong regional and ethnic orientations.

In part, class divisions are relatively unimportant in Zambian politics because Africans have only recently been able to enter positions above the level of unskilled and semi-skilled work. As a result, classes have not yet developed or entrenched themselves in Zambian society. The data on the social background of Zambian civil servants, presented in Table 2, illustrate this point. The picture presented here sharply contrasts with the evidence that V. Subramaniam collected in his six-country study of administrators. Subramaniam's survey indicated that 81 to 97 per cent of the civil servants in Denmark, Great Britain, France, the United States, Turkey and India had fathers with middle-class occupations.[13] Applying Subramaniam's definition of middle-class occupations to the data in Table 2, only 54 per cent of the Zambian civil servants have fathers in this type of employment. Similarly, less than 10 per cent of the Zambian civil servants are the sons of governmental employees, whereas 46 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively, of the civil servants in Turkey and India—the two developing countries in Subramaniam's survey—have followed their fathers into government service.

The data in Table 2, however, indicate an increase in the civil servants coming from the urban, modern sectors. This trend is most noticeable for middle-level civil servants and university students. While 52 per cent of the older civil servants in clerical and executive positions are sons of traditional rulers, small-scale farmers, and fishmongers, only 32 per cent of their younger colleagues are, and only 16 per cent of the university students come from this background.

If, as expected, the future corps of senior civil servants in Zambia will consist primarily of those who are currently attending a university, then about two-thirds will come from middle-class families. Moreover, the proportion of civil servants who enter the bureaucracy with middle-class backgrounds, is likely to continue to increase. Given the requirements for entry into the civil service, middle-class families would seem to be in a better position than the peasantry to offer their children the needed education, experience, and career orientation.

In his study of elite values among Zambian politicians and senior civil servants, James Scarritt found some evidence that the distinctions being made indicate the emergence of class interests. Scarritt found a high level of agreement among members of the governing elite that they should receive special rewards and privileges. " 'The uneducated man—the laborer—cannot expect to be equal to the educated man holding a responsible position,' it was said."[14] As important as Scarritt's findings are, they measure only a single attitude related to class interests,[15] and cannot therefore be regarded as evidence of class consciousness or class-based political activity.

The studies of Zambian mineworkers by A. L. Epstein and Robert H. Bates emphasize the importance of distinguishing between class attitudes and the bases for participation in politics. Epstein and Bates have concluded that class interests are highly salient to the mineworkers and that their solidarity vis-à-vis mine management is intensified by the racial (i.e., white-black), cultural, and income differences between the two.[16] Common interests in the mining context did not, however, lead to mixing among the various ethnic groups in social relations and, according to Bates, did not result in common political allegiances or activity. Involvement of mineworkers in national politics has maintained an ethno-regional orientation.[17]

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[12] Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy," 1010–1019; W. Lloyd Warner, Paul P. Van Riper, Norman H. Martin, and Orvis F. Collins, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), and R. K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).

[13] Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy," p. 1016. Middle-class occupational titles, according to Subramaniam, include shopkeepers and merchants, governmental employees, business employees, professionals and skilled workers. Excluded from this category are unskilled workers, farmers, and agricultural workers.

[14] James R. Scarritt, "Elite Values, Ideology, and Power in Post-Independence Zambia," *African Studies Review*, 14 (April, 1971), p. 42.

[15] Scarritt's study was designed primarily to determine the political ideology and values of top party and government officials and to gauge the degree of unity within the elite; it was not specifically concerned with the issue of class consciousness.

[16] A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 160–161, and 240, and Robert H. Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development: A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 114–119.

[17] Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development,* p. 118.

Table 2. Trends in the Social Backgrounds of Zambian Civil Servants, 1969

	Father's Occupation							
			Middle Class					
	Traditional Ruler %	Small-Scale Farmer, Fishmonger %	Teacher, Clergyman %	Civil Servant, Clerk, District Messenger %	Merchant %	Semi-skilled Urban Worker or Mine-Worker[a] %	Unskilled Worker %	Other %
Senior Civil Servants over 35 ($N=97$)	7	22	13	12	25	18	1	4
Senior Civil Servants under 35 ($N=68$)	3	29	13	6	13	19	9	7
Middle-level Civil Servants over 35 ($N=61$)	21	31	7	7	2	21	8	2
Middle-level Civil Servants under 35 ($N=93$)	7	27	11	10	3	32	7	4
Undergraduates at University of Zambia in Arts, Law and Humanities ($N=223$)	9	8	32	26	4	5	10	6

[a] Semi-skilled workers include such positions as plumber, bricklayer, mechanic, and hospital assistant. Unskilled workers include gardeners, houseboys, and handy-men.

Sources: Data on Middle-level civil servants from the Zambia Localized Civil Servants' Association Survey. (See footnote 25 for details about this survey.) Data on senior civil servants and students at the University of Zambia from V. Subramaniam, "The Social Background of Zambia's Higher Civil Servants and Undergraduates," paper presented to University Social Science Conference, Nairobi, December, 1969.

Richard L. Sklar and M. G. Smith have, from different vantage points, discussed the tendency in many societies for ethnicity and culture to coincide with class differences and inequities in the distribution of political power, economic wealth and social status.[18] In Zambia, ethnic groups are *not* identified with socioeconomic classes; instead each include members of all classes and levels of society. Ethno-regional communities, however, have been noted for occupying distinct places within a hierarchy of political power. A major concern of postcolonial politics is the determination of how this power and wealth will be structured and who will occupy the most favored and pre-eminent positions.

Ethnicity, Politics and Administration: Bemba Dominance

For the first years after Independence, Zambia was ruled by a government and party whose top officials had been selected with a view to achieving a balance between expertise and political support on the one hand and a representation of all major ethnic groups on the other.[19] This balance, however, was rudely spoiled at the 1967 Annual Conference of UNIP, held at Mulungushi. The bitterly fought elections for positions on the party's Central Committee revealed publicly the deep ethnic and regional divisions within the party. Alliances were formed between the Bemba and the Tonga on one side and the Lozi and the Nyanja on another. Some individuals, like Grey Zulu and, most notably, President Kenneth D. Kaunda, remained aloof and neutral in this struggle. Their ethnic identity was nonetheless important in calculating the effects of the Mulungushi Conference on ethnic representation. The Bemba-Tonga alliance won decisively. Of the eleven members of the Central Committee, six were Bemba and two were Tonga. One Lozi won an uncontested position and other posts went to individuals outside the major ethno-regional groups.[20]

President Kaunda was frankly disappointed about the way in which the votes were solicited. He told the party:

> We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and

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[18] Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration—A Radical Approach," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 6 (1967), 1–11 and M. G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism," and "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," in *Pluralism in Africa,* ed. Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 27–66 and 415–458. See also the discussion of incorporation in Cohen and Middleton, *From Tribe to Nation in Africa,* pp. 1–34.

[19] For details on the background of these officials, see Mulford, *Zambia,* pp. 330 and 331 and Robert I. Rotberg, "Tribalism and Politics in Zambia," *Africa Report* (December, 1967), pp. 29–35.

[20] Rotberg, "Tribalism and Politics in Zambia," pp. 29–35.

> provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a state of hate, based entirely on tribe, province race, colour and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this Party and Government.[21]

A significant aspect of the Bemba-Tonga alliance in UNIP is that the Tonga distinctly constituted the weak partner. Since the Southern Province, the Tonga area, has been a stronghold of the African National Congress,[22] UNIP officials from that area could not claim to have popular support or to be able to deliver votes from their constituencies. Their strength within UNIP depended almost entirely on their right to cast a vote and their membership in an alliance. The Bemba, on the other hand, represented one of the areas of Zambia with the most organized local level support for UNIP.

Representative Bureaucracy

Not surprisingly, the charge leveled after the 1967 Mulungushi Conference was that the government was Bemba-dominated. The Lozi-based United Party, which formed after Mulungushi, charged in its publication, *The Mirror:*

> . . . There are 73 tribes in Zambia and their interests must be balanced. But look at this arrangement: The President, the Vice-President, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission—which deals with Promotions of Civil Servants; Teaching Service Commission—which deals with Promotions of teachers, Police Service Commission—which deals with Promotions of police; University Council of Zambia and Judiciary Service Commission belong to one tribe. The Commissioner of Police and the Secretary to the Cabinet belong to one tribe. These are the people governing the country and all the other ministries and departments are merely branches of some form or other of the above. The same tribe has majority [sic] of Permanent and Under Secretaries than any other tribe. It has more people in the foreign service than any other tribe. It has more Directors in Charge of Departments and Semi-Government Organizations such as the Zambia Railways, Zambia Broadcasting Services and the Commissioner of Traffic Departments, etc., etc.
>
> What is all this about? Does it mean that they are the most dedicated ones that other tribes? [sic] It is also estimated that the same tribe has nearly 150 people in the executive and higher positions of office in the Public Service. The Tongas, the Ngonis, and the Lozis next range between 30 and 50 people each in similar positions. Can anybody explain why?[23]

Civil servants, too, felt anxiety after the Bemba attained predominance in the ruling party. In a questionnaire distributed through the Zambia Localized Civil Servants Associations,[24] 26 per cent of the respondents answered affirmatively to a question asking if they felt they had ever been mistreated in the civil service because of their tribal affiliation. When asked whether it was more important to abide by the bureaucratic norm of basing appointments and promotions solely on merit or whether a conscious effort should be made to maintain a tribal balance in the bureaucracy, 45 per cent of the respondents indicated that the latter was essential for Zambia.

The pattern of response by ethno-regional identity is interesting in showing that the Lozi and those from the small ethnic groups of the Northwestern, Copperbelt and Central Provinces express the greatest concern about tribalism in the civil service and that despite the charges of Bemba domination, a significant percentage of the Bemba respondents also indicated concern about tribalism. Among the respondents, 43 per cent of the Lozi, 39 per cent of those from small ethnic groups, and 22 per cent of the Bemba said they believed that they had been mistreated because of their tribe. Indicating their feeling for a need to maintain an ethnic balance in the civil service were 52 per cent of the Lozi respondents, 78 per cent of those from the smaller groups, and 38 per cent of the Bemba. Least concerned about tribalism were the Nyanja-speaking civil servants: only 15 per cent said they had been mistreated because of their ethnic identity and 30 per cent of them said there was a need for tribal balance.[25]

The charge of tribal domination means that a certain ethno-regional group is accused of receiving preferential treatment when appointments and promotions are made. The evidence given to support such a claim is that the proportion of people in a given position who are from the allegedly favored group is higher than the proportion of the total population that group represents. The accusation does not always carry with it a charge that unqualified people are filling positions. Tribalism can mean that when other factors are equal members of one ethnic group are consistently treated better than those from others. It is important to remember that it is an ethno-regional group's *percentage of the total population* which is important in calculating the representative nature of the bureaucracy. Ethnic breakdowns of qualified graduates or some other grouping more relevant than the total population are not used by those alleging the existence of tribalism. Alternatively, representative bureaucracy is defined as balance, i.e., equivalent shares of positions by each of the major ethnic groups. Whichever standard is used, the Zambian government is ethnically heterogeneous but not representative.

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[21] Republic of Zambia, Information Services, *Mulungushi Conference* 1967 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967), pp. 52 and 53.

[22] Mulford, *Zambia*, 107–142. Also, Thomas Rasmussen, "Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7 (1969), 407–424.

[23] "Tribalism in Zambia, Who Are Encouraging It?" *The Mirror* (Lusaka), I (March, 1968), 3.

[24] The questionnaire was distributed to a random sample of Zambian civil servants posted to stations outside Lusaka. The sample was drawn from staff lists of all civil servants, rather than from the membership rolls of the Association. Out of 195 questionnaires mailed, 154—78.9 per cent—were returned. Attempts to extend the mailed questionnaire to civil servants working in Lusaka received so little cooperation that the effort was abandoned. Interviews conducted by the author provided evidence that the attitudes of civil servants posted to Lusaka do not differ significantly from those of colleagues working elsewhere. I am grateful to the Zambia Localized Civil Servants' Association for their cooperation and, of course, accept full responsibility for the interpretation of the data.

[25] Based upon the observations reported by Ian Scott and Robert Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections," *Africa Report* (January, 1969), 42–27, and on field research done by the author in the Eastern Province, it appears that UNIP local officials in the Nyanja-speaking areas are more concerned about Bemba domination than are Nyanja-speaking civil servants. In the middle and lower ranks of the civil service, Nyanja-speaking civil servants have fared relatively well and so expressed less experience and less fear of ill-treatment because of their tribe than other civil servants have. See Dennis L. Dresang, *The Zambia Civil Service: Entrepreneurialism and Development Administration* (Nairobi: East African Publishing

It is indeed curious that, as charged by the United Party, virtually all of the most senior government positions in Zambia after the 1967 Mulungushi Conference were occupied by Bemba. With the exception of the President, the United Party enumeration of senior posts occupied by members of the same ethno-regional group in 1968 is accurate.[26] Table 3 presents the ethno-regional breakdown of the total population and of people occupying senior governmental positions as of December, 1968. The data indicate that the smallest groups were grossly underrepresented; the Bemba and the Nyanja overrepresented. Bemba dominance was most striking in positions at the head of government commissions and ministerial departments.

Ascriptive identity as a possible factor in appointing and promoting personnel can be felt in certain ministries and departments as well as in government as a whole. The evidence and the "folklore" indicate that specific units of the Zambian bureaucracy appear to be the preserve of certain ethno-regional groups. In December, 1968, the senior posts of the Ministry of Local Government and Prisons, both at headquarters and in the provinces, were staffed primarily with Lozi. Four of the top six Zambian civil servants at headquarters and one-half of the Provincial Local Government Officers were Lozi. Of the 14 Zambians in substantive posts in the Office of National Development and Planning, 8 were Lozi. Similarly, 8 of the 10 senior Zambians stationed at headquarters in the Ministry of Labour were Bemba. In the Ministry of Youth, Co-operatives and Social Development, 9 out of 12 were held by Bemba.

The tendency for units within the government to consist of personnel primarily from one ethnic area may be regarded as evidence of patronage. The data are not available to ascertain whether this distribution reflects patron-client ties or something less personal.[27] Whatever the causes, the resulting pattern contributes to the perception that ethnicity is a salient force. For individual civil servants, the importance of their social identity may lead them to conclude that their career prospects are better in one ministry or department than they are likely to be in another. For the society as a whole, ethnic differences are maintained.

In sum, after the 1967 UNIP elections, the Bemba took the lion's share of the very senior government positions in the ministries and on government commissions. Their dominance was not so pervasive, however, as to make it impossible for members of other groups to enjoy a career and mobility either in the civil service generally or in particular units of the bureaucracy.

Development Administration

Ethnicity and Development Allocations. The rationale for representative bureaucracy would lead us to expect that Bemba domination in the senior echelons of government would lead to public policy that favors Bemba and neglects or sacrifices the needs of other groups. One way of testing these expectations is to examine the pattern of development expenditures in the provinces. Development policy issues constitute an area of the highest long-term and short-term political significance, and thus are an appropriate focus for this analysis. Furthermore, since development plans and allocations are determined by senior civil servants and political officials,[28]

House, 1974), pp. 63–65. One suspects that on the level of national politics, as opposed to intra civil-service matters, Nyanja-speaking civil servants might express the same apprehensions and desires as politicians, farmers, and others from the Eastern Province.

[26] The term "tribe" as used by Zambians in discussing their national politics refers to the ethnic and regional differences that have been delineated above. The quotations by President Kaunda and the United Party are evidence of this. The author used interviews with some of the respondents of the survey to confirm that they too interpreted "tribe" as synonomous with ethno-regional divisions.

[27] For a discussion of patron-client relationships, see Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 68–90, and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 91–113.

[28] A more detailed discussion of development policies and administration in Zambia is available in Dresang, *The Zambia Civil Service*, pp. 110–207.

Table 3. Ethno-Regional Breakdown of Senior Government Officials[a]

	Total African Population %	Cabinet Ministers %	Permanent Secretaries %	Heads of Departments %	Total Superscale %
Bemba	31	27	32	50	38
Nyanja	19	20	26	13	25
Tonga	13	13	15	16	16
Lozi	13	27	15	19	15
Other	24	13	11	3	7
	N=4.1 million	N=14	N=19	N=32	N=289

[a] In calculating these figures, only black African Zambian personnel were included. Superscale positions include all supervisory posts (generally Heads of Departments, the equivalent and above) with a salary of K5,200 or more. (One Kwacha is equivalent to U. S. $1.40.)

this policy area provides an opportunity to correlate available ethnic background data with the outputs of the decision-making process. The effects of social identity might be explored in other policy areas, such as the granting of licenses and the enforcement of various regulations. Data here, however, are not readily available.

From the data presented in Tables 4 and 5, it appears that development allocations to provinces have not been designed to favor one particular region, but rather to emphasize generally efforts in the least developed areas of the country.

Table 4 illustrates the differences in the degree of development and urbanization in the Copperbelt, Central, and Southern provinces on the one hand, and in the rest of the country on the other. In Zambia, as in many countries, the concentration of growth and development has followed the railway line that pioneered contact with the outside commercial world. The single "line of rail," as it is referred to in Zambia, goes through the three provinces with the highest indications of economic development.

The most marked pattern of development expenditure, as shown in Table 5 is that the most developed province, Copperbelt, is receiving the fewest capital funds. Furthermore, no particular province or set of provinces have been singled out for punishment for their political behavior. On a per capita basis, in fact, the Northern Province (Bemba) does not score very high. This is offset to some extent by the economic activity likely to be generated by a major national development project, the construction of the railway from Zambia through to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Also, the figures for development expenditures in the Northern Province reflect the relatively low economic potential of that region. Economic factors also influence the relatively high per capita expenditures for Western and North-Western Provinces, the two areas with the poorest base in infrastructural resources. What appears to be followed, in short, is a strategy of striving for rapid and balanced growth,[29] regardless of the political record of the various ethno-regional groups.

An examination of a specific policy area, the development of primary school facilities, further illustrates the strategy of development administration. The field of education offers some advantages for an analysis of patterns of allocation. This policy area is not encumbered by such factors as soil conditions, the location of mineral deposits, and unhealthy areas that obstruct the equal distribution of agricultural, mining and health services. Schools can be built wherever there are people. Education is, moreover, an issue of high political visibility and salience.[30] If the pattern of ethnic dominance among senior government officials has an impact on the use of development funds, that impact should be reflected in the development of educational facilities. Table 6, however, indicates that Zambia has acted to equalize levels of provincial development, rather than to favor areas with high representation in government. The columns showing the percentages of school age population enrolled in school demonstrate a leveling tendency since independence in 1964. The slightly higher than average percentages recorded in Southern, Luapula, and Northern Provinces in 1969 reflect unanticipated declines in the number of school age children in these areas.[31] On the other hand, the population in Lusaka increased 82 per cent between 1964 and 1969, making it difficult to provide adequate

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[29] For analyses on Zambia's failure to achieve rapid and balanced economic development, see Charles Elliot, ed., *Constraints on Economic Development in Zambia* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[30] See the discussion in John Mwanakatwe, *The Growth of Education in Zambia Since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[31] Republic of Zambia, *Statistical Yearbook, 1970*, p. 3 and *Second National Development Plan*, pp. 169–171.

Table 4. Patterns of Provincial Development

Province	Population (thousands)	Farmers in Traditional Agriculture (thousands)	Number of Manufacturing Establishments	Employed Africans % of Pop.	Dwellings with Electricity Available (%)	Dwellings with Private Water Taps (%)
Copperbelt	544	8.1	317	29	43	47
Central	505	18.7	166	27	17	17
Southern	466	36.5	41	18	10	9
Luapula	357	52.8	1	12	2	1
Northern	564	48.8	1	9	2	2
Western	363	51.1	1	8	1	1
Northwestern	211	32.4	1	11	1	1
Eastern	480	80.7	4	8	1	1

Source: Calculated from Republic of Zambia, *Statistical Yearbook, 1970* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1971), 3–10, and *Second National Development Plan, 1972–1976* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972), 172–174.

schools, despite heavy expenditures. It should also be pointed out that the population in Southern Province is highly concentrated, particularly in the towns along the line of rail. Thus, relatively low amounts of funds could expand educational facilities in a way that resulted in the highest percentage of primary school enrollment. These caveats aside, it is clear that the effort is to provide all provinces with roughly equivalent opportunities to educate their children.

The pattern of development expenditures, whether general or specific to education, does more than demonstrate the absence of Bemba favoritism. It also serves as a reminder that classifying people according to their circumstances of birth or language is, after all, not grouping them according to any criteria necessarily related to administrative behavior or attitudes. Even in a society where ethnic political cleavages are as important as they are in Zambia, civil servants are guided by their bureaucratic environment. Not all administrators who are inclined to act prejudicially for their own ethnic and regional groups are able to do so. Some are constrained by the discretionary authority of their job and the policy requirements of specific issues. Since cotton is not readily grown in Western Province, for instance, a Lozi Cotton Officer can do little to act partially for his area. Others who are in policy areas that allow more options must work with other officials and agencies. The interests of other segments of the bureaucracy may differ from and thus check the designs of a parochially oriented administrator.

The concern of civil servants for their own individual careers provides a fundamental source of guidance for administrative behavior. Zambia's bureaucracy, like that of most other countries, is at least partially oriented toward merit and achievement. Civil servants seeking advancement know that promotions depend not just on seniority and education but also on demonstrated

Table 5. Provincial Development Expenditures
(in Kwacha)

Province	Development Expenditures up to 31 Dec. 1971	Per Capita Expenditures up to 31 Dec. 1971	Development Expenditures Total Estimated Cost	Per Capita Total Estimated Cost
Copperbelt	1,579,000	2.90	9,124,000	16.78
Central	5,410,000	10.71	9,430,000	18.66
Southern	4,236,000	9.09	10,078,100	21.63
Luapula	4,860,000	10.81	10,166,000	28.48
Northern	5,152,000	9.12	9,991,000	17.71
Western	5,784,000	15.93	11,185,000	30.81
North-Western	3,761,000	13.09	7,866,000	37.28
Eastern	4,795,000	9.99	10,123,000	21.09

Source: Calculated from Republic of Zambia, *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures*. 1972 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972). Figures do not include the spending of national projects and programs in the provinces. Provincial allocations are made by the ministries of Rural Development, Lands and Natural Resources, Education, Power, Transport and Works, Health, Legal Affairs, and Provincial and Local Government and Culture.

Table 6. Development of Primary School Facilities, 1964–1969

					1964		1967		1969	
Province	Planned Expenditures (in Kwacha)	Actual Expenditures Up to Dec. 31, 1969 (in Kwacha)	Planned Expenditures Per School Age Child 1969 (in Kwacha)	Actual Expenditures Per School Age Child 1969 (in Kwacha)	No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School	No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School	No. of Students	% of School Age Pop. in School
Copperbelt	5,247,000	140,000[a]	23.8	0.6[a]	82,645	56	116,005	61	135,594	62
Central	4,399,000	3,062,000	22.8	15.8	55,199	41	169,440	50	105,395	55
Southern	1,739,000	719,000	12.9	5.4	60,722	48	82,505	63	96,165	68
Luapula	1,882,000	998,000	20.7	11.0	33,535	35	47,164	51	58,828	65
Northern	3,401,000	1,797,000	23.8	12.2	50,316	33	75,583	51	94,379	64
Western	2,149,000	1,549,000	19.4	13.9	38,151	38	50,176	48	63,736	58
North-Western	1,273,000	839,000	20.3	13.4	15,360	27	23,278	39	29,948	47
Eastern	3,058,000	986,000	22.2	7.2	42,711	52	60,657	53	77,236	56
Total	24,148,000	10,090,000	22.0	5.0	378,639	42	539,353	53	661,281	60

[a] During this period, the mining companies continued to provide educational facilities for most of the families working on the Copperbelt. Thus, central government funds were needed only for the rural areas of that province.

Sources: Zambia, *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures*, 1972, 157–168, and *Statistical Year-Book, 1970*, 3, 14–20.

competence. In addition, the perception of the advantages and disadvantages of a given ethnic identity is important. What may be relevant, in other words, is the belief that Bemba dominance exists; not the actual extent of its existence. The effects of these perceptions can be seen by looking at the behavior of Zambian administrators with responsibility for promoting economic development.

Ethnicity and Entrepreneurialism. Ethnic identity and personal self-confidence affect calculations of what must be done in order to have a successful career. These calculations, in turn, influence the degrees of enthusiasm and innovation with which administrators approach their work, but have little effect on the allocations to ethno-regional groups. An official may, for instance, feel that he cannot rely on his ethnicity to secure promotions. Depending on his self-confidence, either he will work hard at becoming known as an unusually competent administrator and thus compensate for his ethnic identity or he will seek security through low visibility and anonymity.

Zambian evidence is instructive on this point. From data collected through in-depth interviews and an examination of files and documents relevant to cases of development decision making, a select group of thirty-three Zambian officials were studied and classified according to their career orientation.[32] Interviews were designed and case studies selected in order to determine self-confidence, job motivation, career aspirations, and participation in decision making. An administrator was regarded as entrepreneurial if: (1) he had access to resources of funds, equipment and personnel that could be used to promote development; (2) he was self-confident, specifically in that he felt able to influence his own future; (3) he believed that opportunities existed for rapid upward mobility; and (4) he concentrated on one project or program in order to maximize chances of its success and his visible identification with it. The selection of senior officials with development responsibility purposely biases the sample in order to maximize the likelihood of entrepreneurialism. Of the 33 Zambian officials interviewed, 19 demonstrated entrepreneurial traits. Seven of these were Bemba, who generally were men eager to take optimal advantage of their administrative position and their ethnic identity. The twelve non-Bemba calculated that it was essential to demonstrate exceptional ability if they were to overcome the handicap of not possessing the most advantageous ascriptive traits. The nine Bemba and five non-Bemba who were not entrepreneurially oriented lacked ambition and self-confidence and viewed their responsibilities primarily as routine administrative tasks.

The Zambian case suggests that ethnicity does have an impact on development administration. The effects are most clear on the career orientations of individuals. The calculations of an administrator of what he can and should do to seek career advancement, it should be noted, affect entrepreneurialism and innovation, but not the beneficiaries of policy outputs. Ethnic group needs and career demands are not necessarily incompatible, but neither are they consistent with each other. From the pattern of development expenditures, it would appear that bureaucrats concerned with development are guided primarily by professional criteria, and not by parochial interests.

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[32] The study also included 55 expatriates working in Zambia. All officials held a position of department head, the equivalent or above and were in the then Office of National Development and Planning or one of the following ministries: Agriculture, Health, Mining and Natural Resources, Youth, Cooperatives and Social Development, Finance, and Local and Provincial Government. For a more detailed discussion of this study, see Dennis L. Dresang, "Entrepreneurialism and Development Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 18 (March, 1973), 76–85.

Zambian administrators would be unique if they never deviated from wholly economic and commercial norms and never granted parochial favors. The point here, however, is that any role as spokesman of an ethnic group that a bureaucrat might assume is constrained by his area of authority and is compromised by his desire to pursue a successful career.

Although the Bemba victories at the 1967 Mulungushi Conference do not appear to have resulted in substantial disadvantages for other groups in the country, there was widespread belief that non-Bemba were in fact suffering. This belief prompted the political changes that began in late 1969 and culminated in the reversal of Bemba dominance and the decision made early in 1972 to make Zambia a one-party state. These events sharply demonstrate that the representative character of the top levels of government—both politicians and civil servants—is critically important politically, regardless of the actual impact on decision making.

Ethnicity, Politics and Administration: Balance

The discontent generated by the Bemba hold on senior positions in the government and ruling party took a variety of forms. The formation of the United Party has already been mentioned. When it seemed clear that this party was widening its Lozi base and securing support from concerned elements in other provinces, President Kaunda banned the party and detained its leaders. In the Eastern Province, local UNIP officials helped to foster a movement called "Umodzi Ku Mawa" (Unity in the East), which threatened secession of Nyanja areas if the imbalances of the Mulungushi Conference were not redressed. In three provinces there were demonstrations protesting visits of Bemba officials, including the vice president, touring the area.

The General Elections held in December, 1968, clearly signaled the apprehension. Although UNIP won a comfortable majority of the seats in the National Assembly, it lost two major regions of the country, and victory elsewhere was sometimes accompanied by violence and intimidation. The Southern Province continued its overwhelming support for the African National Congress. With the United Party banned, the Lozi electorate turned to ANC, which used United Party organization and ran United Party leaders as its candidates. Bemba domination was a major grievance throughout the country. ANC officials used the issue in their campaigns and local UNIP officials in non-Bemba areas tried to steal ANC thunder by themselves opposing Northern Province control.[33]

The 1968 elections not only dramatized the widespread concern about Bemba domination but also complicated the problems of imbalance. Voters in the Western Province, for instance, chose between ANC and UNIP candidates. All but one of these candidates were Lozi. In expressing their discontent with the ruling party and electing ANC candidates, voters in the Western Province removed from office three Lozi cabinet ministers and one junior minister. The effect was to eliminate almost completely Lozi representation in the upper echelons of the ruling party. The only Lozi cabinet minister who survived the elections had a Copperbelt constituency. Other Lozi political leaders sat on opposition benches in the post-1968 parliament.

It was clear that in the interests of national unity and stability, President Kaunda had to take a more active role in ensuring that all groups within Zambia felt represented in the highest and most visible echelons of government. In mid-1969, the President began slowly and gradually to change the government and the ruling party in order to achieve greater ethnic balance. The public sector was expanded through the establishment of public enterprises, thus making more positions available. Ministries were reorganized. Plans were initiated to revise the party structure to prevent reoccurrences of the 1967 Conference.

Since a major purpose of these changes was to substitute a pattern of predominance of one group with a pattern of balance, those most threatened were members of the allegedly dominant group. Indeed, in August, 1969, Vice President Kapwepwe resigned his post, complaining that there was discrimination against the Bemba and that he was not accepted as the legitimate Vice President by all sectors of the society. Within 24 hours after Kapwepwe's resignation, President Kaunda seized the opportunity to disband the Central Committee that had been elected in 1967, suspend the party constitution, appoint governing committees within UNIP to be responsible to him and reorganize government ministries and portfolios. Kapwepwe was persuaded to rescind his resignation but was stripped of the substantial power he had been given immediately after the 1968 elections, when both planning and finance had been placed under his charge. The two top ministries, as defined by President Kaunda—Rural Development and

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[33] Scott and Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections."

Table 7. Comparison of Ethno-Regional Identity of Senior Government Officials, 1968 and 1972

	Total Zambian Population %	Cabinet Ministers		Perm. Sectys.		Total	
		1968 %	1972 %	1968 %	1972 %	1968 %	1972 %
Bemba	31	27	22	32	13	31	17
Nyanja	19	20	13	26	42	22	28
Tonga	13	13	17	15	4	14	11
Lozi	13	27	13	15	21	22	17
Others	24	13	35	11	21	11	28
	$N=4,100,000$	$N=17$	$N=23$	$N=19$	$N=24$	$N=36$	$N=47$

Finance and Planning—were assigned to a Nyanja and a Tonga, respectively.

As part of the changes set in motion by the President, in November, 1970, Mainza Chona was appointed by Kaunda as Zambia's Vice President, and Simon Kapwepwe was assigned a ministerial portfolio. This change involved more than the replacement of a Bemba by a non-Bemba. Kapwepwe has acquired, rightly or wrongly, the reputation of being the Bemba leader, and so the symbolic blow to that group was substantial.

The response by Bemba Members of Parliament, among others, was a series of charges of discrimination and corruption and a call to establish a new political party. After some hesitation, Kapwepwe launched the United Progressive Party (UPP) in August, 1971. The UPP had a Bemba base, although it tried to broaden that base by articulating the grievances of those unhappy with the slow pace of economic development and the direction of leadership in Zambia.[34] The UPP had only a limited opportunity to test its ability to mobilize an electorate, however. Violent clashes ensued between UNIP and UPP supporters when they vied with one another in by-elections. More than 200 UPP leaders and sympathizers were placed in detention, and finally President Kaunda banned the party and arrested Kapwepwe himself. In the aftermath of these events President Kaunda departed from his intent to persuade Zambian voters to make the country a one-party state through the ballot box. In February, 1972, he declared that the country was going to be a single-party state, and appointed a commission to determine how the constitution should be changed to implement that decision.

Like the non-Bemba complaints of discriminatory treatment in 1968, Bemba charges in 1972 are only partially justifiable. All Bemba who had been occupying top positions have not been removed. Men of Bemba identity occupy cabinet posts, permanent secretary positions and directorships in public corporations. On the other hand, non-Bemba are now serving as Vice President, Head of the Civil Service, Commander of the Air Force, Commander of the Armed Forces, and other positions once held by Bemba. Furthermore, as Table 7 demonstrates, the Bemba can argue that they have less than their share of the most visible posts in government, especially at the permanent secretary level.

According to the data in Table 7, the composition of the senior levels of government failed to reflect the size of ethno-regional groups both in 1968 and in 1972. As long as nonascriptive criteria are used in appointing permanent secretaries and other senior civil servants in an effort to secure the most appropriate talent and experience for these jobs, the goal of a perfectly representative bureaucracy will probably always be elusive. Ethnic arithmetic appears to have been employed more extensively in filling positions at the cabinet level and at the head of major commissions, corporations, and military units. Of the top 29 positions in this category, there were Bemba in 24 per cent, Nyanja in 17 per cent, Tonga and Lozi in 14 per cent each and members of smaller groups in the remaining 31 per cent. In general, those outside of the major ethno-regional groups were receiving significantly more favorable treatment in 1972 than they received in 1968. The Bemba, on the other hand, were under-represented.

Since December, 1972, Zambian leaders have sought support throughout the nation by maintaining a representative balance in the ethnic backgrounds of senior officials and containing political conflict within the framework of a one-party state. The legacy of previous events, however, presents a formidable barrier to national unity. President Kaunda and his lieutenants are confronted by the Bemba perception that there is a systematic attempt to disadvantage them. The Tonga, under the leadership of the African National Congress, have always been suspicious of

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[34] Robert Molteno, "Zambia and the One Party State," *East Africa Journal*, 9 (February, 1972), 6–18.

UNIP and the one-party state idea. In addition, the conflict and hostility unleashed by the 1967 Mulungushi Conference in almost all sections of the country have left many scars and cast doubt on the capacities of Kaunda as a leader. Considering as well the grievances emerging from Zambia's economic difficulties and the new level of authoritarianism in the country, one must be less than sanguine about political stability in the immediate future. International crises in Southern Africa, however, may neutralize domestic discontent and extend the tenure of the incumbent Zambian regime.

Conclusion

In applying the lessons of Zambia to other situations, one must understand the fundamental character of the bureaucratic environment that may counter the forces for ethnic representation. In a government commission, for instance, the appointment of an individual to represent the interests of an ethnic community may clearly and directly bind that individual to maintain the confidence of his ethnically defined constituency. Loss of that constituency may decrease an incumbent's usefulness and prompt a search for another representative. For a civil servant, on the other hand, while ethnic identity may affect career advancement, there is no need to maintain an ethnic following. Here the basic forces prompting representative behavior are absent. Ethnic politics, however, are not likely to distinguish between types of administrative units in pressing for representative bureaucracy.

The fundamental political importance of ethnicity in a country like Zambia is that differences in language, geographic area, political constituency, administrative divisions and development needs coincide and are summarized in political rhetoric with ethnic labels. In some respects, the dynamics of politics in Zambia resemble sectional or regional politics in countries with longer political histories as self-governing nations and with higher levels of economic development. Class divisions in Zambia demonstrably exist, but class identity has not been politicized and is not important subjectively.

An important area of concern in the ethnoregional conflict in Zambia is that one group might seize control of the public bureaucracy and use it for its own advantage. This concern was particularly evident when the Bemba acquired a dominant position within the ruling party in 1967. However, Bemba predominance never went further than appointments at the uppermost echelon of government. The demise of Bemba pre-eminence within the ruling party and state bureaucracy was the result both of their own limited political power and of the fears and activity among non-Bemba that were generated by ethnic imbalance.

The Zambian evidence indicates that an ethnic group cannot rely on representation in the bureaucracy as a resource for effectively pursuing group interests. Individuals are constrained by the authority attached to their positions, by the requirements and options of specific policy issues, and by the criteria used in determining career advancement. To the extent that ethnicity is perceived to be a factor for securing promotions, it is likely to affect the level of initiative and activity, but not necessarily the content of that activity.

Participants in the Zambian political process have acted on the common sense conclusion that the social identity of government officials influences their behavior and priorities. Patterns of development activity do not support this conclusion. Regardless of the actual direction and content of administrative performance, however, the perceived representative character of the most visible echelons of the government has a vital impact on ethnic politics.

Levels of Sociocultural Development Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis*

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Official party doctrine has always emphasized the equality of nationalities in the Soviet Union. In addition to the juridical guarantee of self-determination and the right to develop native cultures that are "national in form and socialist in content," this doctrine envisions the eventual equalization of social and economic development of nationalities and regions. Since nationalism and ethnic antagonisms in the past are said to have derived from inequalities among and within nationalities, the elimination of such inequalities in the framework of a socialist system is viewed not only as an important goal in itself but as a necessary condition for the elimination of ethnic conflict.

In this paper I shall assess the degree to which major Soviet nationalities have in fact tended to converge or diverge in their levels of sociocultural development. Evidence confirming a trend toward equalization may be taken as supporting the official view that the "nationalities problem in the USSR has been solved" through the increased drawing-together (*sblizhenie*) in the development of nationalities and national regions. But such evidence cannot be taken to support the view that leveling is an accomplishment peculiar to the socialist economic and social organization of the Soviet Union, since declines in regional inequality (and in internal economic inequality more generally) have been shown to be characteristic also of nonsocialist societies as they reach relatively advanced stages of development.[1]

In fact, empirical evidence does tend to confirm that regional and ethnic inequality in the USSR has been reduced over time and continues to decline on certain social and cultural dimensions but that inequality has increased on others. This evidence at once complements and contrasts with the findings of two scholars who have relied on economic rather than sociocultural indicators. In his detailed study of regional economic inequality in the USSR, Vsevolod Holubnychy showed that in contrast with a tendency toward equalization during the period prior to World War II, the levels of regional development tended to diverge between 1958 and 1964.[2] Using different indicators, I. S. Koropeckyj similarly showed a gradual leveling tendency between 1950 and 1958 but an increasing disparity in regional economic development between 1958 and 1968.[3] Thus the case for the equalization hypothesis is at best mixed and appears to be contradicted by recent trends in economic indicators.

This paper will test the equalization hypothesis on units of analysis not employed by Holubnychy and Koropeckyj. These authors used measures focusing not on *ethnic groups* but on *administrative regions*. Given the shortage of economic data pertaining to specific ethnic groups and the authors' formulation of the problem in terms of the regional distribution of investment and resources, this regional focus is understandable. But both authors did intend also to determine whether the economic development of *ethnic groups* was equalizing, not simply whether regional inequali-

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* For their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper I would like to thank John A. Armstrong, Mary R. Jackman, Robert W. Jackman, and Sally T. Silver.

[1] Jeffrey G. Williamson has noted a curvilinear relationship between level of economic development and the existence of regional inequality: as a rule inequality is lowest when the levels of economic development are at the lower and higher ends of the continuum, while countries in an intermediate stage are typified by greater inequality. See J. G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 13, No. 4, Part 2 (July, 1965), 3–84. For confirmation of this pattern in the Canadian case, see Alan G. Green, "Regional Inequality, Structural Change, and Economic Growth in Canada—1890–1956," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 17 (July, 1969), 567–583. A similar curvilinear pattern has been hypothesized and demonstrated to be true of income distributions (not necessarily strictly related to regional differentials): see Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays* (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 257–287; and Irving B. Kravis, "International Differences in the Distribution of Income," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 42 (November, 1960), 408–416.

[2] Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 50–120.

[3] I. S. Koropeckyj, "Equalization of Regional Development in Socialist Countries: An Empirical Analysis," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 21 (October, 1972), 68–86. For a similar argument, although not presenting empirical evidence, see Ann Sheehy, "Some Aspects of Regional Development in Soviet Central Asia," *Slavic Review*, 31 (September, 1972), 557–558.

ties existed. Therefore, it is important to try to verify the equalization hypothesis by employing indicators bearing more directly on ethnic equality. This is especially important because measures of regional equality seriously overestimate the degree of ethnic equality, as I shall later show. This paper, then, will not only employ a number of measures of social and cultural development that Holubnychy and Koropeckyj did not use but will make comparisons of ethnic group development in addition to comparisons of regional development.

Sources of Conflict with Egalitarian Goals

In addition to advocating the achievement of ethnic and regional equality, the Soviet regime adheres to several competing goals. First, as Alex Inkeles has noted, the goal of regional equality has always been subordinated to the goals of *military security* and country-wide *economic growth*.[4] In a similar vein, Koropeckyj has attributed the recent reversal of the trend toward inter-republican leveling to the military-strategic objective of dispersing productive capacity to the eastern regions of the country (primarily *within* the Russian Republic) and to the attempt to maximize the growth rate of the entire economy by directing investment away from economic sectors and regions with low productivity and toward those with higher immediate returns on investment.[5]

Second, the promotion of *regional specialization* may conflict with regional equalization. It is not surprising to find in the recent volume outlining the ninth five-year plan (1971–1975) a lengthy section on the "Geographical Distribution of Productive Forces of the USSR and the Development of the Economies of Union Republics."[6] But it *is* surprising, in light of the doctrinal emphasis usually given to regional equalization, that this section refers not once to "equalization" but stresses instead the overall growth of production and living standards in the union republics as well as the rational development and allocation of the country's resources. Here, the need for regional specialization appears to supersede the goal of regional equality. The importance of regional specialization was also emphasized in a recent article in the authoritative party journal *Kommunist* by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, N. K. Baibakov:

> Each republic has the possibility in a planned way to specialize in those sectors and products that correspond to its natural and economic conditions, the labor skills of the population, [and] the sociohistorical and nationality factors; that is, [to specialize] in those sectors and products that are most efficient for it and at the same time necessary for the complex development of the country as a whole.[7]

For purposes of this study, then, one cannot assume that leveling of regional or ethnic development implies that all regions are to become identical to one another.[8]

But as an important monograph on the development of communism in the USSR notes, the need for specialization does not preclude some leveling of regional differences:

> The eventual equalization of the economic and cultural level of national Soviet republics is being accomplished now on a new material-technical base common to all nations of the USSR, on the basis of a socialist division of labor, of specialization and cooperation in the production of Soviet republics. . . . This excludes both the tendency towards unnecessary universalism in the economy of each republic and the narrow, deformed specialization characteristic of capitalism.[9]

In other words, while natural conditions or other priorities in the planned economy of the entire country may compel some regional specialization of economic roles, all regions are expected both to become more internally diversified and to experience substantial progress toward equality of social and economic development (such as increased living standards and educational levels).

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[4] Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective," in *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 262.

[5] As Koropeckyj notes, the shift in investment from the western to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union began in the late 1920's and 1930's, principally as a strategic measure. See I. S. Koropeckyj, *Location Problems in Soviet Industry Before World War II: The Case of the Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), Part I.

[6] N. K. Baibakov, ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971–1975 gg.* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1972), pp. 245–281. Note, however, that the projected rates of growth in industrial production are generally higher for the less advanced regions than for the more industrialized ones, so conceivably the goal of equalization is implicitly recognized.

[7] N. Baibakov, "Ekonomika SSSR—Edinyi narodnokhoziaistvennyi kompleks," *Kommunist,* 1972, No. 16, p. 35. For a similar point, see the recent authoritative monograph on nationality relations: P. N. Fedoseev et al., eds., *Lennizm i natsional'nyi vopros v sovremennykh usloviiakh* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1972), p. 248.

[8] Koropeckyj has observed that the goal of regional economic specialization may compete with that of equalization but he assumes, nevertheless, that the eventual development aim of Soviet doctrine is to achieve an equal amount of industrialization in all regions of the USSR (Koropeckyj, *Location Problems in Soviet Industry,* esp. chap. 4). While this assumption may be essentially valid as an expression of official doctrine, one may question the validity of relying primarily on indices of "industrialization" as the principal indicators of regional equalization. Some alternative measures will be suggested below.

[9] *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii* (Moskva: "Nauka," 1966), p. 256.

Finally, the goal of *regional* equalization may conflict with the equalization of *ethnic groups.* In the more backward areas of the Soviet Union, the levels of urbanization and industrialization of the *regions* in fact far exceed the levels of urbanization and industrialization of the *indigenous populations* of these areas. The cities of the non-Russian republics are often numerically dominated by Russians and other nonindigenous workers, and these "immigrants" tend especially to dominate the more highly skilled occupations. Indeed, migration in the USSR among most of the non-Russian nationalities examined here has been primarily *intra*-republican from villages and isolated settlements to urban areas, while *inter*-republican migration, sometimes planned to accelerate the development of certain regions, has predominantly involved movement of members of the economically more advanced groups (such as the Russians, Armenians, Tatars, and Jews) to the less developed areas or to regions of rapid economic growth.[10] As John A. Armstrong has emphasized, the Soviet Union has largely avoided the path commonly followed in other countries in the early stages of development where an "internal proletariat" of relatively unskilled workers migrates from the poorer regions of the country to the richer ones.[11]

These migration patterns not only commonly provoke ethnic conflict over "cadres policy," but the very process of social equalization of nationalities may build resentment among newly trained locals against the "outsiders" who occupy "their" jobs. This source of tension is sometimes explicitly acknowledged by Soviet social scientists.[12] At the same time, the unskilled native who lacks requisite linguistic and technical skills may be discouraged from seeking jobs in cities dominated by skilled Russians and other Russian-speaking immigrants.[13] Of course, as educational levels and the quality of Russian-language training improve among indigenous rural populations, one would expect rural youths to compete for higher-skilled and more remunerative jobs in the cities.[14] Nevertheless, some rural non-Russians possessing the necessary skills might choose to stay in the countryside if they perceived urbanization to be concomitant with an undesired degree of Russification. Moreover, there is evidence of impediments to official efforts to expand the teaching of Russian.[15]

Thus an examination of the possible gap between the development of national regions and of native populations is important not only because of its direct relevance to the equalization hypothesis but also because of the broader implications of such a lag for various aspects of Soviet social policy.

Measuring Sociocultural Equality

The consideration of possible conflicts between ethnic equalization and other regime goals influences the selection of indicators for social and cultural development. First, economic specialization of regions may counteract absolute equalization of regions but at the same time *need* not do so. Regional *populations* can tend to converge in their levels of social development even while economic differentiation persists. Any measure of regional equalization must therefore avoid laying exclusive emphasis on highly skilled manpower, industrialization, or urbanization. It must on the contrary anticipate the endurance of a division of the labor force between industrial and agrarian sectors (and regions). As a result, measurement of regional differences in economic structure alone would not disprove the equalization hypothesis. But since modernizing tendencies are expected to affect both rural and urban areas (indeed, official Soviet doctrine forecasts eventual parity in income levels, educational and cultural facilities, and living conditions between agricultural and industrial populations), evidence of persistent or increasing sociocultural disparity among regions or among urban and rural populations taken separately *would* contradict the equalization hypothesis.

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[10] See V. I. Perevedentsev, "Contemporary Migration in the USSR," *Soviet Geography,* 10 (April, 1969), 192–208.

[11] John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," in Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union,* pp. 7–8; and John A. Armstrong, "Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization," in *Political Development in Changing Societies: An Analysis of Modernization,* ed. Monte Palmer and Larry Stern (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1971), pp. 136–137. The typical pattern of migration in the early stages of development, from the less advanced to the more advanced regions, has been outlined by Williamson, "Regional Inequality," 5–6 and 8.

[12] See, for example, O. I. Shkaratan, "Etnosotsial'naia struktura gorodskogo naseleniia Tatarskoi ASSR (po materialam sotsiologicheskogo obsledovaniia)," *Sovetskaia etnografiia,* 1970, No. 3, p. 14; and Iu. V. Bromlei and V. I. Kozlov, "Leninizm i osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov v SSSR," *Sovetskaia etnografiia,* 1970, No. 1, p. 13. For discussions of conflict over staffing of administrative and party positions in the USSR, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," *Problems of Communism,* 16 (Sept.-Oct., 1967), 16–26; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), esp. chap. 5.

[13] See V. I. Perevedentsev, *Migratsiia naseleniia i trudovye problemy Sibiri* (Novosibirsk: "Nauka," 1966), chap. 4, translated in *Soviet Sociology,* 9 (Winter, 1970–1), 456–458.

[14] This is the commonly proposed solution to rural overpopulation and urban manpower shortages in some of the national areas. See, for example, the recent account of this problem in Tadzhikistan, in "The Tadzhik Republic's Labor Problem," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* 25, No. 4 (February 21, 1973), 11–12.

[15] See, for example, the criticisms of the inadequate amount and quality of Russian-language instruction in Azerbaidzhan, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (*CDSP*), 24, No. 43 (November 22, 1972), 23, and *CDSP,* 24, No. 51 (January 17, 1973), 23–24; as well as the criticisms of such instruction in Estonia and Turkmenia, in *CDSP,* 24, No. 51 (January 17, 1973), 23.

Second, because national republics and the indigenous populations in these republics may not develop at the same rate, in assessing interregional variance in sociocultural development one should measure the development of indigenous and nonindigenous populations separately, or at the very least, the differences between ethnic group and regional levels of development. Such differences have not been examined in the previous studies cited here.

Ideally, then, one should employ indicators sensitive to both urban-rural and nationality differences. But systematic published data that meet *both* of these requirements are rather scarce. Despite the incompleteness of data on income and production for regions of the Soviet Union, Holubnychy and Koropeckyj were able to use a number of indirect indicators of regional economic development. If, however, one seeks to compare *nationalities* residing within particular regions, the shortage of data is more severe. The lack of data on occupational structures, incomes, or consumption for specific nationalities forces the researcher to rely primarily on social and cultural rather than economic indicators. Fortunately, Soviet census reports, regional statistical handbooks, and a few scattered monographic and periodical sources do provide some systematic data on a number of indicators of sociocultural development for regional and ethnic populations. Although these data do not cover a broad array of social and cultural dimensions, they do provide enough *systematic* evidence to permit cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons of the degree of equalization experienced by Soviet ethnic groups.

Because it is presently impossible to examine a wide variety of indicators of sociocultural modernization that meet the dual criterion of urban-rural and nationality specificity, this paper employs a limited set of indicators that other scholars have found to be useful for measuring social modernization. Although no rigorous effort will be made to test how cohesive the various indicators are, they are intended to reflect two dimensions of sociocultural development: educational or occupational skill levels; and family role structures.

Education and Occupational Skills. Given the extensive scholarly literature on the subject, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that formal education is a key medium for spreading the communicative and technological skills essential to modern economies and societies.[16] The present analysis employs two types of indicators of educational achievement: (a) indicators showing whether groups have achieved the minimum level of education necessary for skilled labor roles; and (b) indicators of the attainment of higher education and specialized training.

Published statistics provide information on the proportion of persons in each nationality group that has achieved at least an "incomplete secondary" education—seven or eight years of formal schooling. This is an important stage in a student's career, for at this point he encounters four basic educational options (or fewer if his previous school performance does not qualify him for certain choices): (1) to continue his general education in a secondary school (through 10 years) and then, if he qualifies, to enroll in a higher educational institution; (2) to enroll in a *tekhnikum* for three or four years of specialized training in a technical skill at a semi-professional level; (3) to enroll in a vocational school to acquire a skilled manual-labor or low-level technical skill; or (4) to enter the labor force, usually in a low-skilled occupation.[17] The completion of "incomplete secondary" education thus signals the achievement of the minimal level of formal education essential for access to most skilled occupations. Consequently, equalization in the proportions of different nationality groups that had attained incomplete secondary education would indicate that all nationalities possessed an equal quotient of individuals available for skilled occupations.

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[16] For a useful brief analysis of the relevant literature, see Olive Banks, *The Sociology of Education* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1971), chap. 10. For discussion of the development and structure of the Soviet educational system, see Jaan Pennar, Ivan I. Bakalo, and George Z. F. Bereday, *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: with Special Reference to Nationality Groups* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

[17] The variety of options is actually greater than revealed here, because a person who enters full-time employment may still enroll in evening or correspondence courses, and a person who eventually graduates from a specialized secondary educational institution (or *tekhnikum*) may later enroll in a regular secondary school. Furthermore, a graduate of a regular secondary school may also enroll in a *tekhnikum*. For a useful brief outline of the structure of the Soviet school system, see Ann S. Goodman and Murray Feshbach, *Estimates and Projections of Educational Attainment in the USSR: 1950–1985*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 16 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967).

But the common acquisition of this minimal level of education would not imply equalization in more advanced training. How far each nationality has progressed beyond this minimal level may be gauged by figures on the number of individuals of each nationality who: (a) are enrolled in specialized secondary or higher educational institutions, (b) have graduated from secondary (both general and specialized) and higher educational institutions, or (c) are currently employed as "specialists" or "scientific workers." To avoid redundancy, I shall rely on indicators of higher educational achievement and current occupation.

The data on specialized manpower have a particular drawback not shared by the figures on educational attainment: they have an urban bias. This problem arises because the figures on specialists do not distinguish the types of occupations but simply lump together all "specialists" by level of education. Since the overwhelming majority of graduates of higher and specialized secondary educational institutions enter nonagricultural jobs, the available gross figures on specialists may exaggerate the inter-nationality and inter-republican disparities not simply because there is wide inter-regional disparity in the skill levels of urban and rural workers taken separately but also because of inter-regional differences in levels of urbanization.[18] Consequently, one must treat the data on specialized manpower with some caution in order to avoid simply introducing an unintended proxy variable for urbanization into the analysis. This is not to deny the significance of gaps in the professionalization of labor forces taken as a whole, but to say that the relatively gross occupational indicators currently available are not sensitive to the variety of social processes actually occurring within urban and rural areas taken separately. On the other hand, the new data on *education* in the 1970 census are divided into urban and rural components.

Family Role Structure. A second set of indicators of social modernization that meet the criteria of urban-rural and nationality specificity pertains to the status of women in the household and the economy. Scholars have frequently linked changing family structures, particularly the breakup of extended family networks or their adaptation to urban and industrial settings, with modernization. Although we lack systematic data on the decline of extended families among Soviet nationalities, we do have a few other indicators of family role structure. Taking the nuclear family as a frame of reference, I shall assume that the liberation of women from strictly domestic roles denotes the modernization of family structures.[19] Although certainly not indicating the total elimination of sex discrimination in employment or other spheres of social activity, the extent to which women have been freed from the primary burden of child-rearing and have attained access to formal education and to occupations outside the household will be taken as an indicator of the modernization of the family structure.[20]

Specifically, four indicators of female status will be used: (1) the relative educational levels of females and males; (2) the incidence of early marriage; (3) birthrates; and (4) female employment outside the household.

To measure the relative educational levels of females and males one may use a method similar to that adopted by D. Peter Mazur.[21] One may calculate for each nationality a "female-male educational ratio" by dividing the percentage of women who have attained incomplete secondary education by the percentage of men who have attained that level. A ratio of unity represents parity in the achievement of this educational level by females and males.

Second, many scholars have noted the relationship between urbanization and the tendency to delay marriage. The correlation between societal development and age at first marriage is especially strong for women.[22] The Soviet Union conforms to the general pattern: taking the entire population of the USSR together, the average age of new brides rose from 23 in 1910 to 27 in 1960, while the percentage of women who married before age 20 declined from 54.5 to 26.3 during the same period.[23] But there were and still are dramatic differences in the age at marriage of various Soviet ethnic groups; despite a nearly universal trend in the Soviet era toward increasing age at marriage for all nationalities, groups that traditionally adhered to Islam still have a substantially greater propensity toward early female marriage than do groups adhering to the Orthodox or some other Christian faith. Measurement of the degree of convergence among Soviet nationalities in the incidence of early marriage may therefore highlight the weakening of previous religious sanctions on marriage practices as well as the increasing tendency toward women's emancipation.

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[18] This argument is based on the assumption that urban work forces absorb greater proportions of highly skilled manpower than rural work forces. Consequently, if Republic A has a larger proportion of specialists than Republic B, this may be because A is more urbanized than B even though within the urban and rural sectors *taken separately* Republic A and Republic B may have identical proportions of skilled manpower.

[19] For discussion of the link between the breakup of the extended family and the growth of equality between the sexes, see William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 20–22. For an interesting empirical analysis of the relationship between level of education and intra-family equality in the USSR, see A. L. Pimenova, "Novyi byt i stanovlenie vnutrisemeinogo ravenstva," in *Sotsial'nye issledovaniia*, vyp. 7: *Metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia byta* (Moskva: "Nauka," 1971), pp. 34–45.

[20] For further discussion of the relationship between modernization and changing family role structure, see Allan Schnaiberg, "Measuring Modernism: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76 (November, 1970), 399–425; and Allan Schnaiberg, "The Modernizing Impact of Urbanization: A Causal Analysis," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 20 (October, 1971), 80–104.

[21] D. Peter Mazur, "Fertility Among Ethnic Groups in the USSR," *Demography*, 4, No. 1 (1967), 172–195.

[22] For a review of relevant literature and an analysis of some trends contrary to this generalization in recent years (within industrialized countries),

A third indicator of female status for which data may be brought to bear is birthrates.[24] The lack or crudeness of data unfortunately limits the usefulness of this indicator, since actual birthrates are available for administrative regions but not for specific nationalities. As a rough approximation of differences in birthrates across nationalities, however, one may calculate child-woman ratios from the 1926 and 1959 census reports. Since the 1959 census report provides nationality-specific age distributions only for relatively gross categories (especially for the younger age groups), I shall calculate the child-woman ratio as the number of children aged 0–9 per 1000 women aged 20–49.[25]

A fourth, and final, indicator of female status is female employment outside the household. It has long been a goal of the Soviet regime to free women for productive labor by releasing them from the exclusive role of managing the household and raising children. The three indicators of female status discussed heretofore may thus be viewed as bearing on this fourth indicator, either because the three are independent causal variables affecting female employment or because all four measures, including female employment, are indicators or products of a single underlying factor: attitudes toward women. The meagerness of available data unfortunately forbids a detailed analysis of female employment. The single source supplying information on women's employment by nationality for 1959 does not reveal the types of employment. Because of this limitation, as well as the lack of data to make longitudinal comparisons, I shall treat female employment primarily as a check on the validity of interpretations of the trends in the other indicators of female status.

By means of this basic set of indicators, the levels of sociocultural development of the fifteen nationalities having union republic status will be compared. While these fifteen groups are but a fraction of the 93 official "indigenous" nationalities of the USSR (or of the 126 nationalities enumerated in the 1959 and 1970 census reports, including 33 groups identified as foreign), taken together they account for 90 per cent of the population of the USSR as of 1970. Moreover, they are accorded the highest political status in the Soviet federation; consequently, they are not only the politically most significant groups but available social and economic statistics are far more extensive and complete for these fifteen groups than for the remaining nationalities.[26]

Analysis

The Equalization of Ethnic Groups

Education and Occupational Skills. The analysis of the relative sociocultural development of ethnic groups begins with an examination of how closely the fifteen union republic nationalities have approached parity in attaining incomplete secondary education. Tables 1a and 1b present the raw data and summary statistics covering four census dates. In Table 1a the scores for 1926 represent the number of *literate* persons per 1000 members of the given nationality; the scores for 1939 and 1959 represent the number of persons per 1000 popula-

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see Ruth B. Dixon, "Explaining Cross-Cultural Variations in Age at Marriage and Proportions Never Marrying," *Population Studies,* 25 (July, 1971), 215–233; and Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns,* pp. 40–48.

[23] V. I. Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov: metodologiia issledovaniia i osnovnye faktory* (Moskva: "Nauka," 1969), p. 120. For longitudinal figures on age at first marriage and the relationship between marriage age and birthrates, see R. I. Sifman and L. E. Darskii, "Pokazateli brachnosti i plodovitosti zhenshchin," *Vestnik statistiki,* 1967, No. 8, pp. 87–95, translated as "Indices of Rate of Marriage and Fertility in Women," in *Soviet Sociology,* 8 (Summer, 1969), 94–109.

[24] For discussion of the links between economic development, family structure, and fertility, see especially Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, "Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 4 (April, 1956), 211–235.

[25] This is the procedure adopted by Mazur, "Fertility Among Ethnic Groups," and Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov.*

[26] For brief descriptions of the cultural and political backgrounds of Soviet nationalities, see the dated but still indispensable source: Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 50–65. For more recent classifications and descriptions of the political and social characteristics of the nationalities, see especially Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," and Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in *Prospects for Soviet Society,* ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968), 143–198.

Table 1a. Educational Levels of Soviet Nationalities in 1926, 1939, and 1959[a]

	1926[b]			1939[b]			1959[b]		
	Urb	Rur	Both	Urb	Rur	Both	Urb	Rur	Both
Russians	688	391	445	165	36	82	364	188	284
Ukrainians	599	392	415	164	48	81	395	211	278
Belorussians	610	344	365	191	31	58	383	163	219
Moldavians	(354)[d]	(254)[d]	(257)[d]	—[c]	—	—	282	137	151
Estonians	—	—	—	—	—	—	435	194	307
Latvians	—	—	—	—	—	—	482	269	369
Lithuanians	—	—	—	—	—	—	315	97	170
Georgians	687	336	392	351	69	137	548	282	375
Armenians	508	211	270	207	41	92	392	241	320
Azerbaidzhanis	238	55	86	146	25	52	314	209	247
Kazakhs	240	66	70	67	13	22	264	171	194
Kirgiz	270	45	47	115	6	10	376	185	206
Tadzhiks	72	8	11	74	3	11	244	191	201
Turkmenians	211	18	20	66	7	14	315	233	242
Uzbeks	310	18	37	69	7	16	278	198	214
Mean for 11 Groups[e]	401.2	171.3	196.2	146.8	26.0	52.3	352.1	206.5	252.7
Coefficient of Variation (V) for 11 Groups	.507	.914	.873	.556	.778	.767	.229	.159	.214
Mean for 15 Groups							359.1	197.9	251.8
Coefficient of Variation (V) for 15 Groups							.228	.232	.263

[a] Sources: Data for 1926 are from the Soviet census: Ts. S.U., *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda* (56 vols.; Moskva: Ts. S.U., 1928–1933). Data for 1939 and 1959 are from the 1959 census report: Ts. S.U., *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda* (16 vols.; Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1962–3). Volume and page numbers are omitted from citations of census figures to avoid unnecessary cumbersomeness.

[b] The figures for 1926 represent the number of persons per 1000 population who were *literate*, because no educational figures were offered in the census. The 1939 and 1959 figures represent the number of persons per 1000 population who have "incomplete secondary" or higher educational attainment. All figures pertain to the portion of the nationality group residing within its official national area (not to the USSR-wide population).

[c] Dashes indicate data not available.

[d] The figures for the Moldavians were not included in calculation of means and coefficients for 1926, because at that time only a small portion of the present Moldavian territory was included in the Soviet Union. Although the Belorussians and Ukrainians also experienced substantial accretions of territory and population within the USSR as a result of annexations during and after World War II, we have included these two groups in the calculations for all periods because the newly acquired populations for these groups were not as significant an addition as were the Moldavian acquisitions (relative to the numbers of persons of the given nationality already residing in the USSR).

[e] Calculations for "eleven groups" exclude the Moldavians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. A similar procedure is followed in subsequent tables.

tion (of the given nationality) who have attained incomplete secondary *education*. In Table 1b the scores record the number of persons per 1000 population (of the given nationality) aged 10 and over who have attained incomplete secondary education as of 1959 and 1970. The goal of adducing some measures for longitudinal comparison of low-level educational achievement necessitates the use of slightly different indicators for different periods. Inasmuch, however, as chief emphasis here is placed on the *variation* among nationalities rather than overall changes in levels of educational attainment, the differences in types of measures are not crucial. In fact, the particular summary statistic chosen to compare the dispersion in scores among nationalities is specifically designed to compensate for differences in the mean scores. Following Williamson and Koropeckyj, I shall place primary reliance on the coefficient of relative variation (V), which measures the degree of dispersion in the scores relative to the mean score.[27]

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[27] For further discussion of this statistic, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 88. The computational formula is:

$$V = \frac{\sigma}{\bar{X}} = \frac{\sqrt{\dfrac{\Sigma(\bar{X} - X_i)^2}{N}}}{\bar{X}}$$

Table 1b. Educational Levels of Soviet Nationalities in 1959 and 1970[a]

	1959			1970		
	Urban	Rural	Both	Urban	Rural	Both
Russians	454[b]	247	364	580	320	494
Ukrainians	476	264	343	605	332	458
Belorussians	478	212	282	616	270	401
Moldavians	360	190	208	548	289	337
Estonians	500	230	358	581	314	462
Latvians	549	314	426	600	370	490
Lithuanians	382	120	209	523	212	356
Georgians	666	365	474	734	458	578
Armenians	533	354	451	599	375	519
Azerbaidzhanis	449	316	365	536	359	437
Kazakhs	380	251	282	522	355	403
Kirgiz	536	280	309	613	366	407
Tadzhiks	359	284	298	465	358	387
Turkmenians	413	346	363	488	407	433
Uzbeks	403	298	318	511	389	420
Mean for 11 Groups[c]	467.9	292.5	349.9	569.9	362.6	448.8
V for 11 Groups	.176	.281	.174	.127	.127	.126
Mean for 15 Groups	462.5	271.4	336.7	568.1	344.9	438.8
V for 15 Groups	.178	.236	.222	.113	.166	.140

[a] Source: 1970 Soviet census: Ts. S.U., *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1973).

[b] The main cell entries represent the number of persons per 1000 population aged 10 and over who have "incomplete secondary education." The figures pertain to the portion of the nationality group residing within its official national area.

[c] Calculations for "11 groups" exclude the Moldavians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.

An examination of the scores for 1926 (Table 1a) suggests several important initial conclusions. First, there is a stark contrast of scores between the highest and lowest groups, ranging from the Russians, with 44.5 per cent of the population literate, to the Tadzhiks, with a mere 1.1 per cent. Second, the gap between the Christian groups taken as a whole and the Muslim groups is enormous. The data in this and subsequent tables are arranged so that the Muslim groups are the bottom six (beginning with the Azerbaidzhanis) and the Christians, the top nine. One can readily see that in 1926 all of the Muslim groups were located well below the mean literacy score for the eleven nationalities, while all of the Christian groups were well above the mean; that is, there is a clear bimodal distribution, with the mean score for the Muslim groups being 4.5 per cent literate, and the mean for the Christians, 37.7 per cent. If the education of nationalities were to be equalized, these six Muslim groups had the greatest burden of catching up. The 1926 scores also suggest a third tentative conclusion: not only are urbanites substantially more literate than ruralites, but the degree of dispersion among nationalities is substantially lower among urban residents than among rural residents. Although the differences in the absolute magnitudes of the scores for the highest and lowest groups are greater for urban than for rural populations, the average degree of

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where

V = coefficient of variation,
σ = standard deviation,
$\overline{X}$ = mean score of all groups,
X_i = score of the *i*'th group, and
N = number of cases.

Williamson and Koropeckyj rely upon a formula that *weights* the individual cases by population size. This is justified in that the data-reporting units (usually administrative units) are often somewhat arbitrary divisions that do not correspond to theoretically or empirically meaningful regional divisions of the country. In the present study, however, we have relied on unweighted scores because the boundaries of nationality areas and of the actual ethnic populations under study do demarcate meaningful analytic units. It is precisely the gaps among nationalities, and among nationality regions (republics) taken as units, with which we are concerned. Moreover, using weighted scores tends to obscure more "general" trends because of the inordinate population sizes of the two largest regions: the RSFSR, with 130 million inhabitants (in 1970), and the Ukrainian SSR, with 47 million, represent approximately 73 per cent of the population of the fifteen republics in our sample. Finally, and most importantly, from the standpoint of official doctrine, there is no theoretical reason to treat the scores of some nationalities as more important than any others, especially since our study is restricted to the fifteen nationalities accorded the highest official political status.

Table 2. Variation in Educational Attainment of Nationalities by Urban-Rural and Age Groups: 1959[a]

	Age Group									
	16–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49	50–54	55–59	60+
Coefficient of Variation[b]										
Total (1)	.103	.143	.282	.284	.358	.487	.585	.694	.813	.904
Urban (2)	.075	.102	.224	.220	.296	.395	.475	.571	.682	.741
Rural (3)	.140	.175	.340	.327	.362	.466	.578	.716	.908	1.107[c]
Mean Per Capita Educated[b]										
Total (4)	704.5	637.3	475.5	488.9	417.3	279.4	187.0	130.3	88.5	44.0
Urban (5)	795.9	737.1	566.5	587.3	536.1	408.1	304.6	235.1	176.6	92.9
Rural (6)	652.7	568.7	406.9	417.3	338.0	191.9	111.5	65.3	40.1	19.5
Urban minus Rural (7)	143.2	168.4	159.6	170.0	198.1	216.2	193.1	169.8	135.6	73.4
Rural/Urban (8)	.820	.772	.718	.711	.630	.470	.366	.278	.227	.210
Year Born:	1940–1943	1935–1939	1930–1934	1925–1929	1920–1924	1915–1919	1910–1919	1905–1909	1900–1904	before 1900

[a] Source: Calculated from figures in the 1959 Soviet census, Ts. S.U., *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR* (Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1962), pp. 238–239.

[b] The mean scores are the number of persons who have attained at least "incomplete secondary" education per 1000 persons of the given nationality. The means and coefficients of variation are unweighted, and are based on the populations of the 15 nationalities of union republic status in 1959. The figures pertain to the portion of each nationality residing in the "area of primary settlement" as defined in the census for each nationality.

[c] The coefficient of variation can take on values exceeding unity if the distribution is extremely skewed. In this instance, the scores of 92 for the Latvians and 43 for the Estonians enormously increase the sum of the squared deviations beyond the squared deviations attributable to the other cases, while increasing the mean by a relatively smaller amount.

variation is lower among urban ($V=.507$) than among rural ($V=.914$) groups. This evidence tends to confirm that modernization (here: urbanization) correlates with a reduction of inequality among nationalities.

The data for subsequent periods corroborate the above conclusions. Given the change of measures, one cannot compare the absolute magnitudes of the 1926 scores with those of later years, but the degree of variation among nationalities shows a substantial reduction over time in all three population categories: urban, rural, and total populations. Only the slight increase between 1926 and 1939 of variation among urbanites appears anomalous, a result which might be explained by the change of indicators. Overall, substantial progress has taken place not only toward reducing inter-nationality variation but also toward raising the levels of education among those groups that had most severely lagged in the pre-Soviet era. If the six Muslim nationalities continue on the average to be less educated than non-Muslim groups as of 1970, it is the traditionally Orthodox Moldavians and (predominantly) Roman Catholic Lithuanians that are the least educated groups.

One can gain a more revealing picture of the longitudinal trends if one turns to comparisons of age cohorts. The evidence in Table 2, which shows the attainment of incomplete secondary education for ten age cohorts in 1959, reveals a strong trend toward increasing education and decreasing inter-nationality variation over time. With the single exception of the 25–29 year-olds (born between 1930 and 1934), who suffered an enduring loss of educational opportunities because of the destruction and disruption of World War II, each successive age cohort displays a reduction in the inter-nationality variation within the urban and rural segments as well as the whole populations. One may also observe that the rural inhabitants still lag behind the urbanites in average educational attainment and reduction of variation: scores comparable to the mean and variation for the youngest rural age cohort had already been reached by urbanites attending school five to ten years earlier (the rural mean of 652.7 and V of .140 for the 16–19 year-olds interpolate the scores for the urban cohorts aged 20–24 and 25–29).

In summary, although the rural inhabitants continue to lag behind the urbanites, both populations have undergone enough homogenization (across nationalities) to permit one to predict nearly total equalization in the attainment of incomplete secondary education in the next few decades. The scores for the youngest age cohort (aged 16–19) in the 1970 census simply continue the trends among the younger cohorts depicted in Table 2: the inter-nationality variation and urban-rural differences are much smaller for the 16–19 year-olds in 1970 than for the 16–19 year-olds in 1959 (this conclusion is based on figures not shown here). Taking the attainment of universal "incomplete secondary education" as an accomplished fact, Soviet educational planners have in fact already set the goal of universal secondary education.

Before turning to other types of educational data, one additional facet of Table 2 must be noted. If one compares the absolute differences in the percentages of urbanites and ruralites who have finished incomplete secondary school, beginning with those aged 60+ in 1959, one finds that the absolute gap between the average urban and rural levels of education tends to increase substantially with each successive age cohort until, reaching a peak among the 40–44 year-olds, it begins to close. In other words, the relationship between increasing education (over time) and the magnitude of the urban-rural gap in education is curvilinear and takes the shape of an inverted "U." The inter-nationality gap displays a similar inverted "U" curvilinearity: if one measures the interquartile range of the educational scores among the fifteen nationalities, beginning again with the 60+ category, the range increases with each successive cohort until, reaching a peak with the 40–44 year-olds for the urbanites and the 25–29 year-olds for the ruralites, it declines.[28] This type of curvilinear relationship between development (here: education) and inequality (here: the urban-rural and inter-nationality differences) conforms with that suggested by Williamson. Only the *absolute* differences, however, reveal such a pattern. The *relative* differences in scores, measured by the rural/urban education ratio and the coefficient of variation (for the inter-nationality differences), decline continuously with each new cohort. Thus, initial stages of development are characterized by a growth in absolute inequality between urban and rural areas and among nationalities even while relative inequality decreases. With either measure, however, the trend among the youngest age cohorts is toward greater equality.

If the above evidence reveals considerable progress toward equality in educational attainment at the minimal level associated with incomplete secondary education, the available data on higher levels of education reveal more substantial differences among nationalities. Tables 3 and 4 show both the degree of change and the continuing differences among nationalities. Table 3 presents figures on the number of specialists per capita employed in 1960 and 1970.[29] Contrasting the coefficients of variation in Tables 1a and 1b with those in Table 3, one can readily observe that the variation in numbers of specialists per na-

Table 3. Numbers of Specialists Among Soviet Nationalities in 1960 and 1970[a]

(per 10,000 population)

	Specialists with Higher Education		Specialists with Secondary Education	
	1960	1970	1960	1970
Russians	181	313	301	498
Ukrainians	139	253	220	396
Belorussians	120	225	205	373
Moldavians	51	121	92	168
Estonians	195	355	293	492
Latvians	178	302	272	438
Lithuanians	129	251	190	388
Georgians	329	460	247	340
Armenians	266	360	201	287
Azerbaidzhanis	163	224	168	245
Kazakhs	96	183	114	198
Kirgiz	97	165	100	153
Tadzhiks	78	139	92	125
Turkmenians	104	170	100	143
Uzbeks	77	152	82	143
Mean	146.9	244.9	178.5	292.5
Coefficient of Variation	.494	.382	.423	.442

[a] Sources: Figures on specialists in 1960 are drawn from Ts. S.U., *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1961). Figures on specialists in 1970 are from Ts. S.U., *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1971). The population bases for the 1960 figures are the 1959 Soviet census totals, while the base for the 1970 figures is the 1970 census report.

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[28] This summary is based on calculations not shown here. In this fifteen-case sample, the interquartile range is calculated as the absolute difference between the scores of the 4th highest and 12th highest cases for each age cohort.

[29] The category "specialists" includes all employed persons who have diplomas from higher educational institutions or specialized secondary educational institutions regardless of their field of study or the type of work currently engaged in. For highly useful discussions of Soviet manpower statistics, see Murray Feshbach, *The Soviet Statistical System: Labor Force Recordkeeping and Reporting Since 1957*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962); and Ann S. Goodman, *Estimates and Projections of Specialized Manpower in the USSR: 1950–1975*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

Table 4. Numbers of Scientific Workers Among Soviet Nationalities in 1939, 1960, and 1970[a]

(per 100,000 population)

	1939	1960	1970
Russians	59	201	474
Ukrainians	34	95	246
Belorussians	32	80	210
Moldavians	—[b]	27	92
Estonians	—	207	466
Latvians	—	190	381
Lithuanians	—	127	306
Georgians	93	309	568
Armenians	98	287	567
Azerbaidzhanis	40	169	297
Kazakhs	10	63	149
Kirgiz	5	60	131
Tadzhiks	8	62	110
Turkmenians	12	71	120
Uzbeks	10	62	132
Mean for 11 Groups[c]	36.5	132.6	273.1
Coefficient of Variation for 11 Groups	.880	.678	.629
Mean for 15 Groups		134.0	283.3
Coefficient of Variation for 15 Groups		.636	.581

[a] Sources: The 1939 and 1960 figures on scientific workers are from Ts. S.U., *Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1961). Figures for 1970 are from Ts. S.U., *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1971). The population bases for the 1939 figures are from Gosplan SSSR, *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moskva i Leningrad: Gosplanizdat, 1940). The bases for 1960 and 1970 figures are derived as in Table 3.

[b] Dashes indicate data not available.

[c] The "eleven groups" exclude the Moldavians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.

tionality greatly exceeds the variation in incomplete secondary education in comparable years.

Comparison of the coefficients for specialists at the two time points for which data are available discloses a mixed pattern: between 1960 and 1970 the inter-nationality variation in numbers of specialists with higher education decreased from .494 to .382, a substantial drop, while the variation for specialists with secondary education increased slightly from .423 to .442.

Once one uses more stringent standards for comparing inter-nationality variation, then, the inequality in social development becomes more apparent. The figures in Table 4 regarding "scientific workers" also support this conclusion.[30] Although one may observe a moderate degree of movement toward equalization in the numbers of scientific workers per capita, the coefficient of variation for scientific workers in 1970 was .581, much higher than the coefficients for specialists and for incomplete secondary education in the same year. Tables 3 and 4 thus reveal large persistent inter-nationality gaps and only moderate progress toward the elimination of those gaps in recent years. A quite similar pattern may be discerned in figures on higher educational attainments in the 1970 census, which show that although the coefficient of variation declined from .708 to .458 between 1959 and 1970, substantial variation remains (the coefficients are based on raw data not presented here). From this evidence one may infer that it will be a long time, if ever, before the considerable equalization achieved at lower levels of education is matched at more advanced levels of training.

The groups lagging furthest behind are once again those that had furthest to go at the beginning of the Soviet era: the Muslim nationalities. But the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, and Moldavians also trail behind a number of other groups. One might explain this lag in part by the absence of Soviet control over all or substantial portions of the populations of these nationalities during the interwar period. The annexations of new territories exposed the new populations to the greatly increased educational opportunities that had been created for the other Soviet nationalities in the 1920s and 1930s. In effect, then, the newly annexed populations had an approximately 20-year deficit in educational opportunities to make up—except, in such regions as Estonia and Latvia, where extensive school networks existed under the independent governments. The severe war devastation in both the newly acquired and pre-existing Soviet territory may also have contributed to the delayed development of these groups. Age-specific figures on the "incomplete secondary education" of Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Russians (and to a very mild degree, also Armenians) indicate that both the 25–29 and the 30–34 year-olds obtained less education on the average than their older or younger co-nationals. For all other nationalities, however, only the 25–29 year-olds showed such a decline. The significant lag of these three nationalities in gaining specialized secondary and higher education may therefore partially derive from

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[30] The category "scientific workers" partially overlaps with that of "specialists" and includes every employed person to whom the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education has granted a degree and/or an academic title, *plus* persons lacking such a degree or title if they are employed in certain occupations or organizations (such as scientific research institutions or higher educational institutions). For further discussion, see Feshbach, pp. 29–31.

Table 5. Class Structure of Soviet Nationalities: 1939 and 1959[a]

(in percentages)

	White Collar "Employees"		Workers		Collective Farmers		Totals[c]	
	1939	1959	1939	1959	1939	1959	1939	1959
Russians	18.7	22	38.2	54/23[b]	38.5	24	95.4	100.0
Ukrainians	13.1	13	29.3	34/15	54.6	53	97.0	100.0
Belorussians	10.8	12	20.7	31/11	60.4	57	91.9	100.0
Moldavians	—[d]	4	—	13/4	—	83	—	100.0
Estonians	—	22	—	51/19	—	27	—	100.0
Latvians	—	18	—	46/19	—	36	—	100.0
Lithuanians	—	14	—	34/12	—	52	—	100.0
Georgians	17.0	23	12.4	23/10	58.2	54	87.6	100.0
Armenians	19.7	20	21.5	40/17	52.5	40	93.7	100.0
Azerbaidzhanis	9.5	15	12.2	24/8	70.1	61	91.8	100.0
Kazakhs	8.0	16	25.6	44/6	60.8	40	94.4	100.0
Kirgiz	4.6	8	7.5	22/4	83.8	70	95.9	100.0
Tadzhiks	5.7	8	8.7	18/4	79.2	74	93.6	100.0
Turkmenians	6.1	9	11.7	22/5	77.2	69	95.0	100.0
Uzbeks	5.4	8	11.1	27/4	79.6	65	96.1	100.0
Mean for 11 Groups	10.8	14.1						
V for 11 Groups	.492	.385						
Mean for 15 Groups		14.0						
V for 15 Groups		.414						

[a] Source: Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1972, No. 4, pp. 6 and 13.

[b] Figures on "workers" in 1939 include "state farmers." The first figure for 1959 also includes state farmers in the worker category; while the second figure includes only industrial workers.

[c] Totals in 1939 do not add to 100 because some persons fall into an "other" category, which includes primarily private farmers. The "others" are included with the figures on collective farmers in 1959. This classification and treatment of the "others" is unavoidable because our source treats the data in this way.

[d] Dashes indicate data not available.

their loss of school facilities during the war, and their inordinately high involvement in the war. Certainly, before concluding that there had been a deliberate policy of "holding back" specialized education from Ukrainians and Belorussians, one must consider these alternative explanations.[31]

Table 5 presents another type of evidence on the relative numbers of skilled workers among nationalities. Calculating the percentage of the work force holding jobs as white collar "employees" (*sluzhashchie*), one finds the variation among nationalities to have declined from .492 in 1939 to .385 in 1959.[32] But once again substantial disparity characterizes the rates of access to more highly skilled economic roles. It is important to add that such disparity is not confined to the predominantly urban-oriented jobs so-far discussed (scientific workers, specialists, and white-collar workers). Although we lack comparable data for earlier years, Table 6 shows that as of 1959 there was a good deal of variation in technical skills among the agrarian work forces of different nationality groups. Available data on the attainment of higher education do reveal, however, that

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[31] Bilinsky overlooks these factors when examining the apparent limitations on the training and use of specialized Ukrainian manpower, while Aspaturian says that Stalin deliberately restricted Ukrainian access to higher education (a policy that Aspaturian says was reversed by Stalin's successors). Although there may be some evidence to support Bilinsky's and Aspaturian's views, certainly one cannot automatically attribute all deviations from strict proportionality in access to education to deliberate intentions of the Soviet leadership without first considering other factors that might account (or partially account) for such deviations. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness Among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union," in Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, pp. 147–184; and Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," pp. 178–179.

[32] The term "employee" (*sluzhashchie*) as used in the present analysis roughly denotes persons employed in nonmanual occupations. Sometimes the term is used in a more restrictive sense to refer to low- and middle-level administrative, supervisorial, or office personnel, as distinguished from the "intelligentsia" of specialists with higher education or of persons in high administrative positions.

Table 6. Skilled Agricultural Workers as Percentage of Total Agricultural Work Force in 1959[a]

(for residents in official national area only)

	(1) Supervisors and Specialists	(2) Equipment Operators	(3) All skilled Workers (1+2)
Russians	3.6	10.6	14.2
Ukrainians	2.7	7.0	9.7
Belorussians	2.3	4.3	6.6
Moldavians	1.1	4.2	5.3
Estonians	5.3	6.4	11.7
Latvians	4.7	6.2	10.9
Lithuanians	3.2	4.7	7.9
Georgians	3.9	1.5	5.4
Armenians	3.8	3.3	7.1
Azerbaidzhanis	3.5	3.3	6.8
Kazakhs	6.5	7.9	14.4
Kirgiz	2.4	3.2	5.6
Tadzhiks	1.9	2.2	4.1
Turkmenians	1.9	2.9	4.8
Uzbeks	2.2	4.3	6.5
Mean	3.27	4.80	8.07
Coefficient of Variation	.426	.487	.400

[a] Source: Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR* (Moskva: "Mysl'," 1971), p. 85. Also available in Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1972, No. 4, p. 14.

within both the urban and rural populations inter-nationality variation declined considerably between 1959 and 1970: between 1959 and 1970 the variation dropped from .636 to .426 among urbanites, and from .581 to .306 among ruralites (these figures are based on data not shown here).

To summarize the analysis thus far, although by almost every measure there has been substantial movement towards equalization of nationalities during the Soviet era, this movement is strongest for the least demanding indicator (incomplete secondary education), and especially for the youngest age cohorts. Once one compares the equalization of higher educational attainment and skilled manpower, whether for the entire nationalities or for their urban and rural populations separately, one observes significant remaining dispersion among nationalities.

Family Role Structure. We shall now examine change in family role structures among nationalities. One measure of the relative status of women and men is the female-male education ratio discussed above: the proportion of females having incomplete secondary education divided by the proportion of males who have achieved such education. The results of these calculations are presented in Tables 7a and 7b. For want of education figures in 1926, one must again rely on literacy rates, thereby reducing the strict equivalency of measures over time. Nonetheless, the overall trend reveals a remarkable decline in the magnitude of the female-male differences. The average female-male literacy ratio in 1926 was .284, indicating that only 284 women were literate for every 1000 literate men.[33] For some nationalities, particularly the Muslim groups, these ratios were minuscule. Only 5 Tadzhik women were literate for every 1000 literate Tadzhik men; while the highest ratio among Muslim nationalities amounted to a mere 170 literate women per 1000 literate men. By 1970, however, although the ratios for Muslim groups still trailed behind those of all Christian nationalities, the size of the gap between the Muslim and Christian groups had significantly decreased. Consequently, the coefficient of variation among the total populations of the nationalities had fallen from the very high figure of .853 in 1926 to a low .102 in 1970. In short, even if as of 1970 only 830 women had attained incomplete secondary education for every 1000 men with that degree of education, the absolute gap between women's and men's education and the absolute and relative differences among nationalities had progressively decreased from earlier levels.

Age at marriage is a second indicator of female emancipation. In the immediate pre-Soviet era it was especially Muslim groups that encouraged females to marry early.[34] But the Armenians, who adhered predominantly to the Gregorian (Orthodox) Church, also favored early female marriage.[35] One would therefore expect the loss of religious sanctions over marriage practices and the breakdown of numerous customary practices resulting from the increasing education and urbanization of Soviet nationalities to reduce the prevalence of early marriages. The evidence in Table 8, which

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[33] When speaking of the relative "numbers" of women and men who have attained literacy, I shall for convenience assume that the proportions of men and women in the population are identical. But note that because the ratio is calculated as a ratio between the *proportions* of women and men who have attained literacy (education), the ratio is not actually distorted by the unequal numbers of men and women in the population.

[34] For detailed empirical analyses of female status and birthrate differentials among (former) Muslim groups, see G. A. Bondarskaia, "Rol' etnicheskogo faktora v formirovanii territoriial'nykh razlichii rozhdaemosti," in *Voprosy demografii (Issledovaniia, problemy, metody)*, ed. A. G. Volkov et al. (Moskva: "Statistika," 1970), pp. 160–175; and the various articles in M. K. Karakhanov, ed., *Problemy narodonaseleniia* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1970).

[35] Mary K. Matossian, *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), p. 5.

Table 7a. Female-Male Education Ratios: 1926, 1939, 1959[a]

	1926			1939			1959		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Russians	.814	.507	.583	.908	.609	.804	1.031	.914	.996
Ukrainians	.712	.462	.496	.774	.590	.684	.909	.759	.825
Belorussians	.723	.407	.441	.833	.537	.686	1.008	.799	.889
Moldavians	(.252)	(.311)	(.249)	—	—	—	.783	.706	.719
Estonians	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.009	1.010	1.016
Latvians	—	—	—	—	—	—	.957	.949	.960
Lithuanians	—	—	—	—	—	—	.987	1.000	1.000
Georgians	.885	.677	.727	.880	.663	.791	.991	.995	.969
Armenians	.713	.272	.400	.707	.367	.578	.972	.851	.922
Azerbaidzhanis	.282	.093	.170	.394	.167	.287	.667	.590	.616
Kazakhs	.233	.067	.081	.245	.167	.189	.650	.563	.589
Kirgiz	.181	.024	.034	.424	.100	.188	.681	.596	.600
Tadzhiks	.055	.006	.005	.294	.167	.222	.628	.517	.672
Turkmenians	.127	.030	.026	.182	.077	.125	.610	.786	.730
Uzbeks	.199	.097	.161	.343	.182	.250	.682	.662	.664
Mean for 11 Groups	.4476	.2402	.2840	.5440	.3296	.4367	.8026	.7265	.7702
V for 11 Groups	.6753	.9376	.8526	.4859	.6590	.5888	.2086	.1960	.1913
Mean for 15 Groups							.8377	.7771	.8111
V for 15 Groups							.1927	.2074	.1924

[a] Source: 1926 data are from the 1926 Soviet census (cited earlier), and represent the proportion of females *literate* divided by the proportion of males literate. The 1939 and 1959 data are from the 1959 Soviet census (cited earlier) and represent the proportion of females having incomplete secondary education (or beyond) divided by the proportion of males who have achieved such education. All figures apply to the portion of each nationality residing in its official national territory only.

records the proportion of women aged 16–19 who are married, supports this expectation. From an average of 46.1 per cent of young women married in 1926, the figure declined to 15.6 per cent in 1970 (for the 11 groups for which data are available at both time points).

At the same time, Table 8 presents some unexpected relationships. The inter-nationality variation (*V*) *increased* between 1926 and 1959 rather than decreased: from a *V* of .531 in 1926 to a *V* of .749 in 1959 (for the 11 nationalities for which data are available at both time points). But then the variation *decreased* significantly by 1970 to .355—a level below that for 1926. How might one account for this pattern? It is clear that every nationality examined here exhibits a decline in the incidence of early marriage over time. But the inter-nationality differences grew relative to the mean between 1926 and 1959. In fact, many of the Muslim groups deviated absolutely much more from the mean score in 1959 than in 1926. Thus, despite the decreasing *incidence* of early marriage between 1926 and 1959, affecting every Union Republic nationality, there was an increased *relative variation* among nationalities. But by 1970, both the absolute and relative differences among nationalities declined substantially so that there is an overall curvilinear pattern to the change in inter-nationality inequality over time.

Like the early marriage indicator, the next indicator of cultural diversity—birthrates—brings inter-nationality differences into clearer focus between 1926 and 1959. Table 9 shows the coefficient of variation to have climbed from .141 in 1926 to .336 in 1959. In addition, while the child-woman ratios for all Christian groups have progressively *decreased,* the ratios for all Muslim groups except the Azerbaidzhanis have *increased.* One must, of course, keep in mind certain drawbacks to the use of child-woman ratios to measure fertility rates, especially their sensitivity to differential child mortality rates and to discontinuities in the age structures of populations. The relatively small inter-nationality differentials in the child-woman ratios in 1926 may obscure strong differentials in actual fertility at that time, while much of the increase in subsequent ratios for Muslim groups may have resulted from decreasing child mortality rates. Nevertheless, differential child mortality rates—in fact minor for 1959—cannot explain the large remaining inter-nationality variation. Moreover, as indicators of the emancipation of women from primarily domestic roles, child-woman ratios have considerable utility in their own right. These

Table 7b. Female-Male Education Ratios: 1959 and 1970[a]

	1959			1970		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Russians	.966	.839	.921	.934	.838	.908
Ukrainians	.860	.702	.772	.865	.724	.794
Belorussians	.935	.729	.816	.922	.737	.824
Moldavians	.760	.660	.673	.863	.789	.799
Estonians	.961	.966	.964	.973	.945	.968
Latvians	.917	.904	.919	.948	.915	.937
Lithuanians	.942	.959	.953	.952	.872	.925
Georgians	.955	.904	.923	.964	.891	.929
Armenians	.931	.794	.874	.953	.878	.928
Azerbaidzhanis	.660	.549	.589	.749	.645	.685
Kazakhs	.642	.534	.561	.819	.722	.748
Kirgiz	.684	.556	.566	.868	.717	.744
Tadzhiks	.530	.650	.619	.658	.748	.710
Turkmenians	.620	.752	.707	.731	.824	.786
Uzbeks	.679	.633	.640	.775	.773	.767
Mean for 11 Groups[b]	.769	.695	.726	.840	.772	.802
V for 11 Groups	.199	.169	.186	.112	.094	.102
Mean for 15 Groups	.803	.742	.766	.865	.801	.830
V for 15 Groups	.185	.192	.192	.110	.105	.109

[a] Source: 1970 Soviet census (cited earlier).

[b] The figures are based only on the portion of each nationality that resides in its official national area, and represent the proportion of females (aged 10 and over) having incomplete secondary education or beyond divided by the proportion of males who have achieved such education.

data reveal tremendous inter-nationality differences in the child-rearing burdens placed on women.

In summary, viewing child-woman ratios as measures of women's domestic obligations, the relative differences among nationalities have increased over time. The previously obscured (or, perhaps, minimal) relative variation in fertility had been brought into the open by 1959 and may well have increased in the 1960s despite apparent reductions in overall rates.[36] (Unfortunately, the available 1970 census data do not allow us to calculate child-woman ratios for that year.) Perhaps as a consequence of varying child-woman burdens, or as a consequence of a common causal factor affecting women's status, female employment outside the household—our fourth indicator of female status—correlates highly negatively with child-woman ratios, as Table 10 shows.[37]

Summary. The preceding analysis has revealed a mixed pattern of relationships between socio-cultural development and equality among Soviet nationalities. Measured in absolute terms, the increases in levels of education, numbers of skilled workers, and female access to formal education have been enormous, as has the reduction in the incidence of early marriage. Birthrates, too, have shown substantial change over time, though not always in the expected direction. Thus if one were to focus primary attention on the *amount* of change one would have to conclude that almost universal progress toward modernization has

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[36] At least as far as one can judge from *regional* indicators, the crude birthrates of all the nationalities considered here dropped off markedly in the 1960s. See *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1971), pp. 50–51. For more detailed analysis of longitudinal trends in fertility in the USSR, see Jerzy Berent, "Causes of Fertility Decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," *Population Studies,* 24, No. 1 (March, 1970), 35–58, and No. 2 (July, 1970), 247–292. Extensive discussion and analysis of fertility declines in general and within the USSR in particular is found also in Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov,* pp. 162–175 and 233–249; and G. A. Bondarskaia, "Vliianie etnicheskogo faktora na uroven' rozhdaemosti v SSSR i v nekotorye sotsialisticheskikh stranakh evropy," in *Faktory rozhdaemosti,* ed. A. G. Volkov (Moskva: "Statistika," 1971), pp. 52–62.

[37] Actually, the relationship between birthrates and female employment may be reciprocal, with increased employment leading to lower birthrates. For a recent analysis, however, that questions whether any causal linkage exists between birthrates and economic independence of women in the Soviet Union, see D. Peter Mazur, "Fertility and Economic Dependency of Soviet Women," *Demography,* 10 (February, 1973), 37–51.

Table 8. Early Marriage Among Soviet Nationalities: Proportion of 16–19 Year-old Women Married[a]

	1926			1959	1970
	Rural	Rural	Total	Total	Total
Russians	—	—	.150	.091	.088
Ukrainians	.106	.131	.128	.096	.109
Belorussians	.107	.082	.084	.060	.066
Moldavians	—	—	—	.150	.113
Estonians	—	—	—	.042	.048
Latvians	—	—	—	.045	.059
Lithuanians	—	—	—	.047	.052
Georgians	.182	.311	.286	.107	.135
Armenians	.374	.639	.572	.166	.160
Azerbaidzhanis	.615	.568	.579	.272	.179
Kazakhs	.712	.535	.583	.275	.117
Kirgiz	.881	.876	.876	.448	.200
Tadzhiks	.472	.637	.615	.384	.252
Turkmenians	.606	.637	.636	.320	.189
Uzbeks	.527	.568	.560	.323	.219
Mean for 10 Groups	.458	.498	.492		
V for 10 Groups	.546	.473	.477		
Mean for 11 Groups			.461	.170	.156
V for 11 Groups			.531	.749	.355
Mean for 15 Groups				.188	.132
V for 15 Groups				.700	.474

[a] Source: 1926, 1959, and 1970 Soviet census reports (cited earlier). All figures apply to the portion of the nationality group residing in its official national area only, except for the 1926 figures on the Russians, which pertain to the entire Russian population of the USSR.

characterized the sociocultural development of union republic nationalities.

But the initial expectation of a decline in the relative differences of sociocultural development among nationalities has not always proved correct. In general, those aspects of social relations most amenable to planned change over a relatively short time-span (such as access to education) have shown the greatest change and the greatest reduction in inter-nationality variation. Least susceptible to planned change have been certain practices once supported by strong religious sanctions—those relating to marriage, fertility, and female status in general. Thus, only the most recent figures on early marriage show a reduction in variation from the 1926 levels, while fertility differentials still apparently exceed 1926 levels and are, in any event, quite large.

One should not underestimate the importance of the relative intractability of family practices. The still large inter-nationality variation testifies to the ability of family practices to withstand intensive educational campaigns and legal restrictions designed to change these practices.[38] In attempting to account for differential fertility rates among nationalities, Soviet scholars themselves have recognized that family practices are highly resistant to change. M. K. Karakhanov, for example, has observed that rapid socioeconomic progress in Central Asia has outstripped the transformation of popular customs:

> Although economic, social, and cultural progress to a certain degree influences the regulation of fertility level, the relatively persistent character of customary forms and diverse traditions—not excluding the religious—facilitates the persistence of a high level of fertility.[39]

One may propose that Soviet nationalities must advance along two dimensions of sociocultural change before they can become fully equal. First, the provision and use of cultural facilities, particularly educational facilities, must be expanded in order to increase the education and occupational skills of the population. Although Soviet

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[38] For a discussion of the legislative aspect, see Gregory J. Massell, "Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia," *Law and Society Review,* 2 (February, 1968), 179–228.

[39] M. K. Karakhanov, "Dinamika narodonaseleniia srednei azii," Karakhanov, *Problemy narodonaseleniia,* p. 23.

Table 9. Child-Woman Ratios of Soviet Nationalities: 1926 and 1959[a]

(Number of Children Aged 0–9 per 1000 Women Aged 20–49)

	1926			1959		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Russians	—	—	1233	747	1049	863
Ukrainians	940	1397	1341	576	816	714
Belorussians	1038	1512	1468	575	995	836
Moldavians	(1166)	(1395)	(1387)	831	1235	1190
Estonians	—	—	—	518	772	638
Latvians	—	—	—	513	713	612
Lithuanians	—	—	—	670	921	823
Georgians	927	1618	1484	660	1072	905
Armenians	1271	1760	1660	1048	1508	1240
Azerbaidzhanis	1593	1807	1772	1490	1836	1711
Kazakhs	1056	1269	1265	1740	1948	1896
Kirgiz	944	1161	1159	1516	1933	1885
Tadzhiks	1328	1321	1322	1753	1789	1782
Turkmenians	1401	1384	1384	1848	1795	1809
Uzbeks	1193	1096	1112	1743	1916	1878
Mean for 10 Groups[b]	1169.1	1432.5	1396.7	1294.9	1560.8	1465.6
V for 10 Groups	.184	.159	.140	.386	.265	.315
Mean for 11 Groups[c]			1381.8			1410.8
V for 11 Groups			.141			.336
Mean for 15 Groups				1081.9	1353.2	1252.1
V for 15 Groups				.474	.340	.398

[a] Source: 1926 and 1959 Soviet census reports (cited earlier). The data in 1926 apply to the portion of each nationality residing within its official national area as the borders were defined at that time. The data in 1959 apply to the "primary area of settlement" of each nationality as defined in the census report summary volume.

[b] The scores for "10 groups" exclude the Russians as well as the others omitted in previous tables from the 1926 totals. No age breakdowns for the Russian population of urban and rural areas of the RSFSR were provided in the census report.

[c] The scores for "11 groups" exclude the Moldavians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.

nationalities have progressed significantly on this dimension, and the degree of inter-nationality variation has continuously decreased over time, at more advanced levels of training large relative differences among nationalities remain.

But the change affecting those social areas most directly linked to technological development—urbanization, education, and occupational structures, for example—only later begins to affect attitudes and practices involving interpersonal, primary-group relations. Family structure and customs related to home life would appear to be less susceptible to transformation than the more macro-level economic and social organization of communities, even though Soviet doctrine condemns "outmoded" traditions such as the subordination of women and the adherence to religious rites and dogma. Because traditional attitudes towards fertility have lingered on, inter-nationality differences in fertility have become more apparent as a result of improved sanitation and health care. In more general terms, the significant equalization of females and males as measured by access to education is often accompanied by the preservation of family practices that help maintain women's primary role in the family and household.[40] This is not to say that little change has taken place in family structure, but only that despite absolute gains in women's standing, vestiges of earlier values may lead to continuing or (for a time) even increased inter-nationality disparities as the groups undergo economic modernization. The earlier finding, however, of a curvilinear relationship between level of education and inter-nationality differences (measured in absolute terms) does appear to hold true for the early-marriage indicator and may also hold true for birthrates once we can compare more recent data with the presently available data.

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[40] This conclusion applies not only to Muslim nationalities but also to Christians, especially the Armenians. Although as a group the Armenians are among the three or four most highly educated nationalities in the USSR, they lag behind all other union republic Christian groups in decreasing early marriage and child-woman ratios, and they lag well behind the others in the employment of women outside the household. On the last point, see A. A. Isupov, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR (po itogam perepisi 1959 g.)* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1964), p. 46.

Regional versus Nationality Development.

We have yet to consider the extent to which regional development has exceeded or fallen short of nationality development. To investigate this problem we shall focus on one dimension of social development that is of particular political importance: the relative positions of native and non-native specialists in the non-Russian republics. Table 11 compares the *total* number of specialists per capita with the number of *native* specialists per capita in the economies of the union republics in 1960. The differences between the two sets of figures are striking. If the mean number of (total) specialists (per 10,000 population) in the union republics in 1960 was 166.7, the mean number of *indigenous* specialists (per 10,000 natives) was 145.3. Similarly, if in 1960 the mean number of scientific workers (per 100,000 population) in the republics was 145.3, the mean number of scientific workers among the *indigenous* populations of these republics was 128.8. Thus the social development of natives lags behind the social development of the total populations of the Union Republics.

Table 10. Correlation Between Child-Woman Ratios and Female Employment Outside the Household: 1959[a]

	Child-Woman Ratio	
	600–999	1000+
Per cent of Females Employed Outside the Household[b]:		
20–34	0	7
35–49	6	0
50–55	1	1

[a] Source: Source of child-woman ratios as in Table 9. Data on female employment are from A. A. Isupov, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR (po itogam perepisi 1959 g.)* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1964), p. 46.

[b] Persons spending their time tending private garden plots or family livestock are not counted as "working outside the household."

Table 11. Number of Total and Native Specialists and Scientific Workers in National Republics: 1960[a]

	Specialists with Higher Education (per 10,000 pop.)		Scientific Workers (per 100,000 pop.)	
	Natives	All	Natives	All
Republic:				
RSFSR	172	177	197	207
Ukraine	124	164	70	111
Belorussia	102	137	49	85
Moldavia	53	115	27	69
Estonia	198	202	197	190
Latvia	173	195	169	160
Lithuania	134	137	129	122
Georgia	325	264	294	226
Armenia	243	233	258	242
Azerbaidzhan	176	198	187	195
Kazakhstan	108	136	74	103
Kirgizia	107	144	68	112
Tadzhikistan	76	118	69	109
Turkmenia	108	148	73	121
Uzbekistan	80	132	71	127
Mean	145.3	166.7	128.8	145.3
Coefficient of Variation	.475	.254	.619	.385

[a] Source: Ts. S.U., *Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik* (Moskva: "Statistika," 1961). The population bases are the 1959 census totals.

There are some exceptions found among the Baltic groups (Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians) and two of the Transcausasian nationalities (Georgians and Armenians). One might account for the latter two exceptions by noting that Georgia and Armenia are distinguished by having (a) very large numbers of native specialists per capita, and (b) very small proportions of non-indigenous residents (especially from outside of Transcaucasia) in their official national areas. Given the exceedingly high educational qualifications of the natives (the Georgians and Armenians are the two most highly skilled of the union republic work forces—see also Table 3), the relatively low qualifications of the longstanding enclaves of other nationalities tend to drag down the per capita figures for the republics as a whole. The high skill levels of the indigenous populations of the Baltic republics may also help explain their deviation, though this argument is less convincing for the Lithuanian case.

More important than the differences in the two sets of mean scores, however, are the differences in the *variation* between inter-republican scores and inter-nationality scores. In 1960, the coefficient of variation for the inter-*republican* differences (including all nationalities residing in each republic) was significantly lower than the coefficient for inter-*nationality* differences (among the titular indigenous nationalities of each re-

Table 12. Class Structures of Total and Native Populations of Union Republics: 1939 and 1959[a]

	Per cent of Work Force in "Employee" Category			
	1939		1959	
	Natives	All	Natives	All
Republic:				
RSFSR	18.7[b]	18.6	22	22
Ukraine	13.1	17.2	13	17
Belorussia	10.8	14.5	12	16
Moldavia	—	—	4	11
Estonia	—	—	22	24
Latvia	—	—	18	21
Lithuania	—	—	14	16
Georgia	17.0	17.2	23	24
Armenia	19.7	14.6	20	22
Azerbaidzhan	9.5	16.6	15	23
Kazakhstan	8.0	17.4	16	21
Kirgizia	4.6	12.4	8	18
Tadzhikistan	5.7	10.2	8	16
Turkmenia	6.1	15.4	9	20
Uzbekistan	5.4	12.9	8	17
Mean for 11 Groups	10.8	15.2	14.0	19.6
Coefficient of Variation for 11 Groups	.492	.160	.388	.143
Mean for 15 Groups			14.1	19.2
Coefficient of Variation for 15 Groups			.411	.187

[a] Source: see source for Table 5.

[b] The table entries represent the percentage of the work forces of the native population or the entire republican population occupied in "white collar" jobs. For the remainder of the distributions in broad occupational categories (workers, collective farmers) see the original sources.

public). For specialists, the inter-republican score was .254, while the inter-nationality score was .475; for scientific workers, the corresponding scores were .358 and .619. These figures support the argument presented at the beginning of this essay that indicators of *regional* equalization are seriously misleading as indicators of inter-*nationality* equalization. As projected, the presence of nonindigenous specialists raises the average qualifications of the workers in the union republics, while reducing the amount of inter-republican variation from what might have occurred if natives alone served in specialized occupations.

The official interpretation, however, that the influx of specialists from outside the regions has accelerated the development of the non-Russian populations is not necessarily confirmed (nor can it be refuted with the present data). If the presence of outsiders lowers inter-republican variation, it does not necessarily accelerate the growth of native cadres of specialists. On the contrary, the presence of outsiders may to some extent impede the opportunities for the training and employment of natives by displacing natives from jobs, raising job competition, and creating a *de facto* need for Russian in certain occupations.

In some cases the employment of non-natives in the non-Russian areas may also induce trained native specialists to find work outside their own republics, particularly for the Ukrainians and Belorussians, in whose republics non-natives occupy 40 per cent of the specialist positions, while about 25 per cent of the native specialists work outside their respective official republics. Of course, such evidence does not conclusively prove that the presence of outsiders induces the natives to emigrate. Indeed, the Ukrainian and Belorussian cases are anomalous, since large minorities of these nationalities were born, raised, and educated outside their official republics. But in most other republics the local economy absorbs at least 90 per cent of the native specialists.[41] The possibility that the influx of non-natives may stimulate the advancement of the non-Russian cadres by stimulating the growth of local industry must thus be balanced against the evidence of deleterious influences.

That the equalization of national republics exceeds the equalization of the native populations dwelling in them may also be gleaned by comparing the class structures of the official indigenous populations of these republics. Table 12 reveals once again the substantial lag of the native behind the general populations of the republics and the significantly greater variation among nationalities than among republics. More important, however, since these data cover two points in time (1939 and 1959), one can now see that among both republics and nationalities variation has significantly declined through time. Extending this comparison on the basis of 1970 census data on higher educational attainments, one finds that between 1959 and 1970 the coefficient of variation declined from .404 to .272 for the *entire* (indigenous and "immigrant") populations of republics, and from .733 to .461 for the *indigenous* populations (these coefficients are based on raw data not presented here). Not that natives are about to catch up with the general populations of their respective republics, but the trend toward inter-republican equalization holds true for the native as well as the general populations.

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[41] Armenia constitutes a major exception because it has so saturated its own specialized work force with Armenians (92 per cent of the higher specialists in Armenia are Armenians) that almost 50 per cent of all Armenian specialists with higher education must seek employment outside the Armenian Republic.

Conclusion

Like Holubnychy and Koropeckyj, we have found uneven support for the equalization hypothesis. Although Soviet nationalities have experienced substantial and continuous equalization over time on measures of education, inter-nationality differences in family role structure show greater persistence and have tended to follow a curvilinear pattern of change.

These apparently contradictory tendencies do not necessarily disprove the equalization hypothesis, however. Instead our results tend to corroborate the pattern noted by Williamson and others, who have found an inverted "U" relationship between economic development and inequality, with economic development leading first toward increasing inequality, then toward decreasing inequality. The mixed support for the equalization hypothesis may be tentatively attributed to the serial or asynchronous occurrence of different aspects of social and cultural development: the initial social change associated with urbanization, mass education, and the development of skilled labor produces increased inter-nationality inequality for a time, which is followed by increasing equality (as shown by the present data); but change in family structures not only begins later but completes its cycle at a slower pace than does change in those social relations more directly linked to technological development. Consequently, when viewing the relative variation among nationalities we may be viewing occupational and educational equality after the highest point of inequality has already been passed (before the Soviet era), while in observing the variation in family role structures we may be tracing the levels of inequality as they achieve the apogee of what may eventually prove to be an inverted "U" relationship. In other words, there is no necessary contradiction in the patterns of relationships observed in the educational and family variables, but rather a difference in the time schedules according to which the two types of social phenomena are changing.

I do not intend to imply that all of the dimensions of social change here studied follow precisely the same pattern. Indeed, the form of the relationship between economic development and inequality depends in part on the measure of inequality employed. For example, the analysis of incomplete secondary education among different age cohorts reveals that even after 1926 one may discern an inverted "U" pattern among the *absolute* differences among nationalities despite the pattern of monotonically decreasing *relative* inequality over time.[42] But for the early marriage indicator, no such curvilinear pattern in the absolute differences occurred, since at each successive time period the interquartile range declined. Furthermore, Holubnychy and Koropeckyj's analyses show that according to some indicators of economic development the relationship between development and regional inequality in the USSR may deviate from the inverted "U" pattern, with recent evidence suggesting increasing divergence among regions during the 1960s. On the basis of an examination of planned growth in per capita output for the 1971-1975 period, Noren and Whitehouse have projected that regional divergence will continue to increase.[43]

Finally, further study of the relationship between nationality and republican development in the USSR is clearly warranted. Here I have shown that measures of regional inequality seriously underestimate the degree of inequality among nationalities in the Soviet Union. The influx of non-native skilled manpower has evidently both created and perpetuated the lag of two-thirds of the nationalities here considered behind the development of their respective republics. This analysis should also caution other researchers who may wish to study regional inequality in multinational countries to distinguish between regional and ethnic inequality.

[42] A similar pattern may be discerned in the measures of specialized manpower in Tables 3 and 4. If one calculates the interquartile range, the *absolute* difference between the 4th highest and 12th highest scores *increased* over time, while the *relative* differences among nationalities tended to *decline*. One would expect both the absolute and relative differences on these measures to decline eventually, thereby conforming to the inverted "U" pattern observed with incomplete secondary education.

[43] James H. Noren and E. Douglas Whitehouse, "Soviet Industry in the 1971–1975 Plan," in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 223–224.

Models of Statistical Relationship*

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The endless stream of proposed measures of statistical relationship is matched only by the countless suggestions offered for selecting among them. The criteria include such features of the statistics as their means of handling "ties," their dependence on the variables' numbers of categories, and especially their operational interpretations. The interpretation question has become dominant, but the central point of this article is that the most basic aspect of selecting relationship measures is choosing a "model" of a relationship. Simply stated, the extreme value conditions of a statistic must be understood before attempting to interpret its intermediate values. Different coefficients embody different models, and the choice between measures is essentially a choice between these models. A classification scheme for different models will be presented in this paper. The substantive utility of the various models will be emphasized, the basic thrust being toward encouraging greater use of multiple measures in order to study several aspects of a relationship.

Introduction

Exactly twenty years ago, Leo Goodman and William Kruskal redirected the study of "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications."[1] Their treatment has created a widespread belief that the worthiness of a coefficient is mainly a matter of its "interpretation"—specifically how intermediate values of the statistic are to be interpreted. What, for example, would a .5 correlation value *mean?* Correspondingly, the debate about the best measure has evolved into a contest between prospective interpretation systems. Probabilistic interpretations have caught the fancy of many analysts,[2] as if such interpretations possess a special mystique that renders their further justification unnecessary. Interpretations have often been based on the numbers of concordant, discordant, and tied pairs of observations,[3] without a clear reason for using pairs of observations as the units of analysis. Costner's efforts have made "proportional-reduction-in-error" interpretations particularly popular,[4] although the form of "error" involved can be so unusual that no one would have suggested its reduction.[5] Measures of predictability have been sought for nominal variables, implying without proof that such predictability is analogous to the association of interval variables. The search for interpretable measures has also spurred the development of new statistics which embody specific methodological concepts (such as those of information theory) and has legitimized the invention of ad hoc coefficients which fit particular substantive needs. But the quagmire of alternative interpretation systems has not simplified the task of the analyst seeking a measure for use in research.

Emphasis on the interpretation of intermediate values of a statistic overlooks the primary question—intermediate to what? Under what conditions does the coefficient attain its maximum and null values? An intermediate value is, after all, intermediate to the situations which the measure treats as a perfect relationship and as a null relationship, so it is important to ask whether the statistic's extreme value conditions are of substantive interest. The conditions under which a coefficient achieves its maximum and null values specify its implicit "model" of a relationship. The interpretation of a measure should be evaluated only within the context of its relationship model. Even probabilistic measures, predictability scores, information theory statistics, and ad hoc coefficients should be evaluated on this basis, though their formulations may obscure their underlying models. The utility of a statistic depends directly on the substantive appropriateness of its model of a relationship.

The stress on interpretations has led to a widespread view that some interpretations (and therefore measures) may be preferable to others. The researcher is tempted to decide which interpreta-

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* I am indebted to the many friends, colleagues, students, and reviewers who commented on early versions of this paper. The final draft reflects particularly the generous suggestions of Robert C. Luskin.

[1] Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (December, 1954), 732–764.

[2] William H. Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 53 (December, 1958), 814–861.

[3] Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Association for Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (December, 1962), 799–811.

[4] Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), 341–353.

[5] See, for example, Somers's presentation of a proportional-reduction-in-error interpretation of his d_{xy} in Robert H. Somers, "On the Measurement of Association," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (April, 1968), 291–292, and also Thomas P. Wilson, "A Proportional-Reduction-in-Error Interpretation for Kendall's Tau-*b*," *Social Forces*, 47 (March, 1969), 340–342.

tion seems most correct and then employ only the corresponding measure. Yet once it is realized that different statistics are intended to measure different concepts, it becomes useful to employ multiple measures to analyze various aspects of a relationship. More than one relationship model can be of substantive interest, so several coefficients can be used simultaneously.

In order to keep the task of reasonable magnitude, the present study will emphasize dichotomous independent and dependent variables. This case has been chosen because it is the simplest and most basic statistical situation and because it permits effective illustration of several different models. All comments are intended to apply only to this case unless specifically stated otherwise. Although the dichotomous variable case is somewhat specialized, it helps focus attention on the relationship model underlying a statistic. If the coefficient's underlying model is uninteresting in the dichotomous case, that model and that measure will not have greater utility in the more complex nondichotomous case. Generalization to polytomous variables is appropriate only if the model is useful in studying dichotomies.

The main example used in this paper involves party voting in legislatures, party being the independent variable and the vote for or against a motion being the dependent variable. Political scientists have long been interested in gauging party differences on legislative roll calls. Nonvoting is typically excluded from the analysis, so both variables are dichotomous in two-party legislatures (see Chart 1).[6] The regression slope (known in this field as Rice's index of party differences) is the traditional measure of party voting differences, though the potential applicability of other coefficients has been recognized.[7] The use of the legislative illustration in the following discussion should not be permitted to conceal the generality of either the problem or the results.

		Party		
		Republican	Democrat	Total
Vote	Yes	p_{11}	p_{12}	$p_{1.}$
	No	p_{21}	p_{22}	$p_{2.}$
Total		$p_{.1}$	$p_{.2}$	1.0

Chart 1. Cross-Tabulation of Party and Vote[a]

[a] Cell entries are probabilities—proportions of the total number of cases that fall in the cells.

Statistical Models

Measurement of a statistical relationship should be based on a specific relationship model—an image of what would constitute the maximum possible relationship between the variables along with a decision about what the absence of a relationship should mean. Certain extreme conditions merit particular attention because of their substantive meaningfulness and their common usage in statistics. The most prevalent definitions of maximum and null relationships will be listed in this section, after which the models based on combinations of these definitions will be presented and the differences between the models will be clarified.

Maximum relationship. Chart 2 shows various forms of monotonicity which can be regarded as maximum relationships between dichotomous variables. Different statistics embody these different conceptions of the perfect relationship. The definitions below will be given in terms of dichotomous variables, with the more general definitions being listed in Appendix I.

(1) "Strong monotonicity" requires that the independent variable categories be homogeneous but differing on the dependent variable. This is equivalent to two opposite zero cells in the cross-tabulation of dichotomous variables (Chart 2.1). In the legislative example, strong monotonicity corresponds to the two parties being united in opposition to one another.

Some statisticians view strong monotonicity as the only legitimate form of a perfect relationship.

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[6] There would be little need to resort to a summary statistic were we considering only the relation between a single vote and party, but the interest usually extends to the importance of party across a wide range of votes. The fundamental concern would be in comparing the strength of party effects to other effects (such as regional divisions and urban-rural differences) or in comparing the role of partisan effects across issue areas, across time, between legislative chambers, and/or between different legislatures. Being able to summarize the importance of party (and other) effects on each vote permits comparing the distributions of the summary measures over the votes.

[7] Grumm has employed the phi-statistic in this regard, Turner used the related chi-square statistic, and MacRae worked with Yule's Q (without reporting specific results). Anderson's handbook on roll-call analysis mentions several standard statistical coefficients, but does not consider the stakes involved in the choice between them. MacRae's roll-call analysis text includes an excellent discussion of measuring party differences, including comments on the choice between the regression slope and Yule's Q. See John G. Grumm, "The Means of Measuring Conflict and Cohesion in the Legislature," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 44 (March, 1964), 377–388; Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 175–200; Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 43–54.

Vote	Rep.	Dem.	Total
Yes	.60	.00	.60
No	.00	.40	.40
Total	.60	.40	1.00

Chart 2.1
Strong monotonicity
$p_{12} = p_{21} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = p_{22} = 0$

Vote	Rep.	Dem.	Total
Yes	.60	.40	1.00
No	.00	.00	.00
Total	.60	.40	1.00

Chart 2.2
Moderate monotonicity
$p_{21} = p_{22} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = p_{12} = 0$
Or: $p_{12} = p_{21} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{22} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{21} = 0$
Or: $p_{12} = p_{22} = 0$

Vote	Rep.	Dem.	Total
Yes	.50	.40	.90
No	.10	.00	.10
Total	.60	.40	1.00

Chart 2.3
Weak monotonicity
$p_{22} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = 0$
Or: $p_{12} = 0$
Or: $p_{21} = 0$

Chart 2. Maximum Relationship Condition[a]

[a] As explained in the text, these are not mutually exclusive conditions; when one rule is satisfied, weaker rules are also satisfied.

Other statisticians routinely correct for unequal numbers of categories or different marginal distributions for the variables, conditions which preclude strong monotonicity. Rather than adopt either of these approaches, these adjustments will be treated here as statistical models with distinctive substantive implications.

(2) "Moderate monotonicity" adjusts for unequal numbers of variable categories, as when the dependent variable lacks variance. It is satisfied if the categories of the variable with the greater number of categories are homogeneous on the other variable. With dichotomous variables, moderate monotonicity requires two zero cells in the cross-tabulation, zero cells which can be in the same column or row (Chart 2.2) or different columns and rows (so that a case of strong monotonicity also satisfies moderate monotonicity). A unanimous legislative vote can be perfectly predicted from party, so this model would treat the relationship of party with unanimous votes as maximal.

(3) "Weak monotonicity" assumes that the categories of the independent variable are as homogeneous on the dependent variable as possible, given differences in variable marginals. This case corresponds to at least one zero cell in the cross-tabulation of dichotomous variables (Chart 2.3). (Note also that cases of strong and moderate monotonicity do satisfy weak monotonicity.) Complete voting cohesiveness by one party would be regarded as full party responsibility even if there is a factional split in the other, since no greater responsibility would be possible, *given the vote marginals.*[8]

These three definitions of a maximum relationship cumulate. If strong monotonicity exists, then the other forms also hold; if the moderate rule is satisfied, then so is weak monotonicity. Thus fewest votes would be considered maximally related to party under a strong monotonicity criterion while the greatest number of votes would be viewed as maximally related to party under weak monotonicity.

Null relationship. Four important forms for the definition of no relationship are illustrated in Chart 3.

(a) "Accord" occurs when there is agreement between the majorities of the independent variable categories (Chart 3a). The independent variable is regarded as lacking explanatory power unless the central tendencies of the independent variable categories are conflicting. According to this position, party is irrelevant to the vote if a majority of both parties vote together. Similarly class voting would be considered nonexistent if the majorities of all classes vote for the same party.

(b) "Balance" holds when there is no tendency for the cleavages on the two variables to be reinforcing (Chart 3b). Cleavages would be reinforcing if, for example, religious and party divisions

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[8] If the marginals are accepted as given, the number of Democrats voting no in Chart 2.3 could range between 0 and 10. If there were 1 Democrat voting no (and 9 Republicans voting no), the relationship between party and vote would not be as strong as in Chart 2.3 and similarly if more than 1 Democrat voted no. If there were 10 Democrats but no Republicans casting negative votes, the party responsibility would again be maximal given the vote marginals. Thus the strongest relationships between party and vote with the given marginals occur when there is one zero cell in the table—no Democrats or no Republicans voting in the negative direction. Any other case represents a weaker relationship.

Vote	Rep.	Dem.
Yes	.50	.30
No	.10	.10
Total	.60	.40

(.50>.10 & .30>.10)
Chart 3a
Accord
$p_{11} \geq p_{21}$

and

$p_{12} \geq p_{22}$
Also null if:
$p_{21} \geq p_{11}$
and
$p_{22} \geq p_{12}$

Vote	Rep.	Dem.
Yes	.45	.35
No	.15	.05
Total	.60	.40

(.45+.05=.50=.35+.15)
Chart 3b
Balance
$p_{11}+p_{22}=p_{12}+p_{21}$

Vote	Rep.	Dem.
Yes	.45	.30
No	.15	.10
Total	.60	.40

(.45/.60=.75=.30/.40)
Chart 3c
Independence
$p_{11}p_{22}=p_{12}p_{21}$

$$\left(\frac{p_{11}}{p_{.1}}=\frac{p_{12}}{p_{.2}}\right)$$

Vote	Rep.	Dem.
Yes	.30	.20
No	.30	.20
Total	.60	.40

(.30=.30 & .20=.20)
Chart 3d
Cleavage
$p_{11}=p_{21}$

and

$p_{12}=p_{22}$

Chart 3. Null Relationship Conditions[a]

[a] Relations among these null conditions are described in the text.

were equivalent, so that all voters were either Protestant Republicans or Catholic Democrats, but there would be no tendency towards reinforcement if there were as many Protestant Republicans and Catholic Democrats as there were Protestant Democrats and Catholic Republicans.[9] In the dichotomous case, balance means the numbers of cases along the major and minor diagonals are equal. The relationship of party and issue position is balanced if Republicans voting yes and Democrats voting no constitute exactly half of the number of legislators. A balance between the number of Democratic liberals and Republican conservatives on the one hand and Democratic conservatives and Republican liberals on the other hand would indicate a null relationship, while an imbalance indicates the existence of a relationship.

(c) "Independence" exists when the percentage distributions across the dependent variable categories are the same for each independent variable category, as when equal proportions of Republicans and Democrats vote yes (Chart 3c). McGinnis has argued that statistical independence is the only legitimate interpretation of the lack of a relationship;[10] the present argument is that there can be legitimate substantive interest in other forms of a relationship.

(d) "Cleavage" occurs when all independent variable categories split evenly between the dependent variable categories. There is total cleavage if both Democrats and Republicans are evenly split between yes and no votes (Chart 3d). At least one party would have to show some degree of internal cohesion for there to be a relationship between party and vote.

These forms of a null relationship are interrelated. If the cleavage situation exists, there would be no relationship under any of these forms, so Chart 3d is a null relationship under all four definitions. Independence and balance are equivalent if equal numbers of cases fall in both independent variable categories. If balance occurs or if the variables are independent, then the majorities of the independent variable categories must be in accord, so Charts 3a–3d are all null under the accord rule. The fewest votes would depart from a null relationship under the accord definition, while the most votes would depart from it under the cleavage rule.

Relationship models. The above definitions of a perfect relationship and a null relationship can be combined to yield a family of different relationship models as shown in Chart 4. A few combinations are inconsistent because a particular set of data can simultaneously satisfy the maximum and null value conditions.[11] The remaining combina-

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[9] The literature which argues that democratic stability depends on individuals having numerous cross-cutting group memberships is reviewed in Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), chapter 4.

[10] Robert McGinnis, "Logical Status of the Concept of Association," *The Midwest Sociologist*, 20 (May, 1958), 72–77.

[11] Models 3a and 3b would regard Chart 2.3 as both a perfect and a null case. Model 2a would treat unanimous and near-unanimous votes as both perfect and null relationships. Balance can occur on unanimous (and near-unanimous) votes, which would make model 2b indeterminate. Maximum departure from cleavage does exist on unanimous votes, but



	a. Accord	b. Balance	c. Independence	d. Cleavage
1. Strong Monotonicity	1a	1b	1c	1d*
2. Moderate Monotonicity	2a*	2b*	2c	2d
3. Weak Monotonicity	3a*	3b*	3c	3d

Chart 4. A System of Models of Statistical Relationship

* Inconsistent; see footnote 11.

tions—1a, 1b, 1c, 2c, 2d, 3c, and 3d—constitute the models employed by most common statistical measures. A variety of measures based on these models are listed in Chart 5.[12]

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such a relationship would not fulfill the conditions for strong monotonicity; consequently model 1d cannot exist. As a result of these problems, measures cannot be based on models 1d, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.

Additionally, models 2c and 3c would regard all unanimous cases as both a perfect and a null relationship. Measures can be based on them only if they are undefined for strictly unanimous items.

[12] As noted in the chart, the computational formulas shown linearly transform the coefficient values to range from zero for a null relationship to one for a perfect relationship. The transformations are *not* always appropriate for nondichotomous variables, or for comparing relationships involving dichotomous variables with ones involving nondichotomous variables. Particularly model 1b and 2d measures might validly reflect the numbers of categories for the variables. Absolute values have been employed for measures of departure from statistical independence since signs are of limited meaning when dealing with dichotomous categoric variables.

Several measures are undefined for strictly unanimous items. A measure which does not approach zero as a variable becomes unanimous is regarded as satisfying the moderate (or, if appropriate, weak) monotonicity rule.

The opposition index is suggested by MacRae, *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting*, p. 199. Koppa is a linear function of the usual simple agreement score. The cross-cutting measure is based on the work of Rae and Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages.* An unconventional formula is shown for Goodman and Kruskal's tau, based on an algebraic simplification of its formula to phi-squared for dichotomous variables. Theta is described in Robert C. Messenger and Lewis M. Mandell, "A Modal Search Technique for Predictive Nominal Scale Multivariate Analysis," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 67 (December, 1972), 768–772. The phi/phi-max formula differs from the usual version of that statistic in that it assumes the value of unity *whenever* there is a zero cell in the cross-tabulation. The cosine-pi approximation for tetrachoric *r* is employed. The backward regression

Model	Measure	Formula
1a	Lambda, symmetric	$(\mathrm{Min}(p_{1.}, p_{2.})-\mathrm{Min}(p_{11}, p_{12})-\mathrm{Min}(p_{21}, p_{22})+\mathrm{Min}(p_{.1}, p_{.2}) -\mathrm{Min}(p_{11}, p_{21})-\mathrm{Min}(p_{12}, p_{22}))/(\mathrm{Min}(p_{1.}, p_{2.})+\mathrm{Min}(p_{.1}, p_{.2}))$
1a	Lambda, asymmetric	$(\mathrm{Min}(p_{1.}, p_{2.})-\mathrm{Min}(p_{11}, p_{21})-\mathrm{Min}(p_{12}, p_{22}))/\mathrm{Min}(p_{1.}, p_{2.})$
1a	Opposition index	$(p_{11}-p_{21})(p_{22}-p_{12})/p_{.1}p_{.2}.$
1b	Koppa*	$\lvert p_{11}+p_{22}-p_{12}-p_{21}\rvert$
1b	Cross-cutting*†[a]	$1-4(p_{11}+p_{22})(p_{12}+p_{21})$
1c	Phi* = Kendall's tau-*b* = Pearson's *r*	$\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/\sqrt{p_{.1}p_{.2}p_{1.}p_{2.}}$
1c	Goodman and Kruskal's tau*	$(p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21})^2/p_{.1}p_{.2}p_{1.}p_{2.}$
1c	Uncertainty, symmetric†	$2+2(p_{11}\log_2 p_{11}+p_{12}\log_2 p_{12}+p_{21}\log_2 p_{21}+p_{22}\log_2 p_{22})/(p_{1.}\log_2 p_{1.}+p_{2.}\log_2 p_{2.}+p_{.1}\log_2 p_{.1}+p_{.2}\log_2 p_{.2})$
1c	b_{yx}* = Somer's d_{yx}	$\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{.1}p_{.2}$
2c	b_{xy} = Somer's d_{xy}	$\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{1.}p_{2.}$
2c	Uncertainty$_{y/x}$	$1+(p_{11}\log_2 (p_{11}/p_{.1})+p_{12}\log_2 (p_{12}/p_{.2})+p_{21}\log_2 (p_{21}/p_{.1})+p_{22}\log_2 (p_{22}/p_{.2}))/(p_{1.}\log_2 p_{1.}+p_{2.}\log_2 p_{2.}$
2d	Theta†[a]	$2\,\mathrm{Max}(p_{11}, p_{21})+2\,\mathrm{Max}(p_{12}, p_{22})-1$
2d	Average cohesion	$(\lvert p_{11}-p_{21}\rvert/p_{.1}+\lvert p_{12}-p_{22}\rvert/p_{.2})/2$
3c	Phi/phi max*	$\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{.1}p_{1.}$ if $p_{11}p_{22}\geq p_{12}p_{21}$ and $p_{22}\geq p_{11}$ $\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{.2}p_{2.}$ if $p_{11}p_{22}\geq p_{12}p_{21}$ and $p_{22}<p_{11}$ $\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{.2}p_{1.}$ if $p_{11}p_{22}<p_{12}p_{21}$ and $p_{21}\geq p_{12}$ $\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/p_{.1}p_{2.}$ if $p_{11}p_{22}<p_{12}p_{21}$ and $p_{21}<p_{12}$
3c	Yule's *Y**	$\lvert\sqrt{p_{11}p_{22}}-\sqrt{p_{12}p_{21}}\rvert/(\sqrt{p_{11}p_{22}}+\sqrt{p_{12}p_{21}})$
3c	Tetrachoric *r**	$\sin[(\pi/2)\lvert\sqrt{p_{11}p_{22}}-\sqrt{p_{12}p_{21}}\rvert/(\sqrt{p_{11}p_{22}}+\sqrt{p_{12}p_{21}})]$
3c	Yule's *Q** = Goodman and Kruskal's gamma	$\lvert p_{11}p_{22}-p_{12}p_{21}\rvert/(p_{11}p_{22}+p_{12}p_{21})$
3d	Maximum cohesion	$\mathrm{Max}(\lvert p_{11}-p_{21}\rvert/p_{.1}, \lvert p_{12}-p_{22}\rvert/p_{.2})$

* Signs have been deleted for dichotomous nominal variable relationships.
† Range has been modified to go from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables.
[a] Direction has been reversed so that 0 corresponds to null relationship.

Chart 5. Formulas for Relationship Measures

The several models have been ordered in Chart 4 roughly in terms of their "leniency." Model 1a, at the top of the chart, is most restrictive in its definition of a perfect relationship while treating the greatest number of cases as lacking a relationship. Model 3d, at the bottom of the chart, is the most lenient in its assessment of a perfect relationship and codes the fewest situations as lacking a relationship. There is only a partial order on the intermediate models, but generally the models near the top of the chart are less lenient than those near the bottom.

Implicit in the categorization of models is that models near one another in Chart 4 tend to be similar to each other. Models sharing a common maximum (or null) value condition (and measures based on those models) should tend to behave similarly. The cumulation involved in the definitions for maximum and null value conditions also guarantees some similarity among all the models, though different models can assess the same bivariate distribution in very different ways. In fact, a distribution considered a perfect relationship by one model can sometimes be treated as null by another. For example, models 3c and 3d are maximal for the data in Chart 2.3, while models 1a and 1b are null.[13]

Two models are particularly different from the others in what they measure. Only under the cleavage rule can a relationship exist without differences in the behavior of the independent variable categories. Thus models 2d and 3d do not imply any contrasting of the groups' (parties') behavior. Relationship statistics based on these models do not measure differences.

These several themes can be illustrated by analyzing the behavior of the measures in a real data situation. The measures of Figure 5 have been calculated for the relationship between party and vote over a series of roll-call votes taken in the United States House of Representatives. To obtain differences in independent variable marginals, votes from the 83rd Congress (1953–54) in which the parties were nearly equal in size have been used together with votes from 1965 when the

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coefficient, b_{xy}, is included in Chart 5 since its maximum and null value conditions are among those treated in the text. Other measures are standard statistical coefficients, simple transformations of such coefficients, or totally ad hoc measures.

[13] An a priori ordering of the severity of null conditions *b* and *c* is not evident, but the ordering in the text has been chosen because condition *b* behaves like condition *a* in this instance (and in the cases mentioned in footnote 11) while condition *c* behaves like condition *d*.



Figure 1. Factor Space for Measures Calculated on Nonunanimous Votes

Democrats had more than a two-thirds majority. There were 347 roll calls in these years, including 39 totally unanimous votes on which coefficients undefined for unanimous variables could not be computed. Variables lacking variance are of limited interest, so the basic analysis employs only the 266 votes in which 90 per cent of the two parties were not in agreement, a common definition of nonunanimity in legislative studies.

Pearson's *r* values have been calculated between all pairs of the several measures.[14] The correlations are all positive; the lowest correlation between coefficients based on different models is .13 with nearly all correlations being above .50. The lower left part of Table 1 reproduces the correlations among the better-known statistics. (The correlations between measures based on the same model are described in a later section.)

A principal component analysis reveals that a single component accounts for 80 per cent of the total variance of the 18 measures. Only for the coefficients based on cleavage models (2d and 3d) does the first component account for less than half of the measure's total variance (and is the second component about as important as the first). With the exception of those two models, the different statistics do tap the same basic notion (though somewhat different aspects) of a relationship. Figure 1 displays the second and third dimensions of the component solution.[15] The cleavage model (2d and 3d) measures are separate from the others in this figure and particularly distant from the accord model (1a) ones, so there is a vivid contrast between the models at the top and bottom of Chart 4.[16]

Overall, measures based on different models do behave differently, but the differences are not always great, and the conditions governing them must be carefully specified.[17] Models employing

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[14] The use of Pearson's *r* here is debatable, but it is consistent with the usual practice of treating party voting measures at the interval level (as by taking their mean over a series of votes). The Pearson's *r* values should be considered conservative since they measure only linear rather than monotonic relationships; for example, the Yule's *Q* and Yule's *Y* values have a correlation of "only" .94 with one another while in fact their relationship is perfectly monotonic.

The correlational approach employed in this section would not be possible in legislatures where the relationship between party and vote is identical for all votes, in which case there would be no variance in the relationship statistics. Fortunately for the analysis, the relationship between party and vote varies considerably among different votes in the American Congress. The standard deviations of the measures could range from .00 to .50 (except for the opposition index with a maximum of 1.00 since it has been allowed to take on negative values); the actual values range from .19 to .30 (with the exception of the opposition index with a standard deviation of .38).

[15] Variation on the first component is slight (all values around .65); its effect can be visualized in Figure 1 by curling the page so the bottom three points and the top point are slightly below the others.

[16] Sharp differences among the models can also emerge with respect to unanimous and near-unanimous variables. If the dependent variable is strictly unanimous when indepedent variable categories are of equal sizes, null conditions *a-c* would be satisfied, while models 2d and 3d would be maximal. If there is a single dissenting vote with equal-sized independent variable categories, null condition *a* would be satisfied, models 1b and 1c would be near null, model 2c would be moderate, model 2d would be near maximal, and weak monotonicity (maximum condition 3) would be achieved. Thus models 3d, 3c, 2d, and to some extent 2c are more distinct from the other models in the presence of unanimous and near-unanimous variables.

The analysis in the text was replicated with unanimous and near-unanimous roll calls retained. The correlations between the different measures (upper right of Table 1) remain positive, except for some involving the cleavage model (2d and 3d) statistics, but the correlations involving model 3c and even moreso models 2d and 3d fall. The first principal component is strong, but the model 3d and especially 2d coefficients are virtually independent of it. The model 3c measures and, to a less extent, b_{xy} (a model 2c statistic) are more distinct from the remaining measures in the component solution.

[17] Measures based on different models should behave differently, at least to the extent to which their underlying models differ. This maxim specifically contradicts the view that coefficients should be stable when the variable categories are collapsed, since collapsing categories may validly alter the degree of fit with some models. Furthermore statistics should

Table 1. Representative Correlations between Measures of Party Voting Calculated on House Roll Calls, 1953–54 and 1965[a]

		Model						
Model	Measure	1a	1b	1c	2c	3c	2d	3d
1a	lambda-asymmetric	—	.91	.93	.87	.59	.16	.14
1b	cross-cutting	.91	—	.89	.96	.63	.14	.19
1c	b_{yx}	.94	.92	—	.88	.69	−.22	−.04
2c	uncertainty$_{y/x}$	.87	.97	.91	—	.71	.34	.42
3c	Yule's Q	.67	.71	.83	.75	—	.24	.46
2d	theta	.50	.67	.46	.66	.50	—	.84
3d	maximum cohesion	.32	.51	.45	.61	.79	.66	—

[a] Correlations above the diagonal are based on all votes; those below the diagonal exclude unanimous and near-unanimous votes.

the "cleavage" interpretation of a null relationship differ most sharply from the others. Among the remaining models, models 1a and 3c are most different from one another, but their considerable covariation should not be overlooked. Finally models 1b, 1c, and 2c are moderate, and measures based on them are quite similar in their behavior.

Model selection. The different models correspond to different substantive theories of a relationship, so the analyst can choose a substantive model and then use a measure embodying that model. The choice of a substantive model will be illustrated in this section by interpreting the various models in the party voting context.

Model 1a. This is the most rigorous model, utilizing the most stringent definition of a perfect relationship along with the null relationship definition which codes the most relationships as null. This model classifies all instances of party agreement as null relationships, while it accepts only strong monotonicity as a perfect relationship. Those ideologues believing that party agreement proves the party system is a sham because the bourgeoisie and proletariat have opposite objectives would employ this model.

Model 1b. This model differs from model 1a in accepting instances of party accord as cases of a relationship so long as the party and vote cleavages are reinforcing. It is a model based on the balance between issue positions that are consistent and inconsistent with party divisions. For example, a balance between the number of Democratic doves and Republican hawks on the one hand and Democratic hawks and Republican doves on the other hand would indicate a null relationship; a relationship would exist if the Democratic doves and Republican hawks predominate (or if the Democratic hawks and Republican doves predominate).

Model 1c. This model differs from the previous ones in viewing only statistical independence as the lack of a relationship. Party would be related to vote so long as members of one party vote yes in greater proportions than those of the other party; complete party voting would require the total opposition of the two parties.

Model 2c. This model differs from model 1c only in accepting a unanimous vote as a perfect relationship, since such votes can be perfectly predicted from party.

Model 2d. Like model 2c, this model accepts a unanimous vote as involving perfect prediction from party, but it regards as a null case only those instances in which both parties split evenly on the vote. The more cohesive the parties, the more successful is the prediction that members vote with their party's majority. This model sums up the predictability of the vote for each party, while avoiding contrasts of the behavior of the parties. It tests how cohesive the parties are, not whether one is more cohesive than the other.

Model 3c. Like model 2c, this model regards statistical independence as the null value condition. It accepts, however, a single cohesive party as the definition of a perfect relationship. It is a weak ideological model in which a perfect relationship holds so long as proponents of a motion can identify one party as their friend (because it unanimously favored the motion) or their enemy

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not be judged according to whether they are sensitive to the Pearson's *r* correlation "underlying" the cross-tabulation because they may be purposefully based on relationship models different from that of Pearson's *r*. An interesting empirical analysis of the behavior of several measures is given by Brent M. Rutherford, "The Accuracy, Robustness and Relationships Among Correlational Models for Social Analysis: A Monte Carlo Simulation," (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5–9, 1972). A useful discussion of intuitive notions of a relationship and of the factors underlying differences among measures is provided by A. A. Hunter, "On the Validity of Measures of Association," *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (July, 1973), 99–109. However, neither author's interpretation of the results acknowledges sufficiently the meaningfulness of differences in the behavior of measures.

(because it unanimously opposed the motion). This model is particularly appropriate when the line separating the independent variable categories is questionable. If, for example, the actual voting division is between southern Democrats and all Republicans on one side and northern Democrats on the other side, the model 3c measures calculated between official party and vote would be maximal.

Model 3d. This is the most lenient model. A single cohesive party is accepted as perfect party voting while any degree of cohesion for either party is viewed as indicating some party voting. Only the most cohesive party's behavior is relevant for this model since the model concentrates on how united is the most cohesive party.

I would regard models 1a, 1c, and 3c as the main models for legislative voting analysis. Model 1c is the classical statistical model and the traditional legislative analysis model. Models 1a and 3c are intriguing alternative models with clear underlying ideological bases. Measures based on models 1b, 2c, 2d, and 3d are excellent illustrations of probabilisitic theoretic predictability and ad hoc measures, but they represent interpretations of a relationship which seem to be of less interest in the present case.

Different substantive situations may call for other relationship models. Also the various relationship models can have special meanings in situations where the distinction between independent and dependent variables is inappropriate. For example, MacRae has demonstrated that model 3c measures are well-suited for tapping cumulative relationships between variables, the relationships which form the basis for Guttman scaling.[18] When measuring agreement among individuals by simply counting up the number of times a pair of individuals gives the same response to a set of items, the resultant simple agreement score is based on model 1b (actually it is a linear transformation of koppa). Students of taxonomy have shown that model 1c coefficients correct such agreement statistics for the amount of agreement expected on the basis of statistical independence, while model 3c measures concentrate on cumulative differences between the individuals or objects being classified.[19]

Chart 6 re-examines the models of Chart 4 from the perspective of what each emphasizes in its measurement. Thus high values for model 1a statistics signify opposite behavior for independent variable categories. Model 1b measures calculated between a pair of individuals are high when there is agreement between that pair of individuals on most items to which they are responding. Model 1c coefficients are large when the independent variable categories are polarized on the dependent variable (which requires equal numbers of rows and columns for complete polarization), while model 2c coefficients are large when the variables are statistically associated with one another regardless of unequal numbers of variable categories. Predictability is tapped by model 2d measures, cumulation by model 3c measures, and cohesion of at least one of the independent variable categories by model 3d statistics.

Measure selection. The choice of a measure of association need be made only after the relationship model has been selected. At that time, however, it is necessary to choose among the measures based on the relevant model. This choice problem leads us to ask a series of questions: In what ways do measures based on the same model differ from one another? How should one choose between measures based on the same model, and how important is that choice?

First, there can be magnitude differences between measures based on the same model. The operations involved in the construction of some measures cause them to have lower values than other statistics. The most neutral standard for comparing coefficient values is the case with 50 per cent in each marginal category of both variables. Figure 2 shows the statistics' values and computing formulas for this case. Curves above the diagonal represent "high-valued" statistics, while those below the diagonal correspond to "low-valued" coefficients. Measures which tend to assume high or low values may have well developed operational interpretations, but they are limited in their power to discriminate between certain sized relationships. A high-valued statistic, for example, provides little differentiation between separate cases with large relationships.

In addition to the magnitude of the coefficient, there are a variety of strategies for a choice between statistics based on a single model. Reasonable considerations in choosing between statistics include how pleasing are their operational interpretations, how simple they are to compute, how well known they are, how readily they generalize to nondichotomous variables, and what measurement level they employ for nondichotomous data.

The selection can also be based on whether "sensitivity" to the choice of independent variable and/or to the independent variable's marginals are desired in the substantive setting. An asymmetric statistic takes on different values depending on which is the independent variable (which may be appropriate, for example, when measuring how

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[18] MacRae, *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting*, chapters 3 and 5.

[19] Robert R. Sokal and Peter H. A. Sneath, *Principles of Numerical Taxonomy* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1963).


Maximum Value Conditions
1. Strong Monotonicity
2. Moderate Monotonicity
3. Weak Monotonicity
Null Value Conditions
a. Accord
b. Balance
c. Independence
d. Cleavage
1a Opposition
1b Agreement
1c Polarization
2c Association
2d Predictability
3c Cumulation
3d Cohesion

Chart 6. Models of Statistical Relationship

well the dependent variable can be predicted from the independent one), while a symmetric coefficient is not sensitive to which variable is labeled "independent." Some coefficients are also sensitive to the independent variable marginals. Consider two legislative votes, 60 per cent of Republicans voting yes on both compared to only 40 per cent of Democrats. Say these votes were taken in different years with the distribution of party strength having changed in the intervening period. A measure "insensitive" to the marginals would regard the extent of party voting on these two votes as identical, while a coefficient sensitive to the marginals might have different values for these two votes.[20] The sensitivities of the measures are summarized in Chart 7.

The correlations between measures based on the same model provide a useful perspective on these many criteria. Over the set of roll calls employed for the analysis of Figure 1, the within-model correlations are uniformly very high[21]—between .89 and .99—regardless of whether the coefficients differ in their operational interpretations, symmetry, or sensitivity to variable margi-

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[20] Maximum value condition 3 was described as providing an adjustment for unequal marginals. That involves a contrast of independent variables and dependent variable marginals, whereas the sensitivity described here is a further sensitivity to changes in the independent variable marginals.

[21] The sole exception involves the opposition index when low variance votes are retained in the analysis. This measure differs from the others in the employing negative values to assess varying degrees of party accord (its null value condition). Low-variance votes would be marked by strong party accord, so this index differs from other model 1a measures for such votes, which results in somewhat lower correlations.

Note that raising the measures (except the opposition index) to a positive power yields another statistic having the same maximum and null value conditions and therefore the same relationship model. Raising to a power provides a statistic whose intermediate values "look" different from those of the original measure, but they would covary perfectly according to Spearman's rho correlation of rank orders. The measures would differ meaningfully only in their magnitudes.



Figure 2. Measure Values as a Function of Cell Size under Equal Marginal Conditions ($p_{1.} = p_{2.} = p_{.1} = p_{.2} = .50$)

Curve 1: lambda-symmetric = lambda-asymmetric = koppa = phi = $b_{yx} = b_{xy}$ = theta = average cohesion = phi/phi max = Yule's Y = maximum cohesion = $4p_{11} - 1$ if $p_{11} \geq \frac{1}{4}$, $1 - 4p_{11}$ otherwise.
Curve 2: Yule's $Q = (2Y)/(1 + Y^2)$ where Y is given by curve 1.
Curve 3: Tetrachoric $r = \sin(.5\pi Y)$ where Y is given by curve 1.
Curve 4: opposition index = cross-cutting = tau$_{GK}$ = phi^2 where phi is given by curve 1.
Curve 5: uncertainty-asymmetric = uncertainty-symmetric =
$2p_{11} \log_2 (p_{11}) + (1 - 2p_{11}) \log_2 (.5 - p_{11})$ if $p_{11} \geq \frac{1}{4}$
$2p_{12} \log_2 (p_{12}) + (1 - 2p_{12}) \log_2 (.5 - p_{12})$ otherwise.

nals.[22] These high correlations were reflected in Figure 1 by the small distances among measures based on the same model. The choice among measures with such great covariation is not critical, so it can well be based on convenience.

Measures based on the same model covary, so their magnitude is the most important property distinguishing them. Minimally, the analyst should bear in mind whether the statistic being employed is high-, moderate-, or low-valued. Certain forms of analysis, such as factor analysis, will be directly affected by tendencies of the coefficients to take on high or low values. Moderate-valued statistics are desirable in that they are of the same order of magnitude as the familiar Pearson's r. When values of different measures are to be compared, it makes particular sense to employ moderate-valued coefficients so that the comparisons are not confounded by idiosyncracies of the measures themselves.

This section has considered the problem of choosing an association measure given the choice of a relationship measure. Preceding sections have emphasized the extent to which different models may be appropriate in different situations. The remainder of this paper demonstrates that more than one model can be of interest in a single substantive situation.

The Use of Multiple Models

While it is possible to choose a single relationship model on the basis of substantive considerations, it often will be useful to employ simultaneously several measures based on alternative models of a relationship. Multiple measures can be used on a given set of data to study different aspects of a relationship. Rather than postulate a single party-voting model in legislatures, for example, one could determine which of several possible models best describe the voting.

The use of multiple measures raises a new problem: How are differences in values of two coefficients to be explained? The differences can be due to the use of different relationship models, but they also can be due to the idiosyncracies of particular measures. Some coefficients are always larger than others, so an appreciation of magnitude characteristics of coefficients is required for the use of multiple models to become practical.

The previous section distinguished between "high-valued," "moderate-valued," and "low-valued" coefficients. When multiple models are used, employing only moderate-valued statistics holds constant some extraneous differences between measures. There are order relationships among these moderate-valued measures which are also important to bear in mind. Chart 8 displays the four-tiered structure of magnitude differences among moderate-valued statistics. The lambda statistics are never larger than any of the others. No model 1b, 1c, or 2c measure is ever larger than any model 2d or 3c statistic. None of these coefficients can be larger than the maximum cohesion score.[23]

This magnitude information should be con-

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[22] These results seem most liable to being dependent on the empirical data being analyzed. Greater variation in the independent variable marginals may have an effect, but the effects are unlikely to be pronounced unless the marginal split betwen parties is 80—20 or 90–10.

[23] The relationships of Chart 8 were originally detected by inspection of the party voting measures for 1953–54 and 1965. Proofs have subsequently been obtained for all of the inequalities shown, while the lack of a consistent ordering with the roll-call data is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of an order relationship.

(i) Measure	(ii) Model	(iii) Asymmetry	(iv) Marginals	(v) Values
Lambda, symmetric	1a	symmetric	sensitive	moderate
Lambda, asymmetric	1a	asymmetric	sensitive	moderate
Opposition index	1a	asymmetric	insensitive	low
Koppa	1b	symmetric	sensitive	moderate
Cross-cutting	1b	symmetric	sensitive	low
Phi	1c	symmetric	sensitive	moderate
Goodman and Kruskal's tau	1c	symmetric	sensitive	low
Uncertainty, symmetric	1c	symmetric	sensitive	low
b_{yx}	1c	asymmetric	insensitive	moderate
b_{xy}	2c	asymmetric	sensitive	moderate
Uncertainty$_{y/x}$	2c	asymmetric	sensitive	low
Theta	2d	asymmetric	sensitive	moderate
Average cohesion	2d	asymmetric	insensitive	moderate
Phi/phi max	3c	symmetric	sensitive	moderate
Yule's Y	3c	symmetric	insensitive	moderate
Tetrachoric r	3c	symmetric	insensitive	high
Yule's Q	3c	symmetric	insensitive	high
Maximum cohesion	3d	asymmetric	insensitive	moderate

Chart 7. Formal Properties of Measures


lambda asymmetric (1a)
lambda symmetric (1a)
koppa (1b)
b_{yx} (1c)
phi (1c)
b_{xy} (2c)
theta (2d)
average cohesion (2d)
Yule's Y (3c)
phi/phi max (3c)
maximum cohesion (3d)

Chart 8. Order Relationships among Moderate-valued Statistical Measures[a]

[a] A connecting line indicates that the top coefficient is less than or equal to the bottom one.

Table 2. Mean Values for Measures of Party Voting in House, 1953–54 and 1965

Measure	Model	Values[a]	Means without Near-Unanimous and Unanimous Votes	Means with All Votes
Opposition index	1a	low	.127	−.125
Uncertainty, symmetric	1c	low	.235	.181
Uncertainty$_{y/x}$	2c	low	.239	.216
Goodman and Kruskal's tau	1c	low	.272	.237
Cross-cutting	1b	low	.279	.230
Lambda, asymmetric	1a	moderate	.308	.266
Lambda, symmetric	1a	moderate	.337	.260
b_{yx}	1c	moderate	.455	.352
Phi	1c	moderate	.467	.414
Koppa	1b	moderate	.475	.415
b_{xy}	2c	moderate	.486	.465
Yule's *Y*	3c	moderate	.541	.537
Average cohesion	2d	moderate	.578	.671
Theta	2d	moderate	.580	.672
Phi/phi max	3c	moderate	.632	.626
Tetrachoric *r*	3c	high	.695	.679
Maximum cohesion	3d	moderate	.750	.805
Yule's *Q*	3c	high	.757	.737

[a] See Figure 2: curve 1 = moderate, curves 2 and 3 = high, curves 4 and 5 = low.

sidered when using multiple models. Say, for example, that phi (model 1c) is .49, while Yule's *Y* (model 3c) is .50 and Yule's *Q* (model 3c) is .80. It would be fallacious to compare the phi and *Q* values since *Q* is higher-valued than phi. The *Y* value of .5 can be legitimately compared to the phi, and making this comparison places the *Y* in perspective. A *Y* of .5 might ordinarily suggest that a model 3c relationship exists, but in this case the *Y* value is on par with the phi. The more restrictive model 1c suffices for description of the relationship. The relationship is effectively summarized by the strong monotonicity model; there is no additional tendency for weak monotonicity.

Party voting in legislatures. The use of multiple relationship models will be illustrated by means of three political examples. The first example returns to the roll-call data previously described. Is there party voting in the American Congress and, if so, of what type? Do the parties disagree with one another? Are there differences in the voting of the parties? Is the predominant conflict one between northern Democrats and a conservative coalition? Multiple measures must be used if one is to test the existence of various forms of party voting.

The mean values of the several coefficients over the roll calls, as reported in Table 2, can be examined to determine the extent of different forms of party voting in the House of Representatives.[24] The support for the hypothesis of party voting under restrictive model 1a is not great, but party opposition sometimes occurs. There is also evidence of party voting as tapped by the traditional model 1c (and the related model 1b). The additional support for the predictability model 2d and for the cumulation model 3c may be considered slight given their leniency. If the House were ruled by a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and a united Republican party, the moderate monotonicity (model 3c and 3d) measures would be at unity; instead significant divisions must exist within both parties. Predictability from party is far from complete even if independence is not used as the definition of predictability (model 2d).

Evidence of party voting in the House seems greater than some have charged and less than others have feared. The usual analysis of party voting using model 1c would find a moderate degree of party responsibility. The present analysis specifies that this responsibility often involves the opposition of the parties but not necessarily the total cohesion of either party. Simultaneous use of multiple definitions of relationship permits more extensive analysis than the customary restriction to a single statistic.[25]

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[24] Considering only the moderate-valued measures, the restrictive model 1a statistics have the lowest means, the model 1b, 1c, and 2c coefficients have lower means than the model 3c and 2d measures, and the lenient model 3d statistic has the highest mean—an ordering of means consistent with both Charts 4 and 8. The differences in mean values in Table 2 are fairly sharp; the value of a coefficient is related to its underlying model. The means for most coefficients drop when unanimous and near-unanimous votes are included, except that the model 2d and 3d measures are higher in this instance (and the model 2c and 3c statistics fall by less than .03 with these data), since such votes are extremely predictable and cohesion is necessarily high.

Group voting in electorates. As another example of this approach we shall consider group voting in a mass electorate. The party for which a person votes is the dependent variable for this case, while the person's group membership is the independent variable. Voting differences between classes, religions, regions, and races have been studied in several countries. The regression slope (that is, the simple percentage difference) is the measure most commonly used, with the closely related phi-coefficient also being employed.[26] The potential use of different and multiple measures to explore group voting more fully has not been exploited.

What is group voting? Does it require the groups to vote for different parties? Is it completely reflected in the difference in support for a party by two groups? Must one group be cohesive for there to be group voting? Each of these possibilities suggests a type of group voting, and we can determine which types hold for particular groups. An exhaustive review of the work on group voting would be beyond the scope of this paper, but we shall focus on a few suggestive cases. Table 3 presents the relevant data.

In Canada, the majorities of the manual and nonmanual workers did not intend to vote in opposite directions in 1960. In fact the difference in their proportions supporting the left parties is barely noticeable. Neither class was particularly cohesive in its party support. Class voting is slight in Canada under any relationship model.

By contrast, class differences are obvious in Britain. The majorities of middle- and working-class identifiers do support different parties. Defection from class occurs, but contrasting the model 1c and 3c measures does not indicate particularly greater defection in one class. Class voting in Britain is adequately described by the traditional model 1c measures.

The more lenient measures have higher values if one group is virtually united or if most of a party's support comes from a single group. Thus the 62 per cent difference in support of the Democratic presidential nominee between blacks and whites in 1968 does not adequately stress the bloc voting by blacks which is evident in the model 3d statistic. Similarly the 53 per cent difference in voting behavior of Norwegian farmers and non-

Table 3. Examples of Group Voting Statistics

		(1a) Lambda	(1c) b_{yx}	(2d) Average Cohesion	(3c) Y	(3d) Maximum Cohesion
Canada 1960	manual workers: 60% left parties non-manual class: 53% left parties	.00	.07	.13	.07	.20
Britain 1963	working class identifiers: 72% Labour middle class identifiers: 21% Labour	>0[a]	.51	.51	.51	.58
U.S. 1968	blacks: 97% Humphrey whites: 35% Humphrey	>0[a]	.62	.62	.77	.94
Norway 1965	farmers & foresters: 60% Agrarian party others: 7% Agrarian party	.16	.53	.53	.65	.86

[a] Insufficient information is available to calculate lambda.

Sources:

Canada: Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 354.

Britain: Donald E. Stokes and David Butler, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 76.

U.S.: Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1085.

Norway: Philip E. Converse and Henry Valen, "Cleavage and Perceived Party Distances in Norwegian Voting," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 6, 1971, p. 115.

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[25] Separate analysis of the two Congresses would yield similar results. The differences in measure means between the two are minimal. The largest difference is .09 for the symmetric lambda; others are .04 or less. There is no trend for higher values in one Congress than the other, though the measures' variances are consistently higher in the 1953–54 Congress in which party sizes were virtually equal.

[26] In particular, the tau-*b* used to measure "status polarization" in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960) is identical to phi since the variable are dichotomous. Rae and Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages*, also suggest the applicability of their cross-cutting measure for studying group voting. See also Walter Korpi, "Some Problems in the Measurement of Class Voting," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (November, 1972), 627–642.

farmers does not emphasize the Agrarian party's lack of appeal outside of its occupational core which the model 3d measure captures.

These examples illustrate how the different models provide alternate perspectives on group voting. As surveys of additional countries become available, it would be fascinating to apply the full set of models in a systematic attempt to classify different forms of group voting.

Generational change in attitudes. As a final example of the considerations discussed in this paper, it is worth investigating the special situation involving time processes. Change can be measured in many ways—i.e. by estimating change parameters, gross change, net change, unidirectionality of change, and the dependence of later values on initial states. Different relationship models emphasize separate aspects of change.

Converse and DuPeux have studied generational change in politicization. In 1958 they interviewed samples of the public in France and the United States. Respondents were asked about their own and their father's partisanship (assuming the respondents knew their father and the father was a citizen eligible to vote).[27] To facilitate the discussion, the substantive example will be simplified so we can speak of whether the father's politicization level (whether or not he had a partisan affiliation) affected the respondent's. Table 4 reproduces the relevant information and gives the values for several coefficients.

Converse and DuPeux emphasize the b_{yx} percentage difference (model 1c, asymmetric) similarity in France and the United States in pointing out the common change process. The effect of higher parental politicization on respondent's politicization level is identical in the two countries, but the full range of statistics provides added insights. An interesting null finding is how little the predictor affects the dependent variable, whether in terms of the respondents moving to the high politicization level regardless of their father's politicization (lambda; model 1a) or little variance being explained (phi-squared; model 1c, symmetric). Yet the gross stability is overwhelming in the United States where 78 per cent of respondents have the same politicization level as their father (which translates to a .56 koppa; model 1b) though less noticeable in France where only 60 per cent have the same politicization level (koppa $=.20$). The unidirectionality of change is not striking in either country—the model 3c measure would be unity if the change were unidirectional (say from low to high but not vice versa); it is, however, actually no higher than model 1c statistics. The model 2d measures indicate some unity of the time 1 groups at time 2, but note that these measures are actually equivalent in value to comparable model 1b and 1c measures (theta $\approx$ koppa and average cohesion $\approx b_{yx}$). There is definite cohesion of at least one of the t_1 groups (model 3d), with the maximum cohesion score in France being much larger than any of the other coefficients.

The Converse-DuPeux emphasis on b_{yx} is consistent with (and one of the best political examples of) Blalock's advice to use unstandardized coefficients when seeking the parameters of social science laws.[28] The actual change process, however, is more complex than b_{yx} suggests because of the low dependence of t_2 states on t_1 states and the definite change in both directions. The gross stability actually varies considerably between the two countries, though the percentage differences do not detect this divergence. As this example illustrates, there are many aspects of a time process; stability and change have several separate dimensions, and the use of multiple models permits an examination of the different dimensions.[29]

Conclusions

In an era in which probabilistic interpretations of measures of relationship are in vogue, this paper has taken pains to avoid mention of the interpretations as they are generally available elsewhere. I have instead argued that the basic question is what the statistic is actually measuring—its model of a relationship. Coefficients often seem more attractive when only their interpretations are provided than when their underlying models are revealed. Thus while there is undoubtedly a place for models 1b, 2c, and 2d, they certainly will not "replace" traditional statistics since they actually measure different concepts. Some measures and models might be more useful in the general case than they are with binary data, though greater generality does not guarantee that the underlying model will be of interest.

Finally I would contend that analysts frequently should not seek a single measure and will never find a perfect measure. Different measures exist because there are different concepts to measure. There may be some bad coefficients, but there is some good in most of them. A bivariate relation-

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[27] Philip E. Converse and Georges DuPeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring, 1962), 1–23.

[28] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March, 1967), 130–136.

[29] See also Hernes's interpretation of several measures of relationship in the context of James Coleman's effect parameters for time-continuous Markov processes in Gudmund Hernes, "A Markovian Approach to Measures of Association," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (May, 1970), 992–1011.

Table 4. Generational Change in Politicization, U.S. and France[a]

	Father's Politicization (t_1)			
	High (knows father's party)		Low (does not know father's party)	
Respondent's Politicization (t_2)	France	U.S.	France	U.S.
High (has partisan self-location)	79.4%	81.6%	47.7%	50.7%
Low (no partisan self-location)	20.6	18.4	52.3	49.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Per cent of sample	29%	91%	71%	9%

Model	Measure	France	U.S.
1a	lambda-asymmetric	.07	.00
1b	koppa	.20	.56
1c	b_{yx}	.31	.31
1c	phi	.29	.18
2d	theta	.20	.57
2d	average cohesion	.32	.32
3c	Yule's Y	.35	.35
3d	maximum cohesion	.59	.63

[a] Data are from Philip E. Converse and Georges DuPeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," p. 14.

ship can tell us much more than any single measure can summarize. If we are unwilling to examine the complete bivariate relationship, at least we should attempt to cope with statistics summarizing different aspects of a relationship. It is time to stop acting embarrassed about the supposed surplus of measures and instead make the fullest possible use of their diversity.

Appendix I

Polytomous Variables

While the text of this paper deals mainly with dichotomous variables, the distinction among the different relationship models remains relevant with nondichotomous variables. The exact considerations depend on the level of measurement.

Because the traditional statistics have seemed inadequate for multiple category nominal-level variables, probabilistic measures have been developed to cope with them. These measures—including lambda, the opposition index, the cross-cutting statistic, Goodman and Kruskal's tau, uncertainty statistics, and theta—are, however, generally not based on the classic relationship model (model 1c). Thus it should be recognized that these coefficients alter the definition of a relationship. The models implicit in these new measures may be valuable, but the statistics are not analogous to conventional interval-level statistics.

By contrast, there are very few measures at the interval level of measurement. Pearson's r is the classic model 1c coefficient and there are some related statistics. Yet the development of interesting relationship models with nominal measures has not been carried through to devising interval-level counterparts. Ironically measure development may now be required at the interval level.

The ordinal level of measurement is marked by a combination of these effects. There are not measures for all the potential models, but the available coefficients differ substantially in what they measure. For example, Kendall's tau-*b* is based on model 1c, Kendall's tau-*c* is the comparable model 2c measure,[30] and Goodman and Kruskal's gamma is a model 3c statistic. The issue involved in choosing among them is thus whether unequal numbers of variable categories and disparate variable marginals should detract from the magnitude of the relationship.

The conventional wisdom is that tau-*c* should be used rather than tau-*b* when dealing with variables having different numbers of categories. In considering the effects of social class on vote, for example, say there are three classes but only two parties with each class totally cohesive in its voting (Chart 9i). Strong monotonicity is lacking since class voting would be greater if each class voted cohesively for its own party in a three-party system. (Identically, if as in Chart 9iii there are two classes and three parties with one class voting for the first party and the other class splitting its

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[30] Actually tau-*c* attains its maximum value only under moderate monotonicity with a uniform distribution of cases on the variable with fewer categories.

3 × 2 Tables:

Chart 9 i
Moderate Monotonicity
($\tau_b < 1, \tau_c = 1, \gamma = 1$)

Class	Party: Rep.	Dem.
Upper	.20	.00
Middle	.30	.00
Lower	.00	.50

$p_{12} = p_{22} = p_{31} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{12} = p_{21} = p_{31} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{21} = p_{32} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{22} = p_{32} = 0$

Chart 9 ii
Weak Monotonicity
($\tau_b < 1, \tau_c < 1, \gamma = 1$)

Class	Party: Rep.	Dem.
Upper	.20	.00
Middle	.20	.10
Lower	.00	.50

$p_{12} = p_{31} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = p_{32} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{21} = 0$

Class	Party: Rep.	Dem.
Upper	.20	.00
Middle	.30	.00
Lower	.10	.40

$p_{12} = p_{22} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{22} = p_{32} = 0$
Or: $p_{21} = p_{31} = 0$

2 × 3 Tables:

Chart 9 iii
Moderate Monotonicity
($\tau_b < 1, \tau_c = 1, \gamma = 1$)

Class	Party: Tory	Lib.	Lab.
Middle	.40	.10	.00
Working	.00	.00	.50

$p_{13} = p_{21} = p_{22} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{12} = p_{13} = p_{21} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{12} = p_{23} = 0$
Or: $p_{11} = p_{22} = p_{23} = 0$

Chart 9 iv
Weak Monotonicity
($\tau_b < 1, \tau_c < 1, \gamma = 1$)

Class	Party: Tory	Lib.	Lab.
Middle	.45	.05	.00
Working	.00	.05	.45

$p_{13} = p_{21} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = p_{23} = 0$
Or: $p_{21} = p_{22} = 0$

Class	Party: Tory	Lib.	Lab.
Middle	.50	.00	.00
Working	.10	.10	.30

$p_{12} = p_{13} = 0$
Also maximal if:
$p_{11} = p_{12} = 0$
Or: $p_{22} = p_{23} = 0$

Chart 9. Ordinal Maximum Value Conditions for 3×2 and 2×3 Tables

vote between the remaining two parties, strong monotonicity would not hold, since class voting would be greater if each class voted cohesively for its own party in a two-party system.) This is a perfect relationship under moderate monotonicity, whereas the strong monotonicity model exacts a penalty for the unequal number of categories. If perfect class voting means that each class votes cohesively for a different party, the strong monotonicity model should be used. Thus the choice between tau-*b* and tau-*c* is not a technical issue relating to the number of categories but a substantive decision about what is intended by a perfect relationship. The class polarization of the vote may best be measured by tau-*b* even when the numbers of parties and classes differ.

Many researchers feel that gamma overstates the size of a relationship while tau-*b* values are comparable to those of the familiar Pearson's *r*. The weak monotonicity model actually determines whether the relationship between the variables is maximal *given their marginals* (Charts 9ii and 9iv). Given the class composition of the electorate and the party vote totals, this model judges whether the classes vote as differently as possible. The leniency of this definition of a perfect relationship partly explains the high values of gamma. This model is of sufficient potential interest so that gamma should not be dismissed out of hand because of its large values. Regardless of whether or not the variables are dichotomous, the critical decision made by an analyst is what relationship model to employ.

This appendix has relied on intuitive understandings of the purposes of the various maximum value conditions rather than careful restatement of them for the polytomous case. The exact definitions are as follows. Strong monotonicity requires that (1) all independent variable categories be homogeneous on the dependent variable and (2) every increase in the value of one variable, from any category to the next higher category, be accompanied by a change in the other variable's value. Moderate monotonicity is satisfied if (1) the categories of the variable with the greater number of categories are homogeneous on the other variable and (2) every increase from any category of the variable with more categories to the next higher category results in the other variable's changing or remaining constant, but not both. Weak monotonicity assumes that (1) the categories of the independent variable are as homogeneous on the dependent variable as possible given differences in variable marginals and (2) an increase in the value of the independent variable results in the value of the other variable's changing, staying constant, or both. For ordinal and interval relationships, increases in one variable would always induce change in a single direction in the other variable; a positive relationship would entail an increase in one variable's inducing an increase in the other.

Individual and Contextual Variables in British Voting Behavior: An Exploratory Note*

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This note reports the results of an initial exploration into the significance of social contexts in the shaping of individual political behaviors. Several "individual-level" socioeconomic variables are selected to serve as one set of predictors of individual voting choices in Great Britain. Several constituency-level or "contextual" variables are selected to serve as a second set of predictors of voting choices. The relative potency of the two sets of predictors is then investigated using a well-known multivariate search strategy, "tree analysis" or AID, developed by Sonquist and Morgan.[1]

"Individual-level" variables are variables whose values are determined solely by the characteristics of individual respondents. Examples include the familiar demographic and social variables like age, sex, ethnicity, occupation, class, and religion, as well as attitudinal variables such as subjective class, party preference or identification, and issue-related opinions. The values of "contextual" variables may be determined in either of two ways: (1) by averaging an individual characteristic across all the individuals occupying a certain (usually geographically-defined) area or context;[2] or (2) by directly measuring for the area or context some characteristic which is *not* affected by the distribution of individual characteristics within the area or context. Examples of the first type of contextual variable are plentiful in the aggregate data reported in censuses: per capita income, proportions in various occupations, mean educational achievements, etc., etc. for states, provinces, districts, constituencies, *departments*, *gemeinde*, etc. Examples of the second type of contextual variable include such environmental traits as the relative presence or absence of geographical features such as mountains, lakes, rivers, or seacoasts; the relative presence or absence of human-created phenomena such as roads, canals, harbors, cities, schools, universities, and many other potentially relevant traits.

Many scholars have argued that social scientists should pay more serious attention to contextual variables when they go about constructing social theories.[3] Unfortunately, many such urgings have been merely hortatory, or else have been supported by relatively unsystematic citations to the scattered literature purporting to demonstrate the existence of "breakage,"[4] "structural,"[5] "compositional,"[6] or "contextual"[7] effects on a variety of individual behaviors. Methodological guidelines for the study of such effects have been proposed and debated.[8] But so far, there have been few systematic efforts to demonstrate empirically the overall significance of contextual variables as predictors of dependent individual behaviors, especially relative to the significance of individual-level predictors.[9] This note serves as a first report of a cross-national investigation in which I am engaged which does attempt to confront directly the question of the relative importance of individual and contextual variables in explaining individual political behaviors. The project design calls for the investigation of the impact on several types of political behavior of a specific set of socioeconomic and political characteristics measured at both the individual and contextual levels in Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. Here only the initial findings for the British case are presented. The data utilized include the Butler-Stokes 1964 sample survey and a set of constituency-based ecological indicators from the 1966 1 in 10,000 Census survey of Great Britain.[10]

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* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, March 16, 1973. The data utilized in this analysis were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and the *Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung*, Cologne. The data were originally collected by David Butler and Donald Stokes and by William Miller. The original collectors and the archives supplying the data bear no responsibility for the uses made of it here.

[1] A brief discussion of the uses and limitations of this technique is given in the AID program description in Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, *OSIRIS II: OS Users Manual* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, mimeo, 1971), pp. 375–388. For a more detailed discussion of the method, see John A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, *The Detection of Interaction Effects: A Report on a Computer Program for the Selection of Optimal Combinations of Explanatory Variables*, Monograph No. 35 (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1964).

[2] An exception is the effort of scholars associated with Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research to develop socially defined contexts, especially through the use of "snowball" and "sociometric" sampling techniques. See Allan H. Barton, "Bringing Society Back In: Survey Research and Macro-Methodology," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 12 (November-December, 1968), 1–9, and the works cited therein.

[3] See, for example, Erwin K. Scheuch, "Social Context and Individual Behavior," in *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 133–135; Tapani Valkonen, "Individual and Structural Effects in Ecological Research," in Dogan and Rokkan, pp. 53–68; and *European Politics: A Reader*, ed. Mattei Dogan and Richard Rose (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 144–145.

[4] The term "breakage effect" is developed in Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 98–101.

[5] Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects," *American Sociological Review*, 25 (February, 1960), 178–193.

[6] James A. Davis, Joe L. Spaeth, and Carolyn Huson, "A Technique for Analyzing the Effects of Group Composition," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (April, 1961), 215–225.

[7] Phillip H. Ennis, "The Contextual Dimension in Voting," in *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, ed. William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 180–211.

Since this note focuses on the relative importance of individual and contextual variables as predictors of individual behavior, and not on particular variables or theoretical concepts, a "search strategy" is adopted. A search strategy allows the investigator to seek out the best predictors of his dependent variables from a prespecified set of predictors. To some, the search strategy is atheoretical, a "fishing expedition."[11] But other scholars argue that rather than being "atheoretical," it is "pretheoretical," because it helps the investigator discover basic relationships in his data which may lead him to more explicit theoretical formulations.[12] I do not wish to enter this debate here. I will only note that for this investigation, an initial search strategy seems quite appropriate, since it will allow me to confront the methodological issue of the relative utility of individual and contextual variables directly, with a minimum of attention to which variables at which levels are *theoretically* significant. Later research can then focus on the question of theoretical significance of certain contextual and individual variables, provided these variables prove worthy of attention as predictors of dependent phenomena of interest.

The most widely used search strategy (other than trial-and-error table building) is undoubtedly stepwise multiple regression. The method which is used here is "tree analysis," as performed by the AID (Automatic Interaction Detector) program developed by the staff of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.[13] AID has analogies to both stepwise regression and analysis of variance. It has two major advantages over stepwise regression which make it the more appropriate search strategy for this analysis: (1) it more readily accepts the data at nominal or ordinal levels of measurement; (2) it does not require the assumptions of linearity and additivity characteristic of ordinary stepwise regression. A disadvantage of the technique is that it is usually necessary to categorize interval level data if one uses several predictors measured at this level in a single analysis.[14]

The predictor variables utilized in the AID analysis are listed in Table 1. This is not the place for an extensive discussion of the reasons for the selection of the particular individual- and contextual-level variables listed there. Essentially, two criteria governed the selection of these variables. The first was theoretical: the predictors were intended to tap the most important lines of social cleavage which, Lipset and Rokkan suggest,[15] are the basis for the formation of political

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[8] See, for example, Blau; Valkonen; Davis, Spaeth, and Huson; Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Jerald G. Bachman, "Structural Versus Individual Effects," *American Journal of Sociology*, 69 (May, 1964), 585–595; Robert D. Putnam, "Political Attitudes and the Local Community," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (September, 1966), 640–654.

[9] One such effort, however, is Leo Meltzer, "Comparing Relationships of Individual and Average Variables to Individual Response," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 117–123.

[10] The survey data were originally collected by David Butler and Donald Stokes. See *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's, 1969). They were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The census data were originally collected by William Miller and were made available through the *Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung* of the University of Cologne. The original collectors and the archives supplying the data, of course, bear no responsibility for the uses made of it in this analysis.

[11] For arguments which, at least by implication, condemn such atheoretical approaches, see Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in *The Methodology of Comparative Research*, ed. Holt and John E. Turner (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 21–71.

[12] See the comments of Lawrence C. Mayer, *Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 279–280 for a discussion of the research strategy appropriate for a pretheoretical discipline such as political science.

[13] Sonquist and Morgan; John A. Sonquist, "Finding Variables That Work," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Spring, 1969), pp. 83–95; and John A. Sonquist, *Multivariate Model Building: The Validation of A Search Strategy* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970).

[14] Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, p. 375.

[15] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1–64. The basic cleavages discussed by Lipset and Rokkan are social and economic in nature. Consequently, the individual and contextual indicators in Table 1 are all social and economic variables. It is possible that more variance would be

Table 1. Predictor Variables Utilized in AID Analyses

Individual-Level Variables

1. Subjective Social Class
2. Trade Union Membership
3. Employment Status
4. Age in Decades
5. Number of Children in Home
6. Head of Household's Occupation
7. Head of Household's Income
8. Respondent's Occupation
9. Respondent's Income
10. Whether Respondent is Dependent Person
11. Urban/Rural Residence
12. Religion
13. Frequency of Church Attendance
14. Residential Mobility
15. Length of Residence in Home
16. Number of Sources of Political Information
17. Type of Housing

Contextual Variables

1. % Aged 0–4 Years
2. % Aged 65 and Older
3. % Dependent Persons
4. Private Houses per Capita
5. Council (Public) Houses per Capita
6. Owner-Occupied Houses per Capita
7. Private Cars per Capita
8. % Northern Ireland Immigrants
9. % Irish Republic Immigrants
10. % Commonwealth Immigrants
11. % Irish plus Commonwealth Immigrants
12. % Professionals, Managers, and Employers
13. % Manual Workers
14. % Unemployed
15. % With No Job During Last Year
16. Nationality (English, Scots, Welsh)

party followings. The second was the pragmatic criterion of availability in the data sets at my disposal.[16]

Figures 1–3 present the results of three AID analyses using the individual and contextual predictors listed in Table 1 to predict Labour party voting in the 1964 British national election for the 1363 respondents who voted either for Labour or the Conservatives. Figure 1 is the "tree" which resulted from an AID analysis utilizing only the *individual-level* indicators in Table 1 as predictors. In each box of the "tree," N represents the number of respondents having the set of characteristics represented by the box, and $\bar{Y}$ is the proportion of these respondents reporting a vote for Labour in 1964. The "per cent V" which appears at each "branching" or "split" in the tree is the proportion of the variance in the preceding or "parent" group *accounted for by that branching*. Groups in the tree were split into further groups whenever the resulting split fulfilled two criteria: (1) the "Between Sum of Squares" produced by the split was at least .6 per cent of the "Total Sum of Squares" for the whole sample of 1363; (2) the N in each of the resulting groups was greater than or equal to 25. Figure 2 is the tree resulting from an AID analysis using only *contextual* variables as predictors of Labour vote. Figure 3 is the tree produced when *all* predictors—individual and contextual—were utilized to predict Labour vote in 1964.

The structure of Figure 1 demonstrates the overwhelming importance of class and class-related variables among the set of individual indicators in Table 1. The first-level split divides the sample on the basis of head of household's occupation into manual and nonmanual workers, a division which evokes the classic "middle class-working class" dichotomy. The second-level split demonstrates the importance of "subjective social class," as it divides each occupational group on the basis of the self-described class statuses of the respondents. By this stage, the difference of proportions for Labour in the two extreme groups—the consistently middle class and consistently working class categories—is .6213, a formidable figure. At the third level, it proved impossible to split the consistently middle-class group in any useful way. The other three categories are split on two additional class-related indicators (trade union membership and type of housing) and on residential mobility. At this point the tree is no longer symmetrical, indicating that a linear and additive model no longer applies to the data. But the increase of .0480 in the maximum difference of proportions is not negligible. The overall maximum difference of proportions (.7227) is achieved with the fourth-level branchings. Two of the three splits at this level are made on the basis of type of housing (each split involves a slightly different dichotomization of the housing variable), while the third is based on number of children in the home, a variable which significantly affects standards of living. The final (fifth-level) splits merely produce some further differentiations in the proportions for Labour for two intermediate categories. Yet even at this level class-related indicators continue to be significant, as the more potent of the splits is based on trade union membership.

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explained if individual psychological orientations (such as issue opinions) and/or contextual political indicators (such as past party voting) were utilized in the analysis. Other studies might find it worthwhile to include such alternative predictors. They were omitted here to maintain manageability of data in an openly exploratory analysis.

[16] Since the independent variables were restricted to indicators of the basic socioeconomic cleavages in Western Europe, there were in fact few problems of availability. All the relevant cleavages could be operationalized by at least one individual and one contextual indicator in the available data sets.


Total Group
$N=1363$
$\bar{Y}=.5285$
$\%V=17.4$
Manual Occupation
$N=805$
$\bar{Y}=.6984$
Nonmanual Occup+MD
$N=558$
$\bar{Y}=.2740$
$\%V=5.1$
Subj Class Working
$N=658$
$\bar{Y}=.7465$
Subj Class Middle +MD $N=147$
$\bar{Y}=.4770$
$\%V=14.7$
Subj Class Working
$N=235$
$\bar{Y}=.4712$
Subj Class Middle +MD $N=323$
$\bar{Y}=.1252$
END
$\%V=3.3$
TU Mem
$N=482$
$\bar{Y}=.7945$
Non-TU Mem
$N=176$
$\bar{Y}=.6150$
END
$\%V=3.8$
Rent House
$N=330$
$\bar{Y}=.8479$
END
Owns House
$N=152$
$\bar{Y}=.6774$
END
$\%V=8.1$
Nonmobile
$N=55$
$\bar{Y}=.6648$
END
Mobile+MD
$N=92$
$\bar{Y}=.3696$
END
$\%V=5.5$
Publ House
$N=59$
$\bar{Y}=.7762$
END
Priv House
$N=117$
$\bar{Y}=.5331$
$\%V=8.2$
Age 50–59
$N=28$
$\bar{Y}=.7852$
END
Other Ages
$N=89$
$\bar{Y}=.4519$
END
$\%V=8.2$
Publ House
$N=73$
$\bar{Y}=.6824$
END
Priv House
$N=162$
$\bar{Y}=.3734$
$\%V=10.7$
Children
$N=59$
$\bar{Y}=.5829$
No Children
$N=103$
$\bar{Y}=.2543$
END
$\%V=16.3$
TU Mem
$N=31$
$\bar{Y}=.7742$
END
NON-TU Mem
$N=28$
$\bar{Y}=.3763$
END

$\bar{Y}$ = Proportion of group voting Labour in 1964; $\%V$ = % of Total Sum of Squares of "Parent" group explained by this split.
Percentage of Total Sum of Squares accounted for by this tree = 32.35%.

Figure 1. Summary of AID Analysis Using Only Individual-Level Variables



$\bar{Y}$ = Proportion of group voting Labour in 1964; %V = % of Total Sum of Squares of "Parent" group explained by this split.
Percentage of Total Sum of Squares accounted for by this tree = 6.4%.

Figure 2. Summary of AID Analysis Using Only Contextual-Level Variables

Even the casual reader will easily notice the striking differences in complexity and potency between the trees in Figures 1 and 2. The individual variables tree (Figure 1) has five levels of splits; the contextual variables tree has only three. The *first* split in Figure 1 accounts for a greater proportion of the variance in Labour-Conservative voting (17.4 per cent) than does the entire tree in Figure 2 (6.4 per cent). Overall, the tree in Figure 1 explains 32.35 per cent of the variance in Labour-Tory voting in 1964, more than five times as much as the contextual tree in Figure 2. Nevertheless, the contextual tree does deserve some limited discussion.

In order to simplify and make manageable the contextual AID analysis and to make possible the combination of individual and contextual variables in the succeeding joint AID analysis, the interval scale contextual indicators were trichotomized. For each variable, roughly equal-sized groups were created representing "High," "Medium," and "Low" levels of the contextual variable. Obviously this procedure "wastes" a good part of the information provided in the original indicators. But it seems unlikely that it would destroy any extant relationship between any contextual variable and the dependent variable, unless that relationship was exceedingly weak to begin with. At this early stage of the analysis, I felt the loss of information could be justified by the gains in ease of computation and interpretability.

The most important variable among the contextual indicators is the proportion of manual workers in the constituency. It is utilized in two of the four splits in the tree and accounts for more than three-fourths of the total explained variance associated with the tree (4.9 per cent out of a total 6.4 per cent). The other two splits involve the percentage of dependent persons (i.e., persons in the very young and very old age brackets) in the constituency and the number of private cars per capita. The latter is—in the British case, at least—an indicator of the class context of the constituency just as is the percentage of manual workers. The dependency percentage is not directly a class-related indicator, but the other class-related indicators (mostly per cent manual workers) are clearly as dominant in the contextual tree as they were in the individual tree.

The difference in potency between the individual and contextual trees immediately suggests that contextual variables are far less useful as predictors of individual voting choice than are individual variables, or, more precisely, that the contextual variables included in *this* study are less useful than the individual variables included in *this* study. But in order to achieve a more definitive judgment on their relative usefulness, the two sets of variables were combined in a third AID analysis. Every predictor was free to "compete" with every other predictor, and only the "best" predictors were utilized in constructing the AID tree. That tree is presented in Figure 3. An examination of the tree reveals startling evidence of the relative insignificance of contextual variables compared to individual variables. To all but the most careful eyes, Figure 3 must look exactly like Figure 1. In fact, it *is* exactly like Figure 1 with one small exception: the middle, third-level split which was made on the basis of residential mobil-


Total Group
N=1363
Y=.5285
%V=17.4
Nonmanual Occup+MD
N=558
Y=.2740
Manual Occupation
N=805
Y=.6984
Subj Class Middle
+MD N=323
Y=.1252
END
%V=14.7
Subj Class Working
N=235
Y=.4712
Subj Class Middle
+MD N=147
Y=.4770
%V=5.1
Subj Class Working
N=658
Y=.7465
Priv House
N=162
Y=.3734
%V=8.2
Publ House
N=73
Y=.6824
END
% Manl Wrkr
Lo−MD N=85
Y=.3567
END
%V=8.3
% Manl Wrkr
Hi N=62
Y=.6489
END
Non-TU Mem
N=176
Y=.6150
%V=3.3
TU Mem
N=482
Y=.7945
No Children
N=103
Y=.2543
END
%V=10.7
Children
N=59
Y=.5829
Priv House
N=117
Y=.5331
%V=5.5
Publ House
N=59
Y=.7762
END
Owns House
N=152
Y=.6774
END
%V=3.8
Rent House
N=330
Y=.8479
END
NON-TU Mem
N=28
Y=.3763
END
%V=16.3
TU Mem
N=31
Y=.7742
END
Other Ages
N=89
Y=.4519
END
%V=8.2
Age 50–59
N=28
Y=.7852
END

$\overline{Y}$ = Proportion of group voting Labour in 1964; %V = % of total sum of Squares of "Parent" group explained by this split.

Percentage of Total Sum of Squares accounted for by this tree = 32.37%.

Figure 3. Summary of AID Analysis Using Individual and Contextual Variables

ity in Figure 1 is made on the basis of a contextual variable, percentage of manual workers, in Figure 3. *No other contextual indicator appears at any place in the tree.* The one which does appear does not affect the difference in proportions voting Labour for the most extreme groups. The split in which percentage manual workers appears produces a slightly smaller difference in that proportion between the two resulting categories than the corresponding split in Figure 1 on residential mobility, but it does increase the total amount of variance explained by the tree from 32.35 per cent to 32.37 per cent (!).[17]

Overall, this analysis suggests a remarkably clear conclusion: contextual variables have little or nothing to add to explanations of individual political behavior based on individual variables—at least for these variables, voting choice, and this sample of the British electorate. Nor do the contextual variables yield satisfactory alternative explanations of British voting behavior in 1964 even if individual variables are ignored. Despite the limitations of this study, it does not take a great deal of courage to suggest that its findings may well be duplicated in other investigations of the utility of contextual indicators as predictors of individual behaviors. Yet British voters may be atypical; their voting choice may be a relatively idiosyncratic dependent variable; the contextual variables taken into account here may be singularly ill-chosen. All these possibilities suggest that further careful research into the overall utility of contextual variables as molders of individual political behaviors is needed.

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[17] Another way of evaluating the trees in Figures 1–3 is by ascertaining the reduction in the number of prediction errors for individual respondents made when using the information provided by the individuals' final group classifications in the trees rather than the overall mode. Without knowledge of individual characteristics, one's best prediction for each individual voter would be the mode: a Labour vote. Predicting the overall mode for all 1363 respondents leads to 641 errors in prediction. Predicting the mode of each final group for all individuals in the group produces the following numbers of prediction errors: Figure 1, 315; Figure 2, 548; Figure 3, 315. For Figures 1 and 3 the proportionate reduction in error is .51 [(641–315)/641]. For Figure 2, it is only .15. Using these measures rather than the proportion of variance explained leads to identical conclusions.

Community and Control: Critical Democratic Theory in the Progressive Period*

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Current political reflection and criticism in the United States, replete with pronouncements as to the moral and intellectual "poverty" of the liberal tradition and its imminent (or hoped for) demise, has decisive antecedents and striking parallels in the Progressive era. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the critique mounted by American intellectuals in this earlier period—the indictments brought against the liberal capitalist order, the arguments made and the means chosen in the dual quest for fraternity and order, the implications for how "politics" is to be conceived and practiced—and briefly to assess its continuing reverberations.

It has often been noted that the challenges to liberal thought and practice that arose in chorus toward the end of the nineteenth century characteristically asserted the need for a rediscovery of *community* in American life, although the terminology and the specific prescriptions varied. Acquisitive individualism seemed to have run rampant in what Parrington aptly termed America's "great barbecue"; thoughtful men perceived not the survival of the fittest but a rising tide of human misery, economic instability, narrowed paths of opportunity, shocking concentrations of wealth, the oppressive exercise of private power, a debasement of moral and cultural standards, and the erosion of traditional patterns of deference and loyalty. Robert Wiebe points to a resultant desire for community "self determination, purity, and unity," the expressions of which ranged from anti-monopoly and anti-alien political movements, to the growth of farmer and labor alliances, to prohibitionism and the single-tax panacea.[1] Progressive publicists and social theorists took up the community theme, often consciously employing it as a corrective to what John Dewey termed "the liberalism of the school of Locke [and] the economists."[2]

It is the argument of this paper that, while the idea of "community" is undeniably central to the social thought of the period, its use as an overarching rubric may complicate more than it simplifies the tasks of those who would critically analyze or appropriate that thought. In the Progressive period, as in our present-day social criticism, the "quest for community"[3] carries divergent meanings and projects a wide variety of social forms. This paper will highlight two quite different, and not always complementary, notions of community which continue to play an important role in our political discourse. These two usages, it should initially be noted, roughly correspond to two primary assumptions of the ubiquitous and seemingly monolithic liberal system that is under attack. The first and most basic assumption, that the "free" individual is the basic unit of the political order and the protection of his life, liberty and property is the state's basic task, is questioned to varying degrees by the thinkers we shall term "communitarians." This "individualist" assumption has classical and Christian roots but dates, in its modern guise, from the rise to political ascendance of the bourgeoisie and receives its definitive articulation in the writings of Hobbes and Locke. The second assumption, the particular target of Progressives whom we shall term theorists of "social control," finds ambiguous support in Locke (and none in Hobbes) but owes more to *laissez-faire* economics. A natural harmony or equilibrium is assumed among "free" individuals (or groups); the safeguarding of the life, liberty and property of each is regarded as a sufficient protection of the *common* good; an extensive role for govenment in this connection is viewed as at once unnecessary and dangerous. It is to thinkers particularly critical of these latter dogmas, which of course were elevated and rigidified in the nineteenth century by way of Social Darwinism, that we first turn.

Ward, Ross and Social Control

Among late nineteenth-century intellectuals, it was Lester Frank Ward who leveled the most telling single blow at the second of American liberalism's cardinal assumptions—at what Reinhold Niebuhr later termed its "soft utopianism."[4]

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* For valuable criticisms and suggestions I am indebted to Jane Flax, John Hallowell, David Mayhew, Marcella McDonald, Carey McWilliams, Andrew Scott, and Thomas Spragens.

[1] Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York. Hill and Wang, 1967), chap. 3.

[2] *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935; reprinted, New York: Capricorn, 1963), chap. 1.

[3] R. Jackson Wilson uses this theme to tie together his suggestive sketches of five thinkers of the period. *In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United States, 1860–1920* (New York: Oxford, 1968). See also Jean B. Quandt, *From the Small Town to the Great Community: The Social Thought of Progressive Intellectuals* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970).

[4] "*Soft utopianism* is the creed of those who [in contrast to the Marxist 'hard utopians'] do not claim

Ward was far from abandoning the analogy perceived by the Social Darwinists between the laws of natural selection as they operated in the biological realm and in society, but he insisted that in both realms, "nature" left untended is wasteful and destructive. "I regard society and the social forces as constituting just as much a legitimate field for the exercise of human ingenuity as do the various material substances and physical forces," wrote Ward in his first major treatise. "The latter have been investigated and subjugated. The former are still pursuing their wild, unbridled course. . . . Why cry '*Laissez faire*!' as if society would ever work out its own progress? As well say to all inventors: Cease trying to control nature, let it alone and it will control itself. . . ."[5] Ward's "dynamic sociology" thus purports to establish a scientific basis for social intervention and control.

Ward appears at first glance to be challenging the first of liberalism's basic tenets as well, for he stresses that the fetish of "abstract" individual right must be transcended if society is ever to become "the arbiter of its own destiny." But it soon becomes clear that his objection is not to the way "liberty" is conceived—in individualistic, utilitarian terms—but rather to the current operationalization of the concept in terms of absolute legal immunities. Such immunities simply preserve the status quo, prohibiting government "interference" and enabling men to defend policies as "principled" which in reality concentrate power and effective liberty in the hands of the few. Ward in fact quickly assures his readers that he is denying abstract rights only "in theory," for his intention is to increase the sum of human happiness, which is, after all, "the only conceivable object of any right."[6] Nor is he guilty of that "false pride" which would grant to human feeling and aspiration a basis apart from the fundamental impulse to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Finding "no generic distinction" between the basic desires of man and the lower animals, Ward goes on to portray the happiness of society as "nothing else than the happiness of its individual units." The diversity of men's appetites makes their direct satisfaction by government impossible; still less does sociology or politics have to do with subjective, "moral" utilities. What "scientific utilitarianism" concerns itself with is rather the "correspondence between organism and environment," so as to devise means whereby a larger proportion of individual actions aimed at happiness may succeed in securing their object. Ward does not seek, in short, to assess or shape individual ends or modes of fulfillment; his aim in attacking *laissez-faire* is rather to facilitate their realization. "The problem of dynamic sociology is the *organization of happiness*."[7]

E. A. Ross, a disciple (and nephew by marriage) of Ward, and an acknowledged pioneer in American social science after his publication of *Social Control* in 1901, carried forward the spirit of reform "within the very discipline that Spencer had hoped would teach men to let things alone."[8] Ross has a more Hobbesian sense than Ward of the way the capitalist system "violently thrusts men apart," creating the need for "artificial frames and webs that may hold the social mass together."[9] Appropriating the terminology of Ferdinand Tönnies, Ross points to the powerful forces that are "more and more transforming *community* into *society*, that is, replacing living tissue with structures held together by rivets and screws." But like Ward, Ross shows little sense of loss. Nor does he anticipate the establishment of control through the renovation of communal institutions and sentiments. Modern cities and nations have, he acknowledges, assumed certain community functions, but they remain preeminently "societies." "It is perhaps safe to say that we are relying on artificial rather than natural supports to bear the increasing weight of our social order, and that a return to the natural basis of social partnership is about as likely as a return to raw food or skin garments."[10]

In fact, while Ross has no doubt that liberal man must be harnessed, he is dubious about not only the possibility but also the desirability of transforming the individual's self-seeking instincts.[11] As communal associations lose their hold on man, human nature displays its "heights" as well as its Hobbesian "depths," Ross asserts, while friendship and association assume their "sweetest" form as they become no longer inherited but voluntary.[12] It is thus not merely out of pessimism that Ross chooses the negative and apparently modest definition of social order as

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to embody perfection, but expect perfection to emerge out of the onging process of history" (Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics* [New York: Scribner's, 1960], p. 13).

[5] Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology* (New York: Appleton, 1883), Vol. I, pp. 35, 53.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 122, 133, 153–156. See also Ward's later *Psychic Factors of Civilization* (Boston: Ginn, 1892), chap. 2, 16.

[8] Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston: Beacon, 1955), p. 161.

[9] Edward A. Ross, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1904), p. 53.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 432–436.

[11] See the discussions in Wilson, *Quest of Community*, pp. 102–113; and Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 170–177.

[12] *Social Control*, p. 405.

the "absence of collisions" and assures his reader that "the goal of social development is not, as some imagine, a Perfect Love, or a Perfect Conscience, but better adaptation; and the more this adaptation is artificial, the less need it be natural."[13] Ross reveals his fear that "the art of domesticating human beings may succeed only too well;" he can only hope that whatever "adaptation" need be imposed will leave individual variety and autonomy of purpose unimpaired.

Both Ward and Ross harbor certain utopian expectations for their new order, despite its artificial and instrumental character. Ross answers his own apprehensions about "the coalescence of physical and spiritual forces in the modern state" with an uneasy anticipation that diversity can be preserved through the continued vitality of the press, religious, professional, and cultural associations, and the universities—and that the uniquely "energetic, self-assertive, and individualistic" Aryan peoples will discover modes of coalescence and control that, while reinforcing the "humane" and suppressing the predatory instincts, will preserve individual distinction and excellence.[14] Serious and unresolved tensions remain in Ward's work; his anticipation of a classless, impartially administered "sociocracy" seems to reintroduce the liberal notion of natural harmonies, or else to presuppose a program of education and socialization which will radically transform individual "utilities."[15] But however problematic their assumptions might be, the fact remains that Ward and Ross do not think of reform as providing a new social and moral setting for the individual or transforming the self-interested, utilitarian quests the liberal state was supposed to protect. Theirs is a critique of means, not ends; their point is not that the ends of the liberal state are impoverished, but rather that *laissez-faire* is rendering them contradictory and destructive.

The notion of community represented by Ward and Ross—that of a society free of "collisions," managed so as to maximize the realization of individual "happiness"—was an enduring legacy of the Progressive period. The old juxtaposition of governmental power and individual liberty was overcome, at least in theory; there was, as Herbert Croly was fond of saying, a new realization that Hamiltonian means could serve Jeffersonian ends.[16] In the end, Robert Wiebe reports, the early Progressive quest for an "organic city" of brotherhood and compassion gave way to a vision which "accepted the impersonal flux of the city and anticipated its perfect systematization."[17] But the alternative visions generated during the period should perhaps not be so easily dismissed, in terms of either their social and intellectual significance or the echoes to be found in the present. It is, then, to ideas about liberalism and community considerably divergent from those of Ward and Ross that we now turn.

Cooley's Alternative Vision

Lester Ward was to be admired for his challenge of those who would misuse Darwin to defend the *status quo*, wrote the young sociologist Charles Horton Cooley in his journal in 1897. But Ward's relegation of the individual to utilitarian ends and of society to physical laws represented, he thought, almost as great a betrayal of human dignity as that perpetrated by the Social Darwinists. "Society," Cooley declared, "is spiritual, but current philosophy does not see this, it sees only the shell."[18]

Cooley's critique of Spencer and Sumner focused not so much on their *laissez-faire* conclusions as on the materialism and determinism of their basic premises: "The physiological aspect of life is expounded and assumed, apparently, to be the only aspect science can consider."[19] Cooley challenged the conceptualization of social evolution in terms of mere physical "survival" and questioned whether, in any case, it was to be primarily explained in terms of biological selection. Man's capacity to "adapt" and develop depends rather on his own unique powers of imagination and intellect. Cooley, like Ward and Ross, demands that these powers be utilized for the purposive control of social forces, but he goes on to insist that progress must be seen as something *more* than the mere "growth of intelligent control."[20] Cooley, later to be heralded as "more than any other single person" the founder of social psychology in America,[21] vigorously insisted that students of society "cease circumscribing and testing ourselves by the canons of physical and physiological science." Those undertaking the tasks of social analysis and reconstruction must rather "answer to the organic character of the social process;"[22] this means understanding a society's potentialities and aspirations from *within* and charting the path of advancement and the ends of social control in qualitative, non-material terms. "Society is not a machine, controlled chiefly by the powers of darkness, but an expression of human nature, capable of reflecting whatever good human nature can rise to."[23]

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 437.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 172–179, 437–440.

[15] Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, chap. 14.

[16] See Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," *The Public Interest*, no. 5 (Fall, 1966), 70–82.

[17] Wiebe, *Search for Order*, p. 170.

[18] Quoted in David W. Noble, *The Paradox of Progressive Thought* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 107. See also John Dewey's early review of Ward's *Psychic Factors of Civilization* in *Psychological Review*, 1 (July, 1894), 400–411. Dewey focuses on the incongruity of Ward's attempt to ground society's purposive, creative "action" in a mechanistic, reflexive individual psychology. In order adequately to support his recommendations, Dewey asserts, Ward should have stated "the mental life in active terms, those of impulse and its development, instead of in passive terms, mere feelings of pleasure and pain" (p. 405).

[19] Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Scribner's, 1902), p. 92.

[20] Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Process* (New York: Scribner's, 1918), p. 405. See also his earlier critique of Social Darwinism: "The Process of Social Change," *Political Science Quarterly*, 12 (March, 1897), 63–81.

Cooley's view rests on the conviction that the individual cannot properly be viewed apart from the social relationships in which he is enmeshed, "in living unity with social wholes." Modern society, to be sure, is characterized by a plurality of groups and often by voluntaristic modes of association, but it is a delusion to suppose that the individual's desires and valuations spring from "the inscrutable depths of the private mind" and hence may be abstracted from or set in opposition to those of "society." The point is not simply an academic one for Cooley, though of course his exploration of the collective formation of "mind" and of the role of primary groups in particular was central to the agenda he laid down for his discipline. His writings are permeated with a passion for ethical regeneration and social reform, the key to which lies in the reconstituting of the social environments where persons form and implement their ideal ends. The values characteristic of American society, while "individualistic" to an extreme, are no more "private" than those of more traditional societies; Cooley parallels Veblen in his description of how the modern market economy "largely dictates the valuations which it afterwards equilibrates."[24] But those values do bespeak a breakdown in community life, a breakdown which, far from freeing man to pursue his "basic" needs and desires, has instead impoverished him, denying his sympathetic feelings and his spiritual and aesthetic impulses. The environments which once sustained men in their interpersonal relationships and their devotion to transcendent ideals have too often succumbed before a commercial system that in its ideology and social consequences has dragged "human nature . . . by the hair of the head."[25]

Cooley's work thus in an important sense is a brief for human freedom, defined as the "opportunity for right development"—and in that very definition is implied a critique of "freedom" as late nineteenth-century American liberalism had come to define it: "cold, harsh, and spiritually poor, and hence not really free." In some strikingly modern passages, Cooley suggests that the individual utilities generated by the market economy and perpetrated by its dominant classes are not an authentic expression of either social or individual needs and hence are an unreliable *datum* for the social reconstructionist:

> So strong is the individualist tradition in America and England that we hardly permit ourselves to aspire toward an ideal society directly, but think that we must approach it by some distributive formula, like 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' Such formulas are unsatisfying to human nature, however justly they may give one aspect of the truth. . . . No aggregation of merely individual good can satisfy the need of the imagination for a unitary conception. . . .
>
> It would be fatuous to assume that the market process expresses the *good* of society. The demand on which it is based is a turbid current coming down from the past. . . . To accept this stream as pure and to reform only the mechanism of distribution would be as if a city drawing its drinking-water from a polluted river should expect to escape typhoid by using clean pipes.[26]

What is needed is not merely renovated structures of economic "opportunity" or the redistribution of the material requisites of effective "freedom," but rather a purification of the wellsprings of valuation and motivation—polluted in an atomistic, competitive society—in terms of which freedom and opportunity are defined and sought. That Cooley should find Ward's projected sociocracy spiritually unsatisfying is hardly surprising.

The key to this moral regeneration and the individual fulfillment it promises is for Cooley the communities in which modern man finds himself. Chief among these, both in strength of impact and in humanistic potential, are the "primary" face-to-face groups—families, work groups, neighborhoods—where "what is universal in human nature and human ideals" is nurtured and men's sympathetic impulses are cultivated and directed to appropriate objects. "All the abuses which are the objects of reform," Cooley quotes Thoreau as saying, "are unconsciously amended in the intercourse of friends."[27] The task is to maintain or recreate viable primary associations amid social and economic forces that have undermined the form they once took and the allegiance they once commanded; "there is nothing upon which the conscience of the time is more determined than restoring them to health."[28]

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[21] Talcott Parsons, "Cooley and the Problem of Internalization," in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., ed., *Cooley and Sociological Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 67.

[22] Cooley, *Social Process,* pp. 397–401.

[23] Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York: Scribner's, 1909), p. 205.

[24] Cooley, *Social Process,* p. 299.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 235.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 316, 417–418.

[27] Cooley, *Social Organization,* p. 34.

In *Social Process* (1918) Cooley turns explicitly to the form such groups might assume under modern conditions and how their functions might be performed. Particular emphasis is placed on the work group, which may assume face-to-face form but which, on another level, will incorporate dispersed persons and groups performing the same or related social functions. Cooley aims at a kind of professionalization that will foster "*esprit de corps*, emulation and standards . . . all animated with a spirit of loyalty and service to the whole. To achieve this would call for no change in human nature, but only in the instigation and direction of its impulses; it would mean chiefly firmer association and clearer ideals of merit among those pursuing the several functions. . . . Freedom, self-expression, and the competitive spirit would be cherished, but could not degenerate into irresponsible individualism."[29] And what of the state, either as an integrating mechanism or as a community in its own right? Cooley is uninspired by the liberal view—"Our picture of the republic is mostly a child's sketch, without beauty or form of depth and harmony of color"—and cautiously announces his own Hegelian proclivities. He cites Ross approvingly, insisting that a purely private view of morality will not suffice for those who would protect the community from the depredations of the "engines of politics or commerce." He attempts to go beyond Ross, however, in giving that public morality a positive substance that will nourish the individual and direct his sympathetic impulses. Cooley says a great deal about how new modes of communication and economic interdependence have made a more inclusive community both possible and necessary. "We need a collective life which, without repressing individuality, personal or local, shall afford central emblems that all may look up to and a discipline in which all may share. A deeper community spirit is needed throughout our society . . . leading up from the neighborhood to the nation."[30]

In the end, however, Cooley echoes many of Ross's misgivings concerning a holistic view of the national community—misgivings grounded not in Ross's suspicion of attempts to institute "Perfect Love" but rather in a concern for the *quality* of the "deeper community spirit" he anticipates. Cooley almost never mentions the Hegelian view of the state without deploring its corruption through "militarism and bureaucracy" in contemporary Germany. And he continually warns against "formalism" in the state—against imposed ideals or bureaucratic coercion which, no less than the "disorganization and disintegration" of *laissez-faire*, divorce human nature from social institutions and take hold of the individual only "by the outside, his personality being left to torpor or to . . . ruthless self-assertion."[31] On the one hand, Cooley doubts that the state can ever engage and socialize the individual after the fashion of the more particularistic group; on the other hand, he fears the conformity and coercion that might result if the state took on a unitary, organic character. His projected model of society is thus pluralistic:

> Our discipline needs to be as diverse as our society. . . . Democracy should not mean uniformity, but the fullest measure of differentiation, a development everywhere of special spirits—in communities, in occupations, in culture groups, in distinctive personalities.[32]

And when Cooley turns to the problem of integrating these loyalties and resolving conflicts among them, his tendency is not to think of ideals and institutions at the national level so much as to invoke a higher religious loyalty which transcends and reconciles all.

Viewed, then, as a critic of nineteenth-century liberalism, Cooley appears far more radical and penetrating than those who simply took aim at the Social Darwinist version of the theory of the invisible hand. He rather focused on the failure of life, liberty and property in their contemporary incarnation to do justice to men's social and sympathetic impulses. But when he attempted to portray the communal contexts in which individuality could find a fuller development and expression, he vacillated between nostalgia for a kind of familial and small-town interaction that, if it ever existed, was not in any case to be restored, and the projection of a professionalization around social functions that hardly warmed the heart and was far more restricted in terms of occupation and social stratum than he acknowledged. And when he considered political entities, particularly the nation, as communities, he displayed a profound ambivalence. On all these counts, as we shall see, Cooley was far from atypical of the social critics of the Progressive period.

Variations on the Communitarian Theme: Royce, Croly, Dubois, Dewey

Considerations of space forbid developing at any length the explicit or implied critiques of liberalism to be found among Cooley's contemporaries. What can be demonstrated, however, is that the Michigan sociologist was not alone either in his preoccupation with the individual's "wholeness" or in his conflicts and uncertainty as to what sort of community might provide moral sustenance and develop sympathetic relationships under modern conditions. We will consider briefly the ideas of four thinkers—Josiah Royce, Herbert Croly, W. E. B. DuBois, and John Dewey—who shared Cooley's central perceptions but who differed from him and from one another in the positive community ideals they projected.

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[29] *Social Process*, p. 143.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 419; Compare *Social Organization*, part VI.

[31] *Social Organization*, p. 349.

[32] *Social Process*, p. 148.

Royce, like Cooley, draws heavily on the pioneer psychologist James Mark Baldwin in portraying the psychological dependence of the individual on his social environments. The keystone of his social thought, however, is a prior notion of the nature of moral man. Invoking Kant, Royce declares the "first principle of ethical inquiry" to be that "my duty is simply my own will brought to my clear self-consciousness." But a second principle turns man to those "superindividual unities" in which he finds himself:

> I, left to myself, can never find a plan of life. I have no inborn ideal naturally present within myself. By nature I simply go on crying out in a sort of chaotic self-will, according as the momentary play of desire determines.[33]

Royce can call himself a "voluntaristic idealist" or an "absolute pragmatist," because in his portrayal of the absolute and of man's dependence on the communities which embody transcendent ethical ideals, he can claim to be doing no more than developing notions of truth and responsibility which do justice to human need and experience. Man's ethical impulses *require* for their satisfaction and integration the apprehension of an ideal which stands over against the self and is seen to possess its own intrinsic value. This apprehension is neither passive nor abstract; Royce rather subsumes "the whole moral law" under the principle of *loyalty*, defined as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." And he continually stresses that the practical result of loyalty is to relate men to one another in purposive human communities.

The implications of this view for the liberal democrat are profound, although Royce rarely gives his discussions an explicitly political cast. In *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908), which can be read as a brief against a presumption of autonomy and sovereignty on the part of the individual will, Royce also makes it clear that he regards such objects and examples of loyalty as American society does provide to be narrowly utilitarian and spiritually impoverished. "Narrow loyalties, side by side with irrational forms of individualism and with a cynical contempt for all loyalty—these are what we too often see in the life of our country."[34] Royce is particularly apprehensive of the loyalties to "mutually hostile partisan organizations . . . sects, or social classes" that he sees arising, and he regards allegiance to the emerging bureaucratic state as an antidote that is, if not ineffectual, then dangerous. He thus calls for a renewed loyalty to the *local* community, a "new and wiser provincialism" in American life. The province, in Royce's terms, is "any one part of a national domain, which is, geographically and socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country."[35] Loyalty to the province thus has a certain immediacy and concreteness; at the same time it is qualitatively different from—and indeed helps one transcend—loyalties grounded in class or partisan interests.[36]

A concern to distinguish among loyalties qualitatively and to provide for their peaceful integration in larger communities led Royce to develop "loyalty to loyalty" as an overarching moral principle: one should choose and pursue one's cause in such a fashion as to honor and enhance the loyalties of one's fellows. It is more immediate loyalties that will "engross and possess" men most strongly, but Royce does not doubt that loyalty at this more abstract level, "making loyalty prosper amongst men," is itself compelling.[37] His later book, *The Problem of Christianity* (1913), makes it clearer yet that loyalty to loyalty does not merely entail liberal tolerance; it is in fact concretized in terms of a "universal community" and clearly elevated to ethical superiority.[38] But Royce did not follow his idealist mentors in turning to the state as the community through which the moral transformation of men was to be accomplished. At the national level Royce rather counseled mutual tolerance and sustenance among provinces and other communities of the loyal. He partially eschewed the liberal-pluralist expectation of a natural harmony among the communities to which men gave their allegiance (the moral dilemma of Robert E. Lee fascinated him), but he still fastened on a renewed provincial life as the only hope for relief from the "harassed mediocrity" and spiritual "estrangement" that he perceived around him. He did not regard the nation as a viable object of men's primary loyalties, and the functional roles Ward and Ross were urging on the state were peripheral to his central ethical concerns.[39]

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[33] Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), pp. 25–31.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

[35] "Provincialism," in *Race Questions, Provincialism, and other American Problems* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), p. 61.

[36] See *Ibid., passim; Philosophy of Loyalty*, chap. 5; and Royce's extended discussion of the characteristics of a "true community" in *The Problem of Christianity* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), II, chap. 9–10.

[37] *Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 125–126, 180–181.

[38] See Peter Fuss, *The Moral Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), chap. 8; and Bruce Kuklick, *Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), chap. 11.

Herbert Croly, a student of Royce and eventually the best known of the Progressive political publicists, shared his mentor's ethical sensitivities, but the ameliorating community he projected was based on shared values and purposes rather than personal interaction and a localized identity. Moreover, the institutional changes he prescribed were directed not only to Royce's affective and integrative concerns, but also to the practical achievement of economic redistribution and social control. What was needed, Croly declared in *The Promise of American Life* (1909), was *both* "centralization" and "nationalization"—the former a means to Ward's utilitarian ends, the latter a "formative and enlightening political transformation" fostering an idea and an experience of community commensurate with "the whole complex of human powers and interests." Croly categorized "individualist" and "provincial" democracy together as reactionary ideas, which merely served to perpetuate "a policy of inaction enveloped in a cloud of sacred phrases."[40]

"I shall not disguise the fact," Croly tells his readers, "that, on the whole, my own preferences are on the side of Hamilton rather than of Jefferson."[41] By that he does not so much mean to denigrate Jeffersonian ideals—he admires Jefferson as a "radical and unqualified democrat"—as to stress that affirmative and concerted national efforts will be necessary to the continued realization of those ideals. Under changing economic and social conditions, Croly warns, the American promise "instead of being automatically fulfilled, may well be automatically stifled;" if Americans wish to maintain the viability of their "traditional vision," they must be willing to reconsider "the traditional American ways of realizing it."[42] But Croly does not leave it at that: he frankly asserts that the new instrumentalities of collective purpose will require that individual goals be tempered and the "indiscriminate scramble for wealth" restrained:

> The substance of our national Promise has consisted of an improving popular economic condition, guaranteed by democratic political institutions, and resulting in moral and social amelioration. These manifold benefits were to be obtained mainly by liberating the enlightened self-interest of the American people. . . . [But] if the fulfillment of our national Promise can no longer be considered inevitable, if it must be considered as equivalent to a conscious national purpose instead of an inexorable national destiny, the implication necessarily is that the trust reposed in individual self-interest has been in some measure betrayed. . . . The
>
> Promise of American Life is to be fulfilled—not merely by a maximum amount of economic freedom, but by a certain measure of discipline; not merely by the abundant satisfaction of individual desires, but by a large measure of individual subordination and self-denial.[43]

Lurking behind such passages is something more than the utilitarian's calculation that individual pursuits must be controlled for the sake of a more equitable overall distribution of goods and opportunities. Croly rather reveals a *qualitative* distaste for American goals in their present incarnation and the resulting "blight" that afflicts the culture.[44] Croly continually asserts that the traditional "Promise" must still be redeemed in urban, industrial America, but, like Royce, he anticipates that self-aggrandizing, materialistic conceptions of that promise will be transcended in the process. Similarly, Croly's support for the pragmatist program of social reorganization and experimentation aims not only at the relief of specific deprivations but also at the cementing of a sense of "joint responsibility" and "brotherhood" which is to be valued in its own right. To foster this quest for "moral" as well as "material" improvement, for a "better society" and a "worthier set of men," Croly turns to a community which Royce saw as holding little ethical promise: the nation.

Croly's positive assessment of the nation as an object—and a "school"—of loyalty reflects both his basic historical determinism and his sense of the historically unique character of the American national spirit. On the one hand, Croly feels that efforts to build communities apart from the concrete ties through which men are already organized and united are futile—and just as consolidation and bigness are not to be escaped in the economic realm, so is *nationality* to be accepted as "the great contemporary political fact." At the same time, nationality is a "political and social *ideal*," and Croly takes particular comfort in the expectation that *American* nationalism, unlike its continental counterparts, will institutionalize and protect the democratic heritage, preserving, not submerging, "individual distinction" and the free interplay of diverse interests. Despite his yearning for a "higher social relation" and a patriotism of "sufficient substance and organization," Croly in the end reintroduces individual autonomy and social diversity as key values and is left with a rather uneasy synthesis.[45]

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[39] Royce characterized contemporary agitation for "social control" as an extension of the quest of the willful individual—apart from any loyalty to "the cause of the community"—for power and enrichment (*The Problem of Christianity,* I, pp. 148–159). See also his personalistic prescription for the failure of the "thoughtful public" in America effectively to implement their ideals: "Reform in such matters, must come, if at all, from within." "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America," in *Race Questions,* p. 137.

[40] Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Capricorn, 1964), chap. 9.

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 29.

[42] *Ibid.,* pp. 5, 17.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 22.

[44] On the expression of this distaste in Croly's early editorial work for the *Architectural Record* see Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism* (New York: Oxford, 1961), pp. 18–25.

Croly's second major work, *Progressive Democracy* (1914) de-emphasizes the theme of nationalism; he gives considerable emphasis, in fact, to the ways in which smaller communities, particularly a democratized workplace, might foster the intellectual and ethical growth and the combined senses of efficacy and interdependence which he deems necessary to national regeneration.[46] Democratic themes are also more prominent in the second book: while Croly is no less convinced that executive and administrative leadership must be underwritten with popular "disinterest" and discipline, he is considerably more concerned to develop means of enlarged participation and democratic control. But Croly's central perception remains constant and in fact underlies his concern for democratization: the crisis which Progressivism must answer is fundamentally one of the spirit:

> Although [democratic political organization] is designed to attain a certain administrative efficiency, its organization for efficiency is subordinated to the gathering of an educational popular political experience. . . . It assumes an intrepid and inexhaustible faith in the value to humanity of an ideal of individual and social fulfillment.[47]

The society's animating faith is to a degree "transcendentalized,"[48] detached from specifically national traditions and symbols, but Croly still sees its propagation as Progressivism's chief goal: "The progressive democratic faith . . . finds its consummation in a love . . . which is at bottom a spiritual expression of the mystical unity of human nature."[49] What continues to distinguish Croly from Ward and his disciples is his sense that control *per se* does not hold the solution to the crisis of liberal society; new structures of human inter-relatedness and "ideal life" are required—to humanize social control, make it work, and give it an ever-expanding sense of possibility, but also to restore the senses of identity and fraternity that have eroded in industrial society.

Relatively subdued in Croly, but more prominent in the thought of John W. Burgess and other nationalists, is the notion of America as a *racial* community, embodying a Teutonic spirit which fosters in men a distinctive identity and a presumably unique set of active virtues. Considerably more interesting and more sensitive in terms of the crisis of liberal society, however, is the use made of the notion of race by an American black trained in German literature and philosophy, W. E. B. DuBois. In *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), the young DuBois mounts an attack on the leadership of Booker T. Washington and his program of "adjustment and submission." Some of DuBois's criticisms fall well within traditional liberal canons; he deplores, for example, the way Washington has been willing to soft-pedal the question of suffrage and other legal and political rights of the black man for the sake of securing sympathy and support among whites for his program of "industrial and intellectual development." In fact, DuBois insists, progress in the one realm is necessary to safeguard gains in the other. DuBois also shares the Progressive conviction that national power can and must be positively employed to serve liberal ends. "The Freedman's Bureau died, and its child was the Fifteenth Amendment"—and DuBois makes clear that this was a bad bargain for the American Negro. An abstract set of rights, increasingly unenforced, were substituted for what might have been an affirmative program to give the "freedom" of the former slaves meaning and substance. DuBois is quite candid about the Bureau's concrete failings, but he still insists that what was really needed was a *permanent* Freedman's Bureau, "with a national system of Negro schools; a carefully supervised employment and labor office; a system of impartial protection before the regular courts; and such institutions for social betterment as savings banks, land and building associations, and social settlements."[50] Instead, liberal political thought and practice have abandoned the black underclass to the overwhelming forces of economic domination and racial prejudice.

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[45] Louis Hartz finds in Croly a "pathetic clinging to Americanism" whereby the vision of a solidary, rationally ordered community was compromised for the sake of assurances that "perfect individualism" would result; his rhetoric became "practically unintelligible when the crucial questions were posed" (*The Liberal Tradition in America* [New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955], pp. 233). Compare the exposition in Mason Drukman, *Community and Purpose in America: An Analysis of American Political Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 281–282, 286–293.

[46] Herbert Croly, *Progressive Democracy* (New York: Macmillan, 1914), pp. 264–265, 378–405. But compare p. 197: "centres of association" in society tend to seek not only "mutual accommodation and adjustment" but also "the realization of common purposes. . . . Society comes to be conceived as a whole, with certain permanent interests and needs, into which the different centres of association must be fitted."

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

[48] See Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*, pp. 66–77.

[49] *Progressive Democracy*, p. 427.

[50] W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, in J. H. Franklin, ed., *Three Negro Classics* (New York: Avon, 1962), chap. 2.

DuBois's kinship with the particular group of theorists that here concern us, however, rests upon the more fundamental ethical case he wishes to make against the liberal capitalist order. Its problems are not merely those of distribution and control. DuBois is of necessity concerned that his people obtain the staples of life, but his most fundamental criticism of Washington's program nonetheless has to do with its "economic cast"—"a gospel of Work and Money to such an extent as apparently almost completely to overshadow the higher aims of life." DuBois is repelled by the nineteenth century's "deification of Bread," and in an eloquent chapter on Atlanta—who, in her pursuit of prosperity and grandeur, he likens to the mythical Atalanta—he warns the South of the delusion that "golden apples are the goal of racing and not mere incidents along the way."

> What if the Negro people be wooed from a strife for righteousness, from a love of knowing, to regard dollars as the be-all and end-all of life? What if to the Mammonism of America be added the rising Mammonism of the re-born South, and the Mammonism of this South be reinforced by the budding Mammonism of its half-wakened black millions? Whither, then, is the new-world quest of Goodness and Beauty and Truth gone glimmering?[51]

While DuBois decries the circumstances that have deprived the Negro of his sustenance and his safety, he finds that this very deprivation has nurtured a certain strength of spirit in the race and, thus far, has made for a degree of immunity to the gospel of wealth. The supreme threat of Washington's program lies precisely in its willingness to forego the nurturing of this spirit for the sake of material advancement.

In DuBois's subsequent work as editor of *The Horizon* (1907–1910) and of the NAACP's *The Crisis* (1910–1934), he naturally becomes more preoccupied with day-to-day threats to the safety and dignity of the Negro community. The case against lynching, disenfranchisement, and Jim Crow he is generally content to make in the familiar terms of Christian morality and the American creed. But when he turns to longer-range plans for amelioration, the distinctive ethical hope he holds out for the Negro community reappears. His advocacy of public control of large industry and of the organization of cooperatives among blacks, for example, does not aim merely at economic gains:

> We must awake! Not in a renaissance among ourselves of the evils of Get and Grab—not in private hoarding, squeezing and cheating, lies our salvation, but rather in that larger ideal of human brotherhood, equality of opportunity, and work not for wealth but for Weal—here lies our shining goal.[52]

Similarly, DuBois's early "separatism," while it represents a strategy for attaining strength and solidarity in the face of continued white hostility and exclusion, also has more positive cultural aims:

> If the Negro is to develop his own powers and gifts; if he is not only to fight prejudices and oppression successfully, but also to unite for ideals higher than the world has realized in art, in industry, and in social life, then he must unite and work with Negroes and build a new and great Negro ethos.[53]

DuBois is rather vague concerning the form this ethos might take or how distinctive it would remain under more favorable social and political conditions, but he leaves little doubt that it would continue to represent a negation of acquisitive individualism. The chief mechanisms of its transmission are to be a highly trained black intelligentsia, an educational program that places "the ideal and the practical in workable equilibrium," and economic institutions that provide everyday training in cooperation and social service. In the long run, DuBois hopes, the Negro ethos will transcend racial boundaries, serving as a leaven in the national community. Thus might the future interaction of the races make for the survival in American life of that which is truly "fit," preserving "for future civilization . . . not greed and impudence and cruelty [but] all that is really fine and noble and strong."[54]

It was John Dewey who gave to these various themes of Progressive political thought their most detailed and integrated exposition. While it is impossible to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of Dewey's thought in brief compass, it is a relatively simple matter to place him in the broad tradition under discussion here, for he, more than any of the other communitarians, developed his social theory in direct and explicit response to contemporary liberal thought and practice.

Dewey echoes Royce in regarding the erosion of the *loyalties* which once gave individuals "support, direction, and unity of outlook on life" as the age's central moral problem and in judging national chauvinism, mass conformity, and the selfish pursuit of class interests to be pathological substitutes for the solidarity, meaning, and common effort men once experienced in their "daily communities." Nor is Dewey completely free of Royce's nostalgia: "To 'restrain' or turn back the industrial revolution and its consequences," he acknowledges, "would be efficacious if only it could occur." But in the end he asserts that the traditional mix of provincial and other-worldly allegiances is no longer viable, that the moral life must find new substance and a new setting. This conclusion is reinforced by the judgment—which eventually overshadows the other elements in his critique of liberalism—that the problems of the age are of a new order, *requiring* new modes of social organization, intelligence and control. The conditions rendering the individual spiritually and too often materially impoverished are "general, not local. They concern complex forces that are at work throughout the whole country. . . . Traditional ideas are more than irrelevant. They are an encumbrance." Dewey, like Croly, takes contemporary economic and technological forces as given: "Political *control* is needed, but the *movement* cannot be arrested. . . ."[55]

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[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 246, 264, 266.

[52] *The Horizon*, February, 1907, p. 8. Compare *The Crisis*, 2 (June, 1911), 64–65; and 9 (April, 1915), 310–312.

[53] *The Crisis*, 17 (January, 1919), p. 112.

[54] See *Souls of Black Folk*, chap. 9.

It is for the sake of such control that Dewey prescribes the collective self-discovery of the "public"—defined in orthodox liberal fashion as those who have a shared interest in controlling the side-effects of otherwise private transactions—and the concomitant strengthening of its agent, the state. Dewey is anxious lest the state transcend this instrumental role; he distinguishes his view from the Hegelian in much more decisive terms than do Cooley and Croly. But Dewey also insists that there be no predetermined set of "inherent" and absolute limitations—such as the common view that the state is merely "an umpire to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon another."[56] His insistence is prompted in part by a growing sense of the extensiveness of the measures which any effective "diking and channeling" of economic and social forces will require. But never far from Dewey's mind is his perception of the threat which the new order poses to the human agency and efficacy presupposed by the democratic idea. It is not enough simply to erect structures that will prevent rapacious behavior and provide the material necessities, for the crisis of the public runs deeper than that. What is crucial is that men have lost the *capacity* they possessed in more provincial settings to perceive and responsibly to shape the forces acting upon the community. "The local face-to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so remote in initiation, so far-reaching in scope and so complexly indirect in operation, that they are, from the standpoint of the members of local social units, unknown."[57] The forces of "electricity and steam" have created the "Great Society," characterized by economic interdependence, nation-wide organizations and systems of communication, and cultural homogeneity. What remains is the distinctly human, purposive task of making this a "Great Community"—"the perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action."[58] It will be a massive undertaking, and it is important that human vision and agency not be artificially restrained in advance.

Dewey, like Rousseau, thus tends to telescope the meanings of "community" and "democracy"; in seeking to recapture the essence of community life, he seeks first of all a sense of efficacy, mastery, and self-direction for its constituents. His attempts to develop a "method of intelligence" adequate to purposive social intervention and the kind of education that could underwrite and guide its application have this qualitative end in view: to make of the Great Society a truly democratic, self-aware, self-determining community. Dewey thus goes considerably beyond his contemporaries in recognizing the importance of personal responsibility and political efficacy—as well as "spiritual" solidarity—to the life of the provincial community and in thinking imaginatively about how they might be restored within and among the distended "publics" of industrial society.

He does not anticipate, however, that individuals and "individualism" will remain unchanged in the process. The Great Community will not merely give men the means of securing antecedent interests; participation will also have a "reactive" effect, increasing their sense of mutual responsibility, broadening their horizons, "clarifying their aims and purging their activities."[59] "Renascent" liberalism, Dewey makes clear, will aim at a personal "liberation" from merely utilitarian quests; economic activity, he asserts, is the "least significant manifestation" of human "initiative, vigor, and independence." The social order, in contrast to Lockean "society," will be "possessed of a spiritual authority that will nurture and direct the inner as well as the outer life of individuals."[60] Dewey remains rather vague about the criteria the Great Community might employ in seeking "growth" for all and in placing a "discount" on the "injurious";[61] he clearly remains close to liberal assumptions both in the ends he posits for the new order (a "flowering of human capacities") and in the harmony and complementarity of interests he anticipates among the "liberated." But his conceptualization of individuality in terms of self-development rather than "negative" autonomy and privacy enables him to see the community as a nurturing rather than threatening force, to see the system bred by *economic* individualism as a threat to individual "freedom" rather than its logical extension, and thus to begin to transcend some of the familiar antinomies that have constricted liberal thought.[62]

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[55] See John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (1929); reprinted, New York: Capricorn, 1962), pp. 37, 52, 68, 93, 119, 158. Italics added. On the criteria for distinguishing "desirable" from inferior forms of community life, see *Democracy and Education* (1916; reprinted, New York: Free Press, 1966), chap. 7.

[56] John Dewey, *The Public and its Problems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1927), p. 73. But note Dewey's own earlier likening of the state to an orchestra conductor "who makes no music himself but who harmonizes the activities of those . . . producing it" (*Reconstruction in Philosophy* [New York: Henry Holt, 1920], p. 203).

[57] Dewey, *Public and its Problems*, p. 131.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[60] Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action*, pp. 30, 38, 88.

It is also Dewey who, among the thinkers we have considered here, comes closest to perceiving the multiplicity of values touched by the loss of community and the multiplicity of institutions that might be necessary to their recovery. Dewey, unlike Croly, sees that the "Great Community," however successful it may be in turning private pursuits to social benefit, however it may increase the efficacy and enrich the interaction of its constituent persons and groups, can never fully replace the local, face-to-face community. "Vital and thorough attachments are bred only in the intimacy of an intercourse which is of necessity restricted in range. . . . The local is the ultimate universal, and as near an absolute as exists."[63] For Dewey, no less than for Royce and Cooley, the crisis of liberal society is a moral one, and it is only through a revitalization of contiguous relationships that men can achieve the rootedness and fellow-feeling necessary to overcome their isolation and narrowness of purpose. Nor can any truly liberating *social* reconstruction proceed unless it is accompanied by a renewal of these wellsprings of identity and common aspiration: the two levels of community, while speaking to different impulses and needs, are also highly interdependent. Dewey, to be sure, is ambivalent and not entirely consistent on this question: his references to communal "stagnancy," "conformity," and "isolation" leave little doubt that the Great Community's work will aim at more than mere sustenance or restoration; it rather "will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experiences of local associations." But Dewey, quoting Cooley, remains convinced that it is the face-to-face community that "really counts" in forming durable "emotional and intellectual dispositions" and that apart from the restoration of community at this level, the public cannot hope adequately "to find and identify itself."[64]

Contemporary Reverberations and Implications

Louis Hartz and other historians have too often maintained their monolithic portrayal of America's "liberal tradition" by ignoring the communitarian strains in Progressive political thought.[65] It must be acknowledged, however, that the contradictions and difficulties of the Progressives and other theorists of the period in a sense bear Hartz out; that is, they demonstrate how difficult it is to apply the insights of Burke or Hegel or Tönnies in America. That the environment provides little in the way of ideological or social-structural reinforcement is also suggested by the subsequent fate of the communitarians' ideas. Ward's and Ross's notion of the national community is the one that has proven most durable; Croly's estimation of the impact of his ideas on Theodore Roosevelt was considerably exaggerated,[66] and he seemed positively mystifying to the architects of the New Deal. More telling yet is the fate of the pluralism of Royce, Cooley, and Dewey. "Group theorists" such as Arthur Bentley and David Truman have drawn heavily on Baldwin's and Cooley's insights about the group-relatedness of individual articulations of right and interest, and many analysts have followed Dewey in regarding group organization as a crucial means to broadened participation and political efficacy in the American system. But the "interest group" is hardly what the Progressives had in mind. Subsequent American pluralist thought has tended to ignore the communal functions of the political "province" or association—its nurturing and extension of men's moral awareness, its awakening of loyalty and existential commitment, its furthering of social solidarity, discourse, and common effort. The tendency has rather been to transfer private material quests from the individual to the "group." Moreover, pluralist analysis has sometimes gone on to undermine the legacy of Ward and Ross as well. Liberal assumptions have been reintroduced, in other words, not only with regard to the *ends* of political association but also through expectations of harmony, equity, and adaptive "adjustment" among contending groups. Political leadership and social control have thus been reduced to brokerage functions: "balancing" interests, maintaining consensus, safeguarding "the rules of the game."

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[61] See the rather general discussion in *Reconstruction*, pp. 197–198.

[62] The conceptual distinctions developed by Steven Lukes are helpful here: *Individualism* (New York: Harper, 1973). For an argument that Dewey, in effect, overcompensated, reducing "meaning to its public context," failing "to do full justice to man's inner life," see John E. Smith, *The Spirit of American Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 129. Considerably more sensitive on this score is Royce, whose "whole philosophy could be interpreted as the story of the cooperation and tension between individual and community" (*Ibid.*, pp. 91–98).

[63] *Public and its Problems*, pp. 212, 215.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 211, 216. For an argument that Royce, in his later writings, was approaching a "multitiered theory of the interpretational community as a promising solution . . . [to the] time-honored problems of political thought," see Peter Fuss, "Interpretation: Toward a Roycean Political Philosophy," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, XXI, 79–80 (1967), pp. 120–131.

[65] See Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, ch. 9. A needed corrective is provided by Wilson Carey McWilliams, who finds a continuing, if often frustrated, search for "fraternity," with the sense of emotional security and "assurance of identity" it brings, in American political thought and movements. McWilliams's portrayal of the Progressives, however, is hardly more differentiated than Hartz's; they remained fixated, he suggests, on "the fraternity of race and blood and the fraternity of national 'mission.'" See *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), chap. 4, 17.

[66] See Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, ch. 4.

It is thus arguable that insofar as the realities and the aspirations of American political life conform to the pluralist paradigm, the critical thrusts of Progressive political thought still confront it in a dialectical fashion. Certainly present-day critiques are often remarkably close in substance and in spirit to the commentaries of the Progressive period. Equally striking, however, is the extent to which the ambivalences, contradictions, and lacunae of Progressive thought also remain. In conclusion, then, it will be useful to take a summary view of some of the problems on which the social critics of the turn of the century focused and to point up some of the continuing dilemmas which their treatments raised.

Implications for Politics. What, in the first place, marks the liberal political community as a defective one? We have suggested that social critics of the period tended to focus *either* on the conflicts and inequities and social drift attributable to the theory and practice of *laissez-faire or* on the individual isolation, acquisitiveness, and "homelessness" that supposedly flowed from the liberal-capitalist sanctification of life, liberty, and property as the primary ends of social and political life. Critics such as Croly, DuBois, and Dewey bridge the dichotomy in various ways, and *within* each cluster of theorists there are important distinctions to be drawn. Communitarians differ, for example, in the relative stress they give to particularized *identities* and common *purposes* as the bases of community life, in their willingness to see "utilitarian" quests as compatible with (or even as a source of) communal loyalties, and so forth. Surely further analytical refinements are in order. But the basic distinctions drawn here amply demonstrate that efforts to understand or appropriate theories coming out of the Progressive period are poorly served by treatments of "community" as a panacea or an undifferentiated concept. To understand its critical thrust and the ameliorative structures and policies it implies requires a discerning examination of the presuppositions and contextual elements governing its use.

To what extent are social maladies to be perceived and solutions projected in *political* terms? Such a question is bound to be vexing, given the disparities and inhibitions within the liberal tradition as to the scope and character of politics. If one construes politics in the Weberian mode, focusing on the statewide "enforcement of its order" by a government which "successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,"[67] it is Ward and Ross and —insofar as Croly and Dewey stress the policies and techniques the "Great Community" will underwrite—the nationally oriented communitarians whose "political" thrust is most conspicuous. This despite the fact that all play down the Weberian theme of coercion and assume an ultimate harmony among the interests upon which the state will impose its "order."

The political implications of the communitarian critics become clearer in light of the less formalistic definitions which modern theorists give to politics. When one's conception of the "political" encompasses relationships of power and authority that transcend the realm of government,[68] the political importance of community organization and collective action becomes manifest. Today, amid cries for "community control" and widespread perceptions of the isolation and impotence of mass man in the face of "remote power,"[69] it is common to think of the community as an instrument of individual and group empowerment, providing means for control of the economic and political environment and for effective representations (or resistance) to "higher" authorities. The earlier communitarian thinkers, reacting to a political culture that reduced the politically relevant ends of man to the utilitarian and the crudely chauvinistic, often countered with an equally exaggerated "spiritual" view of fraternization. Particularly in Dewey and DuBois, however, one finds the beginning of a synthesis—a recognition that the pursuit of power and interest play a critical role in community formation and maintenance, that association is a means as well as an end in itself.

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[67] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 154.

[68] Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 6.

[69] Note the intermixture of themes in such otherwise dissimilar works as Robert A. Nisbet, *Community and Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962) and Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Random House, 1967). Nisbet's mode of social analysis of course has easily discernible nineteenth-century roots, but it is nonetheless instructive to note the tendency of Royce, whose analysis of mass society is easily the most prescient among the American communitarian theorists of the period we have examined, to translate the "crushing" of the individual by "economic and industrial developments" and other "leveling tendencies" in modern civilization into a problem of *spiritual* estrangement, the loss by the individual of "all sense of his unique moral destiny" (Royce, "Provincialism," pp. 74–76 and *passim*).

Similarly, it is in Dewey that one finds the closest approximation of that view of political life recently articulated anew by Hannah Arendt: politics is that realm of *collective* power where free men join together publicly for "speech" and creative "action" directed at the achievement of common ends.[70] Most of our theorists, it is true, share in what Arendt regards as the typically modern view of politics as the domain of *animal laborans*, meeting man's "needs" as producer and consumer, more akin functionally to the Aristotelian "household" than to the *polis*.[71] This is made explicit in the utilitarianism of Ward and Ross, and no less in communitarians such as Royce and Cooley, although it becomes grounds for the disparagement of contemporary politics in the latter cases. But Dewey, Cooley, and occasionally others among the communitarians also capture a glimmer of the Greek ideal, whereby the public space is reclaimed from the powers of production and consumption and men enter politics, not simply to safeguard particularistic power and interest, but to debate collective goals, undertake common enterprises, and distinguish themselves in seeking freedom and vitality for the whole.

If the social critics of the Progressive period frequently caught only a glimmer of the political implications and possibilities of their own work, they nonetheless loosened the bonds that constrained—and still constrain—the liberal discussion of politics. It was the theorists of social control who pointed up the ubiquity of power and conflict in Lockean "society" and the potential of *governmental* power, not as a threat *sui generis*, but as a countervailing and ameliorating force. But it was the communitarians who penetrated more deeply, questioning the conceptual and ethical adequacy of a notion of society's foundations in terms of autonomous individuals and a voluntaristic contract. Liberalism had assumed that men's articulations of their rights and interests, and their divising of means of association and exchange as well, were "natural," i.e., prepolitical. Political organization merely put a seal on these pre-existing ends and arrangements, safeguarding them but adding no substantive ends of its own. The communitarians rightly saw that the theorists of social control took too much of this for granted—equating the common good with new modes of aggregating and implementing "pre-existent" interests, ignoring the kinds of policies and structural arrangements that might put human goals and relationships on a less individualistic and materialistic footing. Cooley and those who shared his perceptions, by contrast, saw that the "wholeness" of man as he came to politics was not a "given" but a problem, and that even if a generalized desire for life, liberty and property could be assumed, these hardly exhausted the ends of community life. But the temptation was strong to avoid the theoretical reconstruction to which these perceptions might have led: while some sought to "enrich" liberal institutions virtually by fiat (Croly), others, having perceived the impoverishment of public life, turned to means of spiritual and social compensation that, in effect, encouraged the abandonment rather than the transformation of politics (Cooley, Royce).

If such escapes fail to do justice to men's stake in and responsibility for the commonweal, the current tendency to regard all of life as "politicized" is likewise oversimple. The liberal view of autonomous man and instrumental communities is inadequate, but thought must still be given to how men's needs for loyalty, solidarity, and collective purpose relate to the traditional rights, interests, and immunities the liberal state has set out to protect (or has simply left alone).[72] The

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[70] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). See also Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and The Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), and Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), chap. 5.

[71] See Arendt, *Human Condition*, pp. 28–37, 305–325. Feminists of the Progressive period argued that the participation of women in politics was necessary and justified precisely because their traditional household concerns had become the business of the state. "If women follow only the lines of their traditional activities here are certain primary duties which belong to even the most conservative women, and which no woman or group of women can adequately discharge unless they join the more general movements looking toward social amelioration through legal enactment." Jane Addams, "Why Women Should Vote" (1910), in Christopher Lasch, editor, *The Social Thought of Jane Addams* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 145.

[72] For a compelling argument as to the continuing moral force of these claims and the concrete forms they might take in the "administrative state," see Charles Reich, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal*, 63 (April, 1964), 733–787. Benjamin R. Barber's fascinating study of the history of a Swiss mountain canton suggests that the view of "freedom" as an absence of constraints, the assumed opposition of the power of the individual and of the collectivity, and an instrumental and defensive view

American communitarians felt this acutely and thus presented their theories as a means of preserving and enhancing the freedoms and institutions of civil society rather than "transforming" or "transcending" them. They felt enormous constraints not to succumb to an organic, statist (and often misperceived) "Hegelianism," though it was their common intent to transcend the "antithesis . . . between society and the individual" posited by liberalism.[73] Similarly, the communitarians were reluctant to divorce political leadership and public policy from the perceived and articulated "wants" of the populace, although several of their arguments set them apart from "want-regarding" theory in its conventional liberal guise: they did not regard all wants as equally legitimate or deserving of public support; they were aware that wants, far from being autonomous, were in fact dependent on economic and political circumstances; and they welcomed the prospect of men debating and implementing their publicly-oriented "ideals" in the political arena.[74]

The problem, of course, is not merely the supposed threat community poses to liberal "wants" and rights; there is also the question of their interdependence. As noted above, the communitarians dealt rather imprecisely with the positive relationship of the quest for power and interest to community formation. But it is important not to take one's frame of reference entirely from those modern theorists who identify politics as the realm of power and domination, for the communitarian theorists raise questions that are all too easily missed in current discussion. There are, after all, as Royce, Cooley, and Dewey variously insisted, crucial qualitative differences between a "group" seeking to secure particularistic power and interest and a community of the "loyal." The needs and aspirations they address—and the notions of "politics" they embody—diverge and often conflict. If the communitarians tend to sentimentalize the association and thus to neglect its potential relevance for liberal politics, they nonetheless have something to say to those contemporary thinkers, whether from the radical left or the pluralist "center," who in their secularizing and instrumentalizing of the community would concede far too much to the liberal-utilitarian view of association and political life. It is a mistake which Dewey and DuBois would not have made, although they admittedly provided only scattered suggestions as to how one might begin to sort out and interrelate the ends of community life and the associational and administrative arrangements required for their realization.

The Ends of Community: Lingering Dilemmas. The question of the ends and "levels" of community thus remains an important and difficult one. Present-day critics, like those of the Progressive period, tend to define the crisis of liberalism in radically divergent terms and in the process to talk past one another. Theodore Lowi, for example, who might be regarded as a modern heir of Ward and Ross, urges an abandonment of the pluralistic reincarnation of market politics and a return to the "formalism" whereby social goals are clearly specified and law and administration are authoritatively directed to their achievement.[75] Across the chasm, meanwhile, Philip Slater portrays less individualistic and achievement-oriented modes of child-rearing and socialization as the only means to free the society of debilitating and socially destructive "loneliness."[76] Some worthy attempts at bridge-building have recently appeared, but their success is mixed. Robert Dahl, for example, posits a multi-tiered model of democratic organization as an antidote to the governmental illegitimacy and unresponsiveness that are the targets of current protest. The welfare-state liberal's fixation on the central government and the radical's quest for direct democracy via neighborhood "control" are both fatally inflexible; what is needed is a frank realization that all-purpose modes of political association and organization are not to be found, that the scope and character of participation and

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of political participation are not written in the stars, but neither are they likely to be completely transcended in the thought and experience of men shaped by the history and political culture of liberalism (*The Death of Communal Liberty* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 3–9, 134–138).

[73] Dewey, *Public and its Problems,* p. 191; see also his discussion in *Reconstruction,* chap. 8. For an interesting modern treatment, which draws heavily on Royce in its grounding of liberal freedoms not in the individual's "autonomy" but in his overlapping (and concentric) "faiths," see H. Richard Niebuhr, *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), chap. 5.

[74] The terminology is adapted from Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), chap. 4. For a discussion of the dilemmas posed for Dewey as a social reconstructionist by his liberal-democratic scruples and his philosophical antidogmatism, see Drukman, *Community and Purpose,* pp. 342–352.

[75] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). Lowi's follow-up volume, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pays more explicit attention to the "social movements" that underwrite the regime of "formalistic democracy and the rule of law." The focus, however, is on participation as an *instrument* for inducing political change in accordance with pre-existing wants; even his discussion of the hypothesized *gemeinschaft* "stage" of organizational development refers to individuals "finding," "discovering" common interests and irritants (pp. 36–43).

[76] Philip Slater, *The Pursuit of Loneliness* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

authority must depend on the specific needs and functions being addressed. "Stages of government fitting together rather like components of a Chinese box are necessary," Dahl says, "if 'the people' are to 'rule' on matters important to them, whether a neighborhood playground, water pollution, or the effective prohibition of nuclear war."[77]

Dahl's apparent synthesis of the communitarian and social-control perspectives is incomplete, however, for the criteria he would apply to community formation and organization have little to do with the affective and ethical concerns expressed by the contemporary critics of liberalism and their communitarian forebears. Dahl rather adopts a radically individualistic posture, assuming "personal choice" and preference to be autonomously articulated, prior to politics. The mode of participation and authority obtaining at any level is to be assessed merely in terms of its effectiveness in implementing these preferences. Thus Dahl assumes that the crisis of liberalism is one of preferences frustrated and "choices" unmet; his discussion of levels of community simply talks past those whose primary concern is to broaden and humanize those preferences through new modes of communal identity and interaction.[78]

Wilson Carey McWilliams, by contrast, makes the fundamental human need for "fraternal relations" the basis of his critique of liberal thought and practice. He is aware of the danger that the quest for fraternity may leave broader questions of right and justice unattended—"that men might create a place for themselves within the existing order without changing it, especially a nook of private gratification which helps conceal the knowledge of public indignity."[79] But his own treatment of fraternity tends to widen the gap between the quests for justice and for community and to remove the latter from politics. Fraternity, McWilliams insists, is based on *both* "intense interpersonal affection" and "shared values and goals considered more important than 'mere life'."[80] This means that "civic fraternity" is impossible in the modern state; in fact, McWilliams echoes the familiar liberal fear that efforts artificially to induce it are dangerous. "The best, or rather the safest, approximation of justice is procedural rather than substantive, limited to external conduct, and leaves the development of man's justly fearful spirit to others than the state."[81] But to see the tasks of justice as "procedural," related to the "external" man, is to declare them peripheral in terms of McWilliams's core values. "Compassion will probably forbid" *discarding* modern society, he acknowledges, crucial as its "power and resources" are to the well-being of millions. But surely McWilliams's willingness not to "discard" mass society and its organs of distribution and control offers little comfort to those deprived and disadvantaged by the current workings of the system or, for that matter, to those who would seek for new standards of political responsibility and purpose.[82]

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[77] Robert A. Dahl, *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 93. Dahl's argument for consolidated jurisdictions and delegated central authority, while issue-specific and anything but doctrinaire, still partakes of the spirit of Ward and Ross and represents something of a departure, it would seem, from the celebration of "minorities rule" to be found in his earlier *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). "Our debates about economic institutions," he laments, "nearly always leave some major alternatives—chiefly 'socialist' alternatives—unexplored" (*After the Revolution?*, p. 119). Yet he still seems to conceive of the public interest in terms of a straightforward implementation of private preferences and to anticipate a harmonious equilibrium between narrowly-based groups and communities—the instruments of "individual effectiveness" (p. 99)—and the instrumentalities of the broader public. The compatibility of pluralist politics with "collective effectiveness" is thus not fundamentally questioned.

[78] Dahl's suggestion that a matter "best dealt with by democratic association" should be handled "by the smallest association that can deal with it satisfactorily" seems to be partially rooted in a sense that human interaction and socialization are qualitatively different in "units of human proportions" (*Ibid.*, pp. 102, 165). Yet his discussion of the individual's "wish to live among others" (p. 9) is devoid of the language of dependence or identification, and he defends his preference for smaller units of association mainly in terms of "individual effectiveness" and economy vis-à-vis the attaining of preferences.

[79] McWilliams, *Idea of Fraternity*, p. 621.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 74. *Local* groups and governments, McWilliams acknowledges, are "small enough to be meaningful to the individual" and thus might play "a far more immediate role in our security and emotional life than those to whom we are tied by abstractions." However, McWilliams foregoes any extended examination of the potential of these units as organs of fraternity, conceding more than one would anticipate, given the balance of his argument, to the "functionalist" contention that their viability is severely reduced because "all the great events of political life cross the boundaries of local areas and defy control by them" (*Ibid.*, pp. 69–70). Compare Dahl, *After the Revolution?*, pp. 64–67, 85–98.

[82] McWilliams, *Idea of Fraternity*, p. 622. It is not, of course, McWilliams's *intention* to "offer comfort" to a society where he feels the discovery of fraternity on any large scale is impossible and where, at the same time, attempts to return to a simple social order are subject to serious moral and practical objections. Neither, however, does he wish to belittle the "decencies and humanities" of the New Deal and other welfare-state reform efforts, however deficient their "compassion" and "impersonal condescension" are in terms of the fraternal ideal (*Ibid.*, chap. 19).

McWilliams insists that the quest for fraternity must take place in the interstices of modern society. His suggestion that "communities and fraternities" should be made "more possible" is not without policy implications, but he portrays the rediscovery of fraternity as primarily a matter of individuals "setting examples," making the most of "chance events of meeting and moment," "recognizing one's fellow citizens when chance casts them in the way."[83]

The Progressives' dilemmas are thus still with us. These dilemmas, however, while genuine and persistent, are perhaps not totally intractable; certainly it is important that contemporary critics of liberalism pay renewed attention to how their perceptions intersect and to the relationships their projected patterns of community organization and interaction bear to one another. To clarify the meanings the "quest for community" assumes in our present discourse would be to understand more fully the hard times upon which liberal politics has fallen, and perhaps to conceive of the directions from which renovation and renewal might come. Equally valuable, however, would be a renewed sense of what politics *cannot* accomplish—by virtue either of incompatibilities among our critiques and goals or of the character of the goals themselves. For if our vision needs to be lifted, if we must go beyond liberal notions of the ends and means of political life, we also need a fresh sense of the limitations and contradictions of that realm and of whatever renovations we undertake. The creative and constructive potential of the idea of community in American political thought is enormous, but it still does not promise salvation.

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[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94, 622–624. "The book," McWilliams writes, "is really concerned to open an area for discussion—to 'set a stage' for policy suggestions, rather than to make them [itself]. . . . Certainly, measures for greater 'community control,' neighborhood stabilization, etc. would rank very high on the list" (personal communication, February 27, 1974). For further hints along these lines, see McWilliams's discussion of the ill-fated Subsistence Homestead and Farm Security programs of the 'thirties (*Idea of Fraternity*, p. 550).

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Professor Bruell's thesis regarding "Thucydides' View of Athenian Imperialism" (*APSR*, 68 [March, 1974], 11–17) can be summarized in the following two propositions:

1. wrong does not properly exist for the mighty in matters of foreign policy;
2. while necessity is the mighty's proper concern in foreign policy, this necessity must derive from a consideration of interest or advantage rather than from anger or revenge.

The impact of these propositions generates the following synthesis: "Justice is the advantage of the stronger," with the qualification "in matters of foreign policy." The significance of these considerations involves the loss of a status for justice separate from interest or advantage in matters of foreign policy. Professor Bruell is correct: if this transformation in the normal (i.e., conventional) meaning of justice occurs, then (in Thucydides' view) we can no longer speak sensibly of the mighty doing "wrong" in foreign policy. Such a statement to be used at all must only apply when the mighty are stupid or make a mistake; then the mighty merely do "wrong" by improperly calculating utility. The necessity of the mighty remains to do whatever is in their interest whether that violates conventional justice or not. I contend that such an understanding of Thucydides' view of foreign policy is too simple.

I agree with Professor Bruell that comprehension of Diodotus' speech (III, 41–48) is central to unraveling this problem. Diodotus' name does mean "Gift of Zeus"; moreover, Thucydides introduces him as the son of Eucrates, a name which means "one who is properly strong" or "he who prevails well" (III, 41).[1] Thucydides here also tells us that Diodotus in the earlier meeting of the *ecclesia* had been the principal speaker against serving the death penalty upon the Mytilenians. At that time he had lost to Cleon. Professor Bruell is correct, the Athenians were angry, they acted in haste. However, only after the Athenian *demos* had begun to reconsider that their action had been savage and brutal were the Mytilenian envoys in Athens and their Athenian supporters able to again put the question before the Athenians (III, 36.4–5). Diodotus is not specifically credited with having introduced this repentant feeling among the Athenian *demos*. Rather, he is able to reintroduce thoughtful discourse only after the Athenians of their own accord have calmed down. More is suggested than merely that the Athenians were ready to make the mistake urged by Cleon. The sequence of these meetings leads to the conclusion that the necessary compulsion of anger and revenge was stronger than the necessary compulsion of interest and advantage. The Athenian *demos* does not want to reconsider the question because they have found a more advantageous solution to the problem, rather they are experiencing shame, that traditional psychological concomitant of justice. The consideration of genuine interest and advantage does not cause the anger of the *demos* to dissipate, rather these considerations depend upon that anger subsiding. If the necessary compulsion of anger and revenge is the stronger of these two principles, then it seems most paradoxical to argue that foreign policy predicated upon the mighty should depend for its correctness upon the weaker principle.

Nor should we necessarily conclude that the question of interest and advantage is the total point of Diodotus' argument. Professor Bruell properly notes that Diodotus alerts his audience to his intention to deceive them. But what is the nature of this deception? At the point in his speech where Diodotus claims the concern in the argument about the Mytilenians must be *advantage*, he distinguishes between this type of deliberation and a lawsuit where the guiding principle is justice (III, 44.4). Diodotus suggests, then, that justice's proper sphere involves legal suits and domestic matters. Diodotus' major argument of utility is the following: If the Athenians impose the death penalty upon the Mytilenians and leave no lesser alternative of penalty, then why should any city in revolt from Athens capitulate until the last extremity of resistance has been exhausted. Athens in the process of stopping revolts will be left with ravaged cities which can neither provide revenue nor arms in the future (III, 46.2–3). He ends this point by returning to the judicial metaphor: the Athenians must not be such strict judges as to bring harm upon themselves, rather the Athenians should here punish moderately (III, 46.4). The deception seems to be that Diodotus has introduced the conventionally just solution under the guise of advantage.

But there is still more significance here. Diodotus has considered the good citizen, the good speaker, and the wise city (III, 42.5); he has discussed the question as it should be discussed by men who are being wise (III, 44.2). The wise course, the good counsel, seems not to treat allies as enemies as Cleon has suggested (III, 40.8), but to treat enemies as allies whenever possible. The last point of Diodotus' argument of utility emphasizes the extent to which the populace of Mytilene remained allies in an oligarchic revolt. The point of the undifferentiated death penalty Cleon advocated would have been to push the populace to the oligarchs in any revolt, making every city in revolt a city of enemies (III, 47). Justice, then, in its most conventional sense must temper the wise foreign policy even when that policy is suffering the agonies of internecine warfare during full-scale war. An Athenian foreign policy which failed to include any moderation by justice if carried to its logical extrême would entail not only the destruction of the Athenian alliance but also perpetual warfare until all enemies submit. Subjugation by one side or the other must ensue. Peace which would require a sort of domestic policy of international law would be impossible. Yet while Thucydides refuses to call genuine the Peace of Nicias (V, 26.2–3), in which no genuine arbitration of disputes between Athens and Sparta took place, he makes no similar claim for the thirty-year truce.

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[1] For a comparative instance of the word "κράτος" but without the prefix "εὖ," see V, 105.2.

If justice is only the advantage of the stronger, as the Athenians in Sparta assert (I, 76.2–4) and the Athenians at Melos insist (V, 105.2), then the slaughter at Melos is required once the Melians refuse to submit. The precise point of the Melian dialogue is that the Athenians so arguing cannot have the friendship of neutrals in foreign policy (V, 95). If these admittedly weak islanders[2] do not submit, the Athenians fear the breakup of their island empire (V, 97). The Athenians do not listen to the Melian argument that refusal to grant a neutral status to Melos will strengthen present enemies and generate new enemies for Athens (V, 98), an argument which strongly resembles Diodotus' argument concerning the original Mytilenian decree. The Athenians on Melos are even more extreme (or, perhaps only more blatant) than the Athenians in Sparta; there is no gentleness to their foreign policy (compare I, 77.1–5 with V, 89). At Melos, the Athenians demonstrate that only power and fear hold together their alliance; Thucydides himself has discussed the dire consequences of governing by these principles (compare II, 8.4–5 with III, 82.8 and III, 84).[3]

Diodotus is properly strong because he understands how conventional justice not only can continue to exist even under an imperial foreign policy, but more importantly how conventional justice must continue to play an essential role in the wise imperial foreign policy. To advance this point he must engage in deception precisely because Athens is not the wise city. Thus, necessity and justice do not function as contraries, i.e., they *can* both be true at the same time. Where one is properly the guiding principle, i.e., necessity in foreign policy, justice in domestic policy, the other continues to operate in the generation of a *μέτριος*. To typify Thucydides' teaching as Machiavellian is to miss the actual reversal intrinsic to each. Machiavelli makes all policy, including domestic policy, operate on the principle of foreign policy; Thucydides demonstrates how justice even in warfare remains essential.

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[2] Here compare the Athenians' typification of the Melians relative weakness (V, 97) with Thucydides' description of Mytilene as a relatively weakly controlled allied *polis* (III, 36.2). Neither Cleon (III, 39.2) nor the Athenians at Melos (V, 94 and 95) can consider independence or neutrality of the relatively weak *polis* in contention. Is this because of the relative weakness of the Melians and the Mytilenians or because of the relative weakness of the Athenians at Melos and of Cleon? I contend the former is only a threat because of the latter.

[3] It is also interesting to compare the reversals of conventional meanings in the Melian dialogue (e.g., V, 111.3 with the word "*αἶσχρός*") with Thucydides' discussion of the conditions for and the process of perversion of normal language meanings (III, 82.4).

TO THE EDITOR:

While making observations of genuine interest and importance in themselves, and correcting me on a significant point, Professor Corsi has not fully grasped the argument of my article. In order to indicate some of our agreements and disagreements so far as I understand them, I am obliged to place that argument in a somewhat broader context.

Professor Corsi believes, erroneously, that the argument of my article is that "justice is the advantage of the stronger," to which he adds, also erroneously, the qualification, "in matters of foreign policy." Furthermore, he appears for the most part to believe that I understand that thesis in the following way: the "mighty," in foreign affairs, never have need of what he calls conventional justice; or perhaps, they must always act selfishly, and to act selfishly means never to act in accordance with conventional justice even when such justice happens to be in one's best interest. To this he responds, quite properly, that even the strongest, even in foreign affairs, cannot dispense completely with such justice. I agree with the general statement of this important point; but my saying that "those who are able to do wrong do not refrain from doing wrong" never excluded this, to say nothing of the fact that there is no necessity for selfishness to be stupidly pursued.[1]

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[1] Nor do the Athenians either at Sparta or Melos assert that "justice is only the advantage of the stronger." (See I, 76.3 and V, 89, and cf. V, 105.4.)

But what Professor Corsi writes suggests further that the love or concern for justice, which exerts some power over the souls of men, may sometimes be necessary to secure or prepare popular agreement to a policy which prudence by itself might require. He makes the observation that it was only after the Athenians had begun to regret their action of condemning *all* the Mytilenians rather than only the guilty to death and to consider it to be savage that Diodotus could advance his prudential arguments. This correct and valuable observation makes necessary some modification of my account of Diodotus' speech. But I would express the needed correction tentatively as follows: the highest deceit of Diodotus is to advance the prudential (and also gentler) policy by arguments which, after proper preparation by appeal to interest, appeal also to the Athenians' somewhat ambiguous sense of justice (III, 47.3; cf. 46.5).

On the basis of such lines of thought as have been indicated, Professor Corsi would be inclined, I believe, to say that Thucydides asserts a strength of justice, where I argue (albeit penultimately) that Thucydides is impressed with its weakness. But it may be that such an assertion of strength would not be so incompatible with that assertion of weakness as one might wish. One must therefore ask whether this strength, or either of its grounds, constitutes an adequate defense of justice against the attack which Professor Corsi believes to have been directed against it, when all the elements of the argument are taken into account. What would constitute such a defense? On these questions, I believe we would disagree. However that may be, it is only in the light cast by a consideration of them that the concern for justice, which Professor Corsi writes of and thereby shows, and which is a pervasive if implicit theme of my article as well, can be properly appreciated.

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As for the latter, it is not absolutely clear that in their view, "the slaughter at Melos is required once the Melians refuse to submit," that they would not, had the decision been theirs, rather have imposed banishment, for example. And their original terms, as they indicate in passing (V, 111.4), were moderate, so that one cannot fairly say that "there is no gentleness to their foreign policy."

TO THE EDITOR:

Jack Walker has already commented on the substantive issues emerging from the paper by Virginia Gray ("Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review*, 67 [December, 1973], 1174–1185). This letter draws attention to some methodological problems.

Gray's models are estimated against time series data, which are likely to be auto-correlated, and include lagged dependent (or endogenous) variables on the right-hand side of the regression equations. This presents very messy estimation problems, which are not considered in detail in many econometric text books.

Let us, for simplicity, consider her linear model

$$A_t = bA_{t-1} + c + e_t$$

although the quadratic equation, also a function of A_{t-1}, contains the same difficulties. As Gray notes, serial correlation of the error terms can indeed lead to distorted results. But problems of serial correlation themselves, if not compounded by other matters, can generally be accommodated by use of Generalized Least Squares.[1] It is for other reasons that the regression results presented in Gray's paper are unreliable.

The major inaccuracies arise from the use of a lagged endogenous variable (in this case, A_{t-1}). If A_t is highly correlated with A_{t-1} (as is, in this case, true), then one of the 'independent variables,' A_{t-1}, will be correlated with the disturbance term e_t whenever e_t is autocorrelated.[2] But Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression specifically assumes that this is not the case, i.e., that the disturbance is uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables. Therefore, much of the explanation of variance, which should in fact be assigned to the disturbance term e_t, will instead be assigned to the correlated variable A_{t-1}, resulting in overstating

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[1] It should be recognized that the Durbin-Watson test (DW), which Gray appears to have employed, is not valid for this case, primarily for reasons related to the distortion of the residuals, and detailed in the text above. In addition, however, DW tests only for the statistical significance of the coefficient of a first order auto-regressive process, which need not be the appropriate serial dependence model. Thus, it is generally preferable to examine the correlograms of the residuals in order to ascertain the model generating the serial correlation, as opposed to relying upon DW alone. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time Series Regression Models," in H. L. Costner, ed., *Sociological Methodology 1973–74* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), is an excellent reference on this point and related complexities.

[2] For example, if

$$A_t = bA_{t-1} + c + e_t \qquad (1)$$

while e_t is a first order auto-regressive process

$$e_t = \rho e_{t-1} + v_t \qquad (2)$$

then, substituting in (1)

$$A_t = bA_{t-1} + c + \rho e_{t-1} + v_t \qquad (3)$$

But, since A_{t-1} is a linear function of e_{t-1} and e_t is a linear function of e_{t-1} then A_{t-1} is correlated with the disturbance term e_t. Similar results can be proved for e_t generated by alternate disturbance structures, as long as e_t is auto-correlated. (i.e., a function of e_{t-1}).

its size and significance. At the same time, the disturbance term will be understated, and the residuals accordingly distorted. The Durbin-Watson statistic is accordingly inappropriate in cases with lagged endogenous variables: It is not intended to, and does not, address the crucial problem of correlation between independent variable and disturbance, and it is no longer even a measure of serial correlation of the disturbances, since the residuals no longer reflect the disturbance. Thus, any serial correlation of the 'true' residuals may be masked.[3]

In addition, high enough correlation between A_t and A_{t-1} makes the regression equation functionally equivalent to regressing A_t upon itself; so it is not surprising when high and statistically significant R^2's result from such a tautology.

From the results presented by Gray, this indeed appears to have been the case. None of Gray's R^2's was below 0.93, and most were well over 0.99. (Contrary to her statement, an R^2 of 0.928 is not generally described as "low.") Unfortunately, insufficient data are presented for a fuller evaluation—in particular, as to why a change in R^2 from .9950 to .9951 (as for the example of Board of Education) is "a significant increase in the proportion of variance explained" or proves that "innovations seem to diffuse through interaction."

Although footnote 25 refers to the "proper adjustments . . . for using a lagged dependent variable," it is unclear what procedure was in fact followed. In theory, the best method involves either the substitution of carefully chosen instrumental variables for the lagged endogenous term, or, alternately, previous knowledge of the precise nature of the underlying process which generates the disturbances, followed by application of some nonlinear least squares algorithm with the appropriate constraints applied to the coefficients (usually impossible in practice.) But it must be recognized that theoretical solutions are not always optimum in a particular applied context.[4] In practice, Gray's equation is probably not testable by any statistical method.

The problems with this regression analysis may have little effect upon the substantive findings, which appear quite cogent. Nonetheless, this brief discussion may point out the perils of application of statistical techniques without full understanding of the often complex assumptions involved.

RAISA B. DEBER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

Ms. Deber's excellent communication quite correctly calls attention to the potential, though not the necessity, for erroneous results when the regression model includes a lagged endogenous variable, i.e., when the dependent variable is some function of its value in the past. As she points out, the messy estimation problems, particularly the tests for auto-correlation and the practical solution to the joint occurrence of lagged variables and auto-correlation, are not discussed fully in many standard econometric texts, especially the one[1] I was consulting for auto-correlation tests when writing the article in early 1971.[2]

Nor do more recent texts provide much help: Wonnacott and Wonnacott discuss the lag problem, though not the solution, in two pages.[3] The second edition of Johnston devotes more space to the problem but leaves open the question of how misleading the use of the Durbin-Watson statistic may be in the lag situation: first, it is noted that the *d* statistic is often applied "for want of anything better";[4] then an experiment is reported showing that the Durbin-Watson test on the OLS residuals is quite powerful;[5] finally, it is reported that a new test has been developed by Durbin for samples larger than 30 and this statistic *h* can be computed in a routine fashion.[6] The latter test is the appropriate one for me to have used; it was first published in an econometric journal in 1970.[7]

Clearly Ms. Deber has hit upon a diffusion problem: if the diffusion of information from technical economics journals to substantive fields of political science were rapid, a more definitive test for auto-correlation at least would have been conducted for my data. I hope that the Hibbs article of this year will speed up the diffusion of such information to political scientists as well as sociologists.[8]

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[3] Indeed, Gray's Figure 1 strongly suggests that auto-correlation is present.

[4] More complete discussion of these complexities, plus an appended bibliography, can be found in Raisa Deber and Nazli Choucri, Appendix B ("Note on Methodology,") and Raisa Deber, Appendix C ("The Results of an Experiment,") in Nazli Choucri and Robert North, *Nations in Conflict: Population, Expansion, and War* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1974).

[1] Carl F. Christ, *Econometric Models and Methods* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

[2] Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1174–1185.

[3] Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, *Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 146–147.

[4] J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972), p. 309.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 311–312.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 312–313.

[7] J. Durbin, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least-squares Regression When Some of the Regressors Are Lagged Dependent Variables," *Econometrica*, 38 (May, 1970), 410–421.

Apart from testing more extensively and more appropriately for the presence of auto-correlation, Ms. Deber's communication is a plea for me, and indeed for anyone working with incremental data, to use an estimation procedure other than OLS because its assumptions *may be* violated for any particular data set in the manner she demonstrates for the general case. It should be noted that some econometricians, such as Theil, argue that OLS and GLS can be justified for a number of data sets which violate the basic assumptions in this manner, provided the sample is large.[9] However, Ms. Deber concludes, as do so many of the econometric texts, that one can't make bricks without straws;[10] specifically, she notes that "theoretical solutions are not always optimum in a particular applied context" and that the solutions she suggests are "usually impossible in practice."

Now what is the substantive political scientist, interested in testing a theory, to do in this situation? If he or she proceeds to make bricks, i.e., to conduct a scientific inquiry, he or she may stumble into problems which worry statisticians but for which they, at present, have no practical solution, i.e., they have not yet assembled the straws to their satisfaction. If, on the other hand, one is paralyzed into inaction by the fear of making bricks which later turn out to be faulty because of the quality of the straws, then we political scientists are at the mercy of statistics.

My own answer to this dilemma is to use whatever statistics are at hand at the moment and to put one's effort into developing an adequate theory which can be tested statistically, logically, against prior empirical findings, and so forth. In the case of innovation, diffusion theory as expressed in formal models of varying complexity is well-established and the empirical evidence is impressive.[11] In a recent synthesis of social change research 174 sets of binary adoption data are reviewed; the time path of all look like an S-curve, which can be described by the cumulative normal or the logistic curve, and the median goodness of fit is high ($R^2 = .98$), regardless of whether the innovations being diffused are technological or social.[12] Thus, I would argue that there is every reason to accept the results reported in my article: the theory is well-grounded, the various findings (graphs as well as regression results) agree with the extensive prior empirical results in other fields of social science, and the statistical methods, though by no means perfect, were reasonably sophisticated among those used by political scientists three years ago.

VIRGINIA GRAY

University of Minnesota

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[8] Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time Series Regression Models," in H. L. Costner, ed., *Sociological Methodology 1973–74* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974).

[9] In answer to "how large is large?" Theil reports sampling experiments consisting of 20 observations where the true value of the lagged coefficient was underestimated 75% of the time, thus leading to a conservative bias: Henri Theil, *Principles of Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), pp. 425–427.

[10] The statement appears in the first edition of Johnston where he is discussing the solutions to multicollinearity: J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), p. 207.

[11] For theory see: James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), chapter 17; David J. Bartholomew, *Stochastic Models for Social Processes* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 206.

[12] Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller, *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 4. The universality of the S-curve is also supported by many studies reported in Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, *Communication of Innovations* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 161–164.

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor A. James Gregor's review of my book, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View From America* ("On Understanding Fascism: A Review of Some Contemporary Literature," *APSR*, 67 [Dec., 1973], 1332–47), is a good example of a political scientist asking answers to ultimate questions that humble most historians, and asking, at the same time, and paradoxically, that historians steep themselves in "hard," "controlled" quantitative data where behavioral answers can be found only because ultimate questions have been forsaken. Gregor takes me to task not only for expressing my disappointment with the Roper polls of the '30s (my one effort at empirical inquiry), but, more importantly, for not doing the impossible—offering a definition of the "reality," "nature," and "essence" of Fascism. In the book I deliberately and emphatically avoided such an exercise, and in the concluding chapter, discussing the various views of Marxists, humanists, liberals, Catholics, etc., I stated clearly: ". . . if one cannot penetrate to the essence of reality there is still considerable satisfaction in viewing it from all perspectives. And if the meaning of Fascism continues to elude historians there is still something to be gained by studying the meanings Americans gave it; indeed there is much more to be gained by comparing American interpretations with those of European *emigres.*"

It is no more necessary to define the essential nature of a political phenomenon before one writes about it than it is necessary to define the essence of a book before one reads it—and understands it. My book dealt with not the reality of Fascism but with American attitudes toward both Mussolini as a political personality and Fascism as an ideological curiosity. Nevertheless, Gregor questions, and rightly so, how I can say that Americans "misunderstood the essence of the Fascist movement" when I myself venture no interpretation of its ultimate historical meaning. Admittedly it is a question that plagued me while writing the book, and one that has as many implications as Melville's solipsistic nightmare. But from a scholar of Gregor's stature, I expected profound political and historical criticisms, not useless methodological quibbles. I also expected that he might understand that there is "reality," and there is "Reality," and that the historian can deal with the former without defining the inner essence of the latter. The historian, that is, can deal with people's perception of the reality and meaning of a given phenomenon, and he can judge critically their views to the extent that that phenomenon developed into something quite different from what was perceived. "This kind of retrospective omniscience," I pointed out in the Introduction, "comes cheap to students of history." Yet it is legitimate to criticize, without claiming to know what Fascism "is," American attitudes and illusions about its historical significance and political direction. Hence, in discussing the views from the White House, I concluded:

> In general, and with some variation in emphasis, both the Republican and Democratic administrations accepted these assumptions: that Mussolini was generating economic and social progress; that although a dictator he enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people; that with the rise of Nazism he would prove a moderating foil to Hitler; and that despite his quixotic temperament he was good for Italy and good for the United States. Doubtless these assumptions contain a modicum of truth, but beginning with the Ethiopian War they collapsed one by one. The real rub, however, is not that history proved these attitudes wrong but that they were based on so shallow an understanding of Fascism in the first place. Roosevelt's hope that Mussolini would restore "democratic processes," for example, betrayed a complete ignorance of Il Duce's scorn for liberal democracy. Similarly, the general belief so prevalent in the State Department under Coolidge and Hoover that Mussolini had exterminated Bolshevism and was rapidly advancing Italy economically, appears, in light of Italy's subsequent economic troubles and the upsurge of Communist strength after the fall of Fascism, only to compound ignorance with illusion.

Throughout the review Gregor roasts me not only for criticizing opinions about a reality without explaining the ultimate nature of that reality, he also burns me for making "judgments," particularly those that "satisfy [my] moral sensibilities," and thus for writing a book in which there is "little . . . that can pass as warranted social science generalization or cognitively supported explanation" (p. 1336). Gregor then concludes his own review of the nine books on Fascism by confessing that "one doesn't really know what to make of all this. Contemporary social science clearly has not provided us with a clear definition of Facism" (p. 1346). Perhaps it is Gregor's need for a "clear definition" that is the problem. Since he does not know what to make of the conflicting interpretations, he seems to suggest that no one has the right to pass judgment on Fascism. Enthralled by the symmetrical beauty of untarnished theoretical classifications and "clear" taxonomic categories, he is uncomfortable with the messiness of historical experience. Demanding a flawless definition, he complains that my judgments and generalizations lack "cognitive" support, which may be only another way of saying that they betray normative concern. Indeed my own historical judgment of American attitudes toward Fascism is both ironical and moral, that is to say, Niebuhrian. Social scientists who listen to Gregor may reject it, but I hope some statesmen will read it:

> . . . the irony is that the attitude of the American government was not so much "reactionary" as "progressive." Most public officials sincerely believed that an Italy under Mussolini would improve economically and that, once the pace of modernization increased, political liberalization would eventually follow. This concept of democracy through industrial progress has been one of America's most venerable assumptions; applied internationally, it has been one of America's most vulnerable illusions. For the doctrine of political salvation by economic growth evolves from America's own national experience, and therein lies its limitations. The lesson of Fascism for American diplomacy is basically this: if there is one historical experience rarer than a Right-wing dictatorship achieving genuine social progress, it is a Right-wing dictatorship transforming itself into a genuine democracy.

Gregor's review is replete with contrived and extracted quotes and phrases taken out of context and crammed together, one gathers, to prove to the reader that I fail to explain what Gregor, and not I, claims that I intended to explain. Two examples will suffice. "It was 'right-wing,' in Diggins' judgment, at least in part because it exploited 'national humiliation—the vital mental germ of almost every right-wing movement' " (p. 1335). Gregor then cites what every sophomore knows, that the left-wing also exploits wounded nationalism, and he follows this up with the wonderful *non sequitur*, that on these grounds

"Castro's and Mao's communism seem to qualify as 'right-wing' " (p. 1335). The problem of distinguishing Mao's nationalism, rooted in immediate historical experience, from Mussolini's, fired by romance and mythos, I'll leave to Gregor, who is as weak with distinctions as he is clever with distortions. For the point is that I was *not* attempting to define, let alone explain, Fascism. On the contrary, in that very sentence he quoted I was describing the appeals of Fascism to the Italo-Americans, who had suffered the humiliation of Caporetto and the Versailles settlement. Small wonder that a reviewer who cannot keep in mind what is being explained cannot himself distinguish between what can and what cannot be explained.

Another example of Gregor's sloppiness occurs when he states that "Diggins is prepared to admit that Fascists felt that a 'dreadful misunderstanding' about Fascism was 'prevalent' in the United States" (p. 1335). Had Gregor carefully read the book, instead of skimming it for isolated phrases like the "political psyche" and the "American mind," which he seized upon to advertise his misspent "analytical" power, Gregor would see that he cannot even report facts accurately, not to mention interpretation. Actually, the "dreadful misunderstanding" was felt, not by Fascists, but by one man, the journalist Charles Sherrill, who was upset because Walter Lippmann and several other newsmen wrote critically of Mussolini's Italy. What point is Gregor trying to make by claiming I am "prepared to admit" that, in respect to press attitudes toward Fascism, not all was sweetness and light? Apparently he wants American opinion to be all of one piece, either favorable or unfavorable toward the Mussolini regime. And when he finds me describing a divided and continuously changing public opinion, it is I, and not public opinion, that he finds inconsistent. "The fact is," Gregor writes, "that there is no public way of choosing between these apparently incompatible generalizations" (p. 1335). Why not? When two or more viewpoints are being described, in what sense can they be said to be "incompatible"? And why does one have to "choose" between varying and contradictory opinions on Fascism, which itself was nothing if not ambiguous? Gregor wonders, after reading my book, "how, in fact, the historian proceeds to formulate and support generalizations" (p. 1335). This author wonders, after reading his review, how one who calls himself a political scientist can continually fail to understand what it is that is being discussed. Thus Gregor appears unable to distinguish Sherrill's statement, as a specific utterance made in a personal letter, from more general attitudes relating to different groups at different moments in time. Not only does Gregor not know what is being explained, he confuses private expression for public opinion. And while he shows no capacity for understanding that "opinion" can be as ambivalent as "reality" is complex, he waxes eloquent about "social sciences generalizations" and "cognitively supported explanation"—always a bad sign.

Similarly, for all Gregor's professed awareness of the distinction between "opinion" and "reality," he completely loses sight of this distinction when he tries to refute my historical generalizations. Specifically, he denies that Fascism was the "first anti-democratic political experiment of the twentieth century," claiming that the Bolsheviks deserve such dubious honor. But is Gregor dealing with "reality," his fetish, or "opinion," my subject? "Whatever else it was," he tells us, "Bolshevism doesn't seem to qualify as a 'democratic political experiment'." Here Gregor falls into the same trap he accuses me of being mired in—judging a political phenomenon not by how it was conceived but by what it became. The point I was trying to make is that the intellectuals' perception of Fascism and Bolshevism in their early stages was quite different. There were thousands of writers in the West for whom Bolshevism did "seem to qualify" as a popular, mass movement and scientific "experiment" in the "new democracy." True, they should have paid more attention to Lenin's *What's To Be Done* than to his *State and Revolution*, but it is worth recalling that the scores of intellectuals who soon broke with Bolshevism did so because its democratic (and anarchist) promises had been betrayed. How many ideologues broke with Fascism out of sense of democratic disenchantment? Finally, Gregor denies that Fascism was "the first modern political movement to blare the noise of ideology into concert halls, art galleries, and literary salons," again claiming that I ignore the "Bolshevik insistence that all culture serve the revolution." This point is debatable, but here, as elsewhere in the review, Gregor conveniently shifts from the subject under discussion: the cultural repercussions of Fascism in the early twenties. Indeed, the unity of art and politics was precisely what was debated, and ultimately rejected, in the early twenties by Bolshevik enthusiasts like Barbusse, Dell, Eastman, Rolland and others. Perhaps not until the thirties did communists *effectively* make "culture serve the revolution." Meanwhile, Pirandello, Pound, Puccini, Santayana, Shaw, and other writers and artists discovered Mussolini long before their Left counterparts were forced to choose Stalin against Hitler, "the bad against the worst."

One is puzzled why Gregor took up so much space in the *APSR* to demonstrate that I was working with a "vague and suspect methodology" (p. 1335). I would be the first to concede this, and indeed admitted it in my Introduction and stressed it again and again throughout the book. If Professor Gregor is in possession of a methodological windfall, if he has the epistemological key that will solve the problem of studying, not only an unfinished and amorphous reality like Fascism, but that "slippery beast" of public opinion, I would appreciate hearing about it in his reply. Students of history need all the assistance and advice we can get from political scientists. What we don't need is more empty rhetoric that predictably calls for methodological precision, particularly in a review that is itself a model of misrepresentation and an escape from the demands of historical explanation and moral judgment.

JOHN P. DIGGINS
University of California, Irvine

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor John Diggins's letter affords me the occasion for restating some very simple methodological suggestions. That Diggins misunderstood my original remarks is much to be lamented, and restating them might serve some purpose.

But first, let me say that Diggins's book accomplished what he says it did—and in my review I clearly granted as much. His book tells us "something" about prewar American views concerning Fascism. In my review I indicated that the book did that "quite well" (p. 1335). Diggins agrees with me that his book does not tell us anything coherent about the "real nature" or the "reality" of Fascism. At this point we seem to part company. Diggins seems to think that it was I who charged him with the responsibility of talking about "essences" and "real" natures. But it was Diggins, not me, who insisted that Americans "misunderstood the essence of the Fascist movement . . . " (p. xv of his Introduction). I simply reminded him that to insist that Americans misunderstood Fascism logically requires that Diggins be prepared to argue that *he* understands it. Since Diggins admits that he does not understand it he might have avoided the dilemma that apparently "plagued" him throughout the writing of his book by simply reporting American opinions without trying to identify it with understanding *or* misunderstanding. My basic objection to Diggins's book has little to do with what he does—report on the collection of confused and sometimes contradictory opinions Americans entertained about Fascism. My objection turns on what he pretends to do: to talk about how that opinion understood or misunderstood the "essence," "reality," or "real nature" of Fascism. Since Diggins seems to believe that it is "impossible" to address himself to the task of defining that "essence" and that "reality," I suggest he stop referring to it.

I am sorry that Diggins seems to feel that this is a methodological "quibble." I am sure he will find my further objection no less of a quibble. My quibble is that Diggins's "rough content analysis" cannot identify the modal traits of a population if the only data he alludes to are drawn from some purposively collected sample of literature. One simply cannot inversely project findings drawn from a potentially biased sample of literature over the attitudes of an entire population (even if that population were better defined than those dealt with by Diggins). This is a very simple rule governing the interpretation of findings. It is common knowledge among undergraduates. It may, therefore, be commonplace, but I don't think it qualifies as a quibble.

Diggins seems content to confuse several issues. I do not expect the world, history or public opinion to be all of a piece. I simply attempted to remind him that he could not talk about complex constructs like "the American mind," or the "American psyche" when his data refer only to his personal insights into some ill-defined, nonrandomly selected collection of literature. To know what some Catholic authors, public officials, or Italo-Americans were saying at any particular time is interesting and perhaps important. But all that one can say about that kind of information is that that was what some Catholic authors, public officials or Italo-Americans were saying at that particular time. One cannot, on the basis of such information (however credible), generalize over all Catholics, all public officials or all Italo-Americans. Still less does it license talk about "the American mind," "public opinion," or "the American value system."

The rest of Diggins's objections turn largely on substantive, but tangential, issues that it would serve little purpose to pursue. I suggest, however, that Diggins write a book about some of the subtle distinctions he wishes to argue. He sees a distinction between Mao's nationalism—"rooted in immediate historical experience"—and Mussolini's nationalism—which was apparently not rooted in historical experience, but "fired by romance and mythos." He seems to think that at some vaguely specified time some vaguely specified number of "intellectuals" saw Bolshevism as an experiment in "new democracy"—while everyone apparently agreed that Fascism was intrinsically and inherently "anti-democratic." I suggest that to support these rather quaint distinctions would require far more than Diggins's confident assertions. But to pursue all this here would hardly serve any useful purpose.

The point of my review was very simple: neither historians nor anyone else can generalize, with any confidence whatever, on the basis of the kind of data Diggins had at his disposal. He could neither generalize over an omnibus "American public opinion," "America's apologia for Fascism," or lead us "to the heart of American political values." Still less can his data, reports on confusing and confused American opinions about Fascism, support his Niebuhrian moral judgments.

If there is an "epistemological key" to be found in all this it is the following: if one is dealing with the reports about the fragmentary, episodic, confusing and sometimes contradictory opinions held by intellectuals who are select members of populations and subsets of populations, and one is employing an admittedly vague and suspect methodology, one should not attempt to talk about complex constructs like "the values of America's business culture," the American "mass mind," or the "pervasive values" entertained by Americans.

A. JAMES GREGOR
University of California, Berkeley

TO THE EDITOR:

Voters in the William Riker and Steven Brams article, "The Paradox of Vote Trading,"[1] do not sell their votes in the best market. As is normal, if you sell your product for less than the best you can get for it, you do not do very well. Consider the first bargain on their Table 5. Voter 2 and voter 3 exchange votes so that each acquires a positive value of 1. However, suppose that voter 2, after having heard voter 3's proposal, approached voter 1 and asked him if he could do better. Voter 1 could agree to vote for $\bar{Y}$ in return for voter 2 voting for X. This would give voter 2 a positive value of 3 points and reduce the loss suffered by voter 1 from -4 to -1. Clearly, both would be made better off by this bargain.

Of course, at this point voter 3 might approach voter 1 and offer to vote for X in return for voter 1 voting for Y. This would lead to a value 2 for voter 1, -1 for voter 3, -1 for voter 2. Again, both the members of the bargain, 1 and 3, can be made better off. As in most logrolling cases, there is a set of bargains of this sort that form a cycle. This is probably the reason that Riker and Brams ruled out recontracting; but the same cycle can occur in negotiation for a contract rather than after the contract or logrolling trades have been completed.

If there is nothing but redistribution involved, such cycles are essentially endless. When there are not only redistributional considerations but also efficiency considerations—i.e., there are different total payoffs to different possible coalitions in real terms, then the cycles are not necessarily unending. This is particularly so if there is a rather small number of possible trades available, as is true in the Riker-Brams article.

In the example given above, like Riker and Brams I did not assume that the individuals sold their votes in the best market because I confined the trading possibilities to trading on X and Y. If the parties seek out optimal trades, the possibility of an agreement that voter 2, regardless of counteroffers, will vote for X and that voter 1, again regardless of counteroffers, will vote for V, provides the highest payment that these two members can obtain from the sale of their votes on those issues. A consistent set of such bargains by all

Table 5. Utilities of Members for Outcome of Voting

	Preferred Outcome Col 1	Motion *x* $u_i(X)$ Col 2	$u_i(\tilde{X})$ Col 3	Preferred Outcome Col 4	Motion *y* $u_i(Y)$ Col 5	$u_i(\tilde{Y})$ Col 6
Member 1*	X	1	-2	Y	1	-2
Member 2	X	1	-1	$\tilde{Y}$	-2	2
Member 3	$\tilde{X}$	-2	2	Y	1	-1
		Motion *w* $u_i(W)$	$u_i(\tilde{W})$		Motion *z* $u_i(Z)$	$U_i(\tilde{Z})$
Member 1	W	1	-1	$\tilde{Z}$	-2	2
Member 2	$\tilde{W}$	-2	2	Z	1	-1
Member 3*	W	1	-2	Z	1	-2
		Motion *t* $u_i(T)$	$u_i(\tilde{T})$		Motion *v* $u_i(V)$	$u_i(\tilde{V})$
Member 1	$\tilde{T}$	-2	2	V	1	-1
Member 2*	T	1	-2	V	1	-2
Member 3	T	1	-1	$\tilde{V}$	-2	2

* Nontrader on pair of motions.

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[1] *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1973), 1235–1247.

members with each other would lead to the solution of exactly the same value as is obtained with what Riker and Brams call "sincere voting." Indeed, all the parties would be voting in the same manner as in sincere voting. At the same time, they would be selling their votes for the highest price.

Riker and Brams have inadvertently assumed that in vote trading you must of necessity vote against your preferences in order to get a payment for your vote. This is not necessarily true; you may secure "bribes" for not departing from your preferences. Indeed, if the people who talk about logrolling as improving the situation were defining logrolling as accepting bargains which are not the best you can do, they could hardly argue for the optimality of the process. Of course, it is true that in the real world information conditions may lead people to make mistakes; but this is just as true in deciding which "sincere" vote is in your best interest as in deciding which bribe to accept.

It has been known for some time that, if the preferences are appropriately arranged, then the logrolling outcome is the same as that which would be obtained under simple majority voting.[2] Further, Riker and Brams are wrong when they say "external costs have generally been ignored in the writings of those who extoll the benefits of vote trading."[3] Such external costs are part of the foundation of the reasoning in *The Calculus of Consent*, where they were discussed in great detail with special emphasis on explicit logrolling and on the case where majority voting leads to the same pattern of votes as "sincere voting." They were also treated in "Entrepreneurial Politics" and in my article, "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model."[4] The particular case they have designed, which I find mathematically most interesting, has not previously been discussed but the general principle is well-known. In such cases, logrolling leads to the same outcome that would be obtained without it and there are arguments in terms of reducing transactions costs for not having logrolling, but this is not the Riker-Brams argument.

In sum, Riker and Brams have demonstrated that those who sell their votes for less than they are worth do badly. In the particular case in which they discuss this, doing badly means that they do worse than they would have done had they not sold their votes at all. The problem, however, lies in the lack of skill on the part of the vote traders, not in the vote-trading process itself.

GORDON TULLOCK

Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University

TO THE EDITOR:

Gordon Tullock, who is one of the chief advocates of the universal desirability of logrolling, has committed a number of errors of analysis and interpretation in discussing our article:

(1) There is no way that the paradox we set forth can be avoided by the methods Tullock suggests. In our example (p. 1241), on any particular pair of motions the following kinds of outcomes are possible, using x and y as an illustration:

	(x, y)	$(x, \bar{y})$	$(\bar{x}, y)$	$(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$
Member 1	2	−1	−1	−4
Member 2	−1	3	−3	1
Member 3	−1	−3	3	1

Our example consisted of a permutation of the three members with respect to three different pairs of motions (x and y, w and z, and t and v). Calculating the results for each member of the permutations among positions, we get:

	Column 1 both motions pass in all three pairs	Column 2 one motion passes, the other fails in all three pairs	Column 3 both motions fail in all three pairs
Member 1	2+(−1)+(−1)=0	(−1)+3+(−3)=−1	(−4)+1+1=−2
Member 2	0	−1	−2
Member 3	0	−1	−2

Defining vote-trading in the natural way, we get column 3, supra, or a value of (−2) for all three members when they trade votes. Tullock, defining vote trading as blackmail, gets column 2, supra, or (−1) for all three members when they trade votes. Since each member would get zero (i.e., column 1) if they did not trade votes, clearly Tullock has not avoided the paradox, which is simply the fact that logrolling may make all the participants worse off than if they forswore it.

(2) Tullock appears to recognize that the paradox still exists because he then proposes the members blackmail each other back to the result in column 1, which is indeed better for everyone. The whole point of the paradox is to reveal this

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[2] Cf. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 126–130.

[3] Riker and Brams, "Paradox of Vote Trading," p. 1240.

[4] Gordon Tullock, "Entrepreneurial Politics," Research Monogram #8, Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1964; Gordon Tullock, "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," *American Economic Review*, 60 (June, 1970), 419–426.

fact. Tullock apparently believes that the matter can stop there, but of course it cannot because it is in exactly that position that a normal trade is desirable. That trade leads to column 3, which is what he was trying to avoid. This is simply to say that the system forms a cycle, which we discussed at length on p. 1245 of our article.

(3) In proposing a trade between 1 and 2 on x and v, Tullock errs when he says that such a trade provides the highest payment that these two members can get from selling their votes on these issues. For member 2, the salience of x (where "salience" is the absolute value of the difference between the utility of a pass and the utility of a fail) is 2, while the salience of v is 3, giving a total salience of 5. But for motions x and y for member 2, the total salience is 6. Hence, 2 makes more on an agreement on x and y than on x and v. Clearly, as we said, x and y is 2's best market, not x and v, as Tullock says.

(4) Despite the oversights in Tullock's letter, there is one serious dispute between us. This concerns the way one is to define and understand vote trading. We have defined it as occurring when there is an obvious and immediate advantage to both parties. Tullock allows also for a kind of blackmail trading. In his procedure, person A attempts to force person B to trade by saying to B that, if you (B) do not trade with me (A), I will trade with someone else (C) in such a way that you will suffer an external cost. Person B can then decide whether A really means his threat. We agree that this is possible in that there are some people who may try anything that can be thought of. On the other hand, this is too contrived an action for most people, especially since it involves a legislator (A) negotiating with a third party (C) simply to manipulate (B). Surely A will not last long as a negotiator if he is known to behave in this way. In general, vote trading is a very difficult form of barter, hard enough to arrange without complicating it. Economists do not create a theory of a market for goods based on blackmail and other highly contrived and unlikely maneuvers. Similarly, we think the analysis of vote trading ought to be in terms of the obvious, direct and immediate advantage of the traders.

We believe it is reasonable for Tullock and other correspondents to be upset by the paradox. But the appropriate reaction is not to deny its existence. There is another way around it, as we pointed out in our essay. That is a system of two political parties with strong discipline, which is, in effect, also the game-theoretic solution of a permanent coalition of some pair of members. No vote trading can occur with such institutions and, naturally, the paradox cannot occur either.

William H. Riker
Steven J. Brams

To the Editor:

In a recent paper Riker and Brams put forward the hypothesis that logrolling may worsen the situation of every voter, a result which they call "The Paradox of Vote Trading."[1] They try to show, moreover, that under the assumptions postulated, this is a consequence of the instability of the possible coalitions of voters, who want to improve their situations by vote trading. For "even if the original trades are not considered binding so that traders can try to extricate themselves from the paradox, they may make new trades which result in an indefinite cycle of return to the original position, return to the paradox etc." (p. 1236). Finally, Riker and Brams believe "that the paradox of vote trading is closely related to the paradox of voting" (p. 1245).

In the following comment I intend to demonstrate

(a) that the results concerning the "Paradox of Vote Trading" are not a special consequence of logrolling, but can also follow from straight majority voting;
(b) that vote trading can only bring about a worse situation for everybody, if logrolling remains incomplete;[2]
(c) that there exists no necessary relation between the "Paradox of Vote Trading" and the Paradox of Voting.

Let us begin by looking at the first question. In doing so I will make use of the numerical example in Riker and Brams's paper. As they did, I will use cardinal utilities, but all my considerations are also valid for ordinal utilities of voters.

Consider first Table 1, where b_{ij} ($i=1, 2, 3$; $j=1, 2$) are six alternatives belonging to three issues b_i ($i=1, 2, 3$). $u_k=u_k(b_{ij})$ is the utility of alternative b_{ij} to voter V_k ($k=1, 2, 3$). Since only one of the two alternatives belonging to each issue can be selected by majority voting, total

Table 1

	b_1		b_2		b_3		
u_k	b_{11}	b_{12}	b_{21}	b_{22}	b_{31}	b_{32}	U_k
u_1	2	−4	−1	1	−1	1	−2
u_2	−1	1	−1	1	2	−4	−2
u_3	−1	1	2	−4	−1	1	−2

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[1] "The Paradox of Vote Trading," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1235–1247.

[2] Riker and Brams seem first to realize this: "We assume, however, that once a set of trades on particular issues is made, new trades cannot be made on these issues" (p. 1240). Later on, however, they state: "in the next section . . . we drop even this assumption and show that the paradox persists even with unrestricted trading" (p. 1241).

utility for V_k sums up to:

$$U_k = u_k(b_{1j}) + u_k(b_{2r}) + u_k(b_{3s}),$$

with $(j, r, s = 1, 2)$. This implies, of course, that the two alternatives belonging to each issue exclude each other.

Now assume that each of the issues b_i has to be decided by simple majority voting. Then b_{12}, b_{22} and b_{32} will be selected by the group and the following total utility result for V_k:

$$U_k = u_k(b_{12}) + u_k(b_{22}) + u_k(b_{32}) = -2, \quad (1)$$

$(k = 1, 2, 3)$. Thus simple majority voting makes every voter worse off compared to the status quo, and this without any logrolling taking place.

Table 1 has been obtained from Riker and Brams's Table 5 by forming the sums $u_i(x)+u_i(y)$, $u_i(\bar{x})+u_i(\bar{y})$, $u_i(w)+u_i(z)$, etc. These sums are used by Riker and Brams to show the advantages of vote trading to different pairs of voters. They are, therefore, in their example the utilities of complex alternatives (the b_{ij}'s) which have been put together out of twelve simple alternatives for the purpose of logrolling. As a consequence, vote trading is for Riker and Brams responsible for the paradox that every voter is worse off (compare their Table 8). But the b_{ij} certainly need not be complex alternatives combined for the purpose of vote trading. Thus straight majority voting can produce the paradox just as well as logrolling.

Let us turn to the second point. Table 2 corresponds to Table 5 of Riker and Brams. It gives the utilities $u_k(a_{fg})$ $(f = 1, 2, \ldots, 6;\ g = 1, 2)$ of twelve simple alternatives a_{fg} belonging to six simple issues $a_f (f = 1, 2, \ldots, 6)$. Thus, we have among others:

$$b_{11} = (a_{11}, a_{21}) \qquad b_{12} = (a_{12}, a_{22})$$
$$b_{21} = (a_{31}, a_{41}) \qquad b_{22} = (a_{32}, a_{42})$$
$$b_{31} = (a_{51}, a_{61}) \qquad b_{32} = (a_{52}, a_{62}).$$

By voting independently on issue a_f, alternatives a_{f1} will be selected by the group, and each member gets $U_k = 0$.

Since, on the other hand, utilities are additive, it follows at once from Tables 1 or 2 that the resulting situation of each pair of voters can be improved by logrolling, as stated by Riker and Brams. Expressing a strong preference of the group by P, we get:

$$(a_{12}, a_{22})P(a_{11}, a_{21}) \quad \text{or} \quad b_{12}Pb_{11} \quad \text{and} \quad (2)$$
$$(a_{32}, a_{42})P(a_{31}, a_{41}) \quad \text{or} \quad b_{22}Pb_{21} \quad \text{and} \quad (3)$$
$$(a_{52}, a_{62})P(a_{51}, a_{61}) \quad \text{or} \quad b_{32}Pb_{31}. \quad (4)$$

Thus, if the group selects the b_{i2} $(i = 1, 2, 3)$ by logrolling, everybody will be worse off, since total utilities for voters are now:

$$U_k = -2 < 0, \quad (k = 1, 2, 3), \quad (5)$$

whereas it amounted to 0 with straight majority voting on each simple issue.

The problem with this approach of Riker and Brams is that the possibilities for logrolling are not exhausted by these three separate processes of vote trading. As a consequence their result follows only if logrolling remains incomplete. For, looking at Table 1 which describes the first round of logrolling, we notice that each pair of voters can improve their positions by additional logrolling. For example, as can be seen from Table 3, V_1 and V_3 will be better off, if they join to bring about by logrolling the even more complex alternative (b_{11}, b_{21}). In this case their total utilities would amount to

$$U_k = 2 > 0 > -2, \qquad (k = 1, 3),$$

whereas voter V_2 would get

$$U_2 = -6 < -2 < 0.$$

As a consequence, V_2 would be worse, V_1 and V_3, however, better off than with straight majority voting excluding vote trading. The group preference for the newly created complex issue is

$$(b_{11}, b_{21})P(b_{12}, b_{22}), \quad (6)$$

whereas $b_{32}Pb_{31}$ remains unchanged.

Table 2

	a_1		a_2		a_3		a_4		a_5		a_6		
u_k	a_{11}	a_{12}	a_{21}	a_{22}	a_{31}	a_{32}	a_{41}	a_{42}	a_{51}	a_{52}	a_{61}	a_{62}	U_k
*	x	$\bar{x}$	y	$\bar{y}$	w	$\bar{w}$	z	$\bar{z}$	t	$\bar{t}$	v	$\bar{v}$	
u_1	1	−2	1	−2	1	−1	−2	2	−2	2	1	−1	0
u_2	1	−1	−2	2	−2	2	1	−1	1	−2	1	−2	0
u_3	−2	2	1	−1	1	−2	1	−2	1	−1	−2	2	0

* Riker-Brams notation.

Now vote trading as described in Table 3 still does not exhaust the possibilities for logrolling. For, besides similar vote trading among different pairs of voters, three instead of two of the complex alternatives b_{ij} can be combined to even more complex alternatives. The outcome of Table 3 is given by (b_{11}, b_{21}, b_{32}) and logrolling only takes place between issues b_1 and b_2. But V_2 can certainly get a better result by proposing a trade to V_3 including all three complex issues, namely (b_{12}, b_{21}, b_{32}). This alternative offers—as can be seen from Table 1—$U_2 = -4 > -6$ to V_2 and $U_3 = 4 > 2$ to V_3, whereas V_1 gets $U_1 = -4 < 2$. From this, it follows that

$$(b_{12}, b_{21}, b_{32}) P (b_{11}, b_{21}, b_{32}). \qquad (7)$$

We note specifically that one voter, V_3, is better off than with straight majority voting, since $U_3 = 4 > 0$.

From the above considerations two results can be derived:

(1) Logrolling can only lead to worse results for every voter, if not all issues offering potential benefits to a majority of voters are included in the logrolling process.

(2) Whatever the results of logrolling may be, at least one of the three voters considered will be better off, if all relevant issues have been included in the vote-trading process.

It seems to me that these results are generally true for any number of voters and for ordinal preferences, but at the moment only a proof for two issues with two alternatives could be given. It follows from the above results that the "Paradox of Logrolling" is a consequence of incomplete and unconnected vote trading. This, however, can only happen in the presence of incomplete information, of transaction costs for logrolling or of limiting rules of the political process. All of these reasons are certainly quite realistic, but should be made explicit as the real cause of the "Paradox of Vote Trading."

Finally we turn to point (c), namely, that there is no necessary relation between the "Paradox of Logrolling" and the Paradox of Voting. It has been shown recently that under certain conditions a logrolling situation always implies circular group preferences, if all voters have full information and if no transaction costs or adverse institutional rules are present.[3] The "Paradox of Vote Trading," however, can only occur if one of these conditions is violated, i.e., if incomplete and unconnected logrolling takes place. Thus vote trading implies the Paradox of Voting, even if the "Paradox of Logrolling" is not present.

Table 3

u_k	(b_{11}, b_{21})	(b_{12}, b_{22})	b_{31}	b_{32}	U_k
u_1	1	−3	−1	1	2
u_2	−2	2	2	−4	−6
u_3	1	−3	−1	1	2

It is perhaps adequate to conclude this comment by clearing up some problems which have only been dealt with in part by Riker and Brams. Looking back at Table 2 we realize that, as stated by Riker and Brams, b_{12}, b_{22} and b_{32} can be brought about by vote trading (see relations (2) to (4)). But without incomplete information, transaction costs for logrolling, or institutional limitations, there exist possibilities for improving these unwelcome results for each pair of voters. From Table 2 we get easily:

$$(a_{11}, a_{21}) P (a_{11}, a_{22}) P (a_{12}, a_{22}). \qquad (8)$$

Because of (8) and (2) one gets:

$$(a_{11}, a_{21}) P (a_{11}, a_{22}) P (a_{12}, a_{22}) P (a_{11}, a_{21}). \qquad (9)$$

Thus circular social preferences result, as had to be expected from the general proof given in the paper mentioned above. Or as Riker and Brams state correctly, the different possible logrolling coalitions are not stable, they are circularly dominated. The same result obviously holds for the other possibilities for logrolling described in (3) and (4). This, however, not only happens in cases in which the "Paradox of Vote Trading" can happen; on the contrary, it is a consequence of any logrolling situation.

Vote trading confined to a combination of two simple issues into complex ones is, as has been shown above, not the only possibility for voters to get rid of the consequences of (2) to (4). Instead of this they can try to form new coalitions by combining into complex alternatives three, four, five or even six simple alternatives. (Compare (6) and (7).) And it is worth stressing that for each of these "levels of logrolling" the phenomenon of circular social preferences is implied by the possibility to trade votes. Thus, e.g., for a combination of six issues we get:

$$\begin{aligned} &(b_{12}, b_{22}, b_{32}) P (b_{12}, b_{21}, b_{32}) \\ &\qquad \cdot P (b_{11}, b_{21}, b_{32}) P (b_{12}, b_{22}, b_{32}). \end{aligned} \qquad (10)$$

Thus the "six-level" logrolling model of Riker and Brams allows for a wealth of political maneuvers. On each level above the first and below the sixth, different results can be obtained by forming new coalitions, either by using the same number of issues as before or by adding additional issues and thus moving to higher levels. On the same level, moreover, the same number of different issues can be combined.

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[3] Peter Bernholz, "Logrolling, Arrow-Paradox and Decision Rules: A Generalization," *Kyklos* (fasc. 1, 1974), 49–62, and the earlier paper by the same author: "Logrolling, Arrow-Paradox and Cyclical Majorities," *Public Choice*, 15 (Summer, 1973), 87–95.

It is important to realize that all these complicated possibilities are present before bringing in the additional conditions responsible for the "Paradox of Vote Trading." It seems, therefore, advisable to keep clearly apart the different assumptions, problems, and consequences of the model.

PETER BERNHOLZ
Universität Basel, Switzerland

TO THE EDITOR:

In our essay, "The Paradox of Vote Trading," we were careful to define vote trading as exchanges between members of votes on issues and showed that such trading could render every member worse off. Professor Bernholz has redefined trading in terms of complex alternatives (made up of several trades) and in terms of "complete" trades on all issues; he then conjectures (with our example) that at least one trader will be better off from such "complete" trading. For the following reasons, this conjecture does not seem to us to resolve the issue:

(1) Bernholz's "complete" trades involve all motions in the system including, of course, those that may be already resolved and those that have not yet been made or thought of. It is hard to think of *any* institutional arrangement that admits of such trades. By contrast, our definition of trades fits naturally with institutions—like American legislatures—where logrolling is practiced on an issue-to-issue basis.

(2) Our assumption—perhaps myopic—is that trades, once made, are final, if only because they are ultimately embodied in actual votes. Bernholz, however, assumes that trades can be perpetually reopened. It seems to us that any possible outcome that is offered as a conclusion to this indefinitely long process ought to be stable in the sense that the supposed conclusion is preferred by a majority to all other outcomes. But Bernholz's "complete" trades are not stable. Indeed, the very set of trades he offers as a candidate for a final outcome (i.e., b_{12}, b_{21}, b_{32}) in statement (7)) is itself wholly unstable. At least two sets of trades are preferred to it by a majority: the status quo of no trades, and the set of trades we pointed out as the paradox of vote trading (see Table 1). Thus, while Bernholz is technically correct in claiming that there is at least one voter who benefits from "complete" trades, still this benefit cannot be realized in practice because a majority prefers other situations. (If two members can enforce the "complete" trades, then they can just as easily enforce no trades.) It seems to us, therefore, that Bernholz's claim "(b) that vote trading can only bring about a worse situation for everybody, if logrolling remains incomplete" is highly misleading because of the fact that Bernholz ignored the problem of the stability of outcomes. Specifically, the fact that "complete" trades are themselves unstable, and can be undone, means that the paradox can recur with continued trading on less complex alternatives. There is no reason to assume that trading must proceed in one direction from less complex to more complex alternatives when it is individually rational for voters to reverse this process.

(3) We also believe that his assertion "(a) that the results concerning the 'paradox of vote-trading' are not a special consequence of logrolling, but can also follow from straight majority voting" is equally misleading. In Bernholz's argument, the simple majority voting takes place on "complex alternatives," which are precisely the completed trades of our example of the paradox of vote trading. Thus, simple majority voting reveals the paradox simply because the paradox is embedded by vote trading in the very issues voted upon. It is not clear, therefore, in just what way Bernholz's example is independent of the paradox of vote trading and his assertion (a) must be regarded as not proven.

(4) Finally, with respect to his assertion (c) that there is no necessary relation between the paradox of vote trading and the paradox of voting, we point out that we did not claim that the relation is necessary. Our claim is simply that in our particular ordinal example of the paradox of vote trading, there is an underlying paradox of voting.

Table 1. Members' Utility for Sets of Trades

	Status quo point of no trades	Trades in paradox of vote trading	Bernholz's "complete" trades
Member 1	0	−2	−4
Member 2	0	−2	−4
Member 3	0	−2	+4

WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester
STEVEN J. BRAMS
New York University

TO THE EDITOR:

J. C. Harsanyi's latest communication (*APSR*, 68 [June, 1974] 730–731) to you renews his disagreement with my "third breakdown of rationality." His initial disagreement, in his review of my book, was based on a mathematical error that he has now retracted. Thus Harsanyi's present criticism of the concept is the *first* that is not based on a mathematical error. His communication rather obscures this point.

In fact, however, Harsanyi's latest communication, though it purports to criticize the "breakdown," does not actually discuss it at all. The "breakdown," as revealed by Theorem 9 of my book, consists in a conflict between two kinds of motivation that a player may have in choosing a strategy; one is the so-called "rational" (i.e., optimizing) motivation of increasing his own payoff *assuming the other player's strategy to be fixed;* the other is the so-called "inducement" motivation of choosing so as to increase one's own payoff *assuming that the other player will be "rational"* (i.e., will optimize). The specific difficulty revealed by my theorem is that a sure-thing strategy, which is undoubtedly *best* from the "rationality" viewpoint, is *worst* from the viewpoint of "inducement": the theorem states that a sure-thing strategy always induces the best equilibrium *for the other player.*

In light of this theorem one cannot assert that there is no difficulty (or a negligible one) with sure-thing strategies unless one asserts that "inducement" as a motivation is negligible. On the other hand, whether the difficulty is serious enough to constitute a "breakdown" is perhaps arguable. Harsanyi, however, in his communication does not discuss the matter at all. He fails to mention either the "inducement" motivation, or the fact that sure-thing strategies are the worst possible ones from this viewpoint. Instead, he points out a certain "rational" characteristic of sure-thing strategies.

Although he does not describe this characteristic in general, but only in reference to a particular 2-by-2 game that he uses as an illustration, I understand him to have in mind the following generalization: If *B* is a sure-thing strategy for Player 1, and if (*B*, *Y*) is an equilibrium more favorable to Player 2 than an equilibrium (*A*, *X*) that is more favorable to Player 1, then *any* positive probability of *Y* being played will cause strategy *B* to have a higher expected payoff for Player 1 (and therefore to be more "rational" for him) than strategy *A;* whereas there will be a *range* of probabilities of *A* being played such that *Y* will be more "rational" than *X* for Player 2.

This, of course, is true. It indicates, correctly, that the rationality of (*A*, *X*) for Player 1 is tenuous, and easily upset: Hence it strengthens the rationality argument for the sure-thing strategy *B*, and hence strengthens, rather than weakens, the third breakdown! For the breakdown, as noted above, consists precisely in the fact that *the worst choice from the "inducement" viewpoint* (which is the sure-thing strategy) is precisely the *most* rational choice! Thus Harsanyi, though he does not discuss the "third breakdown," produces an argument that, by underlining the "rationality" of sure-thing strategies, actually tends to underline the "breakdown" of rationality. For the rationality of the sure-thing approach only makes it the more disconcerting that what is the *best* strategy from the viewpoint of rationality is the *worst* from the viewpoint of inducement.

It is interesting to note what happens if we apply Harsanyi's probabilistic type of analysis to the "inducement" justification for strategy *A* (the justification that Harsanyi ignores). From the "inducement" viewpoint, what matters to Player 1 is Player 2's subjective probability that he (1) will change his strategy from *A* to *B*. Player 1, in order to "induce" the equilibrium (*A*, *X*), must try to make this subjective probability as low as possible. We find that it may rise quite high (in Harsanyi's example, up to 1/2) before it reaches the level at which Player 2 ceases to be "induced" to choose strategy *X*. Thus the "inducement" justification for strategy *A* is not tenuous at all! Indeed, it has the same strength as Harsanyi's argument would give to the "rationality" justification for Player 2 to choose strategy *Y*.

Incidentally, Harsanyi's argument that Player 1 in his example is in a "*much weaker* bargaining position" than Player 2 is remarkable in one respect: it contradicts the well-known "Harsanyi-Zeuthen" criterion for assessing players' bargaining positions in a conflict between two equilibria. According to this criterion (Harsanyi, J. C., "A Solution for Non-Cooperative Games," in *Advances in Game Theory*, Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 52, Princeton, 1964), the players' bargaining strengths are in fact equal. Thus Harsanyi's argument contradicts the very criterion he has made famous.

I conclude by giving an example in which (unlike Harsanyi's example) the unreasonableness of singling out the sure-thing strategy as the unique solution is rather obvious. I suggest that in the following game one would hardly expect that row player would invariably submit meekly to the (1, 5) equilibrium.

1,5	2,4	3,3	4,2	5,1
0,0	2,4	0,0	0,0	2,4
0,0	0,0	3,3	0,0	3,3
0,0	0,0	0,0	4,2	4,2
0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,1

NIGEL HOWARD

The Conan Institute, Ottawa

To the Editor:

In my last letter I discussed a simple two-person game with two pure-strategy equilibrium points, viz. (A, X) and (B, Y). The former is more favorable to player 1, while the latter is more favorable to player 2. I have argued that nonetheless player 1 will have to accept the second equilibrium point (B, Y), even if it is less favorable to him. This follows from the sure-thing principle (since B is player 1's sure-thing strategy). More importantly, it follows from the fact that player 1 is in a much *weaker* bargaining position because he could use strategy A, associated with his favorite equilibrium point (A, X), only if he were *absolutely sure* (with a subjective probability one) that player 2 would also use the strategy X associated with (A, X). In contrast, player 2 can afford to use the strategy Y associated with his favorite equilibrium point (B, Y), even if he is *far from sure* that player 1 will likewise use the corresponding strategy B (so long as player 2 assigns at least probability 1/2 to this possibility).

Howard does not deny the cogency of this argument in terms of what he calls the "rationality" criterion. But he claims that in terms of another, equally valid, strategical criterion, which he calls the "inducement motivation," it is irrational for player 1 to accept the equilibrium point (B, Y) less favorable to him. This is so because player 1 *might* be able to get player 2 accept equilibrium point (A, X). He might be able to achieve this by convincing player 2 that he (player 1) would stick to strategy A anyhow—or, more specifically, by inducing player 2 to assign a subjective probability higher than 1/2 to this possibility. According to Howard, this means that there is a real paradox here: one rationality criterion (which Howard simply calls "rationality") suggests that player 1 should accept the less favorable outcome (B, Y), whereas another rationality criterion (which Howard calls "inducement motivation") suggests that he should not.

My own view is that there is nothing paradoxical in the situation—for the simple reason that Howard's "inducement motivation" is not a valid rationality criterion at all. This is so because player 2, if he is rational, will never take seriously any possible threat by player 1 to stick to strategy A in order to enforce the outcome (A, X)—since the obvious weakness of player 1's bargaining position will make such a threat wholly incredible. The point is that, in this game, *one* of the two players *must* accept a relatively unfavorable outcome: but then this must be precisely player 1 because he is obviously in a much weaker bargaining position.[1] This may be a very unwelcome conclusion from player 1's point of view, but there is nothing paradoxical about it.

The numerical example that Howard adduces in his last letter to the editor does nothing to change this conclusion. In his example, there are five equilibrium points in pure strategies. Of these five, the first one, yielding the payoffs (1, 5), is the least favorable to player 1. Yet, owing to the extreme weakness in his bargaining position, player 1 can hardly do anything else but accept this equilibrium point as the outcome of the game.

At first it may seem surprising that he should have to accept such an extreme and highly unfavorable outcome as (1, 5), instead of such a "reasonable compromise" outcome as (3, 3). But, on further reflection, one can easily see that this is the case. As simple computation shows, if player 1 feels even the slightest uncertainty about player 2's likely strategy choice then he cannot avoid choosing his first strategy, associated with the very unfavorable outcome (1, 5) under discussion. He could choose any other strategy only if he were *absolutely sure* (with subjective probability one) that his opponent would also choose the corresponding strategy. In the contrast, player 2 can afford to choose his first strategy—associated with the outcome (1, 5) very favorable from his point of view—even if he is *far from sure* that player 1 will also choose his first strategy. (For example, player 1 can use his first strategy even if he assigns only probability 1/2 to player 1's using his first strategy, and then divides the remaining probability 1/2 equally among player 1's other four strategies, etc.)

In other words, (1, 5) is the *only* possible outcome if the players start out (as they must) with some—however small—initial uncertainty about each other's strategies. This fact simply rules out any other one of the four alternative equilibrium points as a possible outcome for rational players.

To conclude, in our examples there may very well be a conflict between what Howard calls "rationality" considerations and what he calls "inducement" considerations. But this does not in any way represent a conflict between two different aspects of rationality itself, simply because Howard's "inducement" considerations are not a valid rationality criterion. For instance, in my own example, player 1 could induce player 2 to use strategy X only if he himself could credibly threaten to use strategy A no matter what—but, as we have seen, given the extreme weakness of player 1's strategical position, in actual fact such a threat by him would lack any credibility.

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[1] In my opinion, the probabilistic considerations described above clearly demonstrate the extreme weakness of player 1's bargaining position. However, Howard is right in pointing out that the concept of "risk-dominance" as defined in an earlier paper of mine (in *Advances in Game Theory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) is not sensitive enough to bring out this asymmetry in the two players' bargaining positions.

This, however, means that we have no paradox whatever here, and Howard's third "breakdown" of rationality is just as spurious as the first and the second "breakdowns" are.

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Political Dictionaries: A Bibliographical Essay*

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The editors and authors of these ten books call them dictionaries. All the same, these political dictionaries must not be confused with a standard desk dictionary, let alone the massive unabridged kind. *Webster's Eighth New Collegiate Dictionary* (1973) has 150,000 entries with 27,000 usage examples which, with some additions, is based on *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (1969) with 450,000 entries and 200,000 usage examples. The largest of the volumes reviewed here has fewer than 4,100 entries, and most have far fewer, so that the books are not comprehensive in the sense of exhausting their subject and capturing all possible terminology.† It remains true that the more specialized books here, limited to definite subjects, provide cohesive and ample treatments. This is particularly true for Abrams on cities, Luttwak on armaments, and Safire on American political catchwords and usages. They are really books that could have been cast in other forms than dictionaries, but their authors simply found it attractive to do their work in this format rather than as one-act plays or videotape quiz shows. Theirs was an artistic judgment. Having chosen the dictionary form, they then "do their own thing" with it. They cover many more words and subjects than indicated by a count of the entries because they go into so much more depth than the ordinary dictionary attempts. The resulting art form is really different from a dictionary, and as such it seems to me to succeed when it is handled both with imagination and competence. It fails when taken too literally and given insufficient infusions of fresh air and individuality.

Dictionary making is so likely to be associated with great institutional edifices like Merriam-Webster's unabridged and the eleven-volume Oxford English Dictionary that it is well to hail, if critically, this batch of modest hand dictionaries from the cottage industry sector. Their publishers have doubtless come to believe that acquisition librarians are more likely to give the nod to a book that purports to be a dictionary than a book cast in the form of numbered chapters. Although all of the books here deal with concerns of substantial interest to political scientists, they have little else in common aside from their alphabetical organization.

The editorial apparatus in these dictionaries affords some measure of editorial patience, thoughtfulness, and sophistication. The preliminaries of a preface or foreword and an introduction explain the editorial purpose and plan and, where missing, forecast trouble ahead in the text. Cross-references must be built into the text itself. This feature is absent only in Dunner, an omission explained possibly by the book's being a compilation of entries written by about 200 different political scientists; these authors were not able to refer to each other, and this deficiency was not remedied by the editors. Discussion of method and of sources usually appears in the back matter, along with an index. A judgment of the quality of each apparatus contributes silently to the rating for editing of each dictionary. (See Table 1.) It should only be added that the Cranston and Lakoff *Glossary of Political Ideas* deals with such a small number of topics as to obviate the need for complex editorial tools. By the same token explanatory features become all the more essential as the entries rise to more than 1,000 for Laqueur and for Plano and Greenberg; to nearly 3,000 for Dunner; and to 4,000 in Smith and Zurcher.

The Language of Cities: A Glossary of Terms. By Charles Abrams. (New York: Viking Press, 1971. Pp. 365. $10.00.)

A Glossary of Political Ideas. Edited by Maurice Cranston and Sanford A. Lakoff. (New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. 180. $5.95.)

Dictionary of Political Science. Edited by Joseph Dunner. (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1970. Pp. 585. $3.95, paper.)

A Dictionary of Politics, 6th ed. By Florence Elliott. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. Pp. 480. $2.54. paper.)

A Dictionary of Politics. Edited by Walter Laqueur. (New York: Free Press, 1971. Pp. 593. $14.00.)

A Dictionary of Modern War. By Edward Luttwak. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Pp. 224. $7.95.)

The American Political Dictionary, 3rd ed. By Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972. Pp. 462. $5.95, paper.)

A Dictionary of Political Analysis. By Geoffrey K. Roberts. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. Pp. 229. $8.95.)

The New Language of Politics: A Dictionary of Catchwords, Slogans & Political Usage. By William Safire. (New York: Collier Books, 1972. Pp. $4.95, paper.)

Dictionary of American Politics, 2nd ed. By Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968. Pp. 434. $2.50, paper).

† Where references to the dictionaries may be located alphabetically, no page number is given.

Table 1. Editorial Apparatus in Selected Political Dictionaries

	Total Entries	Preface or Intro- duction	Method Essay	Essay on Sources	Index	Cross Refer- ences	Edi- torial Ranking
Abrams, *Language of Cities*	979	+	+	+	+	+	2
Cranston & Lakoff, *Glossary of Political Ideas*	52	+	–	+	–	+	5
Dunner, *Dictionary of Political Science*	2768	+	+	–	–	–	9
Elliott, *Dictionary of Politics*	952	–	–	–	–	+	10
Laqueur, *Dictionary of Politics*	1433	+	–	–	–	+	7
Luttwak, *Dictionary of Modern War*	539	+	+	+	–	+	4
Plano & Greenberg, *American Political Dictionary*	1143	+	+	–	+	+	3
Roberts, *Dictionary of Political Analysis*	477	+	+	–	–	+	6
Safire, *New Language of Politics*	845	+	+	+	+	+	1
Smith and Zurcher, *Dictionary of American Politics*	4080	+	–	–	–	+	8

From all of this it must not be assumed that the apparatus provided tells the full story of quality; it just gives a hint.

The author of a monograph will ordinarily take some pains defining old words and introducing new ones with careful attention to meaning. Good books are strewn with definitions and explanations of words. By this measure many books could be dictionaries and vice versa. It is quite easy to imagine Abrams, Laqueur, Luttwak, or Safire presenting their ideas in other than alphabetical order. Abrams's book is about the impact of various public policies on the economic and social life of cities around the world. Laqueur's book is about the course of ideological conflict among nations since the Russian Revolution with particular attention to the political leaders embroiled. Luttwak concentrates on national rivalries almost exclusively and assesses power capability at strategic rather than tactical levels. Safire has really written a history of the place of charismatic personalities in the communications network of American political life.

Individuals who write dictionaries often do so with some passion, and this is most evident in the works here of Abrams, Laqueur, Luttwak, and Safire. They bring an enthusiasm to their work in the tradition of Samuel Johnson and Henry L. Mencken. Abrams's book will be a joy to students because the brief definitions of "land fragmentation," "noise," "physiographic determination," and "piece of the action" are accompanied by apt historical information and pungent editorialization. The first of these, among his shorter entries, shows how Abrams brings history and current issues together and includes a typical array of cross references:

land fragmentation The division of landholdings through distribution or descent into parcels too small for economical use. In Europe primogeniture and entailment of land concentrated ownership until the French Revolution brought a counter-trend with its own faults—*i.e.*, the division of land from generation to generation until parcels were too small to be economically developed. In France consolidation of uneconomic holdings has been introduced in the hope of eliminating some of the by-products of fragmentation. One of urban renewal's main purposes is to assemble fragmented land and redevelop it into more practicable plots. (See ASSEMBLAGE; ENTAIL; FEUDAL TENURE; LEX ADICKES; REPARCELATION; URBAN RENEWAL.)

Cities are ancient and exist all over the world, and it is fitting that Abrams's cosmopolitan learning cheerfully registers in this book. He infuses it with humanizing references and with incisive explanations of the consequences of "blockbusting" and the "industrial-development bond." He gives the origin of "sector theory" and tells its chief limitation.

sector theory A theory of urban growth that holds that classes of residential uses tend to be arranged in wedge-shaped sectors radiating from the central business district along major transportation routes. Developed by Homer Hoyt in his study of residential areas in the 1930s, the theory holds that high-rent residential areas are prime shapers of city growth and that there is a decline in desirability and value in all directions from them. Different income groups of a city segregate themselves residentially in sectors and then migrate within the same general sector but away from downtown as the sector grows. The middle-income groups attach themselves as closely as possible to the upper-income areas, which usually have the highest and best land, the most prestigious residents, and the best access to other parts of the city. The theory has been criticized by Lloyd Rodwin, who said that Hoyt's conclusions were based on questionable assumptions and on an *ad hoc* theory of class structure. It assumed that locations were selected for class attractiveness while it ignored other considerations such as the functional adequacy of established environments. (See CONCENTRIC ZONE THEORY; GRESHAM'S LAW OF NEIGHBORHOODS; MULTIPLE NUCLEI THEORY.)

As the gusto in all of this suggests, Abrams has prepared a highly personal tour of the urban world from the experience of a man who was at once a lawyer, a political figure, and a careful reader in the literature of city planning, law, history and the social sciences. Abrams commands the respect and gratitude of all who seek to know this vast subject.

Laqueur's *A Dictionary of Politics* arranges itself through cross-references around the great ideological struggles of the past forty years. These are not explicitly suggested but close study shows this to be a highly integrated book. *On Fascism:* Mussolini, Ethiopia, Nazi Party, *Mein Kampf*, Hitler, Concordat, Goebbels, Goering, Munich, Chamberlain, Mosley, Gestapo, Crystal Night, Spanish Civil War, Himmler, Concentration Camps, Holocaust, Eichmann, Churchill, Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt, Axis Powers, Japan, World War II, and Nuremberg War Crime Trials, among others. *On Communism:* Bolshevism, USSR, Lenin's Testament, World Communism, Sovietisation, Purges, Moscow Trials, Show Trials, Slave Labor, Pyatakov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Tito, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Kuomintang, Mao Tse-tung, Chinese People's Republic, Sino-Soviet Conflict, Lin Piao. *On American Policy:* Cold War, McCarthyism, HUAC, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Korea, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Fourteenth Amendment, Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, John Birch Society. Similar strings of entries spell out the development of Zionism and the Arab response; Colonialism and the Third World; tensions in East Europe; and conflict over the unification of Europe. Laqueur says a good deal, too, on the theme that domestic politics affects foreign policy. This is particularly evident in the treatment of several personalities, institutions and incidents in the domestic political life of France and the United States.

Luttwak, Deputy Director of the Middle East Study Group in Jerusalem, brings an impressive intellect and a strong interest in specifics to the universe of modern war and weaponry. His essay on "war" is a concise philosophical statement about the four rival concepts, hardly precise parallel categories, of von Clausewitz, Marxist-Leninists, pacifists, and peace-researchers. This discussion leads into "total war," "central war," "deterrence," "controlled response," "propaganda," and "political warfare." There are also many articles on particular international incidents or events such as "Warsaw Pact." But the passion shows itself in the fastidiousness of detail in the more technical articles. A book like this relies on other sources, and Luttwak's excellence is rooted in his skeptical, intelligent handling of those sources. Thus he observes that *JANE'S All the World's Aircraft* and related reference sources do not assess the claims of manufacturers. He praises the timeliness of another reference source, *The Military Balance*, issued annually by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Luttwak's feeling for words is expressed in his foreword:

> For obvious reasons, there is a shortage of reliable information about the more advanced weapons. The Russians publish almost nothing, and while Western arms' manufacturers do publish a great deal, many of them also cultivate "brochuremanship," where extravagant claims are camouflaged under the pseudo-technical language fashionable in military circles. ("Advanced" means that it does not work yet; "semi-automatic" means that everything has to be done by hand; "anti-tank secondary kill capability" means that only a hero or a fool would approach a real-life tank armed with one of those . . .) Information about Soviet weapons comes almost entirely from intelligence reports which are leaked, selectively, by the Western military. See *Scarp* for a Soviet I C B M whose performance details were published when the Pentagon had to prod a reluctant Congress to release funds for the *Safeguard* missile defence system.

Luttwak explains that modern weapons have longer lives than is generally thought, and this assertion is proved convincingly in the entry for "B-52" which is cross-referenced to "stratofortress" used in the December 1972 bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. Detailed specifications of size, range, cost, numbers, load, and so on are included for this and other weapons.

Luttwak suffers from "lexicographer's palsy" when he comes to attempt a definition of "aggression."

> Aggression. The UN special committee working on a definition of Aggression has been unable to produce one after about eighteen years of deliberation. No definition is given here; everybody knows what the word means.

This is hardly helpful in a dictionary on war. A superior approach would explain *why* representatives of competing nations in the United Nations propound rival criteria for aggression and what the problems are with so-called neutral definitions of this and other political words; it would then proceed to lay down alternative definitions. Gertrude Stein may know that aggression is aggression is aggression, but when the dictionary makers announce that "everybody knows what the word means," they can close shop.[1]

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[1] After the present essay was completed, the U. N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression agreed upon a draft definition of the word, sub-

The high quality of Luttwak's attention to the military usage could be shown by many examples. Here is his treatment of a term that has entered popular language but is not to be found in any of the other dictionaries:

> Fail-safe. A procedure whereby US strategic bombers with nuclear weapons proceed to target only if specific orders to do so are received at a certain point on their intended path. These communication arrangements are designed to prevent a nuclear strike resulting from technical failure. The alternative procedure is "recall," where the delivery system proceeds as programmed unless actively recalled. Fail-safe was introduced by the U S Strategic Air Command as a replacement for the traditional recall procedure used in non-nuclear bombing. In S A C it is known as "positive control."

Most of the entries for weapons are too long and detailed for reproduction here, but partial quotation from one shows Luttwak's style, his skill at conciseness and detail:

> "Frog." Soviet surface-to-surface unguided rocket series. Frog (Free Rocket Over Ground) is the N A T O designation for a series of Soviet unguided rockets similar in concept to the U S Honest John (M G R-1). These spin-stabilized rockets are sufficiently accurate for nuclear bombardment of rear areas, and are seen as the modern counterpart of classic heavy artillery.
>
> *Frog 1* First of the series and in service since 1957. Six tail fins, solid-propellant spin-stabilized sustainer, no booster. It is 31 ft long, weighs about 6,000 lb and has an estimated range of 40 miles. It is carried on, and launched from, a converted heavy tank chassis.

The treatment of "Frog" continues through "Frog 7" which was first seen in 1965. The entry concludes with a cross-reference to "Scud, Shaddock, and Ballistic Missile for Soviet missiles." There are no direct references to the finely printed photographs of ninety-six weapons in the back of this book but No. 91 shows the "Honest John MGR-1"; No. 92 is "Frog 7"; with additional chilling photographs of "Scud," "Minuteman," "Polaris" and "Poseidon."

Safire's dictionary treats everything in sight with generosity. His accurate subtitle calls the book *A Dictionary of Catchwords, Slogans & Political Usage*, and a long introductory essay and final note on sources and research, plus a bibliography and index to names, make the book a treat to read as well as a durable reference book. The index to names converts this into an excellent book of quotations, one that remedies Bartlett's omission of notable *political* sayings. Innumerable entries give a history that reaches out with a cascade of observations as, for example, with "MY FRIENDS" which starts with FDR, shows that Horatio Seymour used the greeting in 1863, and unwinds with a discussion of the subject of salutations generally, with references to John Witherspoon, Napoleon, Chief Tecumseh, Jefferson, Taft, Kennedy, Truman and Willkie. This entry concludes with details about Roosevelt's apocryphal "Fellow immigrants" address to the Daughters of the American Revolution, April 21, 1938, where the President simply said: "Remember, remember always, that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists." There are entries for "LIMOUSINE LIBERAL," "MANIFEST DESTINY," "MEDICARE," "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX," "MOONLIGHTING," "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE," "RIGHT TO KNOW," and "PENTAGONESE." The book is written by a journalist for readers interested in the development of American political jargon. It is not a political science or an academic book. It is to be highly recommended for its thoroughness, the detail with which entries have been researched and the generous way in which a coinage is turned around prismatically for examination.

Its title to the contrary, Florence Elliott's book is of relatively little interest or value to students of politics. In saying Lyndon B. Johnson "did not contest the elections of November 1968," the author treats us to a correct statement that is an inadequate reading of the truth. In a curious gratuity, Elliott gives Harry S Truman a middle name, Swinomish, when he had none. This dictionary seldom touches political terms and does not tell what precisely is political about its entries on individuals, nations, and events. Its discussion of "League of Nations," "Luxemburg," and "Mendès-France" are barely more than what a fair world almanac would provide. Elliott and Laqueur use the identical title, *A Dictionary of Politics*, and both books are intended to cover the same nations, institutions, ideologies, conflicts and personages in the recent past. Both have an English or European vantage point. Here the similarity ends, simply because Laqueur is interpretive and Elliott is not. Elliott's book in effect is a rather poor World Almanac for 1968–69, and it is simply audacious commercialism that it should be portrayed as *A Dictionary of Politics*.

A Glossary of Political Ideas is a collection of

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mitting it for adoption by the General Assembly at its September, 1974 session. The draft is divided into eight articles containing seventeen paragraphs, too lengthy for quotation here. Article 1 begins: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition" (*New York Times*, April 13, 1974, p. 6). Details on the history of the Special Committee may be found in numerous official publications such as *Yearbook of the United Nations 1971*, v. 25 (United Nations, N. Y.: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1974), pp. 597–601.

terse essays by fourteen British social scientists edited by Maurice Cranston and here edited with additions for American readers by Sanford A. Lakoff. The first of fifty-two entries are "Anarchism," "Authority," "Coexistence," "Colonialism," "The Common Good," "Communism," and "Conservatism." The treatment is in the conventional mode of classical political philosophy with "Equality" never reaching the twentieth century. Yet the book includes brief entries for "Titoism" too sparse to be useful and one for "Trade Unionism" that is too British to be of any service to a student of American institutions. There is a bibliography following each entry. It isn't at all clear what this book is intended for. The entries are less complete than those on nearly every similar topic in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* and of the newer four-volume *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*. There is not enough space available for an author to get off the ground. The result is a book of marginal value to a student beginning to think about the great subjects of political philosophy and of even less interest to a well-read scholar. This Cranston and Lakoff dictionary is competent and reliable, in contrast to Elliott, but it is not imaginatively conceived or energetically executed.

The three dictionaries by Dunner, by Plano and Greenberg, and by Smith and Zurcher have value for the audience of beginning students whose political memories barely reach back to the assassination of President Kennedy. There are hundreds of words that apply to some event or some recurrent matter in the history of American politics. It is a conceit of age to note rudely youth's ignorance of Joe McCarthy's "point of order" or of the Eisenhower delegates' "fair play amendment." These books will surely instruct undergraduate students of American government and politics. They simply cannot be endorsed as the kind of quality political dictionary graduate and other professional students of politics should use.

The Dunner dictionary is the work of many hands, with very brief entries for its many items about world and American history and politics. It is concerned with events of the early years of the Republic as much as it is of recent matters. Except for a worthwhile introductory essay on political science by Dunner, there is very little social science in the book. It does contain longer and better entries for the same items than will be found in Smith and Zurcher. Dunner is also distinguished by its many brief biographies.

Biographical entries appear in three of the political dictionaries but not in the other seven. (See Table 2.) Those in Laqueur are ably researched and written to stress the political significance of the personages described. Those in Dunner contain greater biographical detail, are more concise and often capture in just a few words the key point about an individual. The biographical portraits in Elliott are weakly drawn and omit vital details as well. Mostly, all of these entries are inferior to the short biographies in the *Columbia Encyclopedia* (3rd ed., 1963). In other words, they may jog one's memory in an emergency, if they are handy, but the biographical entries in these dictionaries are not to be substituted for a quick piece of library research. On the positive side, biographical entries inform us that human beings coin political words and develop political ideas as well as act in political life. The inclusion of biographies reduces the function of these dictionaries for the exacting work of word definition and fails, partly by attempting too much that is diversionary.

Plano and Greenberg have selected 1143 terms, agencies, court decisions, and statutes "for their pertinency to the general introductory course in American government and to an understanding of contemporary political events" (preface, p. v). A strong topical ordering gives this book the flavor of a basic text rather than a mere companion. As such, the authors provide no explicit story line but present a bland system of government with few rifts. Societal traits and tensions are ignored, and the tour of federal agencies is comparable but far less comprehensive than that provided by the *United States Government Organization Manual.* The entries in a chapter titled "political ideas" barely carry the subject into the twentieth century, which is to say that there is essentially nothing of the behavioral persuasion in political science in this book. The comments on "ideology" and "pluralism" give no hint of the disputations in the discipline over the proper application and utility of such terms. The book becomes a catalog of familiar enough terms, informing or reminding the nonspecialist about the *Wong Kim Ark* case, the Ramspeck Act and the Hare Plan. Like many books with technical inadequacies, this dictionary does not point the reader beyond itself; it gives citations to court cases but not to statutes and rarely tells where the information presented in each entry came from or where one can look further.

The fault of all three of the dictionaries of American government is not their limited size but in the way many items are treated. After the judicial revolutions since 1937 it is misleading to discuss "precedent" and "*stare decisis*" without an entry for "overruling," accompanied by the statistic that the Supreme Court has overturned its own precedents on more than one hundred occasions. It would not be amiss, further, to observe that many of these decisions have taken a form that many call "judicial legislation" and to make all of this clear through ample cross-references.

Not only the words included in these diction-

Table 2. Political Dictionaries with Biographical Entries

Editor and Title	Total Entries	Total Biographies	Per Cent Biographies
Dunner, *Dictionary of Political Science*	2768	549	20
Elliott, *A Dictionary of Politics*	952	140	15
Laqueur, *A Dictionary of Politics*	1433	454	32

aries but also the omissions betray the absence of a sense of history, of a theory of political power and development, and of an attendant concern for exactness. That government contractors have special obligations could not be learned here. Yet, long before 1965 when "affirmative action" was coined to expand employment pools to hire without regard to race or sex, the federal government was using its contracts to dictate wages, hours, loyalty standards, and other employment policies to numerous corporations.

Although Roberts's ideal is more precise usage, his *Dictionary of Political Analysis* is offered as "a mirror of the present vocabulary of the discipline, not a proposal for a future technical word list from which all ambiguities and imprecisions have been removed" (introduction, p. xx). There is much more here than words of political analysis such as "model" and "attitude scaling": as the book treats "Zionism" and many other political movements as well. It is notably weak in entries on American political institutions as seen by making "Electoral College" in the United States equivalent to the College of Cardinals, whereas Corwin once explained definitively that this is "actually a congeries of 'colleges'."[2] Roberts is another victim of the well-known "introduction to politics syndrome" which has felled many well-intentioned scholars. False parallels are simply one symptom. Another is the effort to provide a denotative definition for a word after insufficient study of its full history and use. "Judiciary" is an example.

Roberts does make an admirable start in introducing the subject of contemporary political science in dictionary form. He includes "gatekeepers" and refers the reader ahead to "systems analysis," which is discussed in a brief essay. The right distinction is drawn between "paradigm" and "ideal type." There is a good definition of "interest articulation" and the only adequate mention of "community studies" in any of these dictionaries. Political scientists wishing to catch up to the growth of the behaviorial persuasion might use Roberts's book as a Berlitz guide to "cohort analysis," "computer utilisation," "conversion process," "Delphi method," "droop quota," "funnel of causality," "grounded theory," "ladder of values," "longitudinal studies," "macro-politics," "metapolicy," "Pareto optimum," "pillarisation," "psephology," "reductionist theories," and "teleological explanation." Many of Roberts's entries are a page or two long, and practically all have cross-references. The best entries contain citations that take the right path as far as they go. Books in point are mentioned but we need page numbers and journal articles as well, about which there will be more further along.

Having carped at some authors for neglecting the discipline of political science, I must fault Roberts for inadequate handling of established legal and political usage. "Conspiracy," "sedition," and "civil rights" might just as well be omitted as given such cursory treatment. They are not words of political analysis in any event, and their meanings in different times and places give them none of the traits possessed by such terms as "attitude scaling." The political scientist as historian and observer of the passing parade will inform himself of the British Secrets Act and of "shield laws," but the kind of dictionary Roberts provides will not carry him far. The political scientist as analyst, on the other hand, has an entirely different intellectual need which Roberts seeks to serve.

As a literary genre, the dictionary of politics is largely uninterested in the history of the words it treats. In his final book, E. E. Schattschneider asserted that political science was impossible a century ago because its vocabulary was inadequate. We have had to borrow. He shows as convincingly as anyone could that the words of politics are derivative, most being old words which have acquired new meanings. Schattschneider asked:

> Where do the new words come from? They come from everywhere. Some are figures of speech, as machine, ring, heckle. Some are derived from the place in which activities are carried on, as cabinet, house, or lobby, or from a seating arrangement, as left and right. Some come from the church: hierarchy and propaganda. Many come from military life: campaign, filibuster, insurgent, picket and partisan. A host of political words are made by adding a new ending to an old word: anarchy becomes anarchism, isolate changes to isolationism, nation to nationalism, total to totalitarianism, and so on.[3]

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[2] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1957*, 4th ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 39.

[3] E. E. Schattschneider, *Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 14.

The common words that have acquired special meaning through political usage present one difficulty. But the derivations of words peculiar to political science require careful analysis and attention to give us a clear measure of their meaning. However well versed in contemporary political science, these lexicographers, save for Roberts, are not dependable teachers of this subject. If they were, they would have done a number of things. First, they would have had to ascertain the universe of publications in which to search for words. The word list need not be comprehensive; seasoned judgment in building a list would be quite acceptable. But one would hope for a careful scanning of, say, the leading texts in the subfields of political science; the leading articles such as those in the Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series; a checklist of classics and key monographs; and the suggestions of a band of specialists with varied orientations and political dispositions. If there is to be a new wave of dictionaries of political science which inform us all and build upon each other, it will be essential that the sources scoured for words be named.

Second, the words must be defined in context and their history indicated so that their functional and operational meaning can be grasped by the novice. A splendid instance of this is provided by Frank J. Sorauf in his text, *Party Politics in America*, by his explanation of the word "stratarchy."[4] He gives us both a connotative and denotative treatment and, in a footnote, tells something of the history of its usage.

> The distribution of power within most American party organizations can be described in Samuel Eldersveld's apt term "stratarchy." It is "the enlargement of the ruling group of an organization, its power stratification, the involvement of large numbers of people in group decision-making, and, thus, the diffusion and proliferation of control throughout the structure."

His citation is then as follows: "Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 99. The term 'stratarchy' comes from Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950)." In a dictionary of politics one would attempt to go further with "stratarchy," to determine how Lasswell and Kaplan picked it up, to ask whether this is yet another borrowing from science—from "strata" in geology, perhaps, as my former colleague David Adamany once suggested to me.

Third, in reaching out, our hypothetical dictionary maker would have cosmopolitan tastes and unbounded curiosity. Not one of these ten dictionaries mentions "true believer" from Eric Hoffer's book of the same title.[5] This is indicative of a too-narrow preoccupation with the words of formal government and the language of dues-paying political scientists.

Fourth, both jargon and humble usages, which are part of the speech of political scientists who forget or never knew where the words came from, could be captured in a carefully done dictionary. Remember V. O. Key's "friends and neighbors" in his treatment of Alabama politics?[6] Other words include "polyarchy" made famous by Robert Dahl.[7]

Fifth, we need rival definitions of our most used words such as political parties. The first thing to say about "political party" surely is that the most thoughtful students of the subject prefer differing definitions. Alex Gottfried in Dunner comes closest to saying this by quoting Edmund Burke but without a reference or date. He then gives an alternative. But why turn to a political dictionary when a textbook does the job better? In his parties text, Sorauf does what the dictionary makers should do by listing a variety of definitions of the political party in a way that is so simple and clear that it deserves quotation here:[8]

> Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770).
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> . . . We may define "political party" generally as the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of

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[4] Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 110.

[5] Speaking of the active, revivalist phase of mass movements, Hoffer states that this phase is dominated by the "true believer" defined as "the man of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for a holy cause." Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 10.

[6] The "friends and neighbors effect" is Key's phrase for a powerful localism in Alabama factionalism where "candidates for state office tend to poll overwhelming majorities in their home counties and to draw heavy support in adjacent counties." Key believes this "points to the absence of stable, well-organized, state-wide factions of like-minded citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern." V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 37.

[7] The idea of employing the word "democracy" to connote the ideal and "polyarchy" the real, the latter to serve as a measure of achieving the former appears first in Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 272–323. Dahl has reintroduced "polyarchy" instead of the word "pluralism" in the latest edition of his text, Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1972), p. vii.

[8] Sorauf, p. 8.

governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views. Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396: italics omitted.

> . . . Any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label. Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 9.

> An "established political party" is hereby declared to be a political party which, as to the state, at the last general election for state and county officers, polled for its candidate for governor more than two per cent of the entire vote cast for governor in the state. Missouri Statutes (V.A.M.S. sec. 120.140, para. 2).

Sorauf also includes a longer section of the Delaware statutes and thus respects the reader's intelligence with a true variety. He also demonstrates the value of an up-to-dateness by including the "label definition of party" developed by Leon Epstein.

Dunner as well as Roberts pays attention, and sometimes impressive attention, to the behavioral persuasion. I was gratified with the treatment of "Games, Theory of" by Harold Guetzkow in Dunner, as he provides us with a coherent two-paragraph history of the subject with comments on its applications, uses and limitations. He begins with this definition: "A theoretical or normative branch of mathematics and economics in which treatment is made of conflict of interests by the formalization of strategies." He mentions Shapley, Shubik, and Riker but without citations. The absence of cross-references in Dunner is a serious hindrance compounded in this instance by the lack of related entries such as "prisoner's dilemma" which is quite fully discussed by Roberts. But Roberts also fails us by supplying no references whatever for this entry. The uninformed reader, whose curiosity is aroused, had better not be stuck with these dictionaries on a desert isle. I have had better fortune in happening to read John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, in which he discusses this matter almost in passing: "The prisoner's dilemma (attributed to A. W. Tucker) is an illustration of a two-person noncooperative, nonzero-sum game; noncooperative because agreements are not binding (or enforceable), and nonzero-sum because it is not the case that what one person gains the other loses."[9] He goes on at length and cites books and articles by W. J. Baumol, R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, and D. P. Gauthier.

This borrowing from other disciplines that seems to characterize political science presents the creator of a political dictionary with different choices. If too venturesome, the dictionary will tend to become an unabridged dictionary of the whole language; if too circumscribed, it will be barren of much of the terminology political scientists put to use. In a prize-winning book in American Political Science Association competition, for example, William K. Muir, Jr. teaches us a great deal about the concept of "cognitive dissonance" which, as he says, "deals with the individual's reactions to the costs of exercising choice, after his mind is made is made up."[10] Yet there are other steps needed to legitimize a term borrowed from social psychology such as "cognitive dissonance" to make it one that has a familiar, exact, and useful place in the language of political scientists. The textbook and dictionary writers have a function to play in this task but, again, one must lament that few see the problem, fewer define their mission in this way, and a still smaller number take the pains to keep up with the literature—the language that publishing scholars employ, in fact—and then introduce these words to a wider audience.

The heaviest borrowing by the dictionaries on American government and political science is from law, and a consistent deficiency is the absence of key words and the scant interest in the functional meaning of the words that are chosen. Plano and Greenberg are clearly superior in explaining that the Supreme Court controls its business by handling "certiorari" and that interest groups present their views there as "amici curiae." In Dunner and in Smith and Zurcher, these words are included but given wooden definitions. None but Smith and Zurcher mention the "removal" of cases from state to federal courts, but even they neglect to explain its origin in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its use by the modern civil rights movement. All omit "barratry," the ancient word for soliciting litigation, and consequently cannot discuss the state legislation against barratry designed to stop NAACP lawyers in the South.

The law entries present still other problems and highlight the disadvantage a lexicographer faces in defining words one-after-another as against a researcher dealing with a few words in the context of a specific inquiry. Consider the doctrine of "dual federalism," so beloved by conservative jurists before the constitutional revolution of 1937, and note what two dictionaries say:

> Dual federalism . . . held that a grant of authority to the national government does not destroy local power

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[9] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 269.

[10] William K. Muir, Jr., *Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 4. Muir has thus brought to the attention of political scientists and lawyers a term propounded by Leon Festinger in *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).

reserved to the states. Plano and Greenberg, *The American Political Dictionary*, 3rd ed.

> A doctrine, occasionally maintained by the Supreme Court, especially 1836–64, that the powers of the national and State governments are separate and distinct, and that the powers delegated to the national government are limited by the powers reserved to the States under the 10th Amendment. Smith and Zurcher, *Dictionary of American Politics*.

Years have passed since Norman Jacobson told me the most simple and best definition of "dual federalism" was Fellman's. I think it probably still is:

> Briefly, the doctrine holds that the mere existence of states constitutes an independent limitation on the exercise of national powers.[11]

If the language of law and politics of an earlier day is not always captured in crisp definitions, there is also failure in handling modern legal usage. There are important lapses in what is included, and because it is unclear what sources are utilized both for the word list and for definitions, the failure sometimes becomes a disaster.

An example of an omitted word is "class action suits" which is nowhere to be found in these dictionaries. Under the *Federal Rules of Civil Procedures* "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all," if certain prerequisites are met.[12] Such suits began more than two centuries ago in England and have been used increasingly in the United States in civil rights, voting rights, welfare and environmental cases. It is fair to say that the leading decisions of the Warren Court could not have taken their sweeping character had they not been brought in the form of class actions to apply to others similarly situated with the plaintiffs. This is a fair sample of what is omitted in these dictionaries.

Students of the American constitutional system will find two dictionaries superior in several respects. Plano and Greenberg have divided the material into eighteen topical chapters with the index serving as a full alphabetical guide to entries. The topics are ordered to follow the structure of most textbooks in American government and each entry is composed of two paragraphs, one definitional and the other addressing itself to the significance of the term. This shows relationships well and means that one may profitably, and with a minimum of confusion, actually read the dictionary straight through. Also, important agencies' cases are grouped together toward the end of each chapter, then important cases and important statutes. The new, third edition of Plano and Greenberg offers readers the advantage of up-to-date information about modifications in Supreme Court rulings, especially compared with rival dictionaries. Smith and Zurcher is the only other dictionary that gives much attention to cases and statutes, with Dunner a weak third. (See Table 3.) Smith and Zurcher provide short treatments, but reliable ones, of the cases and statutes treated. They also include the specific dates of statutes but neither they, nor Plano and Greenberg, cite statutes either to the *Statutes at Large* or the *United States Code* while both are predictably fastidious to cite cases to the *United States Reports*.

Commentary about political science and political words will help would-be lexicographers prepare better dictionaries. Examples abound in a book of readings edited by Max J. Skidmore offering some forty essays on rhetoric and politics which begin with George Orwell's "Politics and the English Language." Skidmore makes many points about the rise and fall of political words that show erosion in the English language that had better keep us from joking about the vain attempts of the Académie Francaise to shore up the language of the French. He argues that it is "no longer possible accurately to grasp any sense of meaning from the words 'defense,' 'victory,' 'free world,' 'aggression,' 'national security,' 'patriotism,' 'policy action,' 'pacification,' 'demilitarized,' and even 'orderly withdrawal'."[13] (Evidently we must choose between Luttwak's belief that everyone knows what "aggression" means and Skidmore's conclusion that nobody knows.) The readings are almost all recent, since 1960, and consequently concern the Vietnam war and the prose of Richard Nixon. But there is debate here, as seen in the attack on Martin Luther King's view of war casualties by Ernest W. Lefever and responses to this criticism. There are fine retrospective articles on what happened to the meaning of words in Nazi Germany which imply that cataclysmic politics foster rapid deterioration of language. By reflecting on political words, rather than defining them, Skidmore's book is more stimulating and may be as useful to political scientists and their students as some political dictionaries.

Political scientists do not yet have a dictionary of professional quality. Most efforts are directed toward undergraduates or the general public. To say that the state of a discipline is revealed by textbooks and reference books is probably to claim too much. Monographs and journal articles surely lead the way. It is a misfortune that the

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[11] David Fellman, "Federalism," *American Political Science Review*, 41 (December, 1947), 1142.

[12] Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 23 (1966). See 26 U.S.C.A. for annotations.

[13] Max J. Skidmore, ed., *Word Politics: Essays on Language and Politics* (Palo Alto: James E. Freel & Associates, Inc., 1972), p. 7.

Table 3. Statutes and Court Cases in Selected Political Dictionaries

Editor and Title	Total Entries	Statutes	Court Cases	Total Statutes & Cases	Per cent of Statutes & Cases
Dunner, *Dictionary of Political Science*	2768	34	23	57	2
Plano and Greenberg, *The American Political Dictionary*	1143	58	105	163	14
Smith and Zurcher, *Dictionary of American Politics*	4080	199	234	433	11

dictionaries in political science seldom incorporate the professional findings. There is evidently a place in the market for political dictionaries for undergraduates; it is hoped that political dictionaries can be improved for the whole profession. If that is done, there will be a better basis for preparing dictionaries that are suitable for beginning students, too. Meanwhile, if the form of a book you are planning does not seem to jell, you might think about casting the first draft in alphabetical order and shipping it around the publishing circuit.

Political Implications of Gender Roles: A Review of the Literature*

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Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to introduce the reader to the contemporary literature on gender roles and feminine behavior, including the major concepts, empirical findings and social thought which have implications for political behavior and research. Generally the emphasis is upon current published writing, although there are exceptions for singular works which it is believed will be useful references. This literature includes reprints of classic statements such as Mill's, Engels's and Putnam's and more than 200 new books, monographs and articles within the past five years. It ranges across disciplines of anthropology, economics, history, psychology and sociology as well as political science; it includes futuristic schemas and offers fresh perspective and new areas for inquiry.

Gender roles as they relate to the psychology and activity of men and women and their systemic cultural, economic, and legal ramifications provide an explanation and a basis for understanding political behavior and thought, including recurrent women's protest movements. Therefore the first part of this essay concentrates on literature which explicates gender roles, life cycles and economic and legal factors which the writer views as independent variables related to political participation. The presentation of material in these areas I believe constitutes a logical progression: once the complex of civic cultural relations is examined, current trends in women's voting, campaigning and officeholding may be understood as "consequence" and "cause."[1] This portion of the literature contributes to building an accurate body of knowledge regarding contemporary political woman, and has potential usefulness for public policy: a significant expansion of democracy is viable with the discernment and removal of the various barriers which have hindered substantial proportions of women from achieving political leadership and hence participating in authoritative decision making and value allocation.

In the next section of this essay, discussion focuses upon works providing background for women's contemporary political behavior. Part two provides an historical sketch of feminine roles in the polity and research and writing on women's political movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. This writing is important for several reasons—there has been little attention given these subjects until recent years; moreover, with few exceptions, social scientific endeavors have been androcentric in focus and viewpoint (Beard, pp. 65–66; Flexner, vii; Lopata, p. 7).[2] Thus these new publications fill a scholarly void, and offer a heretofore rarity—women's interpretations of their sociopolitical history and collective struggles for equality; they may, therefore, be of especial interest to those whose academic concerns encompass political thought and/or political movements.

The origins of gender relationships are explored in the third part of this essay. An essential literature for political scientists' attention, the new writing calls into question the conventional wisdom, that is, the ideology of female inferiority and biological determinism, social constructions which serve as a simplistic, albeit nonscientifically grounded basis for explaining women's past and present political behavior (cf. Bardwick, 1971; Carlson, Tiger). The bibliography which follows is not all-inclusive but will serve to acquaint the reader with major references on this subject. (See also Porter; Rosenberg and Bergstrom.)

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* The author wishes to thank the Council of Academic Deans, Northern Illinois University, for research support, and the Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers—the State University, and the Swedish Ministry of Education for research materials. In addition thanks are due the many colleagues in the Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, who offered criticism of this essay, as well as Henry Kariel, Jo Freeman, Clint Jesser, Naomi Lynn, Mary Cornelia Porter, Linda Richter, William Richter, Marian Rothman, Marie Rosenberg, Evelyn Stevens and the three anonymous reviewers.

[1] Models incorporating the reciprocal causation concept are presented in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Theory Construction* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 115–125; also 95–97.

[2] See, however, the following: David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 337–343; Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (New York: Ronald, 1948), chap. 4; Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale, 1965), chap. 6; M. Kent Jennings and Kenneth P. Langton, "Mother Versus Father: The Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans," *Journal of Politics*, 31 (May, 1969), 329–358; James March, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Political Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Winter, 1953–1954), 461–470; and John Fraser, "Orientations Toward Parents and Political Efficacy," *Western Political Quarterly*, 25 (December, 1972), 643–647.

The Contemporary Situation

In the welter of writing on women in contemporary society, the dimensions that I believe are most relevant to political scientists are the following: (1) gender roles and their perpetuation (2) feminine life-cycle and occupational differentiation (3) gender-biased law, and (4) current trends in voting, campaigning, and office holding.

Gender Identity and Gender Role. Gender is a more precise definitional construct than the more popular concept "sex." Gender consists of two aspects—gender identity and gender role. Identity, Bernard observes (p. 16) in her *Women and the Public Interest*, begins in the hospital delivery room where, on the basis of anatomical cues, the child is classified as male or female. It is this act which primarily seals the child's destiny. Gender may be independent of the genetic sex, external genitalia or internal anatomy of individuals, yet misassigned persons will ordinarily accept the gender identity without question and exhibit the social traits of the gender. Why there are exceptions is unknown, and research findings are equivocal (Holter, 1973, p. 17; Bernard, p. 17; Ramey). While sex is a biological fact, gender is a social-cultural-sociological-psychological fact, Bernard observes. Gender, in my view, is a highly significant "*political fact*," as well, directly related to the political socialization the child will receive, the law which he or she will need to abide by, the differential distribution of social values, and the micro and macro power relations of men and women.

Gender roles, the constellation of traits and behaviors which are "feminine" and "masculine," vary across cultures and times; for example, it is masculine in some societies for men to be highly emotional and sensitive (Bernard, p. 2). They also vary by social economic stratification in the United States and in England. Lower- and working-class male youth are socialized to be politically passive while middle-class youngsters are nurtured to be politically active,[3] whereas the opposite is the case for physical aggression (Strauss; Goode, 1971). There is also the assertion—I believe quite correct—by Holter in her comprehensive *Sex Roles and Social Structure* (pp. 42–52)—that certain traits are functional to those in power (see also Klein, 1972, p. 230). Thus the subordinate group learns to be self-sacrificing and expressive whereas the superordinates are expected to be self-interested and instrumental (also see Bernard, p. 26). The degree to which roles are strictly differentiated appears directly related to the differential rewards in a polity. Hence gender differentiation is not just an intellectual curiosity, but a practice which involves both economic, social and political stakes. Therefore there are incentives to maintain and perpetuate gender patterns (Holter, p. 48).

How Are Gender Roles Maintained? Holter (chap. 1, pp. 16–52; chap. IX) elucidates the following elements: (1) a normative belief and value component which is the basis for moral judgments and for ascribed behavior, traits, work tasks and privileges. (In each culture the role traits are considered inborn, natural, or sacred.) (2) the language (Barron), family, and school (Freeman, 1970; Ehrlich; U'ren), religion, mass media and popular entertainment channel both genders to appropriate life cycles and spheres (Bernard; p. 24; also Ehlmann; Flora; Kohlberg; Komisar; Martin; Trilling). (3) informal positive and negative sanctions, subtle encouragements, and not so subtle discouragements, including ridicule (Holter, p. 202; Palme). (4) occupational gender segregation, stratification and discrimination. To this list, I would add (5) co-optation and tokenism, and (6) coercion through the political process, particularly—in my view—by means of the law (See Holter, p. 21; Mill, pp. 154–180).

While (2), (4) and (6) above have been studied, the remaining elements have yet to be thoroughly investigated. Little is known about gender norms, the degree of passion with which they are held, and the extent to which they underlie social and political behavior. A significant element in (1), it seems to me, is false consciousness,[4] against women's objective self-interest, which includes beliefs in the appropriateness of lower pay, of doing menial work, and of eschewing leadership positions and politics. The lack of substantial numbers of role models in the higher occupational and governmental (Wormser) strata—and the differences in pay and prestige within a given stratum—seem to reinforce belief in a subordinate gender role, whereas co-optation and tokenism appear to function in part to legitimize the claim that the meritorious are rewarded.

Feminine Life Cycle, Occupational Stratification, Political Participation. White-middle-class American and Western European women appear to have similar gender life cycles. They learn supportive and affective roles, internalize politics as a masculine domain, set their aspirations to marriage and motherhood, and are ambivalent (Bardwick and Douvan) about higher education or view it as a means to a feminine job or occupation. Some bright girls seek to fail academically and/or others have psychological conflicts (Chesler) about achievement (Horner)—or—lack of achievement, in a society where it is highly valued as a norm, albeit viewed as a masculine behavior (Horner; Holter, pp. 227–229). Most women, however, marry young and after a brief period in outside employment, they are occupied full-time at home with care of infant children (see Gavron). Isolated, they lack a sense of political self (Lynn and Flora), civic role (Lopata, 1971, p. 47) and political efficacy. Job and career interruptions (Coser and Rokoff) vary with number of children (Bernard, p. 184), and household chores continue when women work for pay (Pyun), occupying from 25 to 40 hours weekly of their time (Myrdal and Klein; also Organization for Economic Development, pp. 185–214; Haavio-Manila; Paloma).

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[3] Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (June, 1970), 423–439.

[4] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," *APSR*, 66 (December, 1972), 1077.

The amount of segregation of women in sex-typed occupations in the United States exceeds that of racial segregation—67% to 47%—women being concentrated in the nonsupervisory (Gross) and non-politically relevant feminine occupations of nursing, elementary school teaching, library and social work, home economics and clerical work (Safilios-Rothschild, p. 100; see also U.S. Department of Labor, *Job Horizons for College Women;* Hapgood; Harbeson). The percentage of women in the remaining professions ranges from less than one per cent of engineers, to 3.5 per cent of lawyers, 7 per cent of doctors, and 28 per cent of biologists (Epstein in Theodore, p. 54).

Within the hierarchy of occupations and in each stratum women rank lowest and are paid less (see Committee on Education and Labor). It is appropriate here to present some statistical documentation: When women are equally qualified and as experienced as male workers there is an average salary discrepancy of 42 per cent with dollar gaps ranging from $3,000 to $6,000 annually. The percentage of women having wage differentials of $3,500 less than their male counterparts is lowest among women operatives and service workers, greater for clerical, and highest among professional workers (Levitin, Quinn and Staines; for Britain see Klein, 1965). See Table 1.

Lest the reader be left with an assumption of a universal pattern, let me sketch some cross-cultural differences. Black women in the United States have long-term commitment to and confidence in their own executive ability, lack strong compulsion to marry and a motherhood mystique, occupy professions in similar proportions to black males (Epstein, 1973; also see Fichter; Bock), and not so incidentally comprise four of the sixteen women presently in Congress (for more on the black woman see Cade; Hare; Ladner; and Lerner, 1972). The pattern of women's options cross-nationally appears to be curvilinear, with the middle range GNP countries per capita offering most opportunity. Thus in Greece, Costa Rica, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe there are high percentages of women in the "masculine" professions, including architecture, dentistry and medicine (Safilios-Rothschild; see also Epstein, *Women's Place*, pp. 12–13; Lapote; U.S. Department of Labor, *The Fuller Utilization of the Woman Physician;* for women in planning, see Hapgood; for banking, see Alexander; for management, Basil; for academe see American Political Science Association; Austin; Chancellor's Advisory Commission; Graham; Kreps, chap. 4; Oldman; Rossi and Calderwood; Suelzle; see also Szalai).

Why differences? My hypotheses are as follows, holding other variables constant: Rapidly developing economies provide employment opportunities for "mixed game" gender occupational patterns; post-industrial economies with small percentage GDP increases and greater unemployment resemble "zero-sum games," with men's mobility into the professions tending to vary inversely with women's. However, when there is discrimination against a subgroup, as with blacks in the U.S., there is also a "mixed game" with differing values, beliefs, and self-perceptions: women are viewed as occupational cooperators, not as competitors (cf. Epstein, 1973).

The skein of relationships between elements of gender roles and political participation is yet to be discerned. There are mediating factors of religion (Islam, for example, appears to be inversely associated with women's political participation, whereas Catholicism may not be), of family and school socialization prior to job decision making and to political activity. Table 2 suggests some research possibilities. When women have "high" decision-making experiences in the family and school (as operationalized in Almond and Verba's interview schedule)—as in the United States—then "low" decision making on the job appears to be a critical variable related to low political participation. In Mexico, however, both school and job decision making, although of different magnitudes, may be of significance to political participation. (For women in Latin America see Pescatello, Stevens.) Other aspects of political participation are discussed in greater detail below.

Coercion to Gender Role Through Law. Why—asked John Stuart Mill—if women are naturally subordinate, is law needed to keep them so? Perhaps because neither socialization, channeling, subtle social control nor co-optation of a few always works; the law is needed to force the "uppity" into line (see Freeman in *Valparaiso*

Table 1. Discrimination Against the American Working Woman: Percentage of Women in Occupational Categories Having Total Annual Income Discrepancies of − $3,500 or More When Equally Qualified and Experienced[a]

Occupational Category[b]	Percentage	Base n	df	x^2
Professional, technical and managerial	70.3	74		
Clerical and sales	64.7	139		
Operative and kindred workers	11.9[c]	59		
Service workers, excluding private household workers	30.4	46	3	64.465[d]

[a] Table adapted from Teresa Levitin, Robert P. Quinn, Graham L. Staines, "Sex Discrimination Against the American Working Woman," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 15 (November/December, 1971), Table 2, p. 248. Briefly the method on which this table is based is as follows: After randomly dividing the sample of men and obtaining, by multiple regressions optimal weighting of selected achievement variables, and after expected values were obtained on the second random half sample of men, these latter figures were compared with observed values (pp. 234–5). The mean of the observed-expected discrepancy for women was −$3,458 (S.D. = $2,200); for the second random half sample of men the mean was −$27 (S.D. = $4,523) (p. 245).

[b] Managerial workers ($N = 19$) were combined with professional and technical workers ($n = 55$). Sales workers ($n = 17$) were combined with clerical workers ($n = 122$).

[c] In the original Levitin, Quinn, and Staines article the figure is 15.2%, which is an error, according to Staines (personal communication, July 16, 1974).

[d] p .001.

Law Review). From the little we know, English, American and French law based on the Napoleonic code is equally oppressive to women (see Beard, pp. 88–155; Silver, p. 85). Kanowitz's excellent *Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution* documents the massive body of statutory and judicial discriminatory law based on beliefs concerning the masculine and feminine genders which would be overturned were the Equal Rights Amendment adopted (see also *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review*, and Committee on the Judiciary).

The discriminatory law in the United States is based on three notions: (1) *Natural male dominance* (Kanowitz, p. 36). Hence in the "doctrine of coverture," the legal unity of husband and wife, the latter's legal identity is eliminated while the husband is given legal charge. In some states the law requires the wife to assume her husband's name, to live where her husband decides; she forfeits rights in some states to contract, to assume liability and to control and manage her own property. The husband is to support the family in marriage and in divorce (Kanowitz, chap. 3). One

Table 2. Percentage of "High" Decision-Making in Family, School, Job and "High" Political Participation: Civic Culture[a] Data, United States and Mexico[b]

	Per cent of *High* Responses			
	United States Sample		Mexican Sample	
Item	Male	Female	Male	Female
Family[c]	27.1	27.8	26	19.3
School[d]	32.8	33.3	21.6	12.1
Job[e]	37.1	10	31.5	5.5
Political Participation[f]	16.7	8	7.9	1.6

[a] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963).

[b] I have constructed the above table from data kindly made available to me by Edward Glab, Jr., of the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, Austin, who utilized Inter-university Consortium for Political Research source decks.

[c] Average responses to variables 8, 9, and 10, influence in family decisions.

[d] Average responses to variables 12, 13, 14, discuss and debate in school, feel free to talk to teacher if treated unfairly.

[e] Average response to variable 15, usually consulted on job decisions affecting respondent, and variable 16, feel free to complain on decisions disagreed with.

[f] Average response to variables 2, 3, 7, 18 influence local decisions and/or Congress, active in political campaign, and member political organization.

study, however, indicates that in most cases, court-ordered child support is not complied with, and in a recent investigation of 12,000 divorces no alimony was requested in 93 per cent (Nagel and Weitzman). (2) *A double standard of sexual behavior.* According to Kanowitz males are allowed great sexual freedom, whereas severe restrictions are imposed on females (p. 23). The law often frees the male customer and punishes the prostitute (Kanowitz: pp. 16–18; see also Petrie; Silver, f.n. 17). It allows the man but not the woman the unwritten law of defense in case of marital infidelity, allows intercourse of underage boys with older women but not vice versa, and does not define sexual assault in marriage as rape (Kanowitz, chap. 2). Until the historic Jane Roe vs. Henry Wade decision of the Supreme Court on January 22, 1973, abortion was illegal in many states and other jurisdictions (Kanowitz, p. 25). (3) *Natural female weakness.* With this notion women were held under interpretations of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to be a separate legal class from men (Kanowitz, pp. 151–154). As recently as October 27, 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld in State v. Constello, a statute which allows longer sentences for women offenders than men offenders convicted of the same criminal conduct (see Temin, p. 357). The law in some instances has sanctioned denial of jury duty; prohibitions from practicing law or working in bartending, wrestling and mining, and from night and overtime work, and inequality in wages (Kanowitz, chap. 6). One justice remarked that women may well be the "victims of protection" (Kanowitz, p. 5). Nevertheless no state law as of 1970 provides job security for women on maternity leave, and only two provide maternity benefits (Ross; see Sweet, p. 208) whereas such is the case in a number of European common market countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, pp. 32–33; see Hoskins and Bixby).

While the Equal Pay Act has been with us since 1963 and the Civil Rights Act since 1964, and while these appear to portend change—how pervasive are the outcomes in eliminating discrimination? Certainly the decade ahead provides an outstanding research opportunity for policy analysis of these laws, including affirmative action, in a time of constricting labor markets in many professions (Gold). The politics of the Equal Rights Amendment and the counter movement to the Roe v. Wade abortion decision are also timely areas for inquiry. Such studies would deepen understanding of the political and economic forces seeking containment of women within traditional roles, and the processes involved.[5]

Political Perceptions and Political Behavior: Plus Ca Change, . . . ? What are the trends in women's political perceptions, voting, campaigning and office-holding? The contemporary American pattern, it appears to me, is as follows: Tensions brought by the interaction between the traditional gender role and the rhetoric of democracy in the home, school, and cultural milieu have been resolved by (a) increased women's voting and political volunteerism, and (b) political behavior within the confines of the gender role, which in turn results in (c) few inputs of political demands (d) few women elected to political office, and (e) few policy changes which would eliminate legal barriers and facilitate more options, and hence give feedback of a broadened gender role. Thus I suggest (following Gross), that the more things have changed, the more they have remained the same.

Past research shows that on the average, women behaved politically in a way we would expect them to, given the nurturing of passivity, expressivness, supportiveness, apoliticism, child and home orientation, time constraints, lower prestige and authority in the occupational hierarchy, lack of political resources and networks critical to political leadership (Lynn and Flora) and a sense of political efficacy necessary in politics. (See Andreas, chaps. 1–4; Heiskanen; Amundsen, p. 130.) One sees, as one would expect, low voluntary organizational membership, low rates of voting and political activism, few officeholders, and a concern for home-oriented issues. (See Costantini and Craik's succinct summary, p. 218; for an early account of women's voting patterns in Europe see Duverger.)

Within recent years, however, women's voting and volunteer political activity has been increasing and concerns and aspirations have widened. We continue to observe trends noted in *The American Voter:*[6] Southern women, those over 55, and women with eight years or less of elementary school are those whose voting rates continue to lag behind men's (Lansing; cf. Kruschke). However, women's turnout has increased at a rate three times that of men's in the years 1948 to 1968, as shown in Ferris's *Indicators of Trends in the Status of American Women* (p. 181). By 1972 the difference in men's and women's vote had narrowed to two per cent and women comprised 52 per cent of those voting.[7] The number of women who take part in one or more campaign activities is now only about 10 per cent less than men, but young women and the highly educated are more active than their male peers (Lansing).

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[5] See "Opposition Rises to Amendment on Equal Rights," *New York Times*, January 15, 1973, 1.

[6] Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

[7] "Voter Participation in November, 1972," *Population Characteristics* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, December, 1972), Series P-20, No. 244, 3.

In a 1971 poll women expressed greater concern than men about ending the Vietnam war, poverty, and drug and gun control (Harris, p. 68 and p. 79). Before the nominations more women than men preferred Senators Muskie, Humphrey, and Kennedy whereas there was greater men's support for President Nixon and Governor Wallace (*Ibid.*, p. 103). Almost half of all women approved efforts to strengthen their status, with 6 out of 10 of the single, college educated and black women holding this view (Harris, p. 2).

As far as I can tell, however, there is no identifiable "women's vote" in the sense of a bloc vote for women's direct self-interest (Chafe, p. 45), be it for the semi-issues of strict enforcement of nondiscrimination at work, easily available abortion and child-care centers, or the nonissues of housewives salaries and pensions, and paid maternity leave guaranteed by law (see Koontz). Contemporary women perhaps represent the ideal type of public regarders and noninstrumentalists, both in voting and in volunteer political work where they usually do the menial tasks. It is noteworthy that even women party leaders do not ordinarily seek the prestige or influence which would advance their own self-interest and/or that of other women (Constantini and Craik, pp. 233–235). In consequence, women's political participation has had scant political impact in policy formulation and outcome.

The lack of a significant proportion of women in state legislatures and in the Congress, is, as suggested earlier, both a consequence and a cause of the continuance of traditional gender roles. For women the recruitment path to elected state and federal office appears to be rockier than for their male peers; they have a narrower network base, fewer political resources, barriers may be thrown up by party leaders and support by men and women harder to obtain. (See Krauss; Lynn and Flora; Bullock III and Heys; Kuriansky and Smith; Jennings and Thomas.) Hence it is not surprising that only about three per cent of the state legislators and the Congress since World War II have been women (Amundsen: p. 78; Werner, 1968; U.S. Department of Labor, 1969, pp. 125–126). Their numbers have been small, and they have lacked legislative leadership positions to make policy changes and to further their legal liberation. Women legislators must ordinarily depend on the altruism of their male colleagues for support. The latter have little to gain politically by offering such support or to lose by withholding it.

To what extent are there harbingers of change? As of 1974, state legislatures remain 94 per cent male, and state senates and the U.S. House of Representative, 96 per cent, although the number of women in state legislatures increased exponentially over 1972 (Lynn; Krauss). While the percentage of women in legislatures shows a fluctuating upward trend in the past ten years, the pattern in Congress appears to be cyclical (see Werner, 1966, Table 12).

The few women who do become office-holders in the United States comprise an interesting leadership group for study. Werner and Bachtold found that while both men and women state legislators have traits closely identified with their gender, e.g., feminine sensitivity, masculine ego strength, psychological trait overlap is considerable—both groups being bold, venturesome, intelligent. Women legislators tend to be more liberal in their political orientation than their male colleagues, according to Werner and Bachtold (fourteen of the sixteen women in Congress are Democrats [see also Means, p. 496]). But, although there are data on the congresswomen's demographic backgrounds, we have little research on their legislative roles (see Foote; also Center for the American Woman and Politics), nor do we have cross-state comparisons of women as state legislators. The question of how women acquire or develop a psychological predisposition to seek political office is also largely unstudied. (See, however, Means; Krauss.)

On the local level in the United States (and in England), the percentage of women in office is higher (see Sullerot, pp. 222–229). This is especially the case with school boards where women may number up to 15 or more per cent (see Gruberg, p. 215). Again, however, little is known about their activities. The rate of participation of women in local and state office in the U.S. seems to vary inversely with the degree of prestige and power of the office, the amount of salary, urbanism, and political bossism, and positively with party competition, number of offices available, proportion of women and men professionals, and the general economic affluence of the particular area (Constantini and Craik; Porter and Matasar; Krauss).

As the reader would suspect, however, the American pattern is not the world pattern. The incomplete and fluctuating U.N. data on women's proportions in parliament and the other available research seem to indicate a general curvilinear pattern corresponding roughly to the options of women in the professions; that is, the middle level GDP (gross domestic product) countries have greater proportions of women in the parliaments than do countries with the highest domestic income and degree of industrialization (Devaud; Fujita; Means; Menon; Norris; Raksasataya; Krauss). There are clearly other factors at work, however. There are no women in parliament in the Islamic Middle East, as expected, yet we find also none in Spain; in the Philippines, New Zealand, Israel, and the Netherlands women have comprised up to 7 per cent of the legislative bodies. The highest Western percentages are in Scandinavia—Sweden and Finland having up to 20 per cent women members of parliament. What also appears to be the case is that as a country develops into the postindustrial phase as in Japan, the proportion of women in parliament (Koyama, p. 142; see also Goode, 1963, p. 350) drops to the 2–4 per cent level of the United States (Werner, 1966; Lamson), England, and Canada (Boyd). The Eastern European countries have consistently high percentages (Chylinska), but in those bodies in which legislative policy is formulated[8]—i.e., in the paid Communist Party hierarchy—there are presently few women or none at all (Kurganoff; Horoszowsky, p. 15; Lapidus; cf. Mandel).

In addition to the occupational opportunity hypothesis which I have advanced earlier to help explain differences in women's proportions in parliament, another major explanatory element may well be structural: Electoral systems based on proportional representation have greater proportions of women in office, as in Scandinavia; such is the case even when proportional representation is combined with single member districts, as in Germany, a point noted by Means (p. 499; see also Krauss). This tendency may reflect another one: the belief that women should be on the ticket, whether as token to appeal to women voters, or as parliament members in their own right (Means, p. 517 and p. 496, f.n. 19; see also Bullock III and Heys). It appears, however, that in either case, parliamentary office-holding ordinarily constitutes an addition to the gender role for exceptionally capable women who are able to combine political careers with the childrearing and household duties traditionally ascribed to the feminine gender (see Means, p. 521).

Gender Roles and Women's Political Movements in Historical Perspective

This section is addressed to these questions: (1) What is women's historical role in the polity? (2) What are the circumstances under which the first women's political movement developed in the 19th century? (3) Why did it decline? (4) What accounts for the resurgence of feminism in the 1960s and what are its goals compared to the earlier movement?

Varying Gender Roles. After reading Bullough and Bullough's *The Subordinate Sex: A History of Attitudes Toward Women* one is left with the impression that the gender role has varied little over the ages. While the misogynist ideology, so well documented by the Bulloughs, survives through the centuries, overt manifestations have been quite different within, and across polities and from period to period (Putnam; Beard; Giele in Klein, p. liv).

Putnam's newly republished 1910 work, *The Lady*, presents an account of women of "the favoured social class" in the Greek, Roman, and later European contexts. She depicts the interrelation of customs and laws to women's roles and offers trenchant commentary on the differences between Plato's and Aristotle's views toward women. Her book, therefore, will rankle some who disagree with her interpretation, but perhaps will interest others in re-examining Plato's and Aristotle's political philosophy with regard to the capacity and place of women in the polity.

"One of the temperamental differences between Plato and Aristotle," Putnam wrote, "consists in the greater willingness of Aristotle to acquiesce in existing conditions and to exert his imagination to provide reasons for their permanence" (Putnam, p. 33). There was ample room for comparative study: Spartan women enjoyed social freedom, shared the physical training of males (see also Mill, p. 139), and held property whereas in Athens it was considered natural for women to live indoors and they were the property of their fathers and husbands. (This near chattel status appears to have followed an earlier period when Athenian women were legally politically equal to men and voted in popular assemblies [Marmor].) As Putnam notes, Aristotle classed slaves and women as naturally inferior (see also Mill, p. 137); whereas Plato in *The Republic* envisioned a polity wherein both sexes would have the same opportunities; women or men talented for the higher occupations—medicine, music, guardians—would enter them regardless of who performed a particular reproductive function (Putnam, p. 36; Beard, p. 70).

In Athens, there is some indication that women participated in the intellectual ferment of the Golden Age, studied with Epicurus, Plato, Socrates and especially Pythagoras, and that several were philosophers (see Davis, p. 192 but cf. Hackert and Pomeroy; see also Beard, pp. 320–325); nevertheless, most of them were restricted to producing legitimate heirs, directing and managing the husband's house and engaging in religious activities (Putnam, p. 1). The Roman lady was quite different, for she had legal control over property. She also was unencumbered by household or childcare tasks since this work was done by Greek slaves. The Roman lady was also educated in the Greek classics, read and wrote Latin, and had a more public and diversified role (see Beard, pp. 298–309).

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[8] D. Richard Little, "Legislative Authority in the Soviet Political System," *Slavic Review*, 30 (March, 1971), 57–73.

While the independence of women was the subject of some uneasiness in Rome (Putnam, pp. 46–47; Bullough and Bullough, chap. 4), in early Christendom the abbess was accepted by monarch and popes as baron, administrator, scholar, artist and minister to the poor and sick (many women were canonized as saints [McGinley]), and this option afforded women freedom from the Hobson's choice of home or outlawry. Women played a prominent part (Beard, pp. 215–278) in the development of the medieval guilds, without experiencing occupational barriers (see Klein, 1972, p. 9). Differences were customarily based on class, rather than gender lines (Beard, p. 254). During the Renaissance women participated in the enlightenment, attended universities, were afforded a classic tutoring, and several were rulers. In addition, the salons of Paris conducted by women were centers of learning, "politesse" and power; women spoke out against the androcentrism of Rousseau, and their aspirations for equality were supported by Diderot and Voltaire (see Bullough. chap. 11; see also Rowbotham, pp. 38–40).

The industrial revolution was to have a profound effect on the future of women, for with it work and home were separated, the extended family gradually declined (Goode, 1963, pp. 11–26), urbanism increased, women became isolated and were either dependent upon their husbands or alternatively they became the poorest paid factory proletariat (Klein, 1972, pp. 13–15; see also Bebel). It was in this context of industrialization that Blackstone developed the doctrine of coverture by which married women in England and then America suffered "civil death," having no legal existence apart from their husbands (Flexner, pp. 7–8). Women of the middle classes, their position considerably lessened, sought education and access to the social and political system as equals while the early factory women wanted protection from sweatshop conditions (see Klein, 1972; p. 15). It was this milieu of industrialization, urbanization and declining status for women that set the stage for the beginnings of protest in the United States and Europe. And it was this class difference in type of repression of women in the lower and middle classes—in my view—which could be exploited to divide and divert them from mutually beneficial social and political goals.

Feminist Political Movements

How did they begin? Women's movements throughout European history—and, it appears, in China, India, and Pakistan (see Rowbotham; Goode, 1963, p. 303, also Ward, p. 66) as well—arise phoenix-like within social revolutions and movements for independence. Women's movements seem to have five analytic components: (a) women, at first other-directed, begin to extend the ideology of equality and social justice to their gender; (b) a new and true consciousness of the role develops out of the general questioning of institutions and norms; (c) the old movement does not adequately meet the newly articulated concerns of women; and (d) the communication network of the old movement serves as the nexus of a women's political organization, and (e) political reforms may be attained which may be more or less real or symbolic in their application, which may lead eventually to the revival of a feminist movement (cf. Freeman, 1973).

In the subsections which follow I shall concentrate primarily on the developments in the United States, covering (a) beginnings of protest; (b) the early feminism; (c) the question of failure of the women's rights movement; (d) the new feminism, and (e) themes of the contemporary movement.

Beginnings of Protest. In 1777 Abigail Adams wrote to her husband, John:

> . . . [In] the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make, I desire you would remember the ladies and be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the husbands. Remember, all men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation. (Schneir, p. 3)

The above is quoted in Miriam Schneir's outstanding compendium, *Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings* where we learn that John[9] replied, "As to your extraordinary code of laws, I cannot but laugh" (Schneir, p. 4). Yet Abigail Adams, for ten years separated from her statesman husband, managed the farm, acquired property for the estate, directed construction of buildings, and superintended dairying operations, according to Buyer's *Notable American Women, 1607–1950*, a most comprehensive three-volume biographical work. Charles Francis Adams who collected the letters of his famous grandparents wrote: "The heroism of the females of the Revolution has gone from memory with the generation that witnessed it, and nothing, absolutely nothing remains upon the ear of the young of the present day but the faint echo of an expiring general tradition" (Schneir, p. xi). (For egalitarian effects of the frontier in eighteenth-century America and decline of women's status in the nineteenth, see Demos.)

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[9] Cf. Jefferson, who wrote, "It is civilization alone which replaces women in their enjoyment of their natural equality," from *Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781–1795*. quoted in Montagu, 36.

In 1792 in England Mary Wollstonecraft published *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*, which is considered the founding work of the modern women's rights movement (Flexner, p. 15). In 1798 after the French National Assembly adopted the Rights of Man, a number of women petitioned in vain to have a Declaration des Droits des Femmes accepted (Klein 1965, p. 19). As some American women taxpayers in New Jersey in 1776 had their suffrage rescinded later in 1807, (U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, p. 134) so with the promulgation of the Napoleonic code (de Beauvoir, pp. 101–102), French women were stripped of divorce and other rights gained in the French revolution. Yet the writing and the speaking for *égalité* continued abroad (de Beauvoir, pp. 116–117) and in the United States. Two southerners who freed their slaves and went North and there agitated against human bondage were Sarah Moore Grimké and sister Angelina; they spoke before large audiences not only in the abolitionist interest but for women. Wisconsin historian William L. O'Neill (1969) credits Sarah Grimké's *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women* (1838) with engendering the sympathy of Protestant clergy to the woman's rights movement (O'Neill, 1969, p. 12; see also Lerner, 1967. For women of the South see Scott, 1970; Lerner, 1972).

The Early Feminism: For Equal Rights. After many women had braved hostile mobs at meetings on behalf of the abolition of slavery, had served as "agents," i.e. official speakers, in that cause, and had circulated anti-slavery petitions which were presented to Congress, Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, along with others of their sex, were excluded from being official delegates to the World Anti-Slavery convention in London in 1840. This "moment of truth" stung many women into new thought and action, according to Stanton, and eight years later, while they both continued as abolitionists, they with three friends called the first political convocation of women. Eleanor Flexner's *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* discusses the first meeting at Seneca Falls in 1848 at which time a paraphrase of the Declaration of Independence—"All men *and women* are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . ."—was adopted and several resolutions passed. Their Declaration covered the scope of grievances which they vowed to undo—the taxation without representation, the inequitable property and divorce laws, the monopoly of the professional occupations, the denial of higher education. (The text may be found in Schneir, pp. 77–82.) A narrowly passed resolution, considered by many to be too radical for the time (1848), called for suffrage and was adopted after being defended on the floor by Frederick Douglass, the black abolitionist leader, among others.

There followed seventy-two years of agitation in legislatures and in Congress with advances and failures; i.e., male blacks were given equal rights and the vote by 1870, while both were denied to women. Among suffrage opponents were the brewery, oil and other business interests, according to Flexner, who feared not only female suffrage but also reform laws which might follow for the now large number of women who toiled in the garment factories (see Scott, 1971, chap. 2); other "antis" were southern politicians who wished to deny the black woman's vote, and northern political bosses wary of a "clean up" in politics (Flexner, pp. 294–305; also David Morgan, chap. 11). Each gain was fought for arduously. There were 277 campaigns for inclusion of suffrage planks in state platforms; 480 state legislative attempts for suffrage referenda in the states and 56 referenda campaigns; on the national level there were 30 to obtain woman's suffrage planks in party platforms (Flexner, p. 173). The suffragists also worked with nineteen separate Congresses until, in 1920, the 19th amendment to the Constitution was adopted and ratified by the states (Flexner, p. 173). More than a million women participated in the final phases (O'Neill, 1969, p. VII; David Morgan, p. 99; see also *History of Woman Suffrage;* Catt and Schuler; Kraditor 1970 and 1971; Parker).

Was the Women's Rights Movement a Failure? The answer to this question depends upon the criteria employed in evaluation. No, if one points to the winning of the suffrage. But in the long run —at least until the 1960s—did this not prove to be a Pyrrhic victory socially and politically? For, as nearly all writers point out, with the gradual disappearance of the movement (Riegel, chap. 11), there was a slow decline in women's status for the next thirty years, measured by fewer women proportionately in the colleges (O'Neill, 1969, p. 93; Newcomer; Epstein, in *Woman's Place*, 1971, pp. 56–60) and in the professions (Knudsen), and an increase in the inequality in wages (U.S. Department of Labor, *Fact Sheet on the Earnings Gap*. p. 1; Knudsen; Suelzle, 1970). Also there were no meaningful increases of women in positions of social and political authority nor of social legislation directly beneficial to the gender (David Morgan, p. 195; O'Neill, 1969, p. 267; Chafe, pp. 37–47).

Why? First, there were divisions within the ranks of the feminist organizations in the 1920s, abetted by the industrial and business interests which feared both the other-oriented social progressivism of one segment and the self-interested egalitarian thrust of the other (see Lemons, chaps. 6–8). Feminist leaders neither mobilized women's bloc voting nor made unified demands for political representation in the parties. During the depression of the 1930s, married women, without any legal protection, were fired from their jobs as a matter of governmental and business policy (Lemons, pp. 230–231). After World War II, many women who had entered the work force were forced out by the closing of government-sponsored child-care centers (Chafe, pp. 186–187), and, later, I believe, by the post-Korean War recession. Many left voluntarily in the ideological milieu of a new familism buttressed by a popularized Freudianism which portrayed the nonhomebound woman as psychologically afflicted (see Bird, p. 31; Firestone, pp. 25–30; O'Neill, 1969, chaps. 9 and 10).

The decline in women's status from the 1930s to the 1960s occurred in Europe, as well as in the United States. (For England see O'Neill, 1971; for France's different pattern see Silver.) The most retrogressive cases were in Germany and the Soviet Union. In Germany where women obtained the suffrage in 1919, Hitler imposed the Napoleonic ideal of "kuche, kirche, kinder" and a women's quota of 10 per cent was set for university entrance; women were removed from judgeships and from the Reichstag, forced into menial and hard physical labor, and prohibited from utilizing birth control devices (Millett, pp. 159–168). In the Soviet Union revolutionary decrees in 1917 and 1918 gave full and equal political and legal rights to women, but the lack of a sustained women's political movement led to the eventual loss of gains for the masses of Soviet women (Salaff and Merkle). In the drive for industrialization in the 1930s, the exigencies of World War II and reconstruction, the official egalitarian ideology was altered, as was the law. Abortions were restricted, then prohibited in 1944, divorces were discouraged by large fines, and the patriarchical family structure was restored (Millett, pp. 168–176). In the mines and heavy industry, a majority of the workforce was female (Schuster), and although there were some advances in education and the professions, the high prestige positions within them were occupied by men (Bernard, p. 137; Salaff and Merkle, p. 177; Horoszowsky, p. 15; Rowbotham, pp. 164–169).

While many European countries granted full political rights to women by the 1920s (a notable exception being France), women's political emancipation in most African and Asian countries occurred after World War II in association with independence and socialist movements (see U.N. Commission on the Status of Women; Ungor; Wolf cf. Snow; see also Rowbotham, chaps. 7 and 8; Ward, pp. 60–76). In Japan, however, political equality was written into the 1946 constitution (Koyama, p. 18), and in Southeast Asia rights were won rapidly and easily (Ward, p. 72).

The Rebirth of Feminism in the United States. Although Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* was first published in the United States in 1953, it was not until the publication of the best seller, *The Feminine Mystique* ten years later that the U.S. movement got underway with Friedan's critique of the neo-familism of the '50s, her designation of the suburban woman's malaise as "forfeited self" and her analysis of the commercial interests served by encouraging women's role as super-consumer (see also Israel and Eliason).

Meanwhile, women's participation in the traditional feminine occupations was rapidly increasing, and many were underutilized in terms of their educational qualifications (U.S. Department of Labor, *Underutilization of Women Workers*, p. 17; Oppenheimer, p. 187). Also coincident with Friedan's book was the issuance of the report of the presidential commission on the status of women, which John F. Kennedy approved earlier on the urging of its first chairman, Eleanor Roosevelt (Bird, pp. 36–37). The *Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women* led to the establishment of 50 state commissions (see, for example, California State Commission), several city and territorial commissions, and later a number of federal task forces (see Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women reports) which documented inequities, the need for child-care centers for the large proportion of mothers in the workforce, and discriminatory laws. (See also President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, and Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women, January, 1972.)

Expectations raised, and spurred on by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (in which a prohibition of sex discrimination had been added as a tactic for defeating its passage [see Kanowitz, pp. 104–5]), Friedan and other older women formed the National Organization for Women in 1966 to pressure federal agencies to enforce the law, and to work for equality in all spheres (Freeman, 1973). Meanwhile, young radical women who had participated in the civil rights and youth movements of the 1960s—like the feminists of a hundred years earlier—were "stung" into separatism (*Ibid.*). Assigned to menial tasks and told to stay in their place (Bird, p. 211; Chafe, p. 233), they split off from the youth movement and organized consciousness-raising groups (Tanner, pp. 231–253; Freeman in Sochen, 1971, pp. 152–153) to analyze where they were and how they got there (Jones and Brown; see also Bird, pp. 211–255). It is estimated that by 1970 as many as 100,000 women in 400 cities were engaged in some aspect of the new United States women's movement (Bernard, p. 217; for impact at Yale, see Lever and Schwartz).

Holt and Levine's *Rebirth of Feminism* (see also Carden; Mitchell, part 1; Firestone, pp. 30–40; Freeman, 1973, 1974; Romer and Secor) includes chapters on the movement's origins, major ideas and critiques, forms of resistance, and the areas of action, including the church and the media (chap. 6). While Holt and Levine employ the methodology of social history, their book offers some touchstones for empirically-oriented political scientists who may be interested in exploring the relationship of the effect of "underground" and "overground" media on public opinion and authoritative decision making.

Themes of the Contemporary Movement: Toward Androgynous Roles. The themes of the present feminist movement are both reformist and revolutionary. Future studies of political thought may find contemporary feminism related not only to the general historical movement for equality but also to the humanistic (Boals) and anti-bureaucratic ideology of the counterculture[10] and to the radical political philosophy of Marcuse.[11]

The reformist view incorporates ideas of early feminism—for equality, life, liberty and happiness, in a sense Seneca Falls all over again. It also calls—most significantly I believe—for sharing of gender roles rather than narrowly differentiated ones, for a marriage partnership with mutual child-rearing and financing of the family, with a career for the wife or husband who wants it (see NOW program in Epstein and Goode, pp. 193–198; Robin Morgan, pp. 512–513; Hobbs; also Rossi in Lifton. For a recent comprehensive study of couples who share roles see Fogarty, Rapoport and Rapoport; also see Holmstrom).

On the basis of Jan Dizard's study of 400 families, Bernard holds that role sharing and non-sex-typing of work would be beneficial for the public interest (best person for the job) and for the happiness of most persons, including children (see Table 3). In Sweden the elimination of gender roles in all aspects of life including the school curriculum, higher education and the law, is government policy (Swedish Government; Palme; Leijon; Frederickson). A government objective is part-time and other work arrangements which will allow both genders to be equal parents. One concern is that children be given more attention by fathers, and another is that women be freed to participate in politics (Dahlstrom). The goal is emancipation of both men and women (see Palme). In my view, a longitudinal study of the Swedish efforts now under way, including their impact on political life, would be a fruitful research undertaking with significant policy implications.

The revolutionary feminists envisage a variety of life styles for women (see, e.g., Bart; Balogun; Densmore; Dixon; Greer), men and children, as well as new forms of the family (e.g., Babox and Belkin; Cudlipp; Densmore; Mandle; Robin Morgan; Sochen, 1971; Stambler; Tanner; Ware; for a 19th-century revolutionary see Gilman; also see Giele, 1972; Sochen, 1972). Perhaps the most radical and future-oriented contemporary work is Shulamith Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (*1970*) which calls for a "cybernetic socialism" in a century or so. In her utopia, which is based in part on Aries's work[12] and bears some resemblance to Huxley's *Brave New World*,[13] technology eliminates labor and makes possible creative activity for all—men, women and children, as well as the artificial creation of human beings. Youngsters would be reared in communal households (not families) and everyone, including children, would receive the same monetary allowance and would be fully integrated into the larger society in which there would also be a pluralism of sexuality. Like Skinner's *Walden II*[14] and to a degree Toffler's *Future Shock*,[15] Firestone's vision fails to elucidate the political structures and political rules which will assure popular control of technology for freedom, egalitarianism and self-actualization.

Origins of Gender Relationships

How did it all begin? When and how did some women first become subordinated? What accounts for cross-cultural differences between the genders? What is the relationship of gender roles to development of government? And what is the political significance of biological differences?

While these questions are only partially answered by the literature, what we have suggests the following: (1) the ecology of a region determines the means of subsistence and thus affects the division of labor between men and women; (2) the control of the means of subsistence is related to superordination-subordination or egalitarian family patterns; (3) the creation of surplus value leads to the rise of the state and to consoli-

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[10] Theodore Roszak, *The Making of the Counter Culture* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1969).

[11] See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

[12] Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Knopf, 1962).

[13] Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: Harper, 1950).

[14] B. F. Skinner, *Walden II* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

[15] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random, 1970).

Table 3. Differntiated vs. Shared Roles and Pursuit of Happiness
(Based on Dizard's Study of 400 Families)[a].

	Pursuit of Happiness[b]						
	Type of Woman			Extent of Male Achievement and/or Motivation			Children
Degree of Sexual Specialization of Roles	Career	Mixed	Housewife	High	Average	Low	
One Role (maximum role differentiation)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Two Roles (wife shares provider role)	+	+	−	+	+	+	+
Shared roles (men and women share many roles)	+	+	+	−	+	+	+
No sex-typing of work	+	+	+	+	+	−	+

[a] Chart adapted from Jessie Bernard, *Women and the Public Interest* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971) p. 276 on permission of the publisher. The chart is based on research reported in Chapter 5, "Work, Marriage, and the Pursuit of Happiness."
[b] + means pursuit of happiness is enhanced; − means pursuit of happiness is retarded.

dation of gender power relationships, and (4) selected biological attributes are emphasized or minimized in the supporting ideology,[16] which serves to explain the extant political arrangements in the particular polity.

Regional Ecology, Family Structure, and Power Relationships. In a study of 748 nonindustrialized societies compiled from the *Ethnographic Atlas*, Sanday found that women contribute the most to subsistence where there is shifting agriculture and horticultural cultivation. Conversely, intensively-cultivated, plough agriculture, fishing and big game hunting (cf. Gough) involve greater proportions of men in subsistence providing. Women's contribution was greatest in Africa and the insular Pacific (also see Mead, 1949, 1963) and smallest in the area around the Mediterranean, followed by North and South America, and East Eurasia. Sanday's analysis appears related to Boserup's findings in *Women's Role in Economic Development*. She observes (p. 60) that in sub-Sahara Africa women were the major agricultural cultivators and landholders prior to European colonization. Women also comprise the vast majority of traders and appear to have played a prominent role in pre-colonial African politics (Lebeauf; Leavitt).

What is the linkage between means of subsistence and family structures? Horticultural economies tend to matriliny (Schlegel, p. 17; see Goode, 1963, pp. 194–195), while plough agriculture is associated with patriliny, and the wet rice cultivation in Southeast Asia (Green, p. 60) is related to a colineal or radial structure. Thus Burma, Cambodia, Java, Laos, Malaya, Philippines (see Green) and Thailand have had a longstanding egalitarian tradition, including, in most areas property and inheritance rights for women (see Ward, pp. 81–87).

While modern researchers discount Morgan and Engels's theory, in *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, of the communal family predating other forms (Gough, pp. 766–767), Engels (p. 43) was certainly right when he called the plough the means of creating surplus value. Before the first milennium, B.C., according to Engels, private property originated in the Mediterranean area and the family structure was subsequently changed from matriarchy to patriarchy. Women were believed to be the first slaves, acquired as sexual property and then utilized as menial servants (Collins, pp. 8–9; Mill, p. 130). They were first legally subjugated under the early autocratic state (Jesser, p. 248). Conversely, matriliny (see Schlegel's study of over 60 matrilineal societies) tends to be associated with minimal states (Schlegel, p. 17).

While it is unclear whether matriarchy, rule by women over men, has actually existed (see Schlegel, p. 139; cf. Davis), patriarchy appears to be a real as well as a nominal classification. Both matriliny and patriliny do not necessarily lead to one gender's superordination, for in the former there may be deference to brother or husbands in property and other matters (Schlegel, p. 64), and in the latter, as Jesser reports, real power may lie in women's *use* of property even while there is a mythology of male superiority (Jesser, pp. 249–

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[16] This term is used synonymously in this essay with social theory. See Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," *APSR*, 65 (September, 1971), Table 1, p. 655. For discussion of the evaluative aspects of ideology, herein referred to as norms, see Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," *APSR*, 66 (June, 1972), 508–509.

250). Ward, in *Women in the New Asia* (pp. 77–78) also points out that although the ideal family unit was patriarchical and extended in China and India, there was considerable freedom and status among women of the lower classes since they were co-contributors to subsistence and their family structure was actually simple, not compound. The well-to-do patriarchial family, often polygynous, denied women the right to divorce and the guardianship of children, the major objective being the perpetuation of the male line (Ward, pp. 84–85).

These fine points are insufficiently analyzed in Millett's *Sexual Politics*, but I believe she is correct in noting that analysis based on economic development is by itself inadequate to explain the power relationships between the genders. It seems that when roles are polarized into expressive and instrumental ideal types, as was the case early in the West, and are reinforced by androcentric beliefs, men's instrumental activities lead to pyramiding of resources, the growth of hierarchical arrangements, the monopolization of force in the state, and power relationships over other men and women (Holter, p. 47; also Gough, p. 768). Millett (chap. 2) points to the matrix of contemporary men's power, in the patriarchal family, in commerce, industry, education, the judiciary, government, police and military forces. She holds that until patriarchy is eradicated, women's inequality will prevail, as it does in the Soviet Union despite socialization of property (Millett, p. 157 and pp. 168–176). Talcott Parsons (1967) expresses a similar view.

Social Construction of Biological Differences. The term "sexism" in the women's literature is utilized analogously to racism to apply to the system of political institutions and processes which maintains the gender order, as well as the ideology which is used as justification for social norms (see e.g., Gornick and Moran, pp. xii–xiii). The ideology of sexism is based on the thesis that women are biologically inferior to men, or that they have particular differences or deficiencies which naturally limit them to a subordinate role (Montagu, p. 205 and *passim;* see Bullough and Bullough for historical account). The fact that women bear children and breast feed them is a biological fact probably related in part to why, in prehistoric times, they most likely did not participate in big-game hunting or other activities far from the hearth (Jesser, p. 248; Gough, pp. 767–768), but were horticulturists, gatherers, or co-cultivators of particular crops. Such constant female characteristics, when divorced from the social context, cannot account for variations or changes in gender roles; the explanations must lie rather in various ecological and political developments. Thus, for example, industrialization and urbanization in sub-Saharan African polities are effecting a change from matriliny to patriliny (see Goode, 1963, pp. 194–195).

It seems likely that ideological beliefs concerning the natures of men and women are socially constructed[17] (see Freeman, 1970) as labor and political patterns become institutionalized. The same biological attributes are variously interpreted in differing polities and times as capacity or disadvantage[18] or emphasized or minimized (Montagu, p. 19). The constellation of traits and behaviors incorporated in a particular gender role are then linked to the particular conceptualization of the biological natures of men and women (see Collins, pp. 12–16), and then tend to be self-fulfilling prophesies. A set of explanations, however, may also be altered or extended to account for changes in gender behaviors. Thus, also to use a contemporary example, in the Soviet Union it is now believed that women's nature especially befits them for being medical doctors (Safilios-Rothschild, p. 104).

The particular existential, economic, social and political considerations of a particular culture thus account for the meaning and emphasis given to physical differences (cf. de Beauvoir, p. 31). In those where a male ideology of physical superiority prevails—such as one where muscular strength is particularly valued—the fact that male mortality rates are greater at every chronological age is generally ignored. Montagu in *The Natural Superiority of Women* notes that it has also been overlooked that males are more subject to disorders and disease than women, e.g., the chromosomal constitution of women allows suppression of the hemophilia gene, color blindness and some sixty other disorders peculiar to males, double the number occurring among females (Montagu, pp. 76–78).

In recent times Freudian psychology, ethology and hormonal research have been utilized to substantiate the belief that women and men's natures account for their behavior in modern society and politics. Space limits an extensive discussion of the logic and scientific findings which refute or question this view. Psychologist Karen Horney (pp. 24–70) notes the male orientation of Freudian psychology as a point of departure and comparison for understanding the psychology and role of women (also de Beauvoir, pp. 33–47; Millett, pp. 177–210; see also Sherfey), and Weisstein has questioned the reliability and validity of the Freudian methodology. Ethological writing, in turn, has focussed on selected cases, ignoring or minimizing the extensive variations in family units and behavior related to particular ecologies of the non-human primate universe (Weisstein; Gough; cf. Tiger; also see Elaine Morgan, chap. 10). In contrast to the nonhuman primates', the human cerebral cortex confers the almost infinite variable characteristics of individual human responses and individual adaptability to environment, according to biologist Ramey. She also holds that there is psychologic sexual neutrality in humans at birth (Ramey, pp. 238–239). Moreover, the social situation affects hormonal levels, as is the case with levels of other secretions, such as adrenaline, rather than vice versa, and there are variations with age and individuals (pp. 243). In consequence Ramey (p. 244; cf. Bardwick) concludes that no psychic response is unique to women or men, despite attempts to construct a case to the contrary (p. 237).

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[17] See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1966).

[18] Galtung notes that the axioms of a theory shall be noncontradictory, i.e., "If it is possible to derive both H [a set of hypotheses] and $\overline{H}$ [an alternate set] from *A* [an axiom set], then *A* is said to be *contradictory,*" Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 463.

A critical question for political scientists it seems to me is not whether male or female biologies are superior or inferior in certain respects, nor how endocrines secrete, but rather: What variances, if any, in the political behavior of men and women may be attributed to biological factors? These linkages are to our knowledge presently unknown. A second area of relevance of the social theories and research presented in this section and throughout this essay perhaps lies in the processes by which they may modify or replace the old gender ideology and norms—and the political paradigms based on them—and in the concomitant impact on policy which would emancipate both men and women and facilitate wider participation in the polity. Third, one hopes that such explanations and research may serve to stimulate others to seek out empirical data which will further the description, understanding and explanation of the many facets of women's and men's political history, thought, and behavior which concern the discipline.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Spinoza's Philosophy of Law. By Gail Belaief. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1971. Pp. 151. $7.50.)

Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza devoted his brief lifetime (1632–1677) to a major reconstruction of philosophy in metaphysics, ethics, and politics. His importance was acknowledged during the seventeenth century, indeed while he was still alive, and subsequent philosophers have explored his work extensively. Relatively little attention, however, has been given to the passages scattered throughout his writings that pertain to the philosophy of law, even though within Spinoza's philosophy, law fulfills an important role in the development of human perfection understood, ultimately, as the intellectual love of God. Gail Belaief's monograph is therefore a welcome effort to expose Spinoza's philosophy of law in a systematic and critical manner and to demonstrate its implications in the solution of some of the theoretical problems with which current philosophers of law are concerned.

In the exposition of Spinoza's position, Professor Belaief has adopted a method of internal and logical analysis. The monograph is totally devoid of any indication of the historical background, circumstances, or influence of Spinoza's philosophy. Rather, given the author's intention, one is introduced to a logically formulated interpretation of the form and implications of Spinoza's doctrine itself as a viable alternative in current discussions of the understanding of law.

The monograph opens by distinguishing two senses of law in Spinoza's writings. In its wider sense, law means regularity of action; in its narrower and stricter sense, law means a plan of life established by man for himself or others with a certain end. With that distinction as a background, Belaief's primary focus in the bulk of the monograph is on the question of the relation between civil law and higher law, including in the latter category both natural law and moral law.

The first three chapters present exceedingly compact expositions of Spinoza's concepts of civil law, natural law, and what Belaief terms "moral law" to designate the principles in Spinoza's ethical theory relevant to the issue of civil law. Belaief attempts to hold the discussion of each of these concepts within the compass of legal theory, narrowly construed. Consequently, other dimensions of Spinoza's metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy are incorporated only insofar as they appertain to the basic question of the monograph. Thus, for instance, Spinoza's doctrine of man as governed largely by passions but destined for rationality and his justification of the principle of freedom of thought and speech are properly stressed in varying contexts. But the intricacy of his understanding of the relation between God and nature, the implications of his geometrical method, and his rendering of the character and perversions of various forms of government (which might be understood as a matter of fundamental law) are not given their full due. The result of the strictures within which the discussion is held is a highly disciplined, but also highly formalized and at times barren analysis.

In the fourth chapter, Belaief presents a critical correction of Spinoza's argument that there is an intrinsic connection between civil law and morality and that subjects have a moral obligation to obey civil law. Belaief contends that on the basis of Spinoza's own principles, a legal system may at the same time be valid but violate the moral law and that therefore legal obligation and moral obligation are logically distinct. The contention is attractive and plausible, even if not fully convincing.

The final chapter is perhaps the most creative. In schematic fashion, it outlines the location of Spinoza's legal thought on a set of six perennial problems in the philosophy of law, such problems as the grounds for the evaluation of civil law, the source of law, principles of judicial interpretation, limits to the sphere of legal jurisdiction, the purposes of law, and legal obligation.

The monograph concludes with two appendices. The first, on "The Classical Doctrine of Natural Law," is not terribly useful, although it is part of Belaief's often reiterated point that Spinoza's notion of natural law radically diverges from the classical and medieval traditions. The second appendix contains the Latin texts of some of the more important passages from Spinoza translated in the body of the monograph itself.

Belaief's effort to demonstrate the continued significance of Spinoza's concept of law is admirable and worthy of attention even if it is too limited to do full justice to Spinoza's thought in the area of law and morality and far too expensive for its length.

DOUGLAS STURM

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Toward a Critical Sociology. By Norman Birnbaum. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 450. $3.50, paper.)

Norman Birnbaum is a publicist, combining academic and journalistic roles, who addresses himself to basic political and social issues and to the politics of his academic peers. In the nineteen-fifties and early 'sixties, when he lived in Europe, he was among the few Americans up-to-date on the course of Critical Theory in Germany and Marxist trends in England and France. The seventeen essays, articles and reports reprinted here are meant to stand "as records of the intellectual situation" between 1954 and 1970 and also as evidence for the author's deserved claim to be recognized as one of the earliest critics of Parsonian functionalism and as one of the oldest men of the New Left. Birnbaum concedes the unevenness of the selections. Some are unduly dated because they are in the nature of a review of then current events, which might and do look different today. Younger readers, to whom the author wants particularly to appeal, could have profited from a re-evaluation explaining the significance of certain events and developments in the light of his own hindsight.

The chapters deal with (1) the state of the nation: England from the late 'forties to the early 'sixties; the counterculture, knowledge elite, and "post-industrialism" of the U.S.; (2) the state of the literature: the treatment of ideology from 1940 to 1960; (3) the state of the profession: the resistance to sociology in the old English centers of learning before the 'sixties; the meetings of the International Sociological Association in 1956 and 1970; (4) the state of mind of David Riesman —liberal pluralism—and of Robert Nisbet— conservative sociology; (5) the state of Marxism in East and West. For reasons of space and mental economy I shall select three dimensions of the collection: the relationship between religion and capitalism, the crisis of Marxism, and the author's notion of critical sociology.

In view of the continued topical relevancy of "religion and capitalism," the volume's only piece of historical research, "The Zwinglian Reformation in Zurich" (1959), warrants special attention. As the author sees it in retrospect, the essay "argues for the capitalist origins of early Protestantism" (p. vii), but a close reading reveals that he promises more than he is ready to deliver. Birnbaum is too prudent a scholar to advance a primarily economic interpretation and in fact does not disagree with Max Weber's multicausal view. He tries to identify the economic and political interests which came to be allied to Zwingli's religious cause, and concludes that the Reformation in Zurich "entailed an alliance of a new mercantile and productive elite with a large group of lesser artisans, against the patricians (mercenaries and rentiers) and certain artisans, very possibly concentrated in the more traditional sectors of the economy" (p. 153). This sounds plausible, but the evidence adduced, especially lists of a few dozen prominent supporters and opponents of Zwinglianism, is less "reasonably clear" to me than to Birnbaum, who himself tones down his conclusions with qualifying phrases. The social composition and occupational makeup of the guilds is not clearly presented, and hence the kind of capitalist characteristics they may have had is not sufficiently elucidated. The relationship between technology, capitalist organization and relative freedom from guild traditionalism remains moot. If some guilds and trades were indeed less tradition-bound because of their fairly recent establishment or reorganization, does support for Zwingli's reformation on the part of some of their leaders and members constitute prima facie evidence for an attitudinal predisposition or elective affinity? As in so many revolutionary situations, it seems to have been only a minority, in this case of guild masters and council members, who were fully engaged by the religious issue: "The others are sick of the matter," as one council member put it (p. 153). The Zurich Reformation, then, may be said to have resulted from an amalgam of religious virtuosity, status preoccupations, economic interests and *raison d'état*. The very republicanism of a city run by its factious upper strata made it likely that the Reformation, short of a successful social revolution, would be channeled into the establishment of a state church controlled by the city council, and neither this development nor the theology of Zwingli, who was primarily a religious virtuoso, can be reduced to "capitalist origins."

In fact, the author himself perceives, and by his reflections contributes to, "the crisis in Marxist sociology"—the title of a 1968 essay, which advocates the transformation and transcendence of categories such as base and superstructure (cf. p. 111); and later he warns the young critics of high culture and the university that "cultural forms are never the direct result of social process" (p. 411). His concern with a critical transcendence of Marxism made Birnbaum act for years as a kind of broker between writers in East and West. Several of his travel and conference reports describe the emergence and incipient decline of an East European intelligentsia similar to its western counterpart in its dissatisfaction with material progress alone, whether capitalist or socialist ("goulash communism"). In the meantime, this decline has become precipitous not only in Poland and Czechoslovakia but also in Hungary and even Yugoslavia—witness the expulsion of three sociologists and philosophers from the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on May 14, 1973 and their dismissal from professional positions, together with four nonparty philosophers, and witness also the gradual re-establishment of party authority over the University of Belgrade (as reported in *The New York Review of Books*, Feb. 7, 1974).

This course of events leads me, finally, to some observations on the fortunes of critical sociology. Within the state-socialist realm the adoption of views similar to those of western liberal social scientists or of their leftwing critics inevitably appears as a "critical sociology," a challenge to the powers-that-be, which sooner or later makes a repressive reaction likely. As the Hungarian Central Committee saw it, the ideological deviation committed by the seven writers was the "pluralization in Marxism-Leninism," made doubly heinous in that they mixed a "rightist-revisionist platform" with "concepts from neo-leftist western ideas alien to socialism" (cf. Radio Free Europe, *Hungarian Press Survey* No. 2309). For the near future at least such critical sociology will be highly circumscribed in these countries. In the West one ambiguous source of support for critical sociology has also lost ground. Birnbaum's collection does not reflect yet another "end of ideology," the waning of the recent academic rebellion. His last essays were written at the height of the student rebellion, but while taking a sympathetic attitude toward its intentions or felt causes, he was quite skeptical of some of its major manifestations, such as its "almost barbarian disregard for what is positive in the legacy of the past" (p. 410), its inability to recognize that the university must be a protected space in which a critical culture can develop, and its failure to understand that "the counter-culture movement does not constitute a substitute for a socialist politics in America" (p. 387). What, then, makes the author's critical sociology different from ours? He assures us that he has a "critical intention with respect to society" (p. vi), but this attitude does not seem to be decisive for the quality and tenability of his analytical points. Maybe he wishes harder than most of us that American social science and society were different and better, but almost all social scientists seem to have plenty of good intentions as well as many dissatisfactions. And good intentions alone are not a precondition for scholarship, which is inherently and irreducibly critical if it truthfully follows its own canons.

GUENTHER ROTH

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Politics in Science. By Marlen Blissett. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. Pp. 229. $4.25, paper.)

Marlen Blissett's Book, *Politics in Science*, is full of ideas and questions. Its "major purpose," as Blissett states in his very first sentence, "is to uncover the political techniques the scientific community utilizes in focusing and coordinating its research." But the book goes much farther, as it has to. For the criteria and system by which scientists make choices about their research are increasingly affected by the configurations of power in the broader political system within which they work. And to go even farther, in the United States (and undoubtedly more generally in all industrialized countries), the political system itself is in a state of transformation. Having already shifted, according to Professor Blissett, from a liberal to a bureaucratic model, it now is moving toward a "post-industrial" model. Through each transformation, the autonomy of science—and thus the capacity of scientists to make their own decisions about their work—becomes increasingly weakened *unless* (and this has all kinds of implications) they become a political force of their own. But here, like paradox or (for some) tragedy, political activism can tend to weaken professional autonomy even more. There is no return to paradise.

Blissett builds his analysis on the broad literature that has emerged on science and society, particularly in the last twenty years. He makes frequent reference to Kuhn and uses Sheldon Wolin's concept of "political space" as a way of looking at the distances and relations between science and the state. From Wolin, he moves forward with the writings of Michael Polanyi, Alvin Weinberg, Don K. Price, and Stephen Toulmin, using each to illustrate a different model of those relations along a spectrum from Polanyi's view of science as an autonomous profession to Toulmin's view of science as enmeshed in the power relations of society. For Blissett, it is Toulmin's view which comes closest to unfolding the situation of science in the "post-industrial state," though Blissett's analysis of the "post-industrial state" at the very end of his book is brief and incomplete since, by his own admission, "it may be hazardous to speculate about an uncompleted development." Indeed, the very term, "post-industrial state," which we all have borrowed and use, shows up the poverty, or temerity, of our analytical capacities; it tells us where we have been, but not where we are going.

Blissett also depends on the results of a questionnaire submitted to a broad range of scientists on their perceptions of their disciplines and professional communities, and on depth interviews with a smaller sample. The responses are used to reinforce the analysis throughout the book and are partially summarized in a series of useful charts, included in the appendices with the questionnaire and a note on research design and methodology. Blissett, moreover, invites his readers to write to him should they wish further data from the responses to the questionnaire. What he provides, however, already indicates the dilemma that scientists realize they are in: a deep attachment to professional autonomy, but a foreboding sense of its vulnerability.

Don K. Price's early book, *Government and Science*, gave many political scientists their first set of intellectual tools to deal with the political implications of science and technology that weighed on our minds from the time the awesome consequences of the wartime Manhattan project became public knowledge. Since then, a widening band of teachers and researchers has grappled with the increased complexities of a science- and technology-based polity. Blissett helps carry on the inquiry. He begins most especially to identify the linkages between his major questions about "politics in science" and the growing questions about "science in politics." Science and politics are now intimately entangled; let there be no question. But there is for all, and not only for scientists, an irreparable loss if this entanglement completely destroys the autonomy of science. Blissett makes no judgment; but his analysis underscores the problem—and the danger.

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Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology. By H. H. Bruun. (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1972. Pp. ix, 300. 62.10 Danish Kr. [$9.00].)

Max Weber's strategic demand for "value-freedom" and "objectivity" in sociocultural and historical sciences has been the focus of unceasing controversy, bitter polemic, and political, philosophical, and methodological misunderstandings ever since its publication in 1904. The depth, intensity, and persistence of these misunderstandings is evident from even a cursory review of recent critiques of the presumed implications of Weber's position, critiques in which we encounter such typical and recurrent arguments as the following:

(1) Weber's demand for a "value-free" social science is a politically pernicious positivism. "Value-free" explanations have the effect of legitimating the events they purport to "explain" by excluding critical judgments, and by hindering perceptions of the self-contradictions immanent in all historical sociocultural processes.

(2) "Value-freedom" is a logical absurdity, for no one can engage in social or historical inquiry without some commitment to value. Better an open and explicit acknowledgment of values than illusion, pretense, or political humbug disguised as "neutrality."

(3) A "value-free" social science is a prescription for a sterile social science because it would block cognitive access to the constitutive moral dimensions of sociocultural objects and realities. All historical sociocultural objects are constituted by value orientations, moral commitments, and life directions psychoculturally immanent within the concrete histories of political communities, socioeconomic institutions, religious movements, and cultural productions.

(4) "Value-freedom" is the ideology of a technocratic, managerial, and instrumentalized scientism. It is the expression of a functionalized "one-dimensional" mode of "rationalism" that negates all possibility of a humanistic critique of taken-for-granted social and political goals.

(5) "Value-freedom" is a transparent attempt to legitimate the opportunistic accommodation of social and political theorists to the dominant class and de facto power structures of society.

(6) "Value-freedom" encourages a nihilistic "decisionism" that divorces moral and political judgments from historical experiences, natural realities, and cultural, social, and religious traditions for the sake of atemporal, capricious acts of political will.

(7) As an alternative, there are many contemporary social and political theorists who champion modes of "reason," cognitive presuppositions, and traditions of inquiry which (it is alleged) promise to declare universally and unambiguously to the consciences of all "rational" men of "good will" the true basis of valid critical judgment and moral consensus. These alternatives (e.g., "natural law," "philosophical anthropology," "dialectics," "emancipatory or critical reason," "biocentric ecology," "linguistic universality," "cybernetic culturology," "analog rationality," "Platonic realism," "rational contractual egalitarianism," "true community" or "fraternity," etc.), are presumed to be incompatible with "value-freedom."

One of the merits of Dr. Bruun's new study of the relations of "values" to "science" in Weber's methodological essays, is the clear implication that the consequences imputed to Weber in the above arguments, are not logically entailed by Weber's concept of "value-freedom." Dr. Bruun's book, despite several limitations—an emphasis upon exegetical exposition rather than systematic critique, and the deliberate neglect of Weber's sociological works—is the most thorough and scrupulously close textual analysis of Weber's notion of "value-freedom" and its cognate ideas now available. The five chapters of Dr. Bruun's book are titled: (1) "Values as a problem of scientific inquiry: value freedom"; (2) "Values as a precondition of scientific inquiry: value relation"; (3) "Values as an object of scientific inquiry: value analysis"; (4) "Values as an instrument of scientific inquiry: the ideal type"; and (5) "The complementary relation of values and scientific inquiry: politics and science." Dr. Bruun's close textual analyses, and citations from Weber's unpublished letters and manuscripts establish that Weber was neither an apologist nor an advocate of narrow positivism, nihilistic decisionism, or technocratic scientism. Weber's mode of value analysis was intended to turn the light of logical and empirical causal analysis upon taken-for-granted social conventions, political and religious dogma, and cultural presuppositions.

As Dr. Bruun notes, Weber's assertion of a logical gap—a dualism between the heterogeneous realms of "is" and "ought"—was an attempt to distinguish between empirically demonstrable "fact" and concrete value "preference." But "value-freedom" ("*Wertfreiheit*")—the denial that *practical* value judgments (i.e., expressions of concrete preferences) were obligatory for social scientists in "empirical" (not "policy") sciences—was a misleading term; for "a 'wertfrei' science is *not* free from all value elements" (Bruun, p. 16). It should more accurately have been called "freedom from value judgment" ("*Werturteilsfreiheit*"), for Weber did not intend to exclude "values" either as the object of study or as a precondition of empirical social science (Bruun, p. 16). Weber's tactical demand for "value freedom" was iconoclastic, not opportunistic. It was not an argument for moral indifference, but—in the historical context of an intensely nationalistic German educational and cultural establishment (where Weber himself was a nationalist)—it was devised to encourage the emergence of neutralized sociocultural spaces; in these "thought zones" theoretical interests might flourish, at a culturally legitimated distance from the immediacies of subjective passion, political or religious pressures, and institutionalized dogma.

From Dr. Bruun's careful reconstruction of Weber's complex argument it is evident that many critics who regard Weber's move towards logical clarification as unacceptable on either theoretical or moral political grounds, have usually overlooked the heuristic location of "value-freedom" within Weber's comprehensive subtle research strategy, by means of which, "values"—at several levels of theoretical sublimation—were incorporated *heuristically* (but not "practically") into the search for "objective" empirical truths. One source of the distinction between the "practical" and the "heuristic" (a distinction contested by some) is traced by Dr. Bruun to a previously unpublished letter to Rickert (June 14, 1904) in which Weber wrote: "*Ihre Zustimmung zu dem Gedanken des 'Idealtypus' erfreut mich sehr. In der That halte ich eine ähnliche Categorie für notwendig, um 'werthendes' und 'wertbeziehendes' Urteil scheiden zu können*" (cited in Bruun, p. 207). The evolution in Weber, from the language of "immediate" or practical evaluation to the "contemplative" language of "value relevance" ("Wertbeziehung") and "ideal type" (see p. 158 of Weber's *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, New York: Free Press, 1949), represented a conceptual shift from levels of immediate dogmatic affirmation to modes of theoretical heuristic intentionality. Nonetheless Weber insisted that a researcher's cultural sensitivity to values was indispensable. It was likely to prove fruitful precisely when one was able to sublimate the most deeply felt value concerns (but not repudiate them!) for the sake of a theoretically mediated causal analysis of culturally "significant"—that is, value-saturated—historical objects (e.g., "the Protestant ethic," "Faust," "Germany," etc.).

Dr. Bruun has chosen to ignore the relationship of Weber's value-analytic and ideal-type methodology to his mature sociology. Instead Bruun emphasizes the "complementary" relations of science to politics in Weber, and argues that the demand for "value-freedom" was primarily "indebted to a growing awareness of the importance of values other than science" (Bruun, p. 76). Weber, however, was always aware of the "polytheism of values." When Weber moved strategically towards "value-freedom" in 1904 it was to break through the stultifying methodological dualisms, restricted epistemological horizons, and value parochialisms of German historicism. Weber remarks in his essay on Eduard Meyer that a proper value analysis would have to become causal-historical in order to fully comprehend ideal value-objects.

From the perspective of Weber's mature sociological works, "value-freedom" was a cognitive precondition for the development of a polycentric comparative historical sociology. It was a tactical move in his effort to transcend cultural parochialism; to combine historical with sociological studies in a new way. Weber's value analysis ultimately resulted in the invention of differential sociological typologies (e.g., *Economy and Society*) appropriate for the depth-historical comparison of plural societies, conflicting cultures, and radically diverse civilizations.

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Ferdinand Toennies on Sociology: Pure, Applied and Empirical. Selected Writings. Edited with an Introduction by Werner J. Cahnmann and Rudolf Heberle. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. 351. $13.50.)

This volume presents a selection of largely new translations from Ferdinand Toennies's sociological work. Oriented especially to a clarification of the conceptual background of the key notions found in Toennies's renowned *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, it offers, for English reading audiences, a first full account from Toennies's own hand of his systematic perspective.

A large portion of the book is devoted to translations which present Toennies's "pure sociology" and its related applications. In addition to four immensely compact statements of his basic concepts in Part II ("The Elaboration of Concepts"), Part III contains a full discussion of his pure sociological concepts of social entities, values, norms, law, social institutions, and the "effectiveness of factors" in social structure. Extensive selections from Toennies's *Einfuehrung in die Soziologie* (1931) are especially in evidence here. "Empirical" and "applied" sociology—the other two divisions of Toennies's "special sociology"—receive less attention. Indeed, the mere dozen pages on "empirical" sociology appear almost gratuitous in the overall context of the volume. The selections from Toennies's "applied" sociology—in the editors' words, that part of his sociology which "applies the static concepts of pure sociology to the dynamic processes of history" (p. xi)—deal with "The Power and Value of Public Opinion," "Historicism, Rationalism, and the Industrial System," "The Individual and the World in the Modern Age," and "The Active Forces of Social Development in the Modern Age."

The first part of the volume, which the editors have entitled "Formation of Concepts," offers fascinating selections from Toennies's discussions both of his own intellectual background and of the origin and development of sociological conceptualization. Here, a revealing autobiographical statement ("My Relation to Sociology"), containing much helpful information about the influence on Toennies of such writers as Otto Gierke, Henry Sumner Maine, Karl Marx, Jacob Burckhardt, and others, is coupled with the prefaces to the two editions of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* as well as excerpts from his various works on Hobbes. These last—regrettably brief—pages on Hobbes are perhaps the most penetrating of the volume and reveal Toennies in one of his strongest roles—as an interpreter of the history and systematics of sociological concepts in early modern political and social thought. Indeed, his eminence in this area has too often been neglected.

Toennies's early philosophical studies came to fullest fruition in his investigations into Hobbes's work, especially "his writings about the philosophy of law and government" (p. 3), and resulted in the publication of two of that author's major works on political theory under Toennies's editorship and the completion of a lengthy study of Hobbes's life and work. These early studies remained with Toennies and left their imprint on the questions which occupied his subsequent sociological efforts as well as on the modes of conceptualization evidenced in those later writings. Although Cahnmann and Heberle have done well to remind us that Toennies was a foremost Hobbes scholar and a co-founder and first President of the *Societas Hobbesiana*, readers might have hoped for even fuller selections from Toennies's work on Hobbes and the background of modern social theory in the central political, juridical, and philosophical debates of the early modern period.

The editors might also have stressed more directly that Toennies was a largely forgotten pioneer in the analysis of "philosophical terminology," a field which was to become in various forms central to twentieth-century philosophy. Unhappily, they chose not to include a selection from Toennies's book-length Welby Prize Essay of 1898 on that topic.

Indeed, from both these perspectives, the volume appears lacking in appropriate balance. Toennies's alleged "influence" upon later sociologists and his "anticipation" of their concepts, methods, and findings tend to be emphasized at the expense of selections featuring areas where he did some of his most effective and still illuminating work and was in many respects more truly a pioneer.

The differences—as well as the similarities—between Toennies and other sociocultural analysts of his time, notably Max Weber, also require appropriate emphasis; indeed, they become especially evident in the final essays of the book ("Applied Sociology"), which present Toennies's views on the central political, economic, and sociocultural transitions involved in the origins of "modernity." Despite the editors' fitting emphasis (p. 37) on Toennies's methodological foreshadowing of Weber, the latter's use of "ideal type" concepts occurred more in connection with depth-historical, comparative investigations into axial social and cultural processes in the transformations of complex societies in East and West and was carefully circumscribed by the particularity and multiplicity of histories under consideration. This sense of historical variety and complexity is far less evident in Toennies's more philosophical, historical (and rather schematic) rendering of these basic transitions and movements. In this connection, it is worth noting Toennies's frequent recourse to "historical materialism" for explanatory modes in accounting for concrete historical events and processes.

On such questions, however, readers must be content to anticipate the editors' companion volume which promises to contain more systematic comparisons—absent in these pages—between Toennies's writings and those of Marx, Weber, Simmel, Durkheim and others who broke new ground in the analysis of sociocultural process. Until then, the present—most welcome and excellent—translations offer the fullest statement in English of Toennies's conceptual system and are thus indispensible for readers wishing a fuller picture of the foundations of that author's axial notions of *Gemeinschaft*, *Gesellschaft*, and the fundamental forms of human will.

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Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters. (New York: Anchor Books. 1972. Pp. ix, 505. $2.50.)

Nine essays on Hobbes, nine on Rousseau, and one linking essay, make up this volume in a "Modern Studies in Philosophy" series. Seven of the essays were written especially for it, the rest are from journals or books published mostly within the last few years. One expects some unevenness in any such collection, and one finds it here—not as between the published and the commissioned essays, nor as between those by established scholars and those by younger ones (which is not quite the same classification), but as between those on Hobbes and those on Rousseau. This unevenness is not a difference in quality, which is on the whole excellent in both, but in the writers' approach and, consequently, in the constituency they will interest. The papers on Hobbes, though not all by professional philosophers, are, with a few notable exceptions, more technically philosophic analyses, devoted to narrower points, and less rewarding for nonphilosophers, than are the papers on Rousseau (none of which are by philosophers). So the Rousseau papers will probably be more welcome to the political theorist.

Of the already published papers, those on Rousseau are by Leo Strauss (1947), Judith Shklar (1964), Bertrand de Jouvenel (1964), Roger Masters (1965, now first published in English), John Plamenatz (1965), and John McManners (1967); some of these are already classics, and it is good to have all of them in this handy form. The new essays on Rousseau are welcome additions. William Pickles gives us new insights by examining Rousseau's attitude toward time. He considers first the question how far Rousseau was a radical and how far a traditionalist, and comes down in favor of his traditionalism. Yet he shows that Rousseau also accepted the inevitability of change, most of it for the worse. Man is good, men are bad. The pessimism about men, and any institutions they are capable of setting up and running, is consistent with the traditionalism. Rousseau's traditionalism is simply making the best of a bad job; men, having failed at the emergence of civil society to steer away from the moral decline which was not then inevitable but optional, must now be content to put up with what they have got, or at least amend their institutions only slowly. The argument is persuasive, though one might ask if it makes enough allowance for the implied position of the *Social Contract* that the General Will might rule if three stipulations were met (a moderate equality of property, the prohibition or offsetting of private associations, and the moral transformation of the people by the charismatic Legislator), and for the outright assertion there that "the moment the government usurps the sovereignty, the social compact is broken, and all private citizens recover by right their natural liberty, and are forced, but not bound to obey." Depending on the weight one puts on "are forced" and on "not bound," this is pessimism or incitement to revolution. Pickles argues finally that the time dimension in the *Social Contract* is the source of some of the perennial difficulties of that work, the fault being in Rousseau's having cast into a temporal sequence what is essentially an abstract moral argument.

Ronald Grimsley brings together and finds a consistency in Rousseau's varied reflections on happiness, which at first sight seem far from consistent. As seeker of happiness Rousseau is often an escapist, retreating to Nature, to reverie, to minutely shared intimacy—yet he is a believer in a benign harmonious universal order. Grimsley finds an intellectual consistency here, without exploring its possible social roots. Could it be that both these positions are reflections of Rousseau's *petit-bourgeois* consciousness? A similar question might be raised about John Charvet's study of individual identity and social consciousness in Rousseau's philosophy. The contrast between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* is plain: the former is dominant in the first stage of the state of nature when by hypothesis a man is incapable of comparing himself with others, the latter (which consists in such comparison) comes only at the later stage of already somewhat social savage existence. But why did Rousseau extrapolate backward from a savage society (for which there was some evidence) to an utterly unlikely condition when individuals were so unaware of each other as to be incapable of making comparisons? The question is not asked, but the answer might be that it was required as the logical starting point for a *petit-bourgeois* vision of the good man and the good society.

The already published papers on Hobbes include Brian Barry's incisive criticism of Warrender and his critics (1968), and Quentin Skinner's classic paper (1966, but now in an "abbreviated and much altered version") decisively refuting the common view that Hobbes's works were uninfluential in his own time, and showing the absurdity of the Taylor-Warrender-Hood view that Hobbes's political obligation was based on a traditional doctrine of natural law; they also include pieces by Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel (1957), J. W. N. Watkins (1965), W. H. Greenleaf (1969) and K. R. Minogue (1969).

Of the three new papers on Hobbes, two will be of interest primarily to philosophers. Ronald Hepburn offers a new view of the role of God in Hobbes's philosophy, which gives new weight to the view that Hobbes's theology cannot serve as a grounding for his moral and political theory. S. I. Benn, minutely analysing Hobbes's position on power (not *potestas* but *potentia*, power not as a right by which men control others, but as possibility, natural faculty, or *de facto* control), demonstrates some inconsistency between the accounts given in *De Corpore* and in *Leviathan* and some other works.

The other new essay in the Hobbes section will be of more interest to political theorists, and may be allowed somewhat longer comment here. William Letwin has devoted twenty pages to arguing that three of the present reviewer's theses about Hobbes are mistaken. The inadequacy of Letwin's case can be indicated in less space. The three theses are: (1) that England in 1650 was essentially a bourgeois market society; (2) that Hobbes's model of society approximates most nearly to such a society; (3) that his prescription of a self-perpetuating sovereign, which made his full doctrine unacceptable to the bourgeoisie, was the result of his failure to see the centripetal force of a cohesive bourgeois class.

On (1), Letwin apparently has not understood and so has misstated my argument from models. I did not argue, as he asserts (p. 145) that England *must have been* a bourgeois (or capitalist) market society *because* it was not either of my other two models: I argued that it was essentially a bourgeois market society because the historical evidence, especially of the extent of the wage relation, brought it into conformity with the main stipulations of the received ideal-type of capitalism (chiefly, that labor is a commodity). Letwin then proceeds to attack my model of that society by examining the attributes I set out, (incidentally reducing my eight to five and leaving out the most important one). He ridicules two of them (factual inequality and inequality of desire) by pointing out that these are characteristic of any known society. Of course they are. I did not "decline to include" (p. 146) either kind of inequality in my other models (customary or status society, and simple market society) nor would any reader who understood the use of the models be "left to infer" that inequality is an essential property only of the bourgeois model (p. 146). Those inequalities were stipulated specifically only in the bourgeois model because only there, where they are for the first time combined with labor being a commodity, and with land and resources being fully marketable, do they become operative factors in the development of the new society.

Two other attributes—that all men are rational maximizers, and that contracts are enforced—are ridiculed (pp. 149–51) on the ground that the desire to maximize, while "probably increasing during the 17th century," had been growing for centuries before then, and that contracts are as old as history. Similarly with the wage relation: Letwin is prepared to grant that about half the men were full-time wage earners, but says "the magnitude of the labour force shows that the phenomenon was not, as Macpherson implies [*sic*], new" and cites evidence of wage legislation in the 14th century. Of course there were some maximizers, some contracts, and some wage earners before the 17th century, but unless one is to say that there is no difference between feudal and capitalist society one must surely go by the measure in which they became prevalent.

As to the second thesis (that Hobbes's model of society was substantially the capitalist market model), Letwin's argument is noticeably thin. He tries to explain away Hobbes's recognition that labor is a commodity, and his scorn for commutative justice, by arguing that his statements to that effect should not be taken out of a very narrow context. He does not attempt to deal with the other evidence, such as Hobbes's dismissal of distributive justice, his views on taxation, and his analysis of changing society in *Behemoth*.

Finally, on the third thesis, Letwin has simply failed to grasp my point that the bourgeoisie would have no objection to an all-powerful sovereign body if they *were* that body, that is, if they as a class controlled Parliament (which would, as I said, make them, not Parliament, the sovereign). This failure is perhaps attributable to his belief that "there was no such thing" as "the bourgeoisie as a class" (p. 159), a belief natural enough to one who sees no substantial difference between the extent of capitalist relations in Hobbes's time and in the preceding centuries.

One may say, as a general rule, that when Letwin fails to understand the argument he imputes a different argument which he is easily able to shoot down. Readers familiar with the three theses will know how imputational and inaccurate Letwin's criticisms are; for others, it seems proper to put some inkling of the position on the record.

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In Defence of Politics, second edition. By Bernard Crick. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972. Pp. 204. $7.00, cloth; $2.25, paper.)

The first edition of this book appeared in 1962. In 1964, a Pelican edition appeared, with minor revisions and the addition of an appendix entitled "A Footnote to Rally the Academic Professors of Politics." The present edition is a reissue of that revised edition (with a somewhat expanded Preface).

In the Preface to the first edition Bernard Crick wrote that his essay was " 'occasioned'—in the words of Hobbes—'by the disorders of the present time'." If any of those disorders have ceased, one suspects they have been more than replaced by new ones; hence a defense of politics is certainly as needed now as it was then. The tendency is widespread to begin by rejecting politics as usual and to end up rejecting politics as a whole.

Crick defends politics by giving it a precise meaning narrower than is customary: it is "the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community" (p. 22). For politics in this sense to exist, public order must exist already. Crick distinguishes political rule from the establishing of public order, the exercise of sovereignty, the creation of a new state by a prince. Such extreme actions are needed to provide the conditions for politics, but politics itself then has a fundamentally different character, above all from the observance of restraints and limitations on action. Political rule is distinguished from autocracy and tyranny, as well as from modern totalitarianism; it is, in short, republican government or mixed regime.

In the bulk of this book Crick defends politics against two sorts of people. First there are totalitarian ideologues, democrats in the Aristotelian sense, nationalists, and technocrats, who are all opposed in some fundamental way to the political manner of acting. Second, there are those who usually favor politics but whose characteristic attitude or impatience sometimes makes them hostile to it: nonpolitical conservatives, apolitical liberals, and antipolitical socialists.

One wonders how best to describe the foundation on which Crick's prudent and moderate acceptance of politics in its complexity and with its necessary limits rests, while others either habitually or at least occasionally are carried to excess. His prudence and moderation remind one of Aristotle. Crick begins and ends his book (not counting the more academic "Footnote . . . " added to the revised edition) with Aristotle—with Aristotle's assertion, against the Socratic paradox that the perfection of the *polis* is its unity, that the *polis* is an aggregate of many (and differing) members. And he frequently refers approvingly to other important Aristotelian assertions, for example about politics as the master science (p. 106 and elsewhere) and about democracy (pp. 66–7). Yet Crick differs from Aristotle in some fundamental respects. First, he does not want to argue that good political practice must aim at the common good or be guided by a consensus on fundamentals. Such notions are rejected as pretentious claims, unnecessary extrapolitical "spiritual adhesive" or "metaphysical cement"; the real good is the activity of politics itself, the preservation of the political way of ruling (pp. 24 and 181). Second, although Aristotle like Crick asserts that some goods transcend the realm of politics, Crick does not investigate precisely what they are; one supposes they must arise somehow from the personal identity, absolute personality, and human autonomy of the individual (pp. 51–56 and 181). Third, whereas Aristotle asserts that the political association is the sovereign association, which aims at the comprehensive good of man, Crick stresses the limits on the aims of politics and usually emphasizes the low or basic concern of politics with survival; when he speaks of the further purposes of politics, his usual intention seems to be to point out the variety of such purposes and the crucial importance of proceeding in a political manner (pp. 24–5), that is, one in which retreat and compromise remain always open (p. 151).

Accordingly, Crick is closer to being a pluralist liberal than an Aristotelian. He agrees with liberals that politics should be limited in scope; "True politics cannot treat *everything* in political terms" (p. 42). He finds it necessary, however, to leave politics enough flexibility to deal effectively with unforeseeable circumstances; hence he rejects the characteristic liberal attempt "to try to remove definite spheres of human activity from any possibility of political intervention or influence" (p. 133). And his politics is a version of pluralism (p. 176n.), but unlike some pluralists he gives prominence to the fact that "Politics embodies an ethic and a conscious purpose which cannot be reduced to sociology" (p. 177). Politics requires a recognition of restraints (p. 21—the attempted distinction between moral and prudential recognition fails), a will in the governing elite to act politically (p. 180). The (moral) choice of politics needs to be backed up truculently. "For it is, after all, too kind (indeed perverse) to respect the morality and wisdom of any who, when politics is possible, refuse to act politically" (p. 31).

Crick's praise of moderation is admirable in many ways: it is presented with considerable clarity, admirable brevity, frequent felicity of expression, and wit. One cannot help fearing, however, that it fails to meet the most radical critiques of politics. Crick asserts that there are human ends higher than politics; he argues that politics cannot attain them, but can provide the necessary conditions for striving for them (pp. 156 and 159). But why might these ends not justify violating the limits on action that characterize Crick's politics?

One could meet this objection by showing that these higher ends cannot be attained by such actions (as Plato does in the *Republic*). Or one could make a kind of Kantian argument that the (moral) principle on which limited politics rests is the foundation of any genuinely human good. Crick seems to take such a position when he asserts that a "consensus about individual human autonomy . . . is the presupposition of *any* possible ethical system" (p. 181). However, aside from the fact that this view resembles the "metaphysical cement" that seemed undesirable to him earlier in the book, he does not try to argue for this position or to investigate whether it would not undermine the political prudence that he is rightly concerned to defend. (For this reason, among others, Aristotle does not make "individual human autonomy" the presupposition of his ethical-political teaching.) Or, finally, one could argue that limited and liberal politics achieves the common good of the society better than any alternatives past or present; to do this effectively one would need to compare the whole way of life to which this politics leads with the alternatives, as Montesquieu does. Crick seems to agree with this view, but not to make the argument, on account of a reluctance to specify the common good and the whole way of life of a society. He rightly fears that such notions can be used in partisan, extremist, and even totalitarian ways. But the adequate defense of politics against its deepest critics may require thorough investigation along such possibly dangerous lines. And as Crick says in another, but related, connection, it is not a very safe world anyhow (p. 28).

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Société et Politique: La vie des Groupes. Tome premier: Fondements de la Société Libérale. Tome second: Dynamique de la Société Libérale. By Léon Dion. (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université de Laval, 1971, 1972. Pp. 444 and 616. No price indicated.)

Pluralismus: Konzeptionen und Kontroversen. Edited by Franz Nuscheler and Winfried Steffani, (München: R. Piper & Co., 1972, Pp. 345. No price indicated.)

Pluralismus zwischen Liberalismus und Sozialismus. By Rainer Eisfeld. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1972. Pp. 195. No price indicated.)

These are important contributions to the discussion about the political structure of post-capitalist society. Their particular value to us lies in their critical re-evaluation of American controversies and findings which the authors and editors are able to view from a different historical experience and against a variety of intellectual traditions, half forgotten or little known in the United States.

While Professor Dion's central theme is the analysis of group influence in the political process, his massive volumes encompass far more than the works by Truman, Key and others. Like Jean Meynaud, Almond, and Eckstein, he searches for a framework which would help order data and make interest group studies more truly comparative. While he too despairs of a "group theory of politics" he nonetheless finds that Easton's systems analysis, especially in its later refined versions, supplemented by some of the concepts of communications theory, is excellently suited for the study of groups. To the French reader Dion's elegant and faithful summary (supplemented by a series of original and clarifying graphs) of the systems theory will be highly profitable. What appears more doubtful to me is whether the author has really shown that the systemic approach looses its abstractness and gains in explanatory power when used for an analysis of the formation, the activities, and the general role of interest groups in the political process. Where Dion engages in the comparison of the impact on groups of political cultures, of traditional or of innovating attitudes and ideologies, he systematizes usefully existing knowledge and occasionally adds to it. (One might regret that the author, Québec's leading political scientist, draws relatively little on Canadian material.) But where he seeks to filter the dynamic relationship between groups and society through a rigorous systems analysis, he does not avoid the pitfalls he criticises in others: his modeling is often abstract and his concepts tautological.

But however one wishes to evaluate its relative success or failure in the general field of theory building, this is not the main purpose of the book or the principal concern of its author. What he furnishes is an up-to-date synopsis and broad-gauged discussion of all major problems faced by pluralist democracies and an extensive review of the literature pertaining to analytical as well as to normative pluralism. The footnotes and a systematic bibliography (of 90 pages!) are almost too rich and hence confusing. To be sure his critical review of the existing literature is not only complete; it is also eminently fair. Yet, just because the book will serve both as a basis for future discussions and a useful working tool, it would profit from a thorough editing that should eliminate at the very least repetitions not only of quotations, but also of tables and other materials that appear in both volumes.

The problems of representation and of participation are central to the consideration of what Professor Dion calls the "dynamics" of modern society. Like Max Weber, Léon Dion emphasizes the ordering and integrative function of the defense of material interests and even of ideological values. Unlike Weber, however, he is convinced that not only the institutionalized representation of functional interests will mitigate the consequences of direct access of pressure groups to the centers of decision making but also that consultative boards, tri-partite committees, etc. have a necessary representative function. (Weber foresaw, and quite realistically, that such arrangements would do little more than increase the relative weight of the bureaucracy.) Dion's comparative discussion to this point is interesting enough, but not exactly convincing. To him consultative boards occupy (or at least should occupy) in the total political system, the same position as political parties, interest groups and mass media. He fails to see to which extent the boards are either ineffective or, when effective, an additional institutionalization of interest groups. Probably the author's down-grading of the role of political parties parallels his prospective views on consultative boards. There is accordingly, in a work devoted to a study of the dynamics of democracy, relatively little discussion of the problems of political opposition.

Throughout the work, the author has difficulties with the central question of the pluralist state: how much integration is needed for the survival of the community? Has not experience shown that in many settings the best integrated groups might also be the most oblivious of the needs, as opposed to the assumed interests of their members? Probably as a result of such uncertainties, Professor Dion never deals decisively with the arguments put forward by Mancur Olsen or Theodore Lowi, although he is fully aware of them.

The corrective which Professor Dion seeks for existing maladjustments is a more participatory form of democracy. His extensive consideration of this concept avoids many of the romanticized versions that have characterized previous discussions. Yet the impassioned description of the present crisis leads to a final part which reads more like a manifesto for substantial reforms than the conclusions of a scholarly work.

The collection edited by Nuscheler and Steffani combines the usefulness of a reader of writings on pluralism (over a time span of 70 years) with an interesting presentation of controversies on the subject. The volume furnishes an excellent supplement to Professor Dion's book whose discussion is limited to English and French sources. With a few exceptions, among them the classic mutations of Harold Laski's thinking from 1915 to 1938, the volume reproduces, together with an excellent introduction by one of the editors, mostly writings by German authors. A comparison between the German discussion and the concepts and controversies presented by Dion provides a striking demonstration that in Germany the problems took on a deadly seriousness which they have lacked, at least until recently, in North America. Initial positions were not far apart: the seminal discussion by von Gierke (1902) had a major and acknowledged impact on Arthur Bentley, who was still able to adjust Gierke's insights to American realities. But during the torments of the Weimar Republic, Carl Schmitt took Laski's earlier exaggerations about the desirable liquidation of the state as proof that pluralism was impeding the "decisionism" without which the state could not survive. Rudolf Smend, at the same time, called for an "integration" which, as he now explains, was at the antipode to Schmitt's notion, based as it was on a fundamental personalism—in fact, a proposal not far from Professor Dion's present stance.

In postwar Western Germany, the discussion has not abated. The most interesting writings are those by Ernst Fraenkel who has insisted that the negation of pluralism by totalitarian thought should now be negated by a neopluralism which keeps an equal distance from the utopians who expected sovereignty to dissolve, and from an enforced harmony à la Rousseau. Thoroughly familiar with the American discussion and probably closest to Dahl in his thinking, Fraenkel is nonetheless on many points original enough. The conservatives' attacks on him are represented here by writers who cling to Schmitt's tradition, presumably in order to save Bonn from the fate of Weimar. More weighty are the "disquieting question-marks" which exist for the late Karl Loewenstein when he discusses the relationship between "the pluralism of groups and the dynamics of power." A broad range of leftist criticism includes Marxist and non-Marxist authors; their arguments parallel in part those voiced by the critics of American pluralism, but there are interesting variations on the familiar theme.

Among the critical voices, Rainer Eisfeld's is the most intriguing because of the breadth of historical approach and the concreteness of analysis revealed in his book. To him pluralism has indeed added a political dimension to the concepts accredited by the liberal state and has thereby broadened the citizens' role in politics. But because of the limited representativeness of the groups, and because the inequality of resources will constantly hamper possibilities for effective representation, he believes that only a socialist reorganization of society can truly meet the challenge which pluralism wanted to present. (This view of course, returns to some of Laski's propositions.)

The contributions to the Nuscheler-Steffani collection by an Italian and a Czech Communist (the latter, O. Sik, now an exile) raise the question, as it were, from the other end of the telescope: should one not concede, they ask, that also in socialist society, pluralist practices *and* principles are indispensable? These questions take on additional significance because political scientists in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe seem now to be venturing for the first time upon studies of interest group activities in their systems. Does one dare hope that, before 1984 befalls us, students and practitioners of politics will yet be converted to Pascal's wisdom (of which Ernst Fraenkel reminds us): "*La multitude qui ne se réduit pas à l'unité, c'est confusion; l'unité qui n'est pas multitude est tyrannie.*"

HENRY W. EHRMANN

la Sorbonne

Contradiction and Dilemma: Orestes Brownson and the American Idea. By Leonard Gilhooley. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972. Pp. 231. $10.00.)

This book is renewed testimony to the veracity of Arthur Schlesinger's comment of 1966 that Orestes Brownson remains "vigorously alive as a figure in American intellectual history." Brownson appears to be generally regarded, on the basis of his essays of 1840, *The Laboring Classes*, as a "utopian liberal" (Mason) or a "pre-Marxian Marx" (Schlesinger) who turned conservative because of his disillusion with the presidential election of 1840 and, more particularly, his subsequent conversion to Catholicism. Gilhooley's careful and well-written analysis of Brownson's writings from 1838–1860 shows that because conservative tendencies in Brownson predate the famous essays his thought possesses a continuity which suggests that the essays were "an extremist assault upon an extreme position" and did not necessarily represent the main current of his early thought.

Gilhooley stresses "turns in emphasis" in Brownson's thought within the context of Brownson's approach to the "American Idea" defined as embracing the "American dream" of democratic equality, the "American experiment" of government of the free by the free, and the "American Mission" of the spread of democracy. Brownson originally assumed the validity of the idea of progress, was optimistic concerning man, and conceived of democracy and Christianity working together toward human betterment. He was, however, no majoritarian democrat or enemy of private property. As his thought developed he qualified his view of progress by his emphasis on divine providence, stressed more strongly the sovereignty of God and objective justice over the "proximate" sovereignty of the people, pointed up the ubiquity of original sin, regarded religion as a precondition of virtue and virtue as a precondition of democracy, focused on the historical providential constitutions of peoples, exalted tradition and the Anglo-Saxon common law heritage, and denied the universal exportability of American democracy, stressing instead the American mission of the spread of Christian society.

Certainly the ablest American Catholic intellectual of his day, Brownson believed that Locke's philosophy undercut individual freedom by denying to men inherent powers to attain truth. At the same time, he scored Transcendentalism for not regarding the "manifold and diverse" (p. 70) world of the senses. Because Protestantism stressed individual judgment and disregarded human solidarity Brownson considered it incompatible with civilization and good government. Liberty and order, he thought, could only be reconciled against the background of the voluntary acceptance of what he regarded as the divinely-appointed institution, the Catholic Church. Without this sheet-anchor, democracy would issue in license and majoritarian despotism. Thus Gilhooley tells us that the "American Idea" in its interrelated and interacting components was revised by Brownson in light of his religious preference as well as his regard for what he conceived to be irreducible aspects of human nature and historical influence and continuity. To bring together the emphasis on the necessity for Catholicism and the regard for historical fact, Brownson attempted to show the medieval higher law lineage of American republican ideas.

This book might be criticized for lacking critical analysis and evaluation. Its professed purpose, however, is to describe the development of Brownson's thought as a preliminary to further study. In that aim Gilhooley has succeeded and has thus greatly aided students not only of Brownson's thought but of nineteenth-century American thought as well.

A. J. BEITZINGER

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John Dewey's Philosophy of Value. By James Gouinlock. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 377. $10.00.)

John Dewey's thought has generally been characterized by others in three ways. The first, and perhaps the most widespread among those who have not read Dewey's works extensively, is that Dewey rejected theory in favor of a total commitment to the resolution of relatively short-range, practical problems. The second is that Dewey's thought is theoretical, since he recognized that resolution of practical problems usually requires abstraction and generalization but that it represents social theory or social anthropology, rather than a philosophical system incorporating metaphysical assumptions. Both of these characterizations assume that Dewey rejected questions of metaphysics as useless and meaningless.

Professor Gouinlock, however, offers a third view, characterizing Dewey's thought as a coherent system about the nature of reality. In addition, he attempts to illustrate that Dewey's conception of value, including his social philosophy, is based on this systematic view of nature. He largely succeeds in both endeavors. Although he is often repetitious, Gouinlock writes clearly, is well acquainted with Dewey's most important works, and has obviously assimilated Dewey's thought.

Approximately a third of the book is concerned with an analysis of Dewey's philosophical system, which is in effect a defense of naturalistic metaphysics. It is also an attack upon the systems of "philosophical dualism" which seem to have characterized the whole of Western philosophy. Philosophical dualism, according to Dewey and Gouinlock, is the assumption of separate realms of being, which results in a number of insoluble and nonsensical intellectual problems. The most important of these problems, at least from a social scientist's perspective, is the mind-body dichotomy, created by the assumption of both psychical and physical realms of being. This problem is of special concern to the social sciences because the origin of the "fact-value dichotomy" lies in the assumed distinction between "material" phenomena and "mental," or "subjective," phenomena.

Dewey's denial of subjectivity is the most striking feature of his system. "Consciousness," "intelligence," and other psychic phenomena are "functions" of an inclusive "situation." "Situations" are, apparently, "experiences" which involve conscious human participation, and experiences are natural events. It is not exactly clear whether "nature" and "experience" are synonymous terms; Dewey's metaphysical monism would seem to dictate this, and Gouinlock appears to proceed on such an assumption. At any rate, Dewey denies autonomous ontological status to consciousness and gives it instead to "experience." Gouinlock then proceeds to isolate the generic traits which Dewey finds common to all forms of experience.

Gouinlock illustrates his abstract discussion of experience with a more specific discussion of value and commitment. Once subjectivity has been abolished, the fact-value dichotomy and its accompanying perplexities cease to be real problems. Values are intrinsic to experience itself, as are the "facts" and the ability to discern them. In Dewey's formulation, "value" is explained as an aesthetic phenomenon experienced during the consummation of a situation—either in actuality or in imagination. The individual does not arbitrarily choose his values; they are simply entailed in his situation.

The crucial question is whether subjectivity can be denied without self-contradiction. Certainly the burden of proof falls upon Dewey and Gouinlock, since the philosopher of common sense does not conform to our commonsensical perceptions on this issue. More important, his position seems to have a logical difficulty. How can one claim to have discovered the generic traits of experience while denying to himself the autonomous ability to do so? Obviously, experience has revealed itself. But why only to, or in, Dewey and his relatively small band of followers? Dewey has not established any criteria by which he can claim primacy for his philosophical assumptions. The "test of experience," so often relied upon by Gouinlock, would seem to lead one to a self-contradictory relativism. This is especially suggested by Dewey's emphasis upon the social nature of intelligence. How does Dewey escape the well-known logical difficulties that have plagued the "sociology of knowledge"? Dewey might very well have argued that worrying about such questions is a waste of time, but this argument does not render them nonsensical. Since Gouinlock argues that Dewey's thought is a coherent, defensible system, his book would have been greatly improved if more space had been devoted to refuting, if possible, such obvious criticism. Unfortunately, Gouinlock tends to defend Dewey's system by oversimplifying and summarily dismissing the major alternatives—a procedure used extensively by Dewey himself.

These deficiencies should not impair the potential usefulness of this book for political scientists. Dewey's conceptions of "community" and "democracy," actually synonymous terms for him, are extremely suggestive, and his ideas concerning the nature of evaluation and human "growth" contain a wealth of insight when viewed as refutable propositions of social theory rather than as logically derived parts of an inclusive philosophical system. Gouinlock explicates these aspects of Dewey's thought with considerable skill. More important, however, given the current vogue of "transactionalism" (originally explicated by Dewey and Bentley in *Knowing and the Known*) among some political scientists, Gouinlock effectively explicates the philosophical assumptions entailed in such a view of the purpose and method of social analysis.

EDWARD B. PORTIS

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L'Explication Politique: Une Introduction à l'Analyse Comparative. By Alfred Grosser. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972. Pp. 183. F 25.-)

In this essay, Professor Grosser, better known among American political scientists for his works on foreign policy and German politics, has undertaken a difficult job. He reviews the state of our discipline, only to raise, without always answering, some of the most searching questions. What is a political phenomenon, and how and why it should be studied. Is our discipline—or rather can it even become—cumulative? What are the limits of objectivity? Can we ever arrive in general terms to the Olympian heights of explanation, i.e., of being able to find even two interconnected and mutually interdependent variables in the sense that whenever and wherever we have one there is also the other? What is the importance of value judgments not only in the procedures we follow to do research but, even more important, in the very choice of the topics that we study?

Well-read in American political science, Grosser joins the ranks of many who have become progressively disenchanted with quantification, not only for the sake of quantification, but, with its inherent limitations; with survey research that unless put in context provides only fragmentary and almost snapshot reflections of attitudes and orientations (see how quickly the findings of the *Civic Culture* read like ancient history); with the plethora of concepts and terms that mean different things to different people and above all with the most damning emphasis, in the name of behaviorism, on all the factors that may *potentially* affect politics and policies while avoiding the very stuff of politics—the agencies that formulate claims and press for decisions and the state organs through which decisions are made.

It is unfortunate that Grosser's book has not been translated into English. It is a very thoughtful inquiry into the state of our discipline and many will regret that having diagnosed a number of the ills that beset us he did not venture to give us his own prescriptions of how to cure them. What is more, there is really very little on the procedures and techniques of comparative politics, as such, except in his concluding chapter—15 pages in all. In the best French philosophic and literary tradition he has produced an extremely provocative critical essay.

ROY MACRIDIS

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Revolutionary Justice: The Social and Political Theory of P.-J. Proudhon. By Robert L. Hoffman. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972. Pp. xvii, 429. $15.00.)

General Idea of the Revolution in the 19th Century. By P.-J. Proudhon. Translated by John Beverly Robinson. (New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd., 1969. Pp. 302. $10.95.)

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is generally known to us as an outspoken social critic and indefatigable man of letters who called for a nonviolent political revolution leading to anarchy. Beyond that, we know little about him or his thought. Professor Hoffman's book is helpful in that it combines a description of Proudhon's life—his activities as a publisher, businessman, journalist, and practicing politician; as an acquaintance of Marx and Bakunin; and as a political prisoner and exile—with a statement about the general perspective and the depth of Proudhon's thought. The translation of Proudhon's *General Idea of the Revolution in the 19th Century* provides us with the most complete statement of his views in English and with a good example of his immoderate style.

Proudhon's book brims with outrage over social and economic injustice and with scorn for traditional attempts to remove or reduce that injustice. The outrage and scorn are prompted by his passion for greater individual liberty and conviction that it is stifled by all existing political institutions. In his eyes, the only solution is a revolution which will lead to government being replaced by industrial organization and laws being replaced by contracts between individuals.

The call for revolution is supported by two kinds of argument. One, interjected here and there throughout the book, asserts the historical inevitability of revolution. Proudhon has discovered that history is progress toward liberty and that authority is no longer needed. It is now possible to go beyond Luther's substitution of the authority of reason for the authority of the church and beyond the revolutionaries of 1789 who rejected feudalism only to embrace a different kind of political order. Proudhon will show us how to abolish authority and secure freedom by means of a true revolution (*General Idea*, pp. 101, 111, 218–219, and 292).

In principle, the revolution is merely another change and can therefore be peaceful. However, a bloody counter-revolution led by the established interests or prideful government is always possible. Proudhon tries to avoid such violence by proving the objective need for revolution. The political and economic analyses or studies around which the book is formally organized provide this second kind of argument. Unfortunately, their potential conciliatory effect is weakened by Proudhon's sarcasm.

For Proudhon, revolution is necessary because the goals of the 1789 revolution have not yet been achieved. Feudalism was to have been abolished and work in society organized so that all citizens might benefit from the fruits of their labor. As is universally acknowledged, the very principles which were supposed to liberate the workers—the division of labor, competition, and credit—have placed them under greater enslavement and suffocated the revolution. Proudhon blames not those principles, but a society which has remained feudalistic and a government which has maintained its old ways. The rich are still favored over the poor and taxes still structured to help the capitalist at the expense of the producer.

No one has yet discovered how to order society correctly. Socialist movements have held up the idea of workers' associations based on the principle of reciprocity. Proudhon rejects that idea, because the individual must bow to the will of the association at some point and thereby allow his liberty to be restricted. Attempts to reduce or abolish authority by limited government or direct legislation by the sovereign people are no sounder. Proudhon claims that authority cannot adequately be reduced, much less abolished, as long as there is government. For example, the most radical proposal for direct government would make the entire populace both sovereign and magistrate. However, the problem then arises of finding a subject over whom the people can be sovereign. The only rational solution is simply to do away with government.

In its place Proudhon proposes the reciprocal justice of contracts between freely consenting individuals. Because association will be based solely on contracts, the subordination and enforced obedience of citizens will be eliminated. The individual will be obliged only to the extent of his freely expressed will and can disassociate himself from any accord to which he does not consent. As a result, social life will be transformed. For example, criminal justice and its spirit of vengeance will give way to mediation between concerned parties and a spirit of reparation. The vision is attractive, but problematic in at least two respects.

In the first place, it presupposes that all of the evil and misery existing in the world are due to society rather than to human nature or to natural scarcity. Proudhon asserts the indefinite perfectibility of mankind and the identity of their interests, while denying the premises held by the defenders of government—the perversity of human nature, essential inequality of conditions, and perpetual antagonism among men. The disagreement is important, but Proudhon's argument never moves beyond the level of assertion.

Here, Hoffman's book could be especially helpful. He has read all of the more than 20,000 pages written by Proudhon and might have shown us how Proudhon answered problems raised in one writing by an argument in another. Instead Hoffman uses his knowledge of the different writings to show only that a given argument can be found elsewhere. He is more concerned with expounding what Proudhon said about such theoretical issues than with questioning why he said it or how it might be correct, probably because he shares Proudhon's historical relativism (*Revolutionary Justice*, pp. ix–xi, 113, 176, and 278).

Hoffman is a better guide for the second kind of problem with Proudhon's vision: its feasibility. A commendable familiarity with economic doctrines enables him to point out the practical flaws in Proudhon's proposals. Recognition of those flaws does not dampen Hoffman's affection for Proudhon, however. He is willing to dismiss Proudhon's political teaching as impractical because he thinks Proudhon's merit lies in his humanist concern, in his ability to point out the shortcomings in political and economic life, and especially in his love of justice.

Hoffman's interest in Proudhon's teaching about justice seems to prompt the curious organization of his book. In the first eight chapters, Hoffman presents a fairly detailed analysis of Proudhon's major works published prior to 1858 and suggests how different events in Proudhon's life influenced the arguments of those writings. There is only a summary statement about the books written from 1858 until Proudhon's death in 1865, and chapter 8 concludes with two poignant anecdotes about his death. Hoffman then changes his method completely and devotes the next four chapters to a very close textual analysis of the post-1858 writings: *De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Eglise* (chap. 9), *La Guerre et la Paix* (chap. 10), *Du Principe Fédératif* (chap. 11), and *De la Capacité Politique des Classes Ouvrières* (chap. 12). Intent upon expounding Proudhon's teaching about justice in these works, Hoffman makes no reference to biographical material in these chapters. The book concludes with a series of speculations about how Proudhon's influence might have been felt and a tribute to his activity as a humanitarian gadfly.

Hoffman has an impressive grasp of Proudhon's thought and of the times in which he lived. From him, we learn to appreciate Proudhon as a man passionately concerned about righting wrong and fighting injustice. We see something of Proudhon's ability to follow an idea out to its end, and we learn about the opinions Proudhon had to combat. Hoffman's use of caricatures and excerpted material at the beginning of each chapter is delightful, as are his accurate and idiomatic translations from Proudhon; it is a pity he had nothing to do with the translation of the *General Idea*. Despite criticisms mentioned above and flaws arising primarily from Hoffman's confusing manner of ordering arguments and habit of raising false issues, he is to be commended for having written a fine and instructive book on Proudhon.

Charles E. Butterworth

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Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum. Edited by Nellie D. Kendall. With introduction by Jeffrey Hart (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971. Pp. 640. $11.95.)

In Willmoore Kendall's life the accidents of personality and of history so combined as to deny an interesting political theorist the audience he ought naturally to have expected. As Jeffrey Hart notes, Kendall was immensely delighted to discover, on his return to Oxford, that his peers knew of his work. Many of us who have been educated in the social sciences in North America can make no such claim. But now, with this publication of a large, and fairly priced, collection of Kendall's speeches, articles, and the incomplete chapters of a book on which he was working at the time of his death in 1967, Kendall's intense confrontation with those ethical, political, and intellectual issues which are basic to the crises of American society are available to all.

Let us begin with the question, Is there a conservative tradition in North America? All too frequently this question is answered in the negative. For example, George Grant, in *Lament for a Nation* (Toronto, 1965), contrasts the Canadian experience with the American by pointing to the existence of a conservative tradition in Canada and to its non-existence in the U.S.A. Hartz and McRae (*The Founding of New Societies*, New York, 1964) make similar points in asserting that the U.S.A. is a perfect bourgeois fragment. From this interpretation it is possible to conclude, as has Bernard Crick in his article entitled "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism," (*The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17 [July 1955] 359–376), that contemporary American conservatives must face the " . . . grave difficulties and limitations of deliberately reviving or creating an American conservatism" (p. 361). Kendall forcefully and directly confronts this interpretation by demonstrating that a conservatism is not only deeply embedded in the founding of the American consensus that " . . . sustained the Philadelphia Convention, the *Federalist* and . . . the First Congress," but that it is a continuing conservatism: it is the grain of American political institutions which may have been painted over by those he calls the "liberal revolutionaries" (p. 53).

At hand is an issue which has stimulated an interesting debate among American historians, beginning in 1940. The debate, simply posed, is whether or not colonial politics and society were democratic; that is, whether colonial society, democratic in structure in that virtually all adult males could participate in politics, engendered a political conservatism characterized by *deference* and its concomitants, the separation and the delegation of power. Kendall's contribution to this debate begins with his article, "On the Preservation of Democracy for America" (1939); he writes: There is pretty general agreement, by this time, that the fifty-five gentlemen who assembled at Philadelphia in 1787 to revise The Articles were not much interested in what we in our time call democracy, i.e., " . . . a form of political organization which lodges absolute power in the numerical majority of the adult population" (p. 103). What interested the authors of the Declaration of Independence, as Kendall writes in his last work (1967), was the founding of a nation on certain principles ". . . which we, the American people, grasp at least intuitively and sufficiently understand. *Or* we are no longer clear as to what the principles are. Either the one, or the other; and if the latter, *our peril, which is the loss of our identity*, is great . . ." (p. 74).

It is of significance that in exploring throughout his life the nature of the original American consensus that ". . . sustained the Philadelphia Convention, The *Federalist* and . . . The First Congress" (p. 80), Kendall seldom permits the inquiry to remain at this historical level; rather, he revisits Socrates, re-reads Milton, Locke, Rousseau, or approaches the notion of "pure tolerance" or the "majority principle" issue head-on, in an attempt to link the particulars of the American experience to what have been for Western man the important political problems. Hart's introductory essay, being preoccupied with Kendall's interests in domestic politics, fails to convey the breadth of his scholarship and concerns. For example, Hart quotes Kendall's statement "What I do take side on is the preamble of the constitution which gives equal status to justice and domestic tranquility" (p. 15), without pursuing at all the interesting implications and possible interpretations stimulated by this insightful recognition about the Constitution. The quoted statement recalls Jacques Maritain's observation that the extreme left is willing to deny *being* for the promises of the future, while the extreme right is willing to accept injustice in order to obtain domestic tranquility. Taking Maritain's distinction, and the sense of Hart's passage which includes the above-quoted statement, one might easily identify Kendall as a simple exponent of the extreme right. But this would be a most unfortunate narrowing of Kendall's position which, to elaborate in the context of Maritain's distinction, is more properly put thus: the left is willing to deny *being* for invalid promises of the future, while the right (that is, Kendall's conservatism) holds that essential for the realization of *being* is domestic tranquility, in that it implies a consensus concerning the ordering of symbols which engender social institutions and which can only be brought into question at the expense of identity.

Kendall's intense love and concern for American political and social institutions are reflected throughout his writings. He deserves to be read for his scholarship and his far-ranging discussions of major political theorists and crucial political issues. This is not to imply that Kendall is not flawed in his handling of some of these thinkers and issues: he certainly is. Thus, I do not—as

Jeffrey Hart does—consider Kendall to be "beyond any possibility of challenge, the most important political theorist to have emerged in the twenty-odd years since the end of World War II" (p. 9). Kendall is an interesting American political theorist whose writings have helped to correct the misunderstanding of the roots and nature of American conservatism, (e.g., Kirk's), by placing it within the framework of the founding of the American nation. His last writings, in which he discussed among other things John Courtney Murray's book *We Hold These Truths*, indicates that Kendall's views had developed in the direction of Eric Voegelin's stance articulated in *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952, p. 189); first, that science, properly understood, is a search for truth, and second, that "it is the American English democracies which most solidly in their institutions represent the truth of the soul." Kendall's strength is that from his first articles in 1939, he recognized the threat posed by the liberal principles of pure tolerance, majority rule, centralization of authority, equality, etc., and by those "ideologies" known as positivism, historicism, relativism, etc., to these democratic institutions and, thereby, to the truths they represent, as well as to the American identity which is so nourished by them.

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Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors. By Marion J. Levy, Jr., (New York: Basic Books, 1972. Pp. 160. $5.95.)

A few years ago in a book review in a scholarly journal Marion J. Levy unleashed himself, and in a magnificent display of wrath and snarling fury delivered himself of the thesis that the advancement of science calls for an end to gentle civilities and an uncompromising commitment to ruthless, unrelenting, yea even nasty criticism so that only the truth will survive. He became so carried away by his message and the glory of his cause that he completely forgot to make any substantive criticism of the book under review. No doubt the nonplussed author was puzzled as to what he possibly could have done to have provoked such a bluster of affect in the name of affectively neutral science; unless, of course, he knew that Levy was then a fundamentalist preacher of pure methodology.

Now Levy has thrown away that reputation, written a book with barely glancing references to methodology, and allowed his private propensities for wit and novelty to shine in public. Although not abandoning academic battles, Levy announces that he is reaching for the bigger public of intelligent laymen and is addressing himself to more than a scholarly audience. He does break out of the sociologist's tradition of soberly elucidating the obvious in grotesque jargon, and he achieves an impressive degree of wit and wisdom. The new Levy stands somewhere between John Kenneth Galbraith and Parkinson's Law; he does not strive for the macrovision of the tallest economist and his prose is still a bit heavy, although not ponderous, his concerns unduly academic and, sad to say, his jokes at times are too convoluted to put him in the class of *The Peter Principle*.

Levy's title suggests he intends to deal with the problems of the developing countries, and he does treat them briefly, but the burden of his interest is with the industrial societies and what makes the few that have achieved modernity so different from the multitude which have not. He claims to be uncommitted about the worth of development, he is not an enthusiast for all of modernity, and he is wise enough to see the follies of where presumed progress can end. As for where it all leads, Levy exudes a reassuringly Jobian spirit of gloom and agrees with Lord Keynes that "in the long-run we are all dead," but on more immediate matters he adopts an unconventionally optimistic outlook, finding more virtue and sense in middle-class ways than in those of backward peoples.

Levy's presentation is a nice balance between important historic themes and expressions of personal prejudice. His topics range from the problems of education for an unknown future, and the challenge of maintaining rapid social change given the difficulty of achieving even slow change, to the unique need in modern societies to deal with strangers and to operate in exotic organizational contexts, and so on. Other subjects he treats include the trend towards increasing centralization, the impact of recreation on politics, and finally the sexual revolution and the demographic changes likely to result when parents can choose the sex of their babies.

The chapters are brief, the words carefully chosen. The examples are vivid, as when Levy speaks of what is in store when longevity tilts human populations in favor of senility and "we shall see a day in which if senile Chinese are wheeled four abreast past a given point, their procession will never end" (p. 46). The thoughts are at times shockingly novel as when he notes that shortly when thirty million Americans own second houses, each on an average of five acres of land, the area damaged, according to conservationists' standards, will be greater than that destroyed by the combined efforts of the lumber and public utility companies.

Levy's capacity for enthusiasm about and astonishment over the commonplace is breathtaking, as when he makes us think twice about the meaning of modern, impersonal relations and thus professes to see a miracle in our ability to walk into a building we have never been in before (only a sign says it's a restaurant), approach a complete stranger (only his uniform serves as introduction), and ask him for a hamburger and a milkshake and then, believe it or not, getting from the unknown the completely familiar items we want. This awe of the ordinary might put Levy back with the run-of-the-mill sociologists were it not for the cleverness of his phrases and quotes. For example:

> Homo sapiens is also homo hierarchicus. Actually down through history the achievement of egalitarianism and freedom has been primarily an elitist preoccupation of individuals who had had every reason to believe they would more than hold their own under such dispensations. Our loftiest expressions about freedom have had undertones of "It's every man for himself and God for us all," said the elephant as he danced among the chickens (p. 71).

At times he goes a bit far in his search for cleverness as when he contemptuously dismisses the concept of "Post Industrial State" as a phrase that is "only acronymically apt."

Standards differ, and different readers will arrive at different ratios of clever to too clever by a half. A useful test of a reader's tastes is Levy's Fourth Law, proclaimed while observing that virtuosity in hypocrisy is probably as rare as virtuosity in anything else, and reads:

> Always pray that your opposition be wicked. In wickedness there is a strong strain toward rationality. Therefore, it is always a possibility, in theory, of handling the wicked by outthinking them. Corollary One: good intentions randomize behavior. Subcorollary One: good intentions are far more difficult to cope with than malicious behavior. Corollary Two: if good intentions are combined with stupidity, it is impossible to outthink them. Corollary Three: any discovery is more likely to be exploited by the wicked than applied by the virtuous (p. 36).

This is an interesting book in which Marion J. Levy is at his best, which is when he is not talking about the obligations of science. Discussions of modernization have long been spiced with more pretensions than wit; Levy has raised the level of the latter without lowering the former.

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Marx's Paris Writings: An Analysis. By John Maguire. With an introduction by David McLellan. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973. Pp. xxiv, 170. $9.00.)

Some decades ago, anyone asked to suggest a book by Marx that might serve as an introduction to his philosophy would be very likely to have named a work of Engels, *Anti-Dühring*. Today the choice would much more probably be the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* Marx drafted in 1844 in Paris, to which perhaps a few smaller pieces he wrote during his honeymoon a few months earlier would be added. Since these small pieces were published while Marx was in Paris in 1844, John Maguire has lumped them together with the 1844 manuscripts as Marx's Paris writings; and they are the subject of his book.

The trouble with these essays is that they are written in a style and vocabulary so cryptic and oracular that they cannot be understood readily even by someone familiar with German and must be considered virtually untranslatable into other languages. Nonetheless, there are translations into English, and Mr. Maguire makes use of them, occasionally offering corrections. His book is, in effect, a translation of these translations into a language understandable to the contemporary reader, and by doing this he has rendered an important service. He has made his contribution more interesting by referring, whenever opportune, to different interpretations of these oracular essays, so that his book has become an introduction to contemporary marxological debates.

In his commentary on these essays by Marx, Mr. Maquire begins with an attempt to define their place within the development of Marx's philosophy, a difficult task which he accomplishes ably. Throughout his book, the author demonstrates his awareness of unresolved questions concerning the relationship between the young Marx and the mature Marx, and he presents a useful survey of the major schools of thought concerning these questions.

Maguire's commentary is presented in a convenient order, topic after topic, which nonetheless manages to convey the manner in which Marx's ideas developed. He takes us from Marx's critique of the democratic state to his earliest models of the capitalist economy, his tentative notions of class conflict, and his total rejection of Hegelian philosophy. Finally, he discusses the basic elements in Marx's own philosophy emerging from this rejection of Hegel and ends with a discussion of the Marxian philosophy of man and the blurred vision of a society without alienation.

Throughout these commentaries, he is aware of the many unresolved tensions within Marx's philosophy, especially that between the Hegelian and the Comtean tendencies. He brings this tension into the open most fully in his discussion of the conflict between deterministic notions and the philosophy of *praxis*. While he leans toward a view which assumes the fundamental unity of all Marxian ideas, seeing the *Grundrisse* (which should be translated as "blueprint") as the bridge between the philosophic essays and *Das Kapital*, he does express his awareness that the opposite conclusions could be drawn, i.e., that the gap between the philosophic writings and the economic work is not easily bridged.

The author is a bit more confident in asserting the essential unity of all the works written prior to 1848. But there too it would be possible to argue other interpretations. One could, I think, distinguish the period prior to 1844 from that between 1844 and 1850. The former period predates his meeting with Engels, the latter is that of their close collaboration. The early Paris period, when Marx drafted the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* serves as the bridge between them. At that time the two friends had not yet met, but Marx had read Engel's essay on political economy. Their major joint work, *The German Ideology,* would then have to be read, not as a continuation of the early Marx, but as a break with him; and indeed it can be so read. The very quotation on p. 108, which according to Maguire demonstrates the continuity, to me demonstrates the break.

The book ends with a teasingly brief but suggestive confrontation of Marxist and Christian stances in the face of the most troublesome questions about human existence. The adjectives I have used here could be applied to the entire book: It is short and at times much too summary. But it is based on impressive knowledge, and every page is thoughtful and stimulating. We must be grateful to the author for his contribution to the debate on Marx's philosophy.

One minor suggestion: the word "*Todesgefahr*" should be translated as "mortal danger;" "danger of death" (p. 4) seems awkward.

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The Politics of Truth. By Holton P. Odegard. (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 439. $13.50.)

Attacking the institutions of pluralist, representative democracy has become almost a fad. This book by Holton P. Odegard, a planning consultant, is another such attack—erudite, eloquent, and basic.

According to Odegard, not only have problems become too complex for representative, legislative democracy, but the forms and political patterns associated therewith are based on a now obsolete view of human nature—atomic individualism and separateness and mind-body dualism. Today, says Odegard, we view man as transactional, one component of an ongoing situation. Reality is fashioned from transactions between perceiver and perceived. The Self (always capitalized) originates and grows by transactions with the other and therefore includes the other. Unity is the truth; individual separateness and all its implications and apparati, like bills of rights, constitutions, legislatures, parties, representatives, compromises are the falsehoods.

Odegard repudiates the old dichotomies: idea and referent, fact and value, individual and group, politics and administration, citizen and governor, representative and constituent, authority and subjection, cause and effect, freedom and control.

As people improve their social perception (of the purposes of others), ". . . the Self is made *whole*some with the roundness of experience" (p. 233). Thereby they achieve "Self-control." When they learn to create and integrate public purposes they achieve social control (after the notion that we control nature through physical sciences). These results will be achieved by the development of an experimental science of purpose—moral or political science, the uppermost science.

The unity of science and truth will expose the unity of moral man. Truth cannot contain conflict and so commitment to it will unify society and government. Man will be unified in science. At the same time, the self-correctibility of the scientific way of knowing means that both Self and society are perfectible.

The only organ of government remotely capable of embodying this program, says Odegard, is public administration—"the natural setting for the first investiture of creative bargaining as political science" (p. 213). Administration grows increasingly expert and scientific. It does not deal in compromise but in problem solving. It eschews partisan politics (a hangover of the phony separateness of Lockeian man). It searches out and develops relevant publics (which could turn into real participation when "human beings-doing" acquire the scientific skills of interpersonal observation, communication, and objectifying of purposes). Finally, public administration is dedicated to the public interest.

Within administration "creative bargaining" will be used to create new, higher-level purposes, rather than disappointing half-and-half compromises. It will accomplish this through "scientific mediation." Government will become a series of social experiments, testing hypotheses, self-correcting in the manner of science, and bringing a higher level of truth in its wake. Participation of "citizen scientists" is to "develop purposes—as—hypotheses," not to secure agreement (which does not validate purpose; only truth does that). Government can then justify policy publicly by reasoned argument instead of depending upon discredited persuasion and compromise.

As this process progresses, administration becomes more democratic. When administration achieves perfection in purpose-knowing, creating, and integrating, perfect democracy will have been achieved because man will be governed by truth. Only pathological cases can resist the law of truth. Eventually participation can and will become vicarious. Nothing could represent me as well as truth, itself. Apathy will signal success rather than alienation. We will be democratically subject to "an authority of organized knowing" (p. 194). "The product is organization around inquiry, the politics of truth" (p. 280).

It seems to me that Odegard reifies his wishes into existing techniques. Take "integration": "Integration is a way of developing purposes, creating them out of the raw materials of the situation" (p. 194). Or again, "creative bargaining . . . is . . . a way for merging or dispelling group differences" (p. 215). Another such technique is "scientific mediation." "Creative bargaining becomes scientific mediation when the ideas involved are so formulated that putting them to use will put them to test. Creative bargaining is thereby converted into a scientific discipline" (p. 233). He launders "control" and "power" with "socialized control" and "functionalized power" (p. 281), terms as good as the originals were bad.

He gives an unusually exalted role in history to ideas. The rejected representative democracy he seems to attribute to some mistaken ideas of Descartes and Locke. And the new governmental dispensation begins "with the realities that are beginning to be understood about human nature as apparent first from experiments in the psychology of perception" (p. 357).

From early training in natural science (biochemistry and chemical engineering) he acquired a faith in science that leads him to overemphasize vastly the success or even possibilities of behavioral science (he has graduate degrees in political science). He also thereby acquired the usual optimism about the ability of science to solve social problems. Strangely, at a time when many students of administration regard bureaucracy itself as a social problem, he projects it as the ultimate hope of mankind. Politics as we know it does not appear. That was part of the old, discredited, representative, democratic system.

His style is apocalyptic and suggestive of great profundities that somehow just escape one. For example, on the role of creativity: "Drawing a deep breath *ex nihilo*, creativity steels itself for the boot-strap self-levitation needed to break out of the circle of reflex action and reaction to win new ways of Self-correction leading to the reciprocal system of deliberate experimentation" (p. 270). Because the old language has misstructured reality a new one is needed. He makes new words like "human being-doing," or redefines old ones. Instead of a "hired-hand responsibility . . . there will be one responsibility common to citizen and administrator alike and focusing on scientific method" (p. 304). Or again, "freedom is the product of control . . . the knowing-how, the controls of democratic moral science" (p. 328). The new free speech is "the basic skill of Self-control . . . that permits (frees) him to stop and reflect (listen), to attempt to allow conflicting facts to speak to him" (p. 326).

Odegard set out to create a utopia, defined as "ideal possibility" (p. 357), and it is probably not fair to complain about the absence of empirical data. Nevertheless, it raises a question: Why should I buy his utopia? Nearly all current history contradicts it. If I accept it I must do so by an act of faith—a leap into the unknown.

I am not so disposed.

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Karl Marx On Revolution. Arranged and edited, with an introduction and new translations by Saul K. Padover. (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1971. Pp. liv, 682. $17.50.)

Karl Marx On Revolution opens a series of thirteen volumes under the collective title *The Karl Marx Library*. Each volume is to be devoted to a general theme and will contain, in full or in extracts, Marx's writings on such topics as religion, philosophy, history, America and Civil War, Britain, freedom of the press, and so forth. The realization of this undertaking comes at an inappropriate moment. Lawrence and Wishart have apparently decided to publish the complete edition of *Marx-Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1958 ff.) in English, and the first volumes are to appear in the near future. This development is bound to reduce the usefulness of Dr. Padover's series on which he must have expended much energy and time-consuming effort.

The volume *On Revolution* is divided into five parts concerned with Marx's revolutionary theory, his examination of communism as a socioeconomic phenomenon and as a political program, his comments and analyses of the revolutionary upheavals in France, Germany and Spain in the 19th century. For Marxian scholars the last part of the volume is of greatest value, since Marx's articles on Spain, published in *New York Daily Tribune* in the 1850s, are not easily accessible. The remaining parts contain very little that is not available in English and important for the understanding of Marx's ideas on revolution. There are, however, some surprising omissions, especially in the first chapter of the book. For instance, only a part of the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction* is included and, despite its universal implications, it is assigned to the chapter on Germany. Similarly, merely a short extract from *The Poverty of Philosophy* is used in the chapter on the theory of revolution; the letter to Annenkov of December 1846 is left out entirely. *Capital* and the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* which are important sources of Marx's views on revolution in the later period of his life, are ignored altogether. One has the impression that Dr. Padover did not formulate for himself clear-cut criteria for what is relevant to the understanding of Marx's theory of revolution, and there is nothing in his own introduction that would guide his readers on this matter.

The sequences of extracts do not always follow their historical order and, since Marx's views on the nature, *modus operandi*, and temporal span of the revolution (in his sense of the term) changed and continued to change considerably in the period following the defeat of the 1848 upheavals, the disregard of chronology is bound to be confusing, at least in some cases, for inattentive readers or for newcomers to Marx's works. Thus, in the chapter on Germany a few articles published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848–49 are followed by extracts from the *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875), and these in turn by some letters to Arnold Ruge of 1843. Marx's ideas on revolution found in his polemical article against Ruge of 1844 (p. 35 ff.), presuppose knowledge of the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843), of which only the second half is included much later in the volume. "International Class Conflict" (Dr. Padover's own title given to a speech on Poland and Chartism made in 1847) precedes a fragment from *The German Ideology* (1846), although the former is incomprehensible without the latter. It is true, of course, that we cannot deal with everything at the same time, but this inescapable limitation does not change the fact that readers well versed in Marx's concepts of revolution can do without the book and those who are eager to become familiar with them are given little help.

The preface, "Karl Marx as Revolutionist," does not serve to introduce the comprehensive collection of extracts with their variety of content. The reader needs an explication of Marx's concept of revolution if he is to study the original writings with understanding; no such explication can be found in the introduction. In particular, there is no indication that the young and the old Marx had different views on many matters. For the young Marx, "revolution" meant a single, decisive and violent overthrow, a massive assault or an armed uprising, such as the French Revolution. Its driving force was the material want, poverty and moral wretchedness of the workers, and its goal was the abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man, as it were, by one stroke. In the early 1850s, Marx realized that this idea was utopian. "Revolution" was no longer a brief trial of strength but an extended, if not permanent, social, economic and political process of change, determined by subjective and objective conditions, which may require the use of force at some stage but also may be accomplished by relatively peaceful means, by a sustained collective campaign. This campaign had to be unending, since the struggle against inhumanity and for man's self-realization has no definite end in that there is no clear-cut division between the kingdom of freedom and the kingdom of necessity.

In addition, the introduction has some other embarrassing shortcomings. Contrary to Dr. Padover's contention, Marx did not use "socialism" and "communism" interchangeably. He disliked the former and clearly preferred the latter. Marx referred to the middle classes as petty-bourgeois but he never confused them with the bourgeoisie. The author's definition of "democracy" is misleading, to say the least, and his discussion of whether Marx was a democrat is simplified in the extreme. *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* was published in book form in 1896 but under the name of Marx, to whom it was attributed by his daughter Eleanor. Its true authorship was established from Marx-Engels correspondence only later.

Dr. Padover retranslated some of Marx's writings but the reviewer has doubts whether his effort was necessary and the outcome superior to that of his predecessors. Some of his first English translations became available simultaneously in K. Marx's *Early Texts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), and *The Cologne Communist Trial* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), while others appeared a little later in a more comprehensive and satisfactory form (K. Marx, *Political Writings*, 2 vols. London: Allen Lane, 1973). Dr. Padover's bibliography of Marx's books in English (p. 642) has numerous gaps. In general, his "Bibliography" (pp. 641 ff.) is highly selective, if not parochial, since he restricts himself to the books produced in the United States. It is hard to discover the audience for whom the volume is intended and suitable. Its price is prohibitive as well as excessive in relation to its content.

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Hegel. By Raymond Plant. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Pp. 214. $7.95.)

Hegel was the last philosopher to present political theory as an integral part of a general philosophical system. Professor Plant is therefore entirely right in his claim that the *Philosophy of Right* cannot be understood apart from its metaphysical context. As he reminds us, Hegel insisted on the point. In the *Encyclopedia* we are shown how it was meant to fit into the greater whole. Indeed, the first parts of the *Philosophy of Right* are incomprehensible, and are therefore usually ignored, when that work is examined in isolation. Professor Plant's discussion, on the other hand, especially of these sections, is a model of succinct exposition. Every serious student of Hegel will appreciate the difficulty of the task he has set himself and will admire the lucidity and comprehensiveness of this book. He has explained the most complex of Hegel's ideas and arguments in clear English prose without simplification. That is a very considerable achievement, and this is a very good book.

There are, however, some difficulties raised by the way this book has been constructed. It is organized without any explicit principle of selection. It was evidently Professor Plant's intention to trace Hegel's development from youth to maturity. To be sure, one can agree with him that it is very useful to look at Hegel's juvenalia very carefully. His enduring aims are there: to overcome Christian estrangement from this world, Kantian dualism and Fichte's solipsism, and above all, to find a philosophical equivalent of the communal harmony of the polis. Important as these early essays are, however, one cannot dwell on them to the exclusion of the works of which they form merely the germ. Professor Plant gives us a meticulous account of all Hegel's work up to and through the Jena lectures and then jumps quickly to the *Philosophy of Right*. The result is that we get a fine picture of the origins of Hegel's mature views but not of their development. This would not matter if it did not lead to certain oddities of interpretation. It is, after all, in the *Phenomenology* that Hegel develops fully his whole philosophy of mind and the way science, culture, and religion structure the development of human knowledge. Again it is in the lectures on *Aesthetics* that we can find the best account of his philosophy of history as a teleological development that is not a theory of human progress. It is here also that we can learn what Hegel thought of his own age. It is not even odd that all this should appear in lectures devoted to art, since art and philosophy, unlike the state, are universal achievements of the human mind for Hegel.

One of the consequences of ignoring these two works is to put a strange emphasis on the influences that shaped Hegel's mature mind. We hear a great deal about his debt to Sir James Steuart, whose contribution to his early interest in theories of history has lately been discovered. But Hegel never even mentions him in the *Philosophy of Right*, although he does acknowledge Smith, Ricardo, Say, and above all, Montesquieu. More seriously, Hegel's overwhelming dependence on Aristotle is never mentioned. Indeed Aristotle's name does not even appear in Professor Plant's book. Yet Hegel often reminds us of his debt to *De Anima* especially. It was Aristotle's notion of immanent teleology that was to serve as Hegel's master idea in overcoming Kantian dualism. It was from Aristotle that he got most of his psychology and the whole conception of human development as a self-motivating and rational process leading to rational knowledge. And it was from Aristotle that he learned of a polity in which the "citizen" and the "bourgeois" were one indivisible person. Again we hear nothing here of Hegel's complex argument against Plato. Finally, although Professor Plant gives us a good account of Hegel's early interest in the Greek idea of fate, he does not show how much Hegel drew on Sophoclean tragedy in his later years. Fate was an idea that he pitted against Old Testament and Kantian legalism to develop a view of responsibility and of punishment that aimed at reconciliation rather than at justice. It was also a conception that guided his view of retrospection as the only true knowledge and of history as a tragic drama.

It is also in these works, neglected in this book, that we can discover how dim a view Hegel took of his own "age of prose." For political purposes that view can be foreseen in the passages Hegel devoted to the Roman legal system in the *Phenomenology*. That too was a state of laws, of legal "persons," not of active citizens, and it is entirely like the modern sovereign state. With that in mind, one should perhaps read the *Philosophy of Right* as a defense of political philosophy, of "the rose in the cross," rather than of the institutions of the post-Napoleonic state. Lastly, the *Phenomenology* alone can give us a clear picture of Hegel's view of Christianity and its relation to philosophy and to the State. Professor Plant is excessively worried by the use of Christian imagery, given Hegel's obvious hostility to revealed religion. In the *Phenomenology* we are told quite clearly that philosophy has succeeded in overcoming revealed religion and now fulfils all the spiritual functions that Christianity served in a "barbaric" and merely "imaginative" way. Philosophy is now able to encompass the idea of mankind and of human freedom without reference to a "beyond," because it can now demonstrate that the human spirit is responsible for its own development without any divine agency. Reason and language (logos) set the ends and stages of human development. They deliver us from subjectivity and aimlessness once we recognize both as collective achievements. There is therefore nothing "paradoxical" in Hegel's remark that the state is now our heaven on earth. The state has at last driven its old rival the "Church" and its "beyond" from the cultural arena. We will now learn to make whatever heaven we know on earth. Philosophy has liberated us finally from the "unhappy consciousness," and to that extent it is indeed "the key to community" as Professor Plant says. It is however only a key. The real work of social transformation must be left to the "world spirit," to history, which philosophy alone can decipher, to be sure, but only retrospectively.

It is one of Professor Plant's many virtues that he does not feel obliged to exonerate Hegel from complicity in the crimes of our own century. He is mercifully above the childish game of identifying "good" and "bad" guys. He might, however, without resort to this sort of nonsense have asked some political questions about Hegel. Why does he identify freedom with knowledge of necessity and not, as most of us do, with striving for the new? How does he reconcile personal moral freedom and historical destiny? And finally, while community and rational authority are no doubt serious public values, what is one to make of them in a world that is ineluctably pluralistic?

In spite of these and other questions that one might put to Professor Plant, his *Hegel* is stimulating and illuminating and deserves a wide readership.

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Handbook of Organizational Measurement. By James L. Price. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972. Pp. 210. $7.95.)

This book is an attempt to present a compendium of measures used in research on complex organizations. It will be useful primarily but not exclusively to investigators planning cross-organizational survey research. Price sets out two purposes—to help improve measurement and to help achieve standardization of measurement. To me, but not to the author (pp. 1, 194), the first purpose is the most important. I agree with Professor Price that measurement in organizational research is crude and poor; in such circumstances it hardly makes sense to try to standardize! But, as Price implies (p. 195), a handy compendium will at least make it easy for investigators to see and, it is hoped, to benefit from, what has been done before.

The author chooses to present measures of the following concepts: absenteeism, administrative staff, alienation, autonomy, centralization, communication, complexity, consensus, coordination, dispersion, distributive justice, effectiveness, formalization, innovation, mechanization, motivation, bases of power, routinization, satisfaction, size, span of control, and succession. Many other concepts might have been included or substituted, and the basis for selecting these particular ones seems to be essentially subjective. The author mentions the criterion of "agreement among researchers" (pp. 7–9), but he does not precisely operationalize it. Price explains why he did not include "consideration" and "initiating structure" (pp. 193–194)—because they do not have conceptual definitions that fit any single concept on his list. One can well imagine the response of the contingency theorists: "They don't have to fit your list; we can supply our own conceptual definitions." Surely, omission on such grounds is unfortunate, and it makes one wonder how many other concepts are left out with similarly shaky justification. To the book's credit, a great many concepts not specifically treated under their own labels are included in the index and are mentioned in connection with one or more synonymous or allied concepts that *are* specifically treated. Such mentions are helpful, but it would have been much more helpful to have bibliographic references to their measurement, in addition. That way, if measures emphasizing a particular slant are not included in the Handbook, at least one would have information on where, if anywhere, to find them. I am thinking of concepts such as conflict, commitment, professionalization, prestige, acculturation, and participativeness. The researcher oriented toward cross-organizational surveys will fare better using this handbook than will those interested in experimental work, simulation, and case studies. Concepts such as organizational slack, aspiration levels, and clarity and operationality of goals, for example, do not seem to be covered.

Another problem the author faced was which measures or scales relevant to each concept to include. Although seven criteria of selection are provided (pp. 5–6), the use, nonuse, and weight given each criterion, and the *ad hoc* introduction of other criteria, seem to have been fairly subjectively and loosely decided. I was aware of many scales that might well have been mentioned but were not. In this case, however, the bibliography provided is excellent. If one's concept of interest is treated, then the bibliography should enable one to find important measures of it that are not reproduced in this volume. Again, measures not heretofore prominent in survey work are underrepresented, e.g., the many measures of centralization or participativeness in experiments, or of effectiveness in program evaluations. Some of the measures included (e.g., of centralization, consensus, innovation) are out of the ordinary and intriguing. One hopes that the Handbook will stimulate further creativity along such paths as well as reinforcing those that are justifiably well trodden.

For each concept treated, Price provides a conceptual definition and general discussion. For each specific measure, he describes the source research and its data collection, details the scoring procedure, discusses validity and reliability, and comments on quality and transferability. On the conceptual definitions, the author simply provides his own, with little defense or justification, and reports whether the measures presented follow it. Further probing, e.g., comparison of alternatives, would have been preferable, but some attention to conceptual definitions is better than none. On validity, Price primarily reports the research results, the implication being that if the hypotheses were (un)supported, the measures are (in)valid. There is obviously an error here. Examining results for predictive validity is a reasonable start, but only that.

In a concluding chapter, the author recommends the inclusion of instrumentation in all research reports. Further, if eliminated by editors or publishers, the measures should be filed with a general distribution source (e.g., the American Documentation Institute). I agree, for requiring such procedures would not only contribute to better measurement, but would make researchers more thoughtful about the reported meaning and importance of their results.

The book has its ups and downs, one of the latter being unfortunate lapses into elementary-school workbook style, but it definitely is worth consulting by anyone embarking on the instrumentation phase of organizational research, especially surveys.

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Political Apocalypse: A Study of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. By Ellis Sandoz. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. 263. $8.95.)

This study of Dostoevsky's Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is an extremely solid, closely thought out, vigorously argued and well-written book. Its aim is to prove that Dostoevsky, in his Legend, has "given mythopoetic expression to an experience of transcendence in the Christian mystical tradition. He has set down an apocalypse." Prof. Sandoz has studied, with a good deal of thoroughness, the social-political background of Russian culture in Dostoevsky's time, the Russian tradition of Orthodox theology on which Dostoevsky draws, and the sectarian mysticism for which he had a good deal of sympathy. All these came together in the Legend to create a powerful synthesis that renews the tradition of Biblical Apocalypse.

Professor Sandoz is a student of Eric Voegelin, and draws on Voegelin's thought for the framework of his interpretation of the political significance of the Legend. Voegelin sees modern totalitarian movements (communism and fascism), as well as a good deal of modern culture, as contemporary forms of the old Christian heresy of Gnosticism. The Legend is Dostoevsky's answer to this heresy as embodied in the radical social-political thought of his time. This, as Dostoevsky understood it, called for the nihilistic destruction of the world and its reconstruction under the aegis of naked human reason. In opposition, Dostoevsky affirmed the transcendence of human freedom to any possible order of immanence, and its subservience only to the divine truth of God and Christ apprehended intuitively by faith.

The reading of the Legend given by Prof. Sandoz is a very strenuous intellectual exercise, and one cannot help wondering whether this comparatively brief text, on the whole quite comprehensible, can really contain all the historical, theological, and political meanings that Prof. Sandoz manages to draw out of it. He certainly makes out a very good (if not entirely conclusive) case for answering this question in the affirmative. Best of all, the weight of his commentary does not interfere with his firm grasp of the existential and experiential core of Dostoevsky's text, which is the source of its power for the common reader.

There is no room here to discuss all the issues he raises, or to quarrel with the fine points of his interpretation. His attempt to turn the Grand Inquisitor into John the Baptist does not seem to me persuasive; and he goes astray in equating the Inquisitor too literally with traditional conceptions of the Anti-Christ. To speak of him as judging mankind "from a nauseous self-awareness of personal decrepitude" (p. 158) just does not correspond to the truth of the text. It is part of the greatness of Dostoevsky that he *does* allow the Inquisitor a good deal of moral sublimity in his own right. Also, while Prof. Sandoz honestly raises the problem of Dostoevsky's own gnosticism—the extent to which he himself nourished millenarian hopes about Russia—he disposes of the matter too lightly. What does it really mean to say that while Dostoevsky did "covet political power and even imperial success for Russia," he did not believe in "the use of power and coercion" to achieve the millennium (p. 235)? This is an issue that needs more elaborate discussion than Prof. Sandoz was willing to give it.

Nonetheless, Prof. Sandoz's book has the great merit of taking Dostoevsky seriously in his own terms, and as a great artist who was also an intellect of notable power. His book is a valuable contribution to the unbiased study of an artist whose work, as Prof. Sandoz amply proves, raises the deepest problems about the meaning and the fate of Western culture in the modern era.

JOSEPH FRANK

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Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior. By William R. Shaffer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 164. $7.50, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

This is not an easy book to review, for seldom has an attack on such an important problem been so mangled and confused as in this volume.

After a fairly straightforward, albeit pedestrian, discussion of recent voting studies, the body of this book is devoted to a comparison of the voting models of Anthony Downs and the Survey Research Center (SRC). The two models are operationalized and compared using the SRC's 1964 presidential election survey. This is a great idea whose time has certainly come. More and more scholars are beginning systematically to question the SRC model (and the SRC's analyses) for allegedly "downplaying" the role of issues and—implicitly or explicitly—the role of rationality and/or policy evaluation in voting. Since the influence of Downs is apparent in the work of so many of the SRC critics/modifiers, it is about time that the Downsian model was operationalized and subjected to some rigorous testing. While this book has been based on a very good idea, it is not a book that can be built upon. Instead it is one that needs to be done over properly.

In brief, the main branch of Downs's theory requires the calculation of four parameters for each voter: the voter's party differential—the difference the election outcome will make to the voter's utility; the probability that the individual's vote will matter to the outcome and hence to the voter's utility; the utility value to the voter of voting for the long-range value of maintaining elections; and the cost to the voter of the voting act. A voter prefers the candidate who promises to give him the largest expected utility. He casts a vote if the sum of his party differential, multiplied by the probability his vote will matter to the outcome, plus the long-range participation value of his vote are greater than his utility cost of voting.

Professor Shaffer's operationalizations of these parameters, and the way he combines them in his model, are questionable at best. A look at the main branch of his Downsian simulation will suffice to show the flaws in his methods.

For an index of the magnitude of each voter's party differential, Shaffer uses a transformed factor score based on three questions about how closely the election is being followed, how much the voter cares about the outcome, and whether the voter thinks the outcome will make a financial difference to him. The direction of the voter's party differential is determined from the latter question and is simply the party whose victory will benefit the voter the most financially. This procedure implicitly makes a strong and unnecessary assumption, that for all voters the utility associated with personal financial gain is greater than the utility of all other issues that they may be concerned with. Further, Shaffer does not even consider that different voters have different concerns and that no single question (or factor) adequately reflects an index of party differential for all voters, even though the survey contains data which would allow him to do so.

Shaffer's operationalization of the probability that a voter's vote will matter is another transformed factor score, based on the perceived closeness of the election. This may be an appropriate index, but Shaffer appears to enter this index additively rather than multiplicatively in his simulation. It is not certain, however, that he enters this probability parameter improperly because he does not provide enough information about how he processes the data; it would be impossible with only information that the book provides to take the book and the SRC data and replicate his results!

One of the few places where Shaffer is clear enough about his methods to make confident criticism easy is in operationalizing the cost of voting through an index of media usage. Media usage might offer a good lead on how the party differential was calculated, but it tells us nothing about the cost of voting itself. Not surprisingly, Shaffer finds his model more accurate without this parameter, for as he uses it, he is assuming that the more media a voter has consumed, the more likely it is that the voter will abstain.

Even more basic is the absence of discussion of how any of the individual scales were weighted or transformed. When an index of the value of a vote is compared with an index of the cost of the voting act, how is it decided whether the utility of voting is greater than the cost of voting? Does Shaffer assume—as it would seem—that both indices are not only perfectly correlated with utility, but also that both indices are measured on the same scale? Does Shaffer even know he is making assumptions about the weighting of interpersonal as well as intrapersonal utility scales? It would appear he does not. Shaffer's operationalizations are weak and their usage unfollowable, so there is little or no reason to draw anything from his discussion of Downs.

Shaffer's dealings with the SRC model are no more meaningful than his "tests" of Downs. While he has shown himself able to summarize much literature on simulations, he does not seem to understand what he has read. All his tests of the SRC six-component model are trivial. Instead of the SRC method of using least-squares techniques to assign weights to their six parameters, he either assigns weights of 1 to all parameters and calls this result the SRC model, or he assigns 5 parameters weights of 1 and lets the sixth weight range from 0 to 1. In essence, if the sum of a voter's weighted scores is exactly zero he abstains, if positive he votes for one party, if negative for the other. Where did the idea come from that 0 and 1 were natural limits for parameter weights of this type? Apparently Shaffer got this idea from misreading voting simulations where parameters were run from 0 to 1 because the parameters were probabilities and thus had "natural" limits of zero and one. In the SRC case such an assumption is meaningless. Might not candidate evaluation matter five times as much as domestic policy and three times as much as group benefits? Such a possibility would require more careful thinking about what parameter weights are, and simultaneous parameter testing. Thus, because flow charts and basic data are seldom clearly presented, and because operationalization and testing are sometimes misleading and generally weak, this book provides neither meaningful nor intelligible evaluations of the Downsian or SRC models.

Scholars, like voters, have limited time and money to spend in acquiring information, and, like voters, often tend to go by labels. It is surprising therefore to find a book of such uneven merit under the label of Oxford University Press. I feel obliged to urge readers to look behind Oxford's prestigious label before they purchase this book.

SAMUEL L. POPKIN
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Multivariate Model Building: The Validation of a Search Strategy. By John A. Sohnquist. (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970. Pp. 244. $5.00.)

Sohnquist has attempted to shine light into the twilight zone between the platonic heights of empirically grounded theory and the more typical depths of idiosyncratic data-grubbing. Asserting that "theory ought to emerge from . . . data . . . " (p. iii), he and his colleagues (much of the work reported on was done collaboratively) have sought to develop a procedure which can be used to "reveal the structure of relationships implicit in a set of data," (p. iii). Dependent variables in this procedure must be either dichotomies or interval-level variables; independent variables must be coded as nominal (or possibly ordinal).

AID (Automatic Interaction Detection), a computer algorithm based on one-way analysis of variance, is to be used to partition the population sequentially into nonoverlapping subgroups such that each split "provides the largest possible reduction in the unexplained sum of squares" (p. 20), with certain constraints which prevent the process from simply generating all possible subgroups. The end product is a tree structure. In the absence of severe skewness in one or more of the independent variables, this tree will be symmetric when the impact of the independent variables can be represented additively; asymmetries in the structure suggest interaction effects.

The subgroups thus generated by the AID analysis are to be used to create new composite variables for each major "interaction" effect. The transformed set of variables is then entered into an MCA (Multiple Classification Analysis) program. MCA is equivalent to a one-zero dummy-variable multiple regression in which coefficients of each class reflect deviations from the grand mean. (Unfortunately there is a typographical error in the defining equation of the MCA Algorithm in equation (1.7), p. 18: n_{12} should be n_{21}.)

The bulk of *MMB* gives a rationale for these recommendations. One chapter comprehensively surveying the literature on "contextual" (i.e., interaction) effects for nominal-level variables (although omitting important work by James Coleman) reveals that sociologists and political scientists have been slow to grasp the proposition that "variables don't always add." The next chapters compare results of AID and other methods for previously analyzed data and evaluate the ability of AID and MCA to "recover," despite superimposed stochastic noise, the actual forms of relationships of artificially generated processes. In an admirable final chapter Sohnquist is honest about possible lack of replicability of the AID partitions, recognizing that the more complex the statistical representation, the more likely it is to be picking up idiosyncratic features of a particular data base (Fudge's Second Law). His discussion of a variety of graphical, tabular and other special techniques for data inspection is excellent, through abbreviated, and even the statistically sophisticated reader can benefit from it.

AID is basically a technique for *describing*, i.e., parsimoniously classifying, a population in terms of its value on a criterion variable. As such it *may* be a useful preliminary to theory building. However, AID tends to use variables which "divide the sample into subgroups of approximately the same size" (p. 131); thus theoretically significant effects may be overlooked for factors rare in the sample, a problem which Sohnquist dismisses far too cavalierly. Also, since the end product of an AID classification is a nominal level variable, AID seems appropriate to theory building only where level of measurement is weak.

MMB sets an extremely high standard for care and candor in data analysis and concern for the appropriate use of statistical techniques, and it is in no way a statistical cookbook. But like the children of Israel worshipping the Golden Calf, some political scientists may mistake the computer for God (or a sausage grinder), and cry out to it indiscriminately for AID so that their articles may multiply and they may flourish. If, however, they read Sohnquist with the care which he deserves, they should at least know better.

BERNARD GROFMAN
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Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs: A Study of Cross-Pressures and Political Behavior. Peter W. Sperlich. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971. Pp. 256. $8.95.)

Students of voting behavior and the sociology (and politics) of knowledge will find Peter Sperlich's book interesting and stimulating. On the empirical level, it presents a careful and detailed development and examination of the hypothesis that politically cross-pressured persons tend to withdraw from political participation. The results of this analysis lead to some modifications of the hypothesis through the identification of conditions under which the withdrawal effect of cross-pressures is heightened or weakened. On the epistemological level, Professor Sperlich discusses why the social sciences tend to view social and psychological conflict in a negative way. He objects to the preconception that conflict is a state that necessarily needs resolution. He believes that the cross-pressure hypothesis emerged from this negative orientation toward conflict and argues for a more balanced view in which the positive contributions of conflict are recognized.

The hypothesis that conflicting attitude elements lead to delay and withdrawal from decision making is rather widely accepted in discussions of voting behavior. Its beginnings in this field may be traced to the landmark volumes, *The People's Choice* and *Voting*, both of which reported that inconsistent demographic and social characteristics (i.e., one or more of which is statistically associated with Democratic voting and the others with Republican voting) led to decreased interest in and attribution of importance to elections, delay in deciding how to vote, and, finally, lowered voting turnout. Psychological conflict was the presumed intervening causal mechanism. Similar results were reported in the later classics, *The Voter Decides* and *The American Voter*, both of which focused more directly on conflict among attitudinal elements themselves. From these auspicious beginnings, the cross-pressure hypothesis became part of the wisdom and folklore of the voting behavior field. Occasional failures to find support for it did not receive much attention nor have much impact on the field.

The data sets Sperlich uses to test the cross-pressure hypothesis are the 1952, 1956, and 1960 election studies of the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies. The major independent variables measuring attitudinal consistency, centrality and magnitude of cross-pressures are based on attitudes toward the candidates and parties as expressed in openended questions. Reporting both favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward one party or its candidates is considered to be an indication of cross-pressures. The dependent variables are all behavioral: time of voting decision, participation in the campaign and voting itself.

Only time of decision yields results consistent with the cross-pressure hypothesis: cross-pressured individuals decide for whom they will vote later in the campaign than do those whose attitudes are consistent. But contrary to the hypothesis, Sperlich finds that cross-pressured individuals tend to participate *more* than consistent individuals, both in the campaign and on Election Day. Among the cross-pressured, the severity of cross-pressures *is* negatively related to participation, but participation is still lower for consistent persons than even for those most severely cross-pressured.

Sperlich's basic revisions of the "standard model" result from an inquiry into the intellectual roots and assumptions about human nature made by cross-pressure theory. Its roots are identified in the psychological theories generally known as "consistency theories" associated with social psychologists such as Heider, Newcomb, Festinger, and others. From these consistency theories, Sperlich extracts three basic propositions which are the (unexamined) assumptions of the cross-pressure hypothesis. The thrust of these are that (1) inconsistency leads to psychic tension which (2) is uncomfortable or painful; hence, (3) since people always seek comfort and pleasure, they act to decrease tension as, for example, by preventing conflicts from arising or by resolving them. In criticizing these assumptions Sperlich asks, Do tensions always create discomfort? Do people universally seek to avoid pain and pursue pleasure?

To explore these questions, Sperlich reviews psychophysiological theories of pain and pleasure and concludes that tension increases may sometimes be pleasurable and that organisms thrive at optimum rather than minimum levels of tension. From a further review of the literature on hedonist motivation, he proposes that a more complex model of motivation is needed, one in which man's varying "levels of existence" are considered. Needs and motivations differ for organic, mental, and social concerns. The "standard" cross-pressure model is then revised in two ways: (1) The notion of appropriate and inappropriate levels of tension with respect to the tension requirements of an individual is introduced. If the tension requirement is high, an increase in tension will be experienced as pleasurable and will not be avoided. (2) The theory is further revised to include the proposition that "the more dominant in any given situation the aims and motives of ego and conscience, the less will behavior be guided by organismic (id) demands for pleasure and gratification, such as expressed in attempts to resolve all conflicts" (p. 84).

Sperlich's tests of the revised theory lead to the discovery of complex relationships among magnitude of cross-pressures, centrality, psychological integration, social conscience, and political behavior. Among the most important findings buttressing his critique of the pleasure principle is that within levels of magnitude of cross-pressures, citizen duty, caring about the election outcome, and education all increase participation. These indicators of conscience (duty and caring) and ego strength (education) are interpreted as working contrary to the pleasure principle since they increase participation in the presence of cross-pressures. Thus, the findings support the revised version of the theory which stresses conditions under which people will seek complexity rather than the simplicity of denial or ignorance. "Only when ego and conscience motives were weak did pleasure-oriented withdrawal behaviors manifest themselves" (p. 134). The fact that the highest level of participation is observed among those with low (as opposed to no) cross-pressures (a low cross-pressure state is equated with one of low tension) is also cited to support the revised theory, since Sperlich views participation in this group as a "tension-increasing" response to low magnitude of cross-pressures. He raises but does not resolve the problem of why consistent persons, presumably under even less tension, should not participate even more.

Sperlich argues that his revision of the cross-pressure model basically changes it from one oriented toward simplicity and harmony to one oriented toward complexity and conflict. He believes that the empirical predictive success of the revised model challenges the harmony-oriented "ruling master theory" of the social sciences and calls for a new paradigm which incorporates conflict as well as harmony in its interpretation of human behavior.

In reviewing this particular study, it seems worthwhile to note that among the social scientists being challenged by Sperlich's analysis are those who originally collected the archival data he uses. Sperlich's work may therefore be added to a growing body of studies in the voting behavior literature that help to dispel the fear that reliance on archival data might lead to a homogenization or conformity of research orientations around the paradigms held by those who designed the source studies and contributed the data. Since the voting behavior field has been so dominated by data emanating from Michigan's Center for Political Studies, it is particularly important to note the intellectual challenge and conflict these data can sustain and encourage.

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New Theories of Revolution. By Jack Woddis. (New York: International Publishers, 1972. Pp. 415. $10.00, cloth; $3.65, paper.)

What is the cardinal sin? It is writing off the working class as a nonrevolutionary force. Mr. Woddis, an old Marxist hand at analyses of African and neocolonist politics, provides ample evidence that Frantz Fanon, Régis Debray, and Herbert Marcuse are guilty of this transgression. The question remains whether these theorists are nevertheless accurate in discounting the revolutionary potential of the working class. Woddis thinks not. In support of his opinion he offers a prodigious collection of data, amounting to overkill, affirming the vitality of the working class—and the Communist parties.

The focus of the inquiry is the role of social classes in the revolution and the subsidiary questions of the form and locus of the struggle, peaceful or armed, town or countryside. Since a socialist revolution requires the transfer of power from the capitalist class to the working class and its allies, the working class, as the advancing class, constitutes by objective necessity the revolutionary instrument. By definition, then, or by the canons of scientific Marxism, if you prefer, the theories of Fanon, Debray, and Marcuse provide no guide to revolutionary action and, indeed, may play into the hands of the ruling classes.

The author's critique takes the form of a class analysis of the ideas of Fanon, Debray, and Marcuse as they apply respectively to Africa, Latin America, and the western world. He attacks Fanon's view that in Africa the peasants with an assist from the *lumpenproletariat*, the uprooted in the urban areas, constitute the only revolutionary class, spontaneously ready to turn to violent action. He rejects Fanon's notion of violence as a catharsis through which the masses come to understand social truths. He rejects as well Fanon's dismissal of the working class as a privileged and hence nonrevolutionary classs, offering in rebuttal evidence of its exploitation and degradation. What appears to concern the author most is that Fanon's denigration of the working class impedes the revolutionary process toward socialism and lends " . . . support to all those who wish to foster a stunted form of capitalism in Africa and maintain the working class in a subordinate position" (p. 169).

So, too, the author attacks Debray for ascribing to the peasantry, together with students and intellectuals, the main potential revolutionary role in Latin America. He hits where it hurts by providing a head count of those who took part in the attack on the Moncada barracks and sailed in the "Granma" to show that they were overwhelmingly wage earners and of lower-class origin, granted the organization of the actions by a group of intellectuals. Much of his discussion is devoted to a defense of the Cuban Communists and the working class in opposing Batista, suggesting that the struggles of the Communists were important in preparing the conditions both for Castro's seizure of power and for the revolutionary process after Batista's flight. As Woddis laid it on Fanon for ascribing a central role to violence, so he also attacks Debray for stressing violence as a necessary experience in transforming oneself into a dedicated revolutionary (p. 398). Woddis is also critical of Debray's concept of the "foco," the isolated guerrilla group which, through expanding military action, grows into a revolutionary vanguard. Che Guevara's misfortune in Bolivia gives the author some ammunition. But the case of Chile is not all that clear; it could be argued that preventive violence against the bourgeoisie was indispensable for securing the Marxist revolutionary process.

Fanon's and Debray's "underestimation" of the working class in developing countries is one thing; Marcuse's characterization of the working class in the western world, particularly in the United States, as a willing collaborator in the *status quo* is quite another. Woddis concedes that Marcuse is right in pointing to the students (and other groups) as constituting a dissident factor, but he argues that they are of mixed class origin, not a social class in the Marxist sense, and serve rather as a "flanking" movement to complement the action of the working class. Conceding also the enormous co-optative magnet of American capitalism, Woddis nonetheless argues that it is ever more necessary to support the revolutionary elements of the working class because there can be no fundamental change in the present system unless it is based in the working-class movement. And there it is. Calling on Lenin, Woddis writes that it is always necessary to have faith in the workers, even when they apparently no longer have faith in themselves. Woddis is no less guilty of the "elitism" with which he charges Marcuse.

What the author's polemic comes down to is that by denying the revolutionary role of the working class, Fanon, Debray and Marcuse are un-Marxist and are objectively playing into the hands of the capitalists. The Marxist, more accurately in Woddis's case, the Marixst-Leninist, premise is that there can be no revolution, conceived as process, without the working class. Theoretically, he has one strong argument: in confrontation with those who control the means of production, no other class or social group in American society disposes of the power comparable to that held by the working class. Yet it is precisely because of their different readings of working-class revolutionary potential that Fanon, Debray, and Marcuse (whose command of Marxist theory will at least match Woddis's) have attempted to develop new revolutionary perspectives. They may be wrong, but at least they treat theory as a creative tool instead of clinging, as Woddis does, to the conventional tenets of Marxism-Leninism in a radically changed world.

BERNARD S. MORRIS

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Establishing Ombudsman Offices: Recent Experience in the United States. Transcript of the Ombudsman WORKSHOP, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 5–7, 1971. Edited by Stanley V. Anderson and John E. Moore. (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1972. Pp. 293. $3.00, paper.)

This book is a nearly verbatim report on an ombudsman workshop held in Honolulu in May 1971. It should be of considerable interest not only to incumbents of new ombudsmen offices and ombudsmen scholars but also to political scientists interested in state and local government or the institutionalization process. Verbatim reports of such discussions run the risk of superficiality, repetition, inaccuracy, and irrelevancy. On the other hand, they can have an advantage over other forms of exposition if they allow the reader to eavesdrop on intelligent and careful questioning of knowledgeable political actors. Fortunately, *Establishing Ombudsman Offices* for the most part avoids the defects and enjoys the advantages of a recorded discussion. This happy situation is attributable in part to the calibre of many of the participants and in part to the detailed agendas of the meetings and the tactful guidance given to discussion by Professors Anderson and Moore.

Because the round table took place in Hawaii and because Horman Doi, the Hawaiian ombudsman, was at the time the only incumbent American ombudsman, many of the participants were concerned with the handling of complaints against government administration in Hawaii. Doi's own account of how he dealt with various problems encountered during his first months in office is very interesting, especially since he is generally considered to have been an immense success. Apparently an important reason for that success has been Doi's political acumen in handling administrators and legislators. The discussion of the Hawaiian ombudsman casts light on what objectives Doi set for himself and how he handled jurisdictional, staffing, publicity and record keeping problems. There is a lucid account of how the office investigates complaints and secures redress for persons with justified complaints, an account further enhanced by Doi's excellent flow chart of his operations reproduced in Appendix I. Significantly, most redress is secured through informal discussions with agency heads. Formal written recommendations are very rarely employed, and Doi had not used and never wanted to use his ultimate weapon of publicity to coerce an agency.

It is generally agreed among scholars that ombudsmen are able to operate effectively only when complementing the activities of other complaint-handling organizations. Appropriately, Doi's account of his office is followed by descriptions of the Honolulu Office of Information and Complaint by its director and assistant director and of the University of Hawaii ombudsman by the incumbent. Both of these organizations cooperate with Doi, and all three have more than enough citizen inputs to keep them busy. Indeed there is evidence for believing that the more complaint-handling agencies there are and the more effectively they perform, the more complaints will flow from the public.

Since the cooperation of administrators is necessary for the success of an ombudman, the deputy chief of the Honolulu Police and the director of the State Department of Taxation were questioned closely at the workshop. Their answers and Doi's comments reveal that the Hawaiian ombudsman's tactful handling of government agencies has generally won their full cooperation.

The book's two editors also made significant substantive contributions to the workshop. Stanley V. Anderson, who has done more than any other political scientist to promote American ombudsmen and ombudsman research, presents a useful analysis of the qualifications to look for in appointing ombudsmen and closed the workshop with the suggestion that from the perspective of American constitutional theory the ombudsman perhaps should be seen as a necessary implementation of the First Amendment right of petition. His colleague at Santa Barbara, John E. Moore, who will shortly publish a full account of the Hawaiian ombudman, provides a useful sketch of the array of public and private organizations in Hawaii which complement the activities of the ombudsman.

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Government Publications and Their Use, 2nd revised edition. By Laurence F. Schmeckebier and Roy B. Eastin. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969. Pp. viii, 502. $9.95.

Annotated Bibliography of Bibliographies on Selected Government Publications and Supplementary Guides to the Superintendent of Documents Classification System. By Alexander C. Body. (Kalamazoo, Mich., Western Michigan University, 1967. Pp. 181. $2.50, paper. First Supplement, 1968. Pp. 115. $2.50, paper. Second Supplement, 1970, 1970. Pp. 138. $2.50, paper. Third Supplement, 1972, Pp. 143. $2.50, paper. Fourth Supplement, 1974. Pp. 142. $2.50 paper. For sale by the author, Alexander C. Body, 925 Westfall, Kalamazoo, Mich. 49007.)

Guide to U.S. Publications. By John L. Andriot. (McLean, Va.: Documents Index, 1973. 3 volumes. Pp. 1,000. Price not listed).

Library collections of U.S. government documents have been called the despair of researchers. They constitute a labyrinth of publications, enormous in their number, variety of form and content, immense complexity, and lack of uniformity in classification. The richness of these source materials over a publishing history of two hundred years is unbelievable, and most gratifying.

Schmeckebier and Eastin is a reference classic in the field of U.S. government publications, although it also provides limited coverage of state and county material. The new edition annotates the basic guides to government publications—indexes, catalogs, and bibliographies—and provides references to valuable compilations and serials. It explains the complicated system (and sometimes lack thereof) of federal government document classification. In the process it covers the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, constitutions, laws, court decisions, administrative regulations, departmental rulings, presidential papers, foreign affairs, reports on operation, organization and personnel, maps, technical and other departmental publications, periodicals, and microfilm editions of government publications.

Frequently, the book devotes half a dozen or more pages to helping the researcher find his way through the *terra incognita* of old reference works, issued over a period of generations with varying publishing standards, indicating their specific character, scope, and value, or their shortcomings such as incomplete coverage, poor indexes, or interrupted periods of publication. The book greatly helps the researcher to ascertain the usefulness of a particular reference work or government publication for his special needs and guides his way through the maze. Studying pp. 139–43 will save students hours of confusion when they seek their way through the changing pagination and indexing practices of the daily, bi-weekly and session edition of the *Congressional Record*, both before and since 1968.

This book is not always well organized, perhaps because of several revisions since its original publication in 1936, nor is it entirely consistent in its format for listing publications. Its value would be greatly enhanced by a more thorough index. But, on the whole, Schmeckebier and Eastin is very valuable. While it is especially useful and indeed indispensable for advanced work it also offers a good deal to the beginner in government document research.

Dr. Alexander C. Body's work contains: (1) 300 annotated bibliographies, representing more than half a million entries from governmental and nongovernmental sources on the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, published by the U.S. government from May 1963 through June 1967; (2) an alphabetical list of 700 officially acknowledged abbreviations and symbols used by government agencies simultaneously serving as an alphabetical list of government series, circulars, handbooks, manuals, pamphlets, periodicals, reports, and government agencies; (3) a classified list of the current government authors, departments, and agencies—all arranged according to the Superintendent of Documents Classification System. An index of bibliographies, a combination of department-agency, author, title, and subject index complete the compilation.

The *Supplements* follow the pattern of the main bibliography in regard to arrangement, treatment, and format. They include 470 additional exhaustively annotated bibliographies, both retrospective and current, covering several periods between 1958 and 1974.

Dr. Body's work is most useful and welcome, and it is hoped that other *Supplements* will follow.

Volume I of Mr. John L. Andriot's *Guide to U.S. Government Publications* provides annotated references to the publications of government agencies in existence in January 1973, while Volume II covers the publications of abolished agencies and discontinued Superintendent of Documents classes of current agencies. Volume III furnishes an explanation and outline of the SuDocs classification system, as well as agency and title indexes. Additions and corrections will be published in quarterly additions to these basic volumes.

This book is a continuation and expansion of Andriot's *Guide to U.S. Government Serials and Periodicals* published in several editions between 1959 and 1972. It provides an annotated list of some 4,000 U.S. government periodical publications, including current serials, periodicals, releases, reports, field agency publications, and ephemeral material. Subseries are included. Dates of first publication and interruptions in publication are furnished. The earlier volumes are of value in tracing government publications which have been discontinued or have changed their contents. The 1972 volume should be used together with the 1969 and 1970 editions, of 1,683 pages (in three volumes) and 609 pages, respectively.

Both of Andriot's *Guides* are indispensable for advanced research work in the field of U.S. government publications. They are also very useful for beginners.

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Social Mobility and Voting Behavior. By James Alden Barber, Jr. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. Pp. 280. $5.95.)

The purpose of Professor Barber's book is to examine how the socially mobile behave politically and what the consequences of such behavior are for the stability and flexibility of the political system. Basically, Barber believes that the socially mobile are influenced politically by the socializing experiences connected with both their past and their present status levels in life, causing them to exhibit political behavior somewhere in between that typical of the two levels. This "intermediate response" is supposedly characteristic of both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile and is assumed to serve as a moderating force in politics, decreasing class conflict and class politics in society and thereby allowing democracy the flexibility it needs to function effectively.

Barber's social mobility theory depends on the larger theory of class influences on political behavior. For the mobile to undergo change, the political influences of the various social classes must be different. While Barber seems to take this for granted, he also cautions us that the correlation between class and political behavior may not reflect any serious "class consciousness" or even any political salience of class at all, but instead the possible influence of related third factors. These "third factors" seem to be attitudes and behaviors acquired from conscious class experiences that are themselves later forgotten or deemed unimportant, or attitudes and behaviors inherited from others having such conscious class experiences. One would think, however, that for the crosscurrent influences of the social classes to be effective on the mobile, the influences themselves would have to be more directly tied to class. To maintain Barber's line of reasoning seems partly at odds with his own social mobility theory, for if class itself is not politically salient to the different levels in society, one would hardly expect these levels to be able to affect the mobile politically in the manner he predicts. In my opinion, Barber unconsciously realizes this, relying implicitly in most of his book on the theory of salient class influences on the mobile. From this perspective, Barber sees society as divided into three main classes each exhibiting different political behavior: the business/professional, white-collar, and blue-collar classes. To test his hypothesis that the socially mobile take intermediate positions between the socially stable individuals of these classes, Barber divides the 1952, 1956, and 1960 Michigan SRC election samples into the mobile and nonmobile components for each of these classes by comparing the respondent's occupational level with that which he reported for his father when he, the respondent, was growing up. Chi-square tests and percentage comparisons are then made between the mobile and the nonmobile on a series of political variables.

Barber believes his findings largely corroborate his social mobility theory. A close look at these findings, however, reveals two possible problems in drawing such a conclusion. First, his basic notion of class differences in political behavior is not reflected as a monotonic pattern in the data as he would have hoped. The white-collar class often registers higher values on political variables than the business class, and, when this occurs, Barber's theory is confounded, since the very groups he intends to use as reference points for the socially mobile are not behaving as predicted. As a consequence of this flaw in the data pattern, the prediction of intermediate behavior for certain mobility groups is often not met. A second problem is that for those mobility groups in which the predictions of "intermediate behavior" are fulfilled, the data findings are usually small; this is because the mobility group in question is usually much nearer to one of its class reference points than to the other, instead of near the middle as a crosscurrent class-influence theory would assume. Of course, the time when people's mobility occurred might be a key factor in determining their exact position between their class of origin and their present status, especially since the political socialization literature provides the underlying rationale for these different class experiences. As plausible as this seems, Barber finds little empirical confirmation for this crucial "time" hypothesis. While not having direct information on when people became mobile, Barber uses "age" as a surrogate measure and finds that the political position of the mobile vis-à-vis the nonmobile changes little across the several age groups.

One naturally wonders why Barber's findings are often weak and sometimes nonexistent. Technical considerations might provide part of the answer—the grossness of the class categories used, the definition of mobility as a comparison between father's and son's status, and the use of recall data to establish that definition. But surely the bulk of the answer goes beyond a discussion of technical problems. The viewpoint of the Michigan team of voting scholars would probably be that class and mobility matter little in the determination of political behavior, at least in modern times. The elections of Barber's study were not dominated by class and mobility factors but rather by Eisenhower's personality, by the "valence" issues associated with his campaigns, and, in 1960, by the overriding factor of religion. As a strange change in position, Barber, on the last page of his book, seems to acknowledge that mobility has little effect statistically in explaining voting behavior, although his earlier contentions with regard to his empirical results leave exactly the opposite impression. As a last point, Barber argues that mobility as a variable is important in the study of political behavior, regardless of what statistical effects it currently has. His reasoning is based on the notion that the simple existence of mobility provides society with both the flexibility and the stability it needs. While one would have to grant the importance of mobility existing in a society, this matter seems academic today. The question of an "open" society was settled early in our history, and there seems little chance that such a condition would be reversed in present times even if it could be. It would seem that class and mobility were both more important and more salient politically in our earlier history than they are today. One can only conclude that Barber concentrated on a variable that has little statistical or substantive importance for contemporary political behavior, and, as a result, the significance of his work for political scientists is not successfully demonstrated.

JERROLD G. RUSK

University of Arizona

Righteous Conquest: Woodrow Wilson and the Evolution of the New Diplomacy. By Sidney Bell. (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, Inc. 1972. Pp. 209. $10.95.)

The re-evaluation of the Wilson Era has called into question the President's role as a diplomatist. Professor Sidney Bell's *Righteous Conquest* asserts that Wilson's foreign policy was primarily aimed at the acquisition of markets in order to enhance the American free enterprise system. Wilson's motivation in most matters has usually been interpreted as an idealistic notion of a democratic world grounded upon international law with the implicit assumption of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Revisionists like Bell, however, emphasize a pragmatic executive who never wavered from an America-first economic plan despite the fact that local nationalism and world revolution tended to counter his program. To Wilson, international trade was all-essential in maintaining American democracy.

Despite the author's emphasis on Wilson's commercial orientation, the president did not differ in outward appearance from the other post-Appomattox presidents. Bell, however, insists that Wilson's uniqueness lay in blending the idealistic with the pragmatic. Of course, Wilson did not consciously adopt these policies but his interference in the Caribbean countries and across the Atlantic did in essence seek to insure the stability of America's markets. In this strategy, Wilson did not waver substantially from the interventionism of the first Roosevelt and Taft, except that the commercialism was now wrapped in Democratic clothing. The Wilsonian system of collective security was in revisionist eyes another example of forwarding America's commercial power. Thus, for Bell, Wilson's quest for markets was a "righteous conquest" based on international order, Anglo-Saxon détente, and the liberating effect of America's supposed moral leadership.

For all its emphasis on economic matters, Bell's analysis differs only slightly from the work of others. Selig Adler (*Hispanic American Historical Review*, 20 [May, 1940], 198–226), has pointed out the similarity of American policy south of the border under Wilson to the imperialistic adventures of his Republican predecessors, though Wilson did veto Bryan's attempt to clamp a Platt Amendment upon Nicaragua. Arno T. Mayer (*Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–19* [1967]) noted that Wilson's aims, especially in founding the League, were intended to neutralize the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution, and that there were more practical reasons for his achievements than the moral precepts Wilson was so adept at repeating. Bell fails to refer to N. Gordon Levin's, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (1968)—a serious omission. In more detail than Bell, Levin weighs the economic basis of Wilsonian internationalism and the way in which the Communist Revolution influenced the Princetonian idealist, especially his plans for a world polity.

While Bell's views are often provocative, they actually only buttress the work of the post-Link revisionists—describing how the Wilson *leitmotif* stressed American economic might in order to gain leverage in *Machtpolitik*. The spate of recent writings has revealed that behind the rhetoric of righteousness lay the pedestrian incentive of the dollar.

Bell's sources are adequate (except for omitting Levin's volume). Unfortunately, the notes are located at the conclusion of each chapter and an annotated bibliography would have been useful. Nevertheless, this generally well-researched and well-written work is a welcome addition to our understanding of one of this century's most enigmatic presidents. Bell makes his point and states the case effectively.

MILTON PLESUR

SUNY, Buffalo

Reform and Continuity: The Electoral College, the Convention, and the Party System. By Alexander M. Bickel. (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971. Pp. 122. $1.75, paper.)

The Convention Problem: Issues in Reform of Presidential Nominating Procedures. By Judith H. Parris. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972. Pp. 194. $5.95.)

The People's President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct-Vote Alternative. By Neal R. Peirce. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968. Pp. 400. $8.95.)

Each of these three books could take as its theme the proposition: "Resolved: any system that three times nominated and twice elected Richard M. Nixon can't be all good." Each author, in his or her own fashion, stakes out a position for liberal reform of that system.

While the theory stated above seems to explain what inspires the writers of this kind of reform literature and is certainly a very good one to account for its present popularity, it will not hold. Each of the books was written before the 1972 national conventions; before Watergate was explored; before the effect of quotas was fully appreciated; and pre-Eagleton and the Agnew of Maryland politics. In fact, Neal Peirce's book on the electoral college system predates the 1968 conventions. Let me begin by briefly summarizing the thrust of each work.

Neal Peirce in *The People's President* has written what he hopes is the basic account of the electoral college system and it may well be so. His audience is those working in Congress and state legislatures who wish to move to a form of direct election. Peirce would provide the arguments and factual ammunition. When he wrote it, he was political editor of *Congressional Quarterly* and this no doubt leads one to expect, look for, and in fact, find those tabulations of statistical detail reminiscent of a well-written sports page. In his relatively long historical section, he is also predictably thorough and painstaking and at points, fascinating. He ends up attempting to state fairly all sides of the electoral college argument and pumps for reform and "a people's president." The book is neither as outdated nor onesided as its mod title suggests. Peirce borrowed it from a *Washington Post* editorial.

The Convention Problem by Judith H. Parris may just as surely be classed as a typical Brookings product. If so, this should be taken as a tribute rather than a dismissal. Its audience is the party pros who in 1972 and after are wrestling with making the rules for presidential nominating conventions. The book is less bulky than Peirce's and more time-bound; in this case to current proposals for convention reform, some of such a minor nature as to be of interest only to the above audience. It is also less historical or statistical than Peirce, but is a good deal more sophisticated in its concern for what political outcomes will follow upon major or minor changes in convention procedure. The author states that the standard by which these procedures should be judged is the extent to which they are "fair and democratic." In actual fact, however, she applies other equally relevant standards since she is never unaware throughout the book that the purpose of a nomination procedure is to find a candidate who has a fair chance of winning, and select him in a way that will not end up tying a cement block around his gullet for the campaign ahead. She also, like all of us, has her own policy preferences which she hopes the fair and democratic procedures will sustain. Throughout, the tone and most recommendations are conventionally liberal, and are stated in a common-sense and reasonable manner—Walter Cronkite fashion.

Reform and Continuity by Alexander Bickel is a paperback of under a hundred pages of text that deals with reform of the electoral college and the presidential nominating conventions, with concluding remarks on the judicial status of state statutes that discriminate against minor party activity. He aims his work at congressmen with perhaps an eye to the supplementary American government text market. Bickel adopts a familiar and increasingly popular style of today, that of the wise old man of experience who wants liberal goals; but hold it, George, not so fast, remember the wisdom of the founders. This stance was originally pioneered in his news columns by Walter Lippmann, but since Bickel's writing, has been elaborated into the full beauty of a crocheted quilt by Senator Samuel Ervin. Bickel's plea is not to throw out you know whom with you know what.

The presidential nominating procedures are so closely intertwined with the election method that if the electoral college is changed, the convention system will probably also change as well—a point none of the authors, I believe, stresses sufficiently. Since I nevertheless think this is so, I will devote more attention to the electoral college reform and note secondarily how its fate will in turn probably affect the fate of the convention reform.

The standard I think relevant in such discussion is not that of slogans such as "power to the people," but the probable political effects of reform on decision outcomes. The questions to be examined are what kinds of politicians will exert greatest influence, and on whose behalf, if the presidential nominating or election procedures are changed.

There is little debate among these writers or, I trust, any one else out of the Wallace camp, about the desirability of getting rid of electors as independent actors, and the sooner the better. Beyond this, the alternative to the electoral college system is not just straight out popular vote, but popular vote with gimmicks. The most dubious gimmick is that which insists that a candidate must get at least 40 per cent of the vote or face a good old-fashioned runoff in the style of the southern primary or the French presidential system. Bickel is correct, I think, in arguing that this would result in a multiparty system. The 1968 result, in which both major party candidates received in the neighborhood of 43 per cent of the vote, would encourage more minor party candidates. Certainly with the 40 per cent rule, Senator Eugene McCarthy would have been in to force a runoff. It would thus make nomination by a major party convention worth a good deal less than now, and in turn make their procedures more responsive to groups not in the center of the political continuum. After a few such elections, I suspect, we would abandon the convention for a national primary with its runoffs. Let me add that unlike Bickel, I do not see a straight out popular vote without gimmicks producing the multiparty result, and for some of the reasons Peirce states, see less reason to oppose it.

Peirce trots out all the electoral college horror stories, with the examples of how, by shifting X thousand votes in states A, B, and C, candidate Q_1 would be elected instead of Q_2, but with less than a popular majority! The trouble with such arguments is they always contain the implied statement, "other things remaining constant." But if you juggle with Q_1 votes in states A, B, and C, similar votes in the other states will also get jiggled around and now you've created a substantial popular electoral college victory for Q_1; at least that's the way it has worked out, except for that other moth eaten horror story: that tragically significant and politically earth-shaking election held back in 1888 when Benjamin Harrison crept in without a popular mandate and so determined all our fates for the next century or two. (The same result incidentally occurred in the February 1974 three-way election in Britain. Without an electoral college, Wilson, who got fewer popular votes than Heath, became Prime Minister.)

Peirce's best argument, it seems to me, is that while the present system gives certain liberal minorities advantages, there is no guarantee that this outcome will remain unchanged. A few elections from now, the hard hats may be the big urban swing vote, or some other group that we professors may not approve of. Defending the electoral college on the basis that we like the way it discriminates now is as risky as defending the Supreme Court because you like its present policy stands.

The most profound effect of changing the electoral college is not sufficiently emphasized in these books—i.e., that it will encourage a further nationalizing of American politics. This trend is already well begun. Under reform, you will be able to recruit your presidential candidates from South Dakota and Arizona without apology. State politicians in national conventions from Daley on, up or down, will lose even more influence in the selection process, as they already have in those states with presidential primaries. But also they will then lose influence in the election process (no more the scare stories built on how Hiram Johnson of California was snubbed by

Charles E. Hughes and got Wilson elected in 1916). The election campaign will also change. Parties will be motivated to get out every potential supporter wherever he, or she, or it, might be holed up. Inevitably, a national registration and election system free of suspicion of fraud will become an absolute necessity. No more state rigging of the countdowns. Again it seems obvious that these changes would be reflected in the nomination process.

None of the books discusses who the new political kingmakers are or will be under a more nationalized system. These national political groupings are already half formed in response to the present need to win presidential primaries, and are presently only partially restrained and frustrated by local politicos. Now they will come to center stage. Their advisors are apparent and are already active in party councils; they include personnel from the large universities and polling groups but yes, also from such research organizations as Brookings, and *Congressional Quarterly*.

But a most important effect of a straight out popular vote system will be an increased influence of the national media. Only one of the authors, Judith Parris, deals with this issue. Very perceptively she points out the conflict in goals between politicians who want to win elections, and media types who want to keep up viewer and reader ratings. She outlines the degree to which TV needs have already reshaped national convention procedures, noting such small but significant points as that the media demand space for equipment even though it blocks the view of convention participants, resisting the suggestion that they use the slightly less effective but serviceable telephoto lens developed for events which will not permit camera platforms on the scrimmage line and in the huddles. The media seek drama and human interest, i.e., entertainment as on any other prime time program. In the exact sense of the words, media men and women are troublemakers for the politicians, since they profit by encouraging conflict and excitement and playing hearts and flowers at odd moments. The state politician has already been banished from the rostrum as too boring for David Brinkley to attend to. Far better to interview the delegate running for vice president in the hotel lobby, with one-half of one convention vote pledged to him on the third ballot. The political prejudices of the media also will be more significant to the outcome. At present they are clearly liberal, since this is conventionally chic, but that this posture will continue given the tremendous investment in facilities for media operations seems to me to be questionable at best. For example, none of the media or, incidentally, none of the authors in the books reviewed who wrote after the event, hammered home the point that to have the chairman of the committee who reforms the delegate selection process at the same time be a major presidential candidate benefiting from those changes, is a hell of a way to get the appearance of "fair and democratic procedures."

It is hardly necessary to go on cataloguing the effect of media needs and concerns on campaigns and candidates—the-look-what-they-did-to-McGovern or how-about-the-Nixon-Kennedy-debates kind of argument. What this example suggests is that people who write books favoring reform should as much as they can spell out all of the political effects on major party groupings of what they suggest or oppose rather than giving us for comfort "the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy." Bickel comes closest to doing so, though for my taste he is too hung up on preserving the present balance of political forces as if it will never change. Judith Parris makes incisive comments when she shakes free of the pure democracy kick. But none of these books have fully treated such problems. A significant issue overlooked is the desirability of accelerating or slowing down the effect of replacing state-based veto groups with nationally-based veto and control groups.

CHARLES PRESS

Michigan State University

Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army. Edited by Leo Bogart. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 393. $12.00.)

Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953. By Richard M. Dalfiume. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969. Pp. 252. $6.00.)

Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces. By Richard J. Stillman, II. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968. Pp. 167. $10.00.)

The Armed Services and Society. Edited by J. N. Wolfe and John Erickson. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 170. $8.95.)

If much remains to be done to accomplish complete racial integration in our society today, the American military experience with racial integration offers some encouragement and not a little basis for pride. No doubt the military would be the first to admit that it is far from reaching the ideal of racial integration and that its record has perhaps not been any better than that of many other institutions in American life in this regard, but the military can also say that the armed forces are more integrated than any other institution today. The studies by Dalfiume, Stillman, and

Bogart et al. provide us with an opportunity to examine this phenomenon and to determine whether or not any instruction can be gained for future actions. The collection of essays from the annual University of Edinburgh Seminar edited by Wolfe and Erickson presents several other ways to view the interaction between the armed services and society primarily in the United Kingdom.

How far we have come and how far we have yet to go on the road to complete racial integration are illustrated in the three books which focus on that problem in the American armed services. Dalfiume gives us the detailed historical treatment of what he calls the "war on two fronts" (foreign enemies overseas and segregation at home). The paradoxes are richly carved (fighting a war for democratic principles with a segregated military force against an authoritarian enemy with a master race ideology) but he does not go beyond telling the story as an historian. Stillman does move toward an appreciation of the political forces, and a little further into the present era, that brought about racial integration in the American armed services during the late 'forties and early 'fifties but he falls short of a thoroughgoing political critique of the process of racial integration. Although he faults historians with too single-minded a purpose in analysis, he relies too heavily on a straightforward historical account of the process of change in military policy and attitudes toward racial integration to satisfy his goal of an exclusively political analysis of the policy decisions.

Bogart and his associates expand on the role social scientists can and did play in providing data in very short order and under a highly pressured deadline for major governmental decisions on this matter. During the Korean War Bogart and his team set out on official assignment from the Pentagon to determine how the military felt about integration in the armed services in Korea and how it was working where it was tried. The evidence from Korea and, shortly thereafter in 1951, from selected posts within the United States showed that the Army's standard of effective manpower utilization could be improved while meeting Negro aspirations for racial equality through integration of the Army. By contrast, and in a more diffuse manner, the Edinburgh series of papers suggests analytical insights mostly in the British context about (1) the armed services as a reflection of the society served, (2) the criteria for determining defense needs, (3) the relationships between successful military training and the individual application of that training to civilian jobs after military service, and (4) the question of whether or not the armed services constitute an embodiment of support for the aspirations of society.

Both Dalfiume and Stillman help us to realize how much the official policy and attitudes toward the practice of racial segregation can change in one institution over the course of a single generation. The strength of Dalfiume's study lies in his detailed description of how the change came about in America's military forces. Today it might be hard to imagine that an Army Chief of Staff could be opposed to racial equality as official policy, yet we find General George C. Marshall upholding quotas for Negroes in the Army, segregated units, and a separate-but-equal principle which almost always meant discrimination against Negroes. (Not all Negro servicemen disagreed with General Marshall, since, according to Dalfiume [p. 47] some black career soldiers felt their stature would be diminished if they were to compete on ability alone in an integrated situation.) If Dalfiume does not make entirely explicit the reasons for the change in military policy on integration within the American armed services, his chronicle of events does give the reader an adequate basis for making his own judgments. One of his major themes which agrees with a position taken by Stillman is that equal opportunity for Negroes in the military closely parallels the critical needs of the military for more manpower (the greater the need for personnel, the more the concessions made by the military). Dalfiume makes us wonder why we did not see the black militancy of the 'fifties and 'sixties coming, since he shows that Negro leadership in society urging integration in the armed forces in World War II was quite different from the "don't-rock-the-boat" rationale of Negro thinking in World War I.

Dalfiume is more optimistic about the effect of the actions of the armed services as a forerunner of action in the larger social context. On this point Stillman provides the most useful insight into the future but one which is subject to question. His feeling that the Negro could fight on the battlefield but not in the political arena offers a rationale for changes in official policy through the early 'fifties, but his pessimistic estimate of the future capability of blacks to press for thorough implementation of integration policies is subject to possible revision when the achievements of the civil rights movement are examined. His prescription for continued political action to gain full implementation of official policy for Negro rights and opportunities is tempered by his appraisal that priorities are being shifted away from this area of public policy. His excellent annotated bibliography is especially helpful for those seeking a variety of sources on such issues among others as the continuing struggle for off-base enforcement of racial equality for armed services personnel in civilian communities.

For those who wish to see how social scientists gathered and interpreted data on efforts to end racial segregation in the U.S. Army in what became a turning point for policy makers who sought a sound basis for reaching decisions, the work of Bogart and his colleagues during the Korean War is most enlightening. Although much is to be gained from a review of their research design and data-gathering techniques, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the work is the open-ended comments of respondents in the direct, earthy language of the GI in combat. From a humanitarian point of view one can be encouraged by these personal accounts. Military experiences frequently make a lasting impression on those who share them and the testimony in this book makes one feel that the willingness to try can overcome long-standing racial prejudices. Without doubt the study succeeded in proving to the military that racial integration in the armed services gives great assistance in solving manpower problems once the policy is clearly established and understood.

The attempt by Bogart and his associates to get finally the results of the study published represents an intriguing and important sidelight. For eighteen years the military placed roadblocks in the way of efforts to make the data available to the general public. Bogart raises the question of how much influence the data would have exerted on such movements as the drive to repeal the separate-but-equal doctrine before the Supreme Court. At least now we can understand the possibilities such evidence offers for changing attitudes and opinions about racial integration.

It is difficult to weave the ideas of the University of Edinburgh volume edited by Wolfe and Erickson into a review of the works of Dalfiume, Stillman and Bogart because the issues discussed are more far-ranging and particularly applicable to the United Kingdom's defense posture and its relationship to British society. The focus is placed on such topics as a general appraisal of British defense strategy and posture for the 1970s (W. Correlli Barnett), world power and population (Colin Clark), problems of alienation (Philip Abrams), social integration in the Deutsche Bundeswehr (R. Warnke), the impact of services on society (Sir James Dunnett), U.S. Navy recruiting programs (Franklin Fisher), management and manpower (Air Marshal Sir Andrew Humphrey), and finally the scope and pressures for change within United Kingdom institutional arrangements for defense (D. Greenwood). Contributions by discussants at the end of each essay do point up discrepancies and differences of opinion quite clearly. In a way many problems discussed in this volume from a British perspective may forecast what is in store for American military pioneers as they contemplate more restrictive roles for the American armed forces in the future international environment.

William F. Levantrosser

Hofstra University

The Conscience of the Corporations: Business and Urban Affairs, 1967–1970. By Jules Cohn. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 122. $6.00, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Whatever happened to the corporations' attack on urban problems? Professor Cohn knows. In this concise treatise he presents a thoughtful analysis and assessment of their participation during the period 1967–1970.

Cohn starts out fast. No messing around with abstract principles. He wants to find out the extent and nature of involvement of corporations in urban problem areas and the reasons for their success or failure. After citing four factors which he believes account for the declining interest of corporation executives—diminished government and public pressure, unexpected economic costs, unexpected skill and expertise requirements, and unanticipated, "sometimes unwelcome" effects on corporations—Cohn lists the motives that executives claim got them involved in the first place. These include "conscience" (the meaning of which remains unclear), enlightened self-interest, public appearance, compliance with government requirements, insurance against destructive tactics by minority group members, and the hope for new markets.

The major types of programs of the corporations that Cohn studied were donations, minority-group hiring, programs for the disadvantaged, and "other." Each type of involvement receives a chapter-length analysis and discussion. The author then presents a case analysis of one corporation's project in employment and training. The book ends with conclusions, followed by an appendix on "guidelines for initiating subsidiary training programs."

Cohn's analysis is based upon survey data which were drawn from 247 of the nation's largest corporations. We learn that corporation donations are the dominant form of aid. Such aid, of course, avoids the problems associated with more active involvement. Yet, the author points out, the gifts have been meagre by any accounting. In 1950, a mere .59 per cent of net profits before taxes were donated to charitable causes, and in 1967 the figure was still only 1 per cent. Unfortunately, Cohn does not give us any figures for the period of his study.

The author does state that the pattern of giving changed slightly. One-third of his survey respondents reported that they had shifted to include organizations more directly involved in urban problems. The proportion given to such established groups as the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, and Community Chest/United Fund (now known as the United Way) was subsequently less than that prior to 1967. Still, the gifts tended to flow to the more conservative new groups.

As for corporate minority employment practices and training programs, Cohn notes that these have been adversely affected by favoratism toward youth, recruitment at entry level jobs with restricted channels of mobility, credential requirements (especially educational achievement), and religious, ethnic, and sexual discrimination at middle- and higher-level jobs. On this last point Cohn points out the exclusionary tactics still employed against Jews at the executive levels. The reader may wonder why this excursus was included, given the seemingly greater magnitude of the problems with respect to nonwhite minority groups.

One-third of the companies in the survey conducted training programs for the disadvantaged. But Cohn believes that these companies had an exaggerated belief in the thesis of cultural differences. As a result, they directed too much attention toward programs designed to smooth over personality differences rather than concentrating upon outright job training. The author points out that it is not as difficult to motivate and train the disadvantaged as many people think; indeed, their employment retention rates are not markedly inferior to those of other new employees.

Cohn briefly discusses other programs and then considers the effects of involvement upon the Corporations themselves. We learn from his discussion that executives always keep in mind the returns to be gained from their corporation's participation and that individuals tend to see their involvement as one means to move up the corporate hierarchy. In his concluding chapter, Cohn makes the depressing observation that conditions are not improving. In Watts, for example, unemployment was 10.2 per cent at the time of the riots in 1965. In 1969 the rate had climbed to 16.2 per cent. Further, constraints upon continuing efforts have been imposed by political snarls, declining interest of governments, and cost limitations. But the principal thesis in this chapter is that business executives simply lacked political and sociological savvy in dealing with the disadvantaged.

For those who wish to find out what has happened to the highly vaunted involvement of corporations in solving urban problems, this book provides a short, no-nonsense account. It is a balanced presentation; but in the author's short editorials, which are interspersed throughout his presentation, there are hints of a stronger passion.

JOSEPH SMUCKER

Sir George Williams University

The Politics of Belleville: A Profile of the Civil Community. By Daniel J. Elazar. (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1971. Pp. 165. $8.50.)

Professor Elazar's brief study of Belleville, Illinois, a small city of 40,000 people within the metropolitan ambit of St. Louis, is an extended footnote to his larger study, *The Cities of the Prairie* (Basic Books, New York, 1970). The themes and the principles of selection and interpretation are set out more amply in the larger work. While it is a self-contained account, anyone with a serious interest in the subject matter and approach should read the longer work as well.

Dr. Elazar's most original contribution in these two works, as in his earlier studies of U.S. federalism, is to bring together contemporary descriptive materials, a conception of stages in the historical development of local, state and federal political institutions, and a conception of political culture which is derived from migration patterns and the materials of social and intellectual history. In this study, as in *The Cities of the Prairie* a series of developmental stages are asserted, marked by particular combinations of migration, cultural patterns, and social and economic development, of which the "metropolitan frontier" is the most recent and the most contemporary. The particular politics of a locality is interpreted as a function of its developmental stage and the contribution of its "migration streams" to its particular "political culture." These matters are set out with some concreteness in terms of population trends, economic trends, the development of religious, intellectual, and educational institutions, city services, and the character of local party divisions and contests for local office.

The result is a persuasive account, especially to someone who has worked with similar materials and who has had a direct exposure to the political personalities and practices of similar places. Since the evidence presented is highly selective and often very summary it cannot be said that the conclusions are established beyond doubt. The data the author uses are drawn from standard sources, such as the census, election returns, published works and unpublished manuscripts, the study of the local press, and substantial interviews with office holders and community leaders. Essentially the selection and combination of these data are highly personal, the plausibility of the result rests on whatever confidence the narrative inspires and its congruence with the reader's own experience. This reviewer is willing to believe that Dr. Elazar's account of Belleville is both reliable and predictive of the state of affairs in other local communities which have similar histories and similar social and economic characteristics. Given Dr. Elazar's assumption that independent cities of intermediate size which are not functionally specific segments of a metropolitan complex, are distinctive entitites, and that a substantial part of the population of the United States lives in such cities, the study is of a general interest.

A few difficulties in the structure of the work should be noted. The brief account of "migration streams," which is presented primarily in the form of a chart, misrepresents the more careful definitions provided in the *Cities of the Prairie*. Migration streams are recognized as originating in the three major divisions of the East Coast (New England, Middle, and South) and from Europe and Latin-America. For each, certain orientations which constitute elements of "political culture" are asserted. In the *Politics of Belleville* the basis for these attributions is certainly not provided. Indeed a series of European migrant streams are condensed into the Southern Stream, though all they seem to have in common is a predominant attachement to the Democratic party. It is not at all clear to me that migrants from New England were more community oriented and those from the Middle States more "individualistic." There are very visible differences resulting from migration patterns cited for Belleville, and to be found universally, in the particular denominational churches founded, and in the socioeconomic attributes of congregation members. That these are correlated with a particular political outlook is not clear, at least between the Presbyterian and Congregational denominations. The general conclusion about Belleville, that a rather small area is recognized as public or governmental, and a rather large one as private or business, is applicable to all Illinios cities known to this reviewer.

Another conception which needs greater explication is the idea of a "civil community" as the appropriate unit for local political studies, as opposed to the more narrow legal structure and area of the city government. That city politics cannot be treated as a set of variables arising only within the formal structure and area of the city is far from a new discovery. That city policies are more or less coordinated with those of major nongovernmental institutions and other special and general governments having jurisdiction in the city boundaries is not surprising either; that such a coordination, whether deliberate and planned or adaptive defines a "community" is another matter.

The most striking concrete political conclusion is that Belleville is governed by a "representative oligarchy" of three elements—labor, business and politics—political office-holding being a specialized and independent occupation. To each of these elements Elazar attributes the capacity for adjustment to change and for accepting new participants. The notable exception he sees is the small group of blacks, since black settlement is discouraged in Belleville as it is in the other East Side cities which have managed to preserve predominantly white populations. The processes of slate making and the isolation of municipal contests from the party-based contests for county, state, and national office are well described. The roots of these arrangements are ascribed to the assembling of the several migration streams which shaped the city political culture. An account is given of interrelationship with other governmental levels, particularly the management of state and federal resources to support developmental projects of importance to the city.

In short, *The Politics of Belleville* is a satisfactory account, problems of proof aside, and the general scheme of inquiry and description is applicable in principle to other cities, as it is intended to be. The general tone of this, as of Elazar's other works on federalism and city politics is optimistic, the optimism of what so many younger students of politics consider to be "establishment political science." Elazar also provides the material for quite contrary assessment; he makes it obvious that Belleville has a mixed record with respect to both ideals and accomplishment, even if he chooses to stress its more optimistic aspects. Elazar's account of Belleville is of particular interest to students of local government and politics since it demonstrates the ability of a small city to maintain its independent political style and preference despite its position in a metropolitan area presumably dominated by a large central city. It should be of interest also to those who would like to see the current trend to cross sectional quantitative studies balanced by longitudinal studies which search for developmental factors shaped by shifting interrelationships of social and political processes.

Phillip Monypenny
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The Water Lords. By James M. Fallows. (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971. Pp. 294. $7.95.)

This volume is one of a series of studies produced by members of the staff of Ralph Nader's Center for Study of Responsive Law. It is primarily a study of the pollution problem of the Savannah River in and around Savannah, Georgia, although it branches into the problems of air pollution and land-use planning as well. It is a detailed, thoroughly researched presentation, bristling with hard data as well as forthright opinions about who are the bad guys, the weak guys, and the good guys in dealing with these complex environmental problems. It is, therefore, in the best Nader style and approach and contrasts with some Nader Center efforts that have been less perspicacious and simply more opinionated.

Fallows, an A.B. in history and literature from Harvard, and his associates lay out in detail a picture of general disregard for the vital water resource by nearly everybody during most of the twentieth century. Water in the volumes coming down the Savannah and in the aquifer near the seacoast was viewed as limitless. It is also a picture of both corporate and public negligence in destroying the water resource and corporate efforts—usually successful—to use its political muscle to coerce or buy local political leaders into accepting their waste contributions to the river as part of their more general contribution to the community.

The record appears to demonstrate conclusively once again the capability of industry and cities to resist measures designed to rectify pollution. Dates for achieving certain goals for cleaning up the river came and went with only modest and clearly inadequate steps taken to meet those goals. Only the Georgia Water Board appears to have had the dedication and the perseverance to make any serious impact on the polluters—including the city of Savannah.

But there is a time dimension to the problem that unfortunately is frequently lost in the beneficial muckraking of the Nader movement. This book concludes its story in 1970 with little positive comment about the efforts to clean up the air and the river. In a letter to me Mr. R. S. Howard, Jr., Director of the (now) Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, states, "The book is a reasonably accurate picture of the situation (political and Savannah River pollution) as it was in *1965* (emphasis added) when this Agency became involved in cleaning up interstate pollution of the Savannah River Estuary." He adds, however, that "at publication time considerable progress had been made in the planning, designing and construction process of the interstate program. I was somewhat disappointed that 'the study' failed to report this."

Illustrative of this time dimension problem is the record of one of the worst malefactors in the Fallows account: Union Camp, the largest Kraft pulp and paper mill in the world. Fallows reports a daily average biological oxygen demand reading of 123,000 pounds for approximately one year from August 1969 to July 1970 (p. 86). By February 1973 the average was 20,300 pounds with the completion of a secondary treatment clarifier and aeration pond. Others such as Continental Can and Savannah Sugar Refinery show a similar improvement. On the other hand, one egregious example of failure to gain corrective action concerns American Cyanamid, which continues to contribute 30,000 pounds/day BOD despite enforcement conference decisions calling for substantial reduction. The situation is now in litigation. It is interesting also that Union Camp recovers 95 per cent of the chemicals formerly discharged into the river. Thus the Environment Protection Division can report that "although the Savannah River is not yet clean and clear, there are data and obvious signs that its quality is improving."

It may well be that the Nader team report helped precipitate this change. But it is unfortunate that the story ends with so negative an impression that Howard reports he continues to receive mail "from all over the U.S.A. demanding that we clean up the Savannah River." Those who might use this report as evidence about the responsiveness of the political system or as textbook material would do well to look a little further so as to report not only the horrors but also the successes.

The study concludes with a useful discussion of alternative remedies for dealing with the pollution problem. Unfortunately the treatment of these remedies is fairly abstract with little discussion of their specific application to the Savannah problems. But the author clearly accepts the view that a multiple approach is necessary, rejecting simplistic solutions for a complex set of problems.

I am struck by one other feature of this book: the audacity of the researchers themselves. It is clear that they went to incredible efforts to get their data, including embarrassing people involved, doing technical field research, and imaginatively probing public records. This approach is perhaps more in the tradition of investigative reporting but one wonders what the dividing line is between scholarship and such reporting. How pallid and lifeless and even meaningless some of our research is because we simply lack the guts, imagination, and technical knowledge to obtain the necessary data. Probably all too often we avoid such things as corruption because we might offend our sources or because the job of gathering the data is too difficult. Applause for the Nader team for determined bird-dogging that turns into scholarship!

DEAN E. MANN
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The Revival of American Socialism: Selected Papers of the Socialist Scholars Conference. Edited by George Fischer. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 330. $10.50.)

Socialism in America: From the Shakers to the Third International. Edited by Albert Fried. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970. Pp. xi, 580. $3.95.)

Professor Fried explains that his comprehensive collection of documents on the history of American Socialism ends with the creation of the Third International (1919) because since then there has been no important movement. The "New Left," he says in particular, is either not intellectually important ("It is still only a mood") or it is not historic socialism ("It is indifferent to the issues [reform vs. revolution, the nature of the Soviet Union, the viability of capitalism, the organization of the working classes, etc.] that meant so much to previous generations of radicals.") Furthermore, the New Left "favors forms of socialism that are at once extremely libertarian and extremely authoritarian" (pp. 15–16, 520). The New Left, then, is a kind of socialism but as yet inchoate contradictory socialism.

Fried's collection includes religious socialists, secular communitarians, "political" socialists (Debs, London, Sinclair) and quasi socialists. The latter includes the famous exchange between Henry George and Serge Schevitch over the "Single Tax." There are in all some fifty selections, most of which have not been reprinted before. They deal to some extent with dated issues of interest only to historians (e.g., the relation between American socialism and organized labor) and with the petty internecine squabbles to which the whole socialist movement was historically prone (e.g., whether Oceania or Kaweah colony is the true socialist order). There is also some discussion of permanent socialist principles which are, however, more authoritatively available in European writers. From this collection, it seems that this old American Socialism is of interest primarily to antiquarians.

Fischer's proffered alternative to Fried's historical debris is a recent socialist revival which he identifies with the New Left. The book consists of papers from the Socialist Scholars Conference which met from 1965–1970 and is now defunct. The papers deal with those issues to which Fried says the New Left is indifferent.

Fischer's book is divided into three parts entitled *New Paths to Socialism*, *Late Capitalism*, and *Neo-Marxism*. Of the three articles in Part I, John Cammett's study of Gramsci's "participatory democracy" and James O'Connor's attribution of causal connections between bourgeois capitalist values and the problems of our time, represent neither new nor persuasive analysis. Martin Nicolaus develops one of the two significant questions of the book, namely, whether the proletariat in advanced industrial societies is revolutionary, actually or potentially. He claims it is neither and is instead "parasitic" towards "underdeveloped" countries, having been bought off by capitalism's shrewd shift of exploitation to nonindustrialized proletariats. Hence, a rising living standard and a rising rate of exploitation have been made mutually supportive. This useful insight explains one of the major embarrassments of Marxist theory in a dialectical manner, that is, in a manner compatible with that theory.

In Part II Paul Sweezy accepts the Nicolaus diagnosis but salvages the theory of the revolutionary proletariat by the consideration that it exists outside the industrialized countries. The plausibility of the Nicolaus-Sweezy view rests on the assertion that capitalist countries "raise further the standard of living of their working classes, [and] bring poverty and misery to the great mass of working people . . . in the dependencies" (p. 167). Demonstrating this assertion would require showing that "poverty and misery" have increased as a consequence of the intrusion of advanced capitalist economies. Sweezy-Nicolaus omit this demonstration, implying that their audience is composed not of potential but of actual believers. For merely potential believers the capitalist assertion that the already poor in underdeveloped countries are better off than they would be in the absence of capitalist economies may seem equally plausible.

Ernest Mandel and Stanley Aronowitz deny the allegedly non-revolutionary character of the modern industrial proletariat. Mandel, citing in particular the "May 1968 French Revolution," argues for "the greatest confidence in the world which will emerge when the working classes, rejuvenated after two decades of slumber, will move to take power" (p. 186). Mandel's argument is more intransigent than Nicolaus-Sweezy's and is supported by some evidence. The persuasiveness of that evidence can be tested by any teacher who asks his students what the "May 1968 French Revolution" was or indeed how many ever heard of it. These incidents have already been forgotten or become history for the current generation. Only the believer can see them as portending an industrial proletarian uprising.

Aronowitz accepts Mandel's evidence but argues that it points, not to a resurgent industrial proletariat, but to a "New Working Class" consisting of "professional, technical and scientific workers." The student-white collar revolts "reflected a much deeper challenge to capitalist institutions" than was explicitly the case. No evidence is offered. Of those assessing the revolutionary potential of the three different proletariats, only Mandel need be taken seriously by the potential believer.

Part III ("Neo-Marxism") deals with the second important question of the book, namely, how adequate is Marxism as a system of thought? Whereas Marx claims his analysis provides a sufficient framework for understanding modern society, Irving Zeitlin argues that Marx needs to be "supplemented" by non-Marxist analysis and uses C. Wright Mills to show how Weberian insights may be incorporated into a Marxian framework without "supplanting" it. Zeitlin does not make an overwhelmingly convincing case. For example, he notes that Weber saw socialism accelerating "what already appeared as a frightening degree of bureaucratization in many strategic areas of social life" (p. 237). To show that this supplements without supplanting Marx, one would need to show how such insights can be squared with the disappearance of "the domination of men over men." One can accept such Weberian insights either by denying the goal of Marxist history or by identifying that goal with bureaucratization. Either solution is destructive of the Marxist framework.

Paul Breines and Ronald Aronson attack Marxist science. Marx claims the individual is produced by objective material conditions and that these conditions are the subject of science. Breines argues that "a coherent and unitary critique of modern society *begins* with a critique of individual existence" (p. 294 emphasis added). This is not necessary if the individual is a product of objective conditions. If the conditions ("modern society") are to be understood in terms of "individual existence," Marxist science is turned on its head. If the individual is to be understood autonomously, then Marxist science has to be replaced by individualist psychology. In either case, science, but not Marxist science, is still possible.

Whereas Breines's essay recommends Marcuse to the New Left, apparently on the grounds that Marcuse's "existentialism" is a remedy to New Left "authoritarianism," Aronson criticizes Marcuse on the explicit ground that he "takes his bearings and his refuge in a truth outside himself." Such "objective truth" is alienating, old Marxist, stuffy, joyless, etc. But denying such truth makes impossible any science. Marx denies that "objective truth" exists unchangeably and asserts it exists dialectically. Aronson denies that it exists at all. His argument means that Marxist science is no longer possible but its goal, "socialism," still somehow is.

Trent Schroyer attacks contemporary science as a "new strategy for legitimating power and privilege" through the doctrine "that knowledge is inherently neutral" (pp. 297–98). Positivist science, he asserts, is the new and "fundamental false consciousness of our epoch" (p. 301). Whereas Marx thought science would destroy capitalism, Schroyer holds that positivism (and a pox on "neo-Marxists" sympathetic to Weber) protects it. This dangerous argument is only half the story. Positivism, with its superstructure, academic freedom, also protects the ability of Marxists and socialists to teach in the universities. It thus permits fulfillment of Lenin's request to give him the minds of the young. The revival of American socialism is better served by a discreet silence regarding positivism than by assaults upon it. By his indiscretion, Schroyer's committment to the truth is shown to be greater than his commitment to socialism. For that reason, his essay is both more instructive and elevating than weak and unconvincing allegations of a "socialist revival" in America.

Gary D. Glenn

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Metropolitan Political Structure: Intergovernmental Relations and Political Integration in the Quad-Cities. By H. Paul Friesema. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1971. Pp. 158. $7.95.)

Prof. Friesema's book is an unpretentious "exercise in political mapping," (p. 140) which, within its carefully defined parameters, makes a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding literature on U.S. metropolitan politics. The eight chapters of the book purport to describe "patterns of intergovernmental activity and other processes of political integration which occur among municipal governments in the Quad-City metropolitan area of Illinois and Iowa [Davenport, Rock Island, Moline, East Moline, Bettendorf and smaller towns]" (p. 1). *Metropolitan Political Structure* is not a comparative study, it deals only peripherally with public policy issues, and its conclusions about "integrative indicators" are derived almost wholly from 49 tables of data which were secured from close-ended, multiple-option interviews conducted with Quad-City public officials over a six-month period.

The virtues of this book are many, and include brevity and clarity, tightness of organization, and wealth of empirical data. The tabular data, it should be noted, are placed next to the explanatory textual materials, and they are always precisely labeled. Footnotes are placed at the bottom of the pages on which they appear, which is exactly where they belong in a book of this sort. A brief but excellent introductory chapter summarizes the recent literature on metropolitan structure and appraises the pioneering work of such metro analysts as Robert Wood, Roscoe Martin, Winston Crouch, John C. Bollens, Henry J. Schmandt, Scott Greer, Frank Smallwood, Edward Sofen, and David A. Booth. The book's conceptualization is handled with admirable skill, and throughout the text empirical process analysis is quite properly given priority over abstract model building. Especially commendable is the virtual absence from the book of that fashionable jargon which disfigures and renders unreadable so much contemporary social science scholarship. At the end of the book there is a no-nonsense methodological appendix, which says exactly what needs to be said and no more. The appendix is followed by an extensive, four-section bibliography. Finally the author chose, wisely I think, not to clutter up his "exploratory" study with statistical tests of significance, the value of which would have been minimal in the context of his limited objectives.

Although the virtues of Mr. Friesema's book far outweigh its defects, a few of the latter should be mentioned here for balance. The book does not have an index—a shortcoming that is normally serious, but less so in this instance because of the book's brevity and the absence from the text of a large number of proper names. The book's style, while clear enough, is generally lacking in grace and vigor. Also the author tends, here and there, to belabor the obvious and repeat himself. And, though this will be disputed, I am inclined to believe that his decision to venture rarely if ever beyond the interview data in drawing conclusions was an example of excessive scholarly caution.

At least some of the merits of this modest but excellent study should probably be attributed to the editorial staff of the University of Iowa Press which, though relatively young as publishers go, is already proving to be an imaginative, venturesome institution. This reviewer spotted only three or four minor errors in the book, a record that contrasts most favorably with the sloppy editorial standards that increasingly are characteristic of the work produced by the most prestigious commercial and university presses.

Of the book's conclusions, three seem to be central. One, a metropolitan political system composed of many separate jurisdictions can be maintained in a functioning state in a wide variety of formal and informal ways. Two, the survival record of a political system, while not the only criterion, is a significant basis for judging the merits of reform proposals. And three, "this study should provide a warning to social engineers that the present political system in metropolitan areas is probably well-entrenched, and operating more rationally and effectively than many will acknowledge" (p. 140). All in all, Mr. Friesema's book is short, readable, timely, and thoroughly documented. It deserves a wide audience.

FRANCIS M. WILHOIT

Drake University

Participation, Planning, and Exchange in Old and New Communities: A Collaborative Paradigm. By David R. Godschalk. (Chapel Hill: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North Carolina, 1971. Pp. 318. $6.00, paper.)

Citizen participation in planning is difficult to conceptualize. In his monograph, Professor David R. Godschalk tries, but is more successful in creating a normative ideal than a descriptive model.

Godschalk begins with the observation that "participation embodies different sets of values, goals, operating principles, and political feasibilities when it is viewed from the side of established authority than when it is seen from the side of partisan groups" (p. 8). Following Gamson, he distinguishes between the social control and the partisan influence perspectives.

> Gamson has shown that there are two major ways of looking at the relationship between citizens and government. His "influence" perspective takes the viewpoint of partisan groups, who see conflict as an opportunity to increase their influence through the use of the proper strategy. His "social control" perspective takes the viewpoint of authorities trying to achieve collective goals, who see conflict as a problem to be managed in order to maintain citizen commitment (p. 71).

Godschalk argues:

> Definitions of participation from either the social control or the influence perspective stake out and clarify extreme positions, one at the "macro" system level and one at the "micro" group level. By the nature of its role, however, local public planning typically must work with and between both levels. The planner needs a framework for integrating the social control and influence perspectives, based on a more operational concept than that of an invisible hand of political democracy (p. 18).

To the planner he recommends "a collaborative paradigm" based upon "exchange theory".

Somewhat murkily, Godschalk defines citizen participation in planning as a process of exchange between citizens and government, and identifies three exchange processes occurring at various levels of the social structure: participation, innovation, and conflict. In participation, citizens and government exchange influence and control; in innovation, they exchange communication regarding proposed change; and in conflict, they exchange threats (p. 74). He further distinguishes three types of exchange, depending upon the expectations of the parties to the exchange: in collaboration, the parties expect to mutually benefit; in competition, to individually benefit; and in conflict, to reduce each other's benefits, regardless of individual gain (p. 23).

"Ideally, Godschalk observes, "the form of exchange taken by participants in planning will be one of citizen-government collaboration" (p. 24). He notes: "Exchange between citizens and government can be visualized as a continuum in which non-participation would be equated with extreme social control, active cooperation and competition would be equated with reciprocal exchange relationships, and conflict would be equated with partisan influence" (p. 127). His implicit argument is that planning suffers under conditions of social control or partisan influence—too little citizen participation or too much. Planning thrives when parity exists between planners and citizen participants, because planners innovate more and citizens accept more innovation. "By activating the community," Godschalk writes, "collaborative planning contributes to the achievement of the process goals of community self-guidance, transformability, and conflict regulation. By involving the community, collaborative planning seeks to escape the false distinction between political decisions based solely on community consensus and planning decisions based solely on professional expertise" (p. 148).

The difficulty with Godschalk's analysis lies in his ambiguous use of the social control, partisan influence, and exchange "perspectives." On the one hand, he uses them to describe the evaluative orientations that social scientists bring to their interpretations of citizen participation experiences: they identify with the citizens or the authorities (or with the planners as Godschalk does) and evaluate events accordingly. On the other hand, he uses them to describe the relative influence that authorities and citizens have in a planning situation. If the balance of power is tipped in the direction of authorities, he notes the dominance of the social control perspective, or if in the direction of the citizens, the dominance of the partisan influence perspective. By obscuring the difference between evaluative orientations of observers and relative power of participants, Godschalk recommends a change in evaluative orientation and expects a change in relative power. In other words, he recommends parity between planners and citizen participants without specifying the social and political conditions under which this parity has occurred or is likely to occur.

In Godschalk's paradigm, there are no economic inequities, no racial conflicts, no political history, no federal programs, no mayors, city councils, or city managers, no burgeoning urban bureaucracies, no neighborhoods deprived of "local liberty." Thus, it is not surprising that to test the usefulness of the collaborative paradigm, he briefly studies two new towns, Columbia and Reston—communities recently founded and remarkably uniform by class, composed of persons who elected planned integration, and administered by a corporation rather than a public body. Lacking an analysis of the determinants of the relative influence of planners and citizen participants, Godschalk labels the most marginal citizen contributions (reponses to surveys regarding the facilities that should be included in the next village center) as evidence of collaborative planning, and places Columbia and Reston near the middle of the continuum between social control and partisan influence—i.e., near the ideal. Such a test of the paradigm of collaborative planning ignores the political and historical context of citizen participation and trivializes the transformative citizen participation movement of the 1960s.

JUDITH V. MAY

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Hugo Black: The Alabama Years. By Virginia Van Der Veer Hamilton. (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 330. $10.95.)

In writing judicial biography, one must decide how much attention ought to be devoted to the subject's pre-court origins and career. Insufficient development of the judge's antecedents reduces the biographer's ability to explain why the subject acts in a particular fashion, while too extensive attention to this dimension can result in a more superficial treatment of the judicial career. A number of effective biographies, such as Mason's *William Howard Taft* (1965), give scant attention to pre-court career; other substantial efforts, including Howard's *Mr. Justice Murphy* (1968), devote as much as a half of the text to analysis of the judge's formative stages. This dilemma is well reflected in the literature on Hugo Black, with volumes by John Frank (1949) and Charlotte Williams (1950) concentrating almost exclusively upon Black's Supreme Court period. Even the most complete analysis of Black, Strickland's symposium *Hugo Black and the Supreme Court* (1967), allots slight consideration to Black prior to his ascension. Professor Hamilton's volume is, therefore, unique in confining itself exclusively to Black's pre-Court activities, and thereby it nicely complements the existing literature on Black's Supreme Court career.

Hamilton frankly warns the reader that her focus is limited to "political biography," that is, the analysis concentrates upon the influences that shaped Black and his activities prior to judicial appointment; it is not meant to encompass "personal biography" which delves into the subject's thoughts and innermost private matters. Nonetheless, the picture of Black which emerges is facinating. Black is portrayed as the typical ambitious lawyer seeking to maximize his potential within the framework of Alabama politics. Interspersed with periods of often lucrative practice, Black undertakes stints as criminal judge and later prosecutor, always discharging his reponsibilities with one eye on the media. At the same time that he defends labor unions and advocates government electric power, he also projects an image of prohibitionist, conservative Protestantism, and an aversion to open immigration. Black secretly joined the Klan in order to develop a power base, even more covertly resigning before the 1926 campaign for the Senate.

Black's Senate career was characterized by numerous publicity-seeking investigations, speeches in support of court packing and limiting federal power to investigate allegedly corrupt Senate elections in Alabama, and persistent opposition to House reapportionment. Yet some flashes of the later Justice Black do emerge: opposition to customs seizure of obscene books, support for compulsory lobbying disclosure, and espousal of New Deal labor regulations and relief measures. But overwhelmingly, however, the picture which develops is of a primarily conservative southern Senator, carefully protecting constituency support with his opposition to antilynching bills and his conduct of colorful utility holding company investigations, and occasionally involving himself in mildly progressive reforms. Roosevelt's decision to nominate Black for the Court (his first choice was an unwilling Sherman Minton) apparently rested upon the slender criteria of loyalty to the New Deal, Senate membership, and geographic representation.

A complete picture of Black is somewhat puzzling: Mr. Justice Black appears very different in action and values from the earlier Black. But since Hamilton's analysis ceases upon Black's appointment, we cannot tell whether Black had more liberal ideas all along or whether he underwent some intense re-examination after joining the Court. Hamilton seeks to discount some of Black's more conservative actions as simply skillful politics. She argues that Black's ten years as a senator did broaden his values, injecting a considerable dose of nationalism, and this, coupled with the Depression and some extensive reading, laid the foundation for a Black with new perspectives. A future integrated biography may clear away some of the mystery. The Hamilton volume stands as a well-researched, clearly written, and comprehensive analysis of Black's pre-Court period. If Professor Hamilton does on occasion offer some rather strained rationalizations for certain of Black's actions (he joined the Klan perhaps to moderate it from within), the author usually maintains the correct perspective for a biographer—skillful blending of a detailed familiarity with the subject with an appropriate measure of objective detachment. The book would seem indispensable for any complete understanding of Hugo Black, the man and the Justice.

R. H. CLARK

Denison University

Young Men Look at Military Service: A Preliminary Report. By Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman. (Ann Arbor: Institute for Scoial Research, The University of Michigan, 1970. Pp. 115. $5.00, paper.)

Public Opinion and the Military Establishment. Edited by Charles C. Moskos, Jr. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971. Pp. xvi, 294. $12.50, cloth; $7.50, paper.)

Can a democratic polity tolerate the long-term presence of large professional military forces? Might not the presence of such powerful, conservatively oriented institutions eventually cause the polity to sicken and die, or to lose its democratic ethos? On the other hand, might not such a presence overstimulate other interest groups to penetrate and reshape military institutions and make them no longer competent to perform their intended tasks?

These alternatives encompass some worst fears of "antimilitary polemicists" on the one hand, and "apologists of the warfare state" on the other—two groups who, Charles Moskos says, too often dominate discussions of military roles in American society. Moskos, editor and co-author of *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, urges that: "If our society is ever to fulfill its democratic promise, the relationships between its civilian and military structures require especially informed and sustained attention" (p. xiv). The ten papers collected in that volume, all written before 1971, do not put to rest those worst fears; but they do address some crucial problems and issues that need to be faced as the nation and its post-Vietnam military system learn to live with each other.

Two concluding papers, by Moskos and Morris Janowitz, deal most directly with large issues in the confrontation between a disillusioned society and its shrinking, all-volunteer military forces. Moskos proposes that after two decades of increasing institutional convergence of the armed forces with civilian society, the trend has reversed and the armed forces will increasingly turn inward. He explores the relative degrees of isolation induced in enlisted and officer ranks by current trends in recruiting, race relations, skill-transferability, and military family life. He is especially concerned that reduced middle-class representation in the enlisted ranks, together with increasing emphasis on college and higher education for the officer corps, will promote caste-ridden and authoritarian military structures, even as civilian institutions are adapting to pressures for more participative forms of control. Janowitz sees similar trends, and also underlines the role of civilian pressures in contributing to both civilian society's and the military forces' sense of separateness.

Janowitz sees some hope for relief if the military services can exploit opportunities afforded by their new all-volunteer base to restructure the military profession. The aim, as he sees it, ". . . will be to develop a military [officer] profession which is closely articulated with civilian society" (p. 260). This will not be easy. All-volunteer services will mean reduced opportunity to recruit officers from the enlisted ranks. Both antimilitary and cost-cutting pressures on ROTC will shift that recruiting base even more toward surviving units located disproportionately in the South and West, at schools with modest academic standards. And a larger proportion of new officers will come from the service academies. Even so, as other contributors to the Moskos volume suggest, the impact on the true officer recruiting base may not be all that constrictive. William Lucas, in an impressive analysis of "Anticipatory Socialization and the ROTC," Lawrence Radway, in an intelligent review of "Recent Trends at American Service Academies," and less friendly and less carefully argued papers, all stress the importance of *self-selection* in recruiting youths to officer training programs and in shaping the product of these programs. It is not clear from any of these studies what will be the real impact of narrowing the officer recruiting net, of attenuating its reach into the upper and lower ends of middle-class recruiting. But it seems unlikely that these changes will have anything like as great an effect on the character of the officer corps as did those reflected in the broadening of military leaders' social backgrounds that took place in earlier decades of this century (see Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960).

Janowitz is, in fact, less concerned to counter recruiting trends than he is to reform officer education and career development. "Like professional development in a wide area of contemporary civilian society, the officer will require both higher degrees of expertise in his particular area of competence and at the same time heightened consciousness of the responsibility of the military establishment as a whole" (p. 266). Some of his suggestions, such as admission to the service academies after three years of high school and the structuring of officer careers around geographic as well as functional specialities, might prove counterproductive to closer military-civilian articulation. Other proposals seem better directed toward the goal: send service academy students to civilian colleges for their junior year; encourage ROTC cadets to break their college years with a year or two of enlisted service; continue placing a large proportion of officers into higher degree programs at civilian universities; make social science education and politico-military experience a normal part of career development at all levels of the profession, rather than tying them to development of a few staff specialists and to the shallow orientation of officers marked for higher command.

All these proposals are relevant to Janowitz's aim of encouraging military professionals to accept " . . . the notion that a successful officer can be one who does not fight, but contributes to deterrence and the resolution of international conflict" (p. 258). Similar calls for reforming the profession are being heard from other quarters as well, including thoughtful military professionals. But there are problems in relations between professionalized military services and a liberal-democratic polity that go beyond the need to encourage military leadership to perfect its rational expertise and avoid resentful inversion to traditionalism, absolutism and authoritarianism. As Samuel Huntington argues: "The parallels to the modern problem of civil-military relations are to be found not in the Praetorian Guard but in the relations that exist in modern states between political leaders, on the one hand, and such specialists as diplomats, civil servants, scientists and economists on the other." ("Civil-Military Relations" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills [New York: Free Press, 1968], Vol. 2, p. 490). Surely these aspects of relations between a new military professionalism and American society also require "especially informed and sustained attention."

Among other issues raised in the Moskos collection, mention should be made of Bernard Beck's intriguing thesis on "The Military as a Welfare Institution," and David Sutton's sobering (but outdated) study of "The Military Mission against Off-Base Discrimination." Both pose interesting questions about extramilitary aspects of relations between the armed forces and society.

A number of the papers incorporate exercises in analyzing survey and other forms of aggregate data. Except for William Lucas's study of anticipatory socialization, these exhibit serious weaknesses that seem to reflect their authors' political and social biases. Similar bias seems to color some interpretations in the otherwise impressive analysis by Jerome Johnston and Jerald Bachman in *Young Men Look at Military Service: A Prelimi-*

nary Report. The report is on a part of the third phase of a longitudinal national survey involving more than 2,000 boys entering the tenth grade in 1966, and explores their employment plans and their political attitudes as they completed high school in 1969. The authors find that a majority of their respondents did not dissent from their government's policy in Vietnam, but that a significant minority, some twenty percent, did. At the end of their imaginative and resourceful analysis, the authors conclude that " . . . dissent over the U.S. Government's Vietnam policy is, for some young men, a major deterrent to military service" (p. 34). But all the data and analysis show is an association between respondents' attitudes toward the Vietnam War and their perceptions of the likelihood of entering military service, an association that supports several different causal hypotheses. Aside from this brief lapse, Johnston and Bachman are most careful to point out and not exceed the limitations of their data. Their intelligent caution might serve as a corrective model for some of the less successful pieces in the Moskos collection.

It is difficult to understand what further policy-shaping or public-informing purposes the Johnston and Bachman report might serve this late in the commitment to all-volunteer military forces. The Moskos volume, on the other hand, does have enough provocative ideas to make it a useful addition to any private or institutional collection on contemporary military affairs.

James M. Gerhardt

Southern Methodist University

Race, Class, and Political Consciousness. By John C. Leggett. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. 243. $7.50, Cloth; $4.95, paper.)

At least since the 1930s, social scientists have tried to explain discrimination against ethnic minorities. The most popular explanatory variables used have been personality; attitudes; fears (rational or otherwise); childhood socialization; peer group, reference group, or subcultural group influence; social status; psychological dislocations caused by upward or downward social mobility; as well as combinations of any of these variables. In *Race, Class, and Political Consciousness*, John C. Leggett takes the vote against housing integration in the 1963 Berkeley, California, fair-housing referendum as symbolic of discriminatory behavior, and attempts to explain it in terms of several demographic and attitudinal variables. The reader infers that the negative vote is intended to symbolize discriminatory behavior because the rambling development of hypotheses in chapter two refers only to what Leggett variously calls discrimination, prejudice, and racism, terms which denote interpersonal behaviors.

The results are expected. People of higher occupational, educational, and income levels were more likely to vote for housing integration than people at lower levels, although when political party preference was held constant, it was found that Democrats at every level were more likely than Republicans to vote for housing integration.

Additionally, the less the amount of church attendance, the more likely the vote in favor of housing integration; while for those who expressed a religious affiliation, the ones belonging to the more liberal wings, e.g., Jews, Unitarians, Congregationalists, were more likely to favor integration. Similarly with university ties: employees and students of the University of California were more likely than others to vote for integration.

Further, the older the voter, the more likely to oppose housing integration, a phenomenon which Leggett attributes to differences in experiences among age cohorts, those over 50, for example, being labeled the Unruffled Generation and said to be mostly "committed to a racist perspective" (p. 124). Similarly, length of residence in Berkeley shows an inverse relationship with a vote for integration. Most of these relationships wash out, however, when political party preference is held constant, Democrats at all levels being more likely to favor housing integration than Republicans.

Finally, the relationship between what Leggett calls an authoritarian ideology, and the fair-housing vote was investigated. Although the ideology is measured by items from the Adorno F-scale, it is not the same as an authoritarian personality. Authoritarian ideology consists of ethnocentrism, politico-economic conservatism, and rural cultural traditionalism. Leggett believes he is measuring an ideology, rather than a personality, because of the similarity between the items and a supposed rural cultural tradition. As expected, the results show that the less authoritarian the respondent is, the more likely he is to vote for housing integration. An attempt to check the strength of the other variables when authoritarianism is held constant is marred in relying on only three items dealt with individually.

As this review has meant to convey so far, neither the book nor the study on which it was based, seems particularly inspired. Both the author and publisher claim that publishing the results of the study ten years after it was made throws light on events during the interim, but I fail to see it. It seems to me that the results would have been highly predictable in 1963 and at any time since. Perhaps the author's insistence that political party preference itself may determine attitudes toward political events shows originality and insight. It is certainly an insight that deserves to be followed up.

Beyond this, the book has some methodological and stylistic flaws. We are never told the form of the questionnaire on which the study was based, nor how it was constructed. We are not told how, nor whether, the interviews were validated, although we are told that some of the students employed "quickly became excellent interviewers." An indeterminate number of people were interviewed for the study as much as a year or more after the election, meaning that there was likely to be a problem of recall for some respondents. Yet this issue is ignored. On the positive side, the sample was carefully chosen, and it was tirelessly pursued to minimize nonresponses.

I suppose it is unfair to fault a writer for stylistic flaws when it is presumably part of publisher's responsibility to correct them, so let them take equal blame for such inelegancies as: "innovational" for "innovative," "Second Holocaust" for "World War II," "heavenly pastures" for "death," "encharged" for "charged," "demarked" for "demarcated," "dressing apparel" for "clothes," "low ascribed ethnic honor" for "low ethnic status," "nucleated spatially," for "geographically divided," and "white dromedary cases" for what?

MICHAEL COHEN

Governors State University

Phil Swing and Boulder Dam. By Beverly Bowen Moeller. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 199. $8.50.)

Ms. Moeller has contributed to our knowledge about the formation of natural resources policy by spelling out the very significant leadership role played by Congressman Phil Swing of California in securing passage of the Boulder Canyon Dam Act. For this alone, her book deserves to be cited in the literature. Herbert Hoover, for whom the dam was named, and to whom much of the credit has been given by other writers, is portrayed as less than an enthusiastic backer of the project.

As a contribution to understanding policy formation, however, her book has two major faults. First, the author never seems to have grasped the place of the Boulder Canyon Dam fight in the entire conservation controversy and in the liberal-conservative struggle within the Republican party, a struggle which eventually drove the Progressive Republicans into support of Roosevelt's New Deal. She reports support from Senator Hiram Johnson and other progressives and reports Swing's visits to other areas such as Eastern Washington where a comparable fight was going on for Grand Coulee Dam, but does not appear to grasp the significance of the broad alliance which was being built.

Second, she fails to comprehend the essential facts about the conservation coalition itself. This coalition, which Henry Caulfield described in his "Three Thrust" theory more than a decade ago, involved development-oriented groups (in this case the irrigators) and regulationist groups (in this case the public power people). Los Angeles was a public power city and was a key to the final policy decision. Although Ms. Moeller hints at these ties, she never relates them to the central issues at stake.

The upshot is a strictly chronological report of undifferentiated events in which a dizzying whirl of new people and next steps are portrayed without any interpretation of significance, interrelationships, or strategy. Routine group meetings are given the same status as significant turning points. The author seems to be content to demonstrate that Swing was present or involved in much of the activity. She apparently either did not understand the substantive national policy issues at stake or felt no obligation to try to relate them to her story. A marvelous topic and much very good research are thus spoiled by dreadfully routine hop-skip-and-jump reporting.

DANIEL M. OGDEN, JR.

Colorado State University

Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Poverty. By Russell D. Murphy. (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971. Pp. xi, 208. $12.50.)

The political entrepreneurs of this slim volume are administrators who developed and implemented a modestly successful antipoverty program for New Haven during the reign of Mayor Lee. They were prudent politicians who took it upon themselves to do something for the poor. They planned, secured support for, and administered a program without much initial political support from the community. Most of the important parts of the book show how these bureaucrats (Murphy uses this term without the usual negative connotations) came to develop support from various interests and how they were able to use local and national resources to succeed in their venture. In short, the study tells how clever and thoughtful people took full advantage of position, resources, and skills to build a program.

Part I lays out the author's methodology. Part II provides broadly narrative background pieces describing the local and national context of the New Haven antipovierty program. Included are interpretative essays on New Haven, its politics, Mayor Lee's style, and the bureaucratic genesis of the poverty program. All have a decidedly pluralist cast in the Dahl tradition. Instead of an economic elite, New Haven is pictured as having a multiple elite structure including political party factions, public agencies, private organizations and citizen groups. Political competition existed among various groups and organizations with the Mayor's office serving a catalytic function. Bureaucrats performed crucial development and policy roles in the city government.

Part III is much more analytic (by design) and deals with the processes of development of support for the program. Apparently in the early 1960s, there was little local demand for clearly antipoverty programs; most of the city's concern took the form of conventional social welfare programs. Thus, the small group of administrator who took advantage of and encouraged the development of the national war on poverty had to carve out a place for the antipoverty program. "Bureaucratic Reciprocity" and "the Matching Game" are two devices used to establish support and resources for the program.

The New Haven group was able to ally itself with the federal government and the Ford Foundation. The local administrators formed alliances, with New Haven offering a proving ground in return for financial support. Their model antipoverty project became a focal point (as redevelopment had in the past) of cooperative enterprise.

Part IV is the most useful part of the book. It provides an excellent applied analysis of the processes and strategies used by agencies in the development of coalitions and constituency relationships. Much conventional analysis of clientele relationships tends to focus on perverse and dysfunctional aspects of agency-constituency behavior. Professor Murphy stresses the positive aspects. His analysis specifies conditions under which the entrepreneurial behavior of public administrators may contribute to the overall welfare of the community. Of particular interest are his analyses of coalition formation, linkages with the community, and community response. He shows how self-interested people playing bureaucratic roles may foster social change.

The closing chapter discusses the social and political role of these new men of politics. Here the author's ties with the heritage of Professor Dahl and his followers is most evident: instead of economic notables or social elites, experienced and thoughtful administrative politicians took advantage of outside support, personal resources, and the fragmented structure of New Haven politics to fashion modest change in social policy. According to Murphy, these people laid the foundation for a lasting coalition which includes the poor—a notable accomplishment in America.

Although little evidence supports the last hopeful generalization, the volume is worth reading as a study of successful administrative behavior in an urban setting. Like many dissertations turned into monographs, the book is a little too narrative and case oriented. The last 150 pages justify the time spent reading through the preceding narrative. Much more pointed, this portion is one of the most insightful studies of administrative leadership done in the past several years.

Louis F. Weschler

University of Southern California

Government Management Internships and Executive Development. Edited by Thomas P. Murphy. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. 281. $12.50.)

Implicit in Professor Murphy's anthology is the assumption that administration acutely depends upon innate ability, common sense, and work experience, and not exclusively on book knowledge and classroom theory. While Murphy might not cavil at the order of importance, he would take umbrage at the mutual exclusivity implied by many of the critics of experiential education. He might further contend that internships suitably provide occasions for a kind of *verstehen* for the students, or an attempt to give them a feel for the reality of administration. Thus, intuition and practical experience need not be divorced from knowledge and analytical exercise. Each can effectively tutor the other. It is his firm belief that knowledge of administration derived from internships—insofar as they are purposefully oriented towards the testing of theory—affords the student the opportunity to view the organization as a dynamic composite of people communicating, interacting, and bargaining—in short, behaving in the richest sense of the term.

The currrent popularity of internships, says Murphy, is a bold manifestation of the continuing support for programs of professional education in the areas of public policy/administration. The internship is perhaps the best way to provide "hands-on" experience for students of administration.

Apart from treating some of the academic questions associated with internships, the book reviews various fellowship programs at the state and federal levels of government. For instance, individual chapters focus on such federal programs as Congressional Fellowships, the White House Fellowships, the HUD Urban Fellowships, and the Washington Semester Internships. What is conspicuously absent—save for a passing reference in the preface—is a chapter on the Public Administration Fellowship Program which provides fellowships in the executive branch of the federal government to college and university professors in the field of public administration and other supportive public policy areas.

Fundamentally, Professor Murphy's book provides us with a useful weapon in the campaign to professionalize governmental manpower. The author gets expert assistance from seventeen contributors drawn from six separate perspectives, most of them academicians. This tightly knit collection of readings is adumbrated into four distinct categories: (1) Internship Dynamics, (2) Urban and State Internships and Fellowships, (3) Federal Internships, and (4) Executive and Organization Development.

The final section of the book seeks to analyze the nature and character of federal executive development programs as distinguished by the Federal Executive Seminar Centers for its middle management corps. Finally, the book concludes with chapters on the application of the behavioral sciences to the training effort in local government organizations, and the related effort behind the Intergovernmental Personnel Acts' proposal to help strengthen state and local governments through improved personnel administration and more effective recruiting and training.

If the book has any shortcomings it is that the editor has not given the intellectual direction that would shape the compilation into a coherent whole. It would seem that the instructions to the contributors were minimal and this is reflected throughout the book. Moreover, the reader looks in vain for sectional prefaces that would bind together the scattered observations of the contributors.

In sum however, while parts of the compilation vary in quality, insight, and substantive merit, taken as a whole, the volume is useful for those of us who seek to promote public service by mating scholarship with experiential learning in order to professionalize government administration.

RAYMOND POMERLEAU
San Francisco State University

Tammany: Evolution of a Political Machine, 1789–1865. Jerome Mushkat. (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971. Pp. 476. $15.00.)

For many years, historians who wrote about political machines tended to judge them moralistically from the perspective of the reformers who opposed them. During the last two decades, however, a new paradigm has evolved. This paradigm essentially rests upon a structural-functional analysis, although within the larger framework there are variations of approach. If Lincoln Steffens could be called the godfather of the first model, then sociologist Robert K. Merton (with a nod toward Edward Banfield & James Q. Wilson) would be the patron saint of the second. Historians today generally agree that political machines arose because of the inability of existing urban governments to meet the needs of cities that were growing larger and more complex. Machines supplied jobs and welfare services for the largely ethnic urban lower and working classes and provided a mobility vehicle for those who found avenues to success blocked (often for ethnic reasons) in the commercial world. They made alliances with businesses that needed either government grants, such as franchises or protection from police interference, and expedited urban decision-making processes. Some historians who have written within recent years have stressed the importance of examining the group characteristics of machine politicians and of their opponents, the relationships between demographic variables and voting patterns, and the ethnocultural context in which the machine operated.

In this volume, Professor Jerome Mushkat analyses the evolution of the nation's longest-lived political machine, Tammany Hall, throughout the first seventy-five years of its existence. In his forward, he announces that he will proceed with his study within the "normal science" approach (to borrow T. S. Kuhn's terminology) followed by other recent historians of political machines. Tammany, he tells us, evolved as part of the process of "nineteenth-century American urbanism" and "'boss' rule grew naturally as the city itself grew." "Far from being unique or reprehensible, [Tammany] was eminently a product of American civilization" (p. x, p. 2). Mushkat proceeds to trace the uneasy evolution of Tammany from a nonpolitical fraternal order to a well-disciplined political organization. He argues, however, that Tammany was more than a group of skilled political mechanics—that it actually had "a political philosophy that the majority of city voters found congenial" (p. 373). This philosophy rested upon the concept that the government derived its will from the people and that public opinion limited what government could and could not do. In its search for the most productive political issues, Tammany made a series of bewildering policy shifts as it sought issues that brought votes.

Mushkat attempts to lead us through the thickets of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian politics, the bank wars and the Loco Foco revolt, the crisis caused by the aid-to-religious-education issue in the early 1840s, the problems caused by the erratic mayor Fernando Wood in the 1850s, and the rise of Tweed to power during the Civil War years, but he often becomes mired in a swamp of names and details. Not only does his analysis lack discipline and order, but it also fails almost completely to answer systematically the questions posed by the present "normal science" approach to the analysis of machine politics—that is, to analyze Tammany's evolution in relation to the process of urbanization. Aside from the aid-to-education issue, Mushkat pays almost no attention to problems stemming from urban growth such as welfare and public health. Absent also is a systematic examination of either Tammany's leadership or the leadership of its opponents, as well as any attempt to relate voting patterns to ecological, demographic, or class variables. Even though the author's bibliography cites a vast number of secondary and primary sources, he seems to have learned little from the sophisticated work of such historians of New York as Frank O. Gatell and Edward Pessen.

In short, although Mushkat has obviously done an immense amount of work in the sources, he has failed to translate these sources meaningfully for his readers. He has neither met the standards set by today's "normal science" approach to the analysis of political machines nor suggested a different approach that could lead to the development of a new paradigm.

JOEL A. TARR

Carnegie-Mellon University

The Rights of the Accused. Edited by Stuart S. Nagel. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972. Vol. I, Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals. Pp. 320. $15.00.)

Following a short and very general overall introduction to the subject by Professor Nagel of the University of Illinois, who has written extensively in this area of our public law, nine specialists contribute essays in this book on particular segments of the subject of the right of the accused, ranging from pretrial arrest and search to such post-trial matters as punishment and double jeopardy. In general, each contributor follows a common pattern of describing some particular right, or bundle of rights, of those who are accused of crime, bringing the exposition down to date, and pulling together whatever empirical evidence is available as to how each right fares at the actual operative level. Thus, these essays combine traditional explication of constitutional law with a considerable amount of material on what is often called "law in action." On the whole, the essays are descriptive, and steer fairly clear of such overall philosophical questions as where to locate the proper balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims of crime. In fact, the latter are scarcely mentioned.

The more general theoretical concepts, to the extent that they are treated at all, are spelled out in Professor Nagel's all-too-brief opening chapter. Here he asserts that the main purpose of those who have legislated into existence the rights of the accused has been "to achieve the effect of lessening the likelihood that an innocent person will be convicted or harassed" (p. 17). I think this is an overstatement, since even guilty people are entitled to due process of law, and when they are assured due process, that makes a difference. Thus, even a guilty person is entitled to representation by counsel, if for no other reason than that a skilled advocate may be able to plea bargain the accused into a more favorable situation. If there is an overall concept in our criminal justice system, it is to protect and expand the amenities of a civilized community. Thus we frown upon illegal searches and seizures not only because they invade the legal rights of the victims of such practices, but also because we value privacy and the right to be left alone, and we seek to avoid brutalizing the police.

Professor Nagel identifies three patterns of differential treatment based on the characteristics of the accused: (1) the disadvantaged pattern, dealing with indigents, blacks, and the less educated; (2) the paternalized pattern, dealing with juveniles and women; (3) the industrialized pattern, concerned mainly with urban rather than rural areas. This is an interesting model, but it is not utilized, except in a rather accidental and unorganized manner, in the specialized essays that follow. Of course, as Professor Nagel points out, the rights of the accused have been expanding, when viewed in the perspective of the last half century, and he connects this trend in part to the increasing affluence and middle-class character of the American society, and to improvements in education.

I suppose it is trite to say once more that a symposium is bound to be uneven. Some of these essays are excellent; some are of middling quality; and James Marshall's essay on trial testimony scarcely belongs in the volume at all. But on the whole, I found these essays well written, properly annotated, and presented with the authority of expertise. Professor Jacob Landynski, of the New School for Social Research, and author of our best book on the subject (*Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court*, 1966), contributes one of the most satisfying essays in the book on his specialty. The well-known civil liberties lawyer, O. John Rogge (author of *Why Men Confess*, 1959), supplies the essay on self-incrimination, in which he advances the extreme view that whenever a defendant repudiates any confession in court, for that reason alone it should be inadmissible in evidence. I know of no court which would accept this view, and I question its wisdom. The processes of accusation are described by Delmar Karlen, Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration (and author of many books, including *Anglo-American Criminal Justice*, 1967), and by J. Lawrence Schulz, who teaches at New York University Law School. Here prosecutorial discretion is analyzed in great detail. Professor William M. Beaney, of the University of Denver Law School, and author of our best book on the subject (*The Right to Counsel in American Courts*, 1955), has prepared a learned essay on his favorite subject. Indeed, Professor Nagel believes that the right to counsel may well be the most important of all of the rights of the accused, though I think the point needs the support of more empirical evidence than is presently available. The remaining essays are concerned with: the right to bail, by Patricia M. Wald (author of *Bail in the United States*, 1964); the jury system, by Rita James Simon, sociology professor at the University of Illinois (author of *The Jury and the Plea of Insanity*, 1967), and Prentice H. Marshall, law professor at Illinois; the conduct of the trial, by James Marshall, a New York lawyer (author of *Law and Psychology in Conflict*, 1966); sentencing and correction, by Robert O. Dawson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas (author of *Sentencing*, 1969); and finally, double jeopardy, by Professor Jay A. Sigler of Rutgers (author of *Double Jeopardy*, 1969).

All in all, the editor did a good job of selecting experts to discuss their specialities, and this is an interesting, timely, and informative book. The level of scholarship is very high, and, except for occasional lapses (e.g., "K. Culp" for "Kenneth Culp Davis," at p. 297), the editing is well done. The tenor of the book is optimistic, but whether this optimism will survive a few more years of a Court presided over by Chief Justice Burger remains to be seen. Probably not.

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

Bureaucracy and Representative Government. By William A. Niskanen, Jr. (Chicago & New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971. Pp. 241. $7.75.)

Bureaucracy & Representative Government, by William A. Niskanen, Jr., is one of the more impressive books I have read in recent years. There can be no question that it is the most significant work yet produced by an economist on the rôle of bureaucracy in the determination of the supply of public goods and services. I fully expect the book to attain the status of a classic in the study of bureaucracy and, more generally, public choice. Professor Niskanen has managed to combine a rare set of scholarly achievements: imagination, rigor, policy relevance, and a remarkable felicity for clear and apt expression.

Niskanen's major concern is to explain the supplies of public services as they are directly affected by the choices and behavior of bureaus and bureaucrats. The question is so obvious and so important that it has rarely been raised by political scientists and students of organizations and only "casually" or tangentially answered by those who, like Tullock and Downs, have addressed themselves to problems of bureaucracy. The only theorists who have consistently faced the problems of the supply and demand for public goods have been economists dealing with public choice, but their work has rarely inspired, let alone informed, political scientists and others who write about the general phenomena of bureaucracy and public administration. Public choice theorists, including Buchanan, Musgrave, Olson, Samuelson, Williams, and others have not stressed the role of bureaucracy. Instead, they have focused upon such other variables as voting rules, the dynamics of political competition, the calculus of voters and politicians, or they have ignored the empirical side and elaborated normative criteria for resource allocation. Niskanen does not ignore these other positive and normative questions; indeed, he devotes considerable effort to illuminating the political environment of public agencies in democracies as well as confronting policy dilemmas.

In concerning himself with the output of nonprofit organizations and, especially the governmental, Niskanen relies upon standard economic tools of analysis (price theory) to guide the inquiry and supply the answers. How successfully can hardly be decided in any "once-and-for-all-time" manner; a legion of critics will doubtless question the elegance and robustness of his model(s) as well as question his command over and application of economics and mathematics. And even those who have some difficulty in reading the book will rise to the occasion to find fault with his "conservative" policy positions. Liberals, in particular, will challenge his major contention that most if not all governmental bureaus "overproduce" their supplies of services to the public. Galbraith, Downs, and Olson had already advanced their contentions that we normally experience "undersupplies" of most public goods. Each did so via a different theoretical route but their conclusion was the same. None of them, however, formulated the problem in quite the same way as Niskanen nor did they achieve the same degree of analytical rigor and imagination in the testing of their propositions. Niskanen modestly refers to his tests as "subjective empiricism" (p. 8).

The basic argument of the book is this: Bureaucracies, i.e., bureaucrats being motivated by a concern for their own salaries, attempt to maximize their budget shares or allocations from the total budget. Accordingly, their output choices are governed by the size of the budget. While the budget is formally enacted by elective public officials (sponsors) the bureaucrats have a considerable say because of their superior bargaining position. The bureaucrats' superior bargaining position is based largely on more and better information, as well as their greater willingness and capacity to pay the costs of bargaining with the sponsors. Just as a producer in the market can concentrate his energies and information so can the bureaucrat do so in the polity. Both the consumers and citizen-taxpayers find themselves at a relative disadvantage because they must disperse their concerns and resources over many more disparate decisions. One may well ask what, if anything, limits the demands of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat? Why are governmental bureaus not larger, and why is their output not still greater? The answer is simple: The bureaucrats are constrained by the politicians' reactions to competing demands for public services and the never-ending complaints about taxes. Since the bureaucrats must win the approval of the sponsors or politicians even to *have* a budget they must supply whatever the politicians demand. As Wildavsky pointed out in *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, a bureaucrat must not promise more than he can deliver or he will pay the ultimate penalty of a smaller budget. On the other hand, if he does better than expected he may be rewarded with a larger budget or other concessions.

Niskanen's recognition of the considerable power of the voters and their representatives (p. 42), probably does some damage to his basic model, as he seems to recognize in Chapters 14–16 where he relaxes the basic model and inserts a number of more realistic institutional assumptions. I must confess that I have not, as yet, been able to decide whether the "aggregative" model in these latter chapters ie entirely consistent with the basic model. The problem may be an outgrowth of my more limited command of price theory. In any event, Niskanen develops his models far beyond anything yet done on public bureaucracies. While the basic messages are clear and simple, the proofs are considerably more detailed and elegant than is customary in writings on public administration.

Among the more clearly-stated and, perhaps, controversial themes are those pertaining to the policy implications of the several models. I should like to end on these matters as does Niskanen. Private, public, and mixed private-public goods and services are produced by a bewildering array of governmental and private organizations guided by mixtures of profit and nonprofit objectives. While Niskanen attempts to account for the production decisions of the nonprofit public bureau, one has the feeling that he does so chiefly as a means for assessing the optimality of those choices i.e., he is much more concerned with supplying policy answers to questions like, which types of organization should produce how much of which types of goods and services?" While Niskanen asserts strong preferences for eighteenth-century liberal ideals he opts for efficiency as the chief criterion by which to judge organizational performance. Unfortunately for the citizenry, resources are seriously misallocated by the bureaucracy as whole and by individual bureaus producing specific services.

Niskanen, accepting a self-imposed policy challenge, suggests ways of achieving greater efficiency in the public sector. Some of his proposals are conventionally conservative; others are not. Some are politically feasible; most seem less so. Most will irritate liberal political scientists. All proposals, however, flow from his positive models. More precisely, the proposals are of two types: one set pertains to reform of the bureaus themselves, while the others pertain to the political system within which the bureaus function. With respect to the former, Niskanen advocates more extensive competition among bureaus producing the same output thereby giving citizens consumer options as occur in the marketplace. While competition among local and state governments exists and public and private bureaus currently compete to some degree, as in the case of postal services and police protection, Niskanen wants the entire public bureaucratic world to assume some of the characteristics of the marketplace and thereby more closely and frequently approach Paretian optimality. Niskanen views such competition as helpful, but he views reform of the political environment or the polity as more critical if less likely to happen. Indeed, imposing competition on the bureaus is itself a political reform of no mean proportions. The last sections of the book (Parts VI and VII) spell out Niskanen's conception of representative government and briefly set forth his reforms. Like most public choice theorists, Niskanen takes a dim view of the electoral process and the behavior of politicians. The culprit is uncertainty, which is regarded as inevitable and far more pervasive than in the market; this being the base, Niskanen advocates reforms that do not so much remove uncertainty as attempt to minimize its impact. In short, Niskanen hopes to "reduce the chances of disastrous behavior by government rather than . . . induce optimal behavior" (p. 137). Niskanen is either a Waldian pursuing a maximin strategy or a strategist opting for Savage's minimization of regret. In either case he is pessimistic.

Niskanen places heavy emphasis upon strengthening the review process by which budgets are formulated and enacted within the legislative and executive branches. Unlike others who press for the same reform, Niskanen suggests that committee and cabinet assignments be randomized on a periodic basis. A variety of other organizational reforms are also advanced including, a policy research institute for the legislature as a whole. These and other such reforms are designed to minimize the role of strong advocates within governmental offices and the high-demand group for public expenditures among the citizenry. A more consequential reform proposal is that of adopting an extra-majority instead of a simple-majority rule in the legislatures for the adoption of spending proposals. Like Wicksell, and Buchanan and Tullock, Niskanen recognizes the difficulties of achieving unanimity or even near-unanimity on fiscal policies and, accordingly, proposes a two-thirds rule. Since he advocates the contraction of governmental activity as a paramount goal, the deadlocks such a rule entails are viewed as beneficial or a small price to pay for so valued an end. Niskanen also advances some novel and, perhaps, unexpected views and reforms of the tax system. He thinks that a progressive tax structure is preferrable to the current proportional system at least under certain specified conditions pertaining to the existence of bureaucratic competition, review boards, and majority rule. The size of government and the allocation of the tax burden is vitally affected by the varying combinations of decision rule, the existence of a review and the prevalence of majority rule. Space does not permit a detailed examination of these permutations.

Niskanen does not assess the political feasibility of his proposals. One can, however, suggest that most of them pose such serious threats to the existing power structure that they will not likely be adopted. The voters' recent overwhelming defeat of Governor Reagan's fiscal proposal—a proposal which Niskanen not only supported but helped to formulate—hardly bodes well for those who want a more limited government.

One does not always expect "wisdom" in more or less technical expositions, but somehow Niskanen provides readers and especially classroom teachers with some highly quotable observations. Two that appeal to me and that I have already included in my lectures are the claim that ". . . the most dangerous of all politicians is one who is indifferent to his own reelection or the future of his party . . . " (p. 137), and the play on Adam Smith—"There is an 'invisible hand' in government but it is a helping hand for some, a barely acceptable appendage to many, and a mailed fist for others" (p. 137).

It is obvious that my admiration for Niskanen's book is virtually boundless.

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Fiscal Federalism. By Wallace E. Oates. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972. Pp. 256. $7.95.)

One of the reputed values, if not virtues, of economics is its explicitness in the face of a world of ambiguity. Professor Oates is an economist, and, consistent with one canon of his discipline, he is indeed explicit on at least two fronts, the purposes of his book and the character of the more discrete questions he confronts.

Fiscal Federalism "explores what economic theory implies about the division of fiscal functions among levels of government, and examines the extent to which such theoretical structure can explain the organization and workings of the public sectors of different countries" (p. vi). This statement accurately conveys the focus of the book as dealing with: (1) formal theory, (2) empirical fiscal practices, (3) comparison in a cross-national sense, and (4) positive rather than perjorative analysis. These are commendable features of a highly commendable book.

Oates offers an economic definition of federalism that is latitudinarian by comparison with ones offered by power-oriented political scientists. His definition is (p. 17):

> A public sector with both centralized and decentralized levels of decision-making in which choices made at each level concerning the provision of public services are determined largely by the demands for these services of the residents of (and perhaps others who carry on activities in) the respective jurisdiction.

The disciplinary differences are evident when Oates's empirical analysis of economic federalism includes fifty-eight nations. Contrast this with the more restrictive criteria of political scientists in which four, ten, or perhaps sixteen nations are acknowledged as federal systems.

These disciplinary contrasts are offered as descriptive and contextual observations, not as critical and limiting conditions. On the contrary, Oates's broad, empirical, and analytical approaches are uniform assets rather than deterrents to the understanding of important intergovernmental fiscal questions. These questions include:

(1) Which level of government is best suited to provide a particular public service?
(2) What are the justifications and optimal arrangements for using intergovernmental grants?
(3) What general and theoretical principles serve as guides in the design of a system of taxation under a federal arrangement?
(4) How are economic federal systems actually organized and what cross-national similarities and differences exist in intergovernmental fiscal relations?
(5) What are the dynamics of fiscal federalism, i.e.,

> what trends are present in the degree of fiscal centralization or decentralization over time?

Enough has been said to highlight the substantive questions and empirical focus of this volume. It has the additional and unusual feature of separating the sometimes involved and technical aspects of empirical analysis from the body of the text. This is accomplished by using appendices for each chapter and allowing the author less encumbered substantive exposition.

This book is more thoughtful than thought-provoking. It relies more heavily on clear, incisive analysis than on new or original insights. Its normative, position, which comes out favorable to fiscal federalism, is tempered and formal rather than burning and ideological. The book seems well suited for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in federalism, public finance, and perhaps public policy. It does not map new avenues for the analysis or directional development of federal systems. But it does provide a much better understanding of the routes such systems have followed to date and some signposts at important forks in the roads.

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Reforming School Finance. By Robert D. Reischauer and Robert W. Hartman, with the assistance of Daniel J. Sullivan. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973. Pp. xiv, 185. $6.95.)

This book is an attempt by three policy-minded economists to crystallize some issues in the national debate about school finance that bubbled up in the period from 1970 to 1972.

The introduction describes three reasons why national attention suddenly turned to the problem of financing elementary and secondary schools. First was a "taxpayers' revolt": for example, the percentage of school bond issues approved around the country began to decline after 1965 and fell sharply in 1969. Second was a series of court decisions that began with the California Supreme Court's ruling in *Serrano v. Priest*, in August, 1971. This and a string of subsequent rulings in other state and federal courts held that the present system of financing public schools through local taxes violated the federal Constitution and some state constitutions as well. Third, the decline in nonpublic school enrollment after 1965 threatened to put further financial pressure on the public schools.

A chapter full of numbers describing disparities in the present system of school finance in the U.S. is followed by a major chapter on "The General Fiscal Dilemma." Here the authors seek "to resolve whether a genuine crisis is developing or whether the problem is of a different sort: while we all want better schools, we are not certain that more money will improve the schools, nor do we like the taxes we now pay to support education" (p. 17). The authors apparently believe there is no real emergency. Total outlays for public schools more than tripled between 1957–58 and 1971–72, in current dollars. About one-fourth of this increase was due to growth in enrollment, which has now petered out as the last babies of the postwar boom are finishing high school. Approximately forty per cent of the increase in expenditures resulted from rising teachers' salaries, but the teacher shortage of the 1960s has now become a surplus. Property tax rates have risen, but other state and local taxes have grown faster than the property tax. And although the property tax is often poorly administered and inequitable, the authors, in their lucid and scholarly discussion of this complex question,conclude that the property tax is probably less regressive than it is reputed to be. Furthermore, what makes differences in the amount of taxable property between localities unfair is that low-income people are prevented from moving to certain wealthy localities—which suggests to this reader that an end to restrictive zoning would be a stronger remedy for injustice in local school finance than would general reduction of property taxes.

Although the pressures on public school finance will subside in the 1970s—and although reports of "crisis" were probably exaggerated in the first place—the authors do consider various proposals for reform. One strategy would aim at reducing inequities in the local property tax. The authors summarize a number of proposals, and include a novel suggestion of their own for deferred payment of property taxes, which would allow elderly homeowners with low incomes to keep their homes without any public subsidy (p. 40). Another strategy would replace some local property tax revenues with other local taxes. Finally, a third strategy would increase the federal and state shares (presently about seven per cent and forty per cent, respectively) of the cost of public schools.

This third strategy for reform is the subject of an entire chapter, which raises a set of

> basic questions that will have to be answered in designing a more equitable school finance system: How high should the basic state educational program be set? Will the differing educational needs and costs of various districts be taken into account? Should local districts be allowed to supplement the basic state program, and if so by how much? If local districts are allowed to supplement the state program, will the state make adjustments for the varying abilities of

> school districts to raise the supplemental revenues? Finally, what kinds of taxes should states use for their increased share, and how should districts' ability to pay be measured? (p. 93).

The authors describe important trade-offs that arise in dealing with these questions. For example, if a given amount of state aid to local school districts produces more equalization of expenditures per pupil, then it will provide less local tax relief, assuming that low-spending districts are to be "leveled up." If, instead, high-spending districts were "leveled down," then wealthier residents might have to resort to private schools to obtain the quality of education they want for their children.

While one desideratum for state and federal aid to public schools is to avoid driving high-income groups into private schools, a frequently stated objective of aid to private schools is to avoid forcing their students into public schools. But the authors conclude that public subsidies of realistic magnitude would not have much effect on stemming the decline of enrollment in parochial schools. The only argument for aid to parochial schools in which they see much merit is that expanding private schools in general might provide more choice among educational styles and philosophies. This is really an argument for a full-fledged voucher system, which would let parents use tax revenues to pay for their children's education in any approved school, public or private. A voucher plan might also be the most effective way to equalize resources available for schooling among families of varying means, because any other scheme to redistribute resources could be undermined by high-income families sending their children to private schools. It is doubtful, however, that a voucher plan would be constitutional if it included parochial schools.

Reforming School Finance does not make firm recommendations of its own. Instead, it describes school finance as a complex distributional game, showing who would win or lose from various proposals, and why the outcome is sometimes uncertain. The authors also choose not to deal with the prior question: Why is school finance really worth worrying about? Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has overturned *Rodriguez v. San Antonio*, declining school enrollments in the 1970s will reduce the pressure for reform of any kind. Unless state constitutions provide a basis for action through the courts, no significant equalization of resources for education is likely to come about until there is widespread agreement that school children *can* benefit from more resources, and that *all* children have a claim to these benefits. But this book does not try to articulate the constructive vision of education which might inspire a major reform of school finance.

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The New Deal and the Last Hurrah: Pittsburgh Machine Politics. By Bruce M. Stave. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. Pp. 262. $8.95.)

The main theme of this book is its contention that whereas traditional opinion has held that the New Deal "assisted in destroying America's urban political machines. . . . the origins of the Pittsburgh Democratic machine . . . were rooted deeply in the New Deal; rather than enfeebling machine politics in Pittsburgh, the New Deal invigorated a previously impotent Democratic organization" (p. ix).

Professor Stave uses three methods to investigate the effect of the New Deal on Pittsburgh's machine politics: (1) interviewing 103 Democratic committeemen who served during the 1930s; (2) comparing names of committeemen listed in election return books with listings of the same individuals and their occupations in city directories; and (3) comparing the demographic findings obtained from the interviews of New Deal committeemen with similar data gathered from an investigation of Pittsburgh's precinct officials in 1954 (William J. Keefe and William C. Seyler, "Precinct Politicians in Pittsburgh," *Social Science*, 36 [January 1960], 26–32).

The interviews with 103 Democratic committeemen revealed that one-third were on the work-relief rolls at some point during the depression decade, and all but four of them served with the Works Progress Administration (WPA). A majority of those who served with the WPA were foremen or supervisors. Several of the committeemen used their WPA work as the "first rung on a ladder of public employment" (p. 166). From this and related data, Stave concludes that the interviews "emphasize the connection between WPA and grass-roots politics during the depression decade" (p. 182).

The comparison of the election-return books with the city directories showed that by 1962, 78 per cent of Pittsburgh's Democratic committeemen held a job with city, county, state or federal government. A study of twenty-two of Pittsburgh's thirty-two Democratic ward chairmen in 1960 indicated that twenty (91 per cent) earned their livelihood by means of a government position. By 1962, nearly 60 per cent of the Democratic committeemen who held public jobs were on the City payroll, as contrasted to the New Deal years when such jobs were more evenly distributed among the several levels of public service. Professor Stave concludes that this comparison "highlights the shift from private to public employment by Pittsburgh Democratic Committeemen during the era and illuminates the organization's use of the payroll for the express purpose of building a machine" (p. 182).

A comparison of the findings relating to Democratic committeemen who served during the 1930s with those of a similar study undertaken in Pittsburgh during 1954 showed the following: (1) of the New Deal committeemen in the study, 57 per cent were under forty years of age as opposed to 20 per cent in 1954; 89 per cent were under fifty years of age during the New Deal's beginning in Pittsburgh, whereas 56 per cent were younger than fifty years of age two decades later; (2) whereas 40 per cent of the New Deal committeemen graduated from high school or went on to further schooling, 48 per cent of the 1954 committeemen did the same; (3) in both the 1930s and 1954, Roman Catholics predominated in the party; (4) in both the 1930s and in 1954, "the politically inclined Irish and the Germans [were] the two leading ethnic groups "involved in Democratic organization politics" (pp. 178–179); (5) there were two and a half times as many foreign-born committeemen in 1934 as there were in 1954. From the above and related data, Stave concludes that "the demographic data shows there was little significant change in the social backgrounds of party personnel who served before and after the age of Roosevelt—it implies continuity rather than change in the Democratic politics of pre-and-post New Deal Pittsburgh" (p. 182).

For this reviewer, the contribution of *The New Deal and the Last Hurrah* comes not so much from its efforts to persuade that "Pittsburgh Machine Politics" were somehow unique in being New-Deal-supported instead of New Deal-enfeebled; rather, the value of this book lies in its vignettes of the colorful characters who peopled the Pittsburgh political scene: the zany Mayor William N. McNair (keeping his campaign promise by putting his desk in the lobby of the City-County Building so that the public would have free access to their chief executive; promising a group of ministers that if they would recommend a candidate for director of public safety, a department abounding in patronage, he would give him favorable consideration; hosting a local vaudeville show for a week and appearing on radio as guest on Major Bowe's amateur show); the jubilant David L. Lawrence, wiring FDR on October 6, 1936—"Some more Roosevelt luck. Mayor McNair resigned and Cornelius D. Scully sworn in to fill vacancy by City Council"; the irrepressible Mrs. R. Templeton Smith, head of the local League of Women Voters (this reviewer attended a City of Pittsburgh Budget hearing in the late 1940's when Mrs. Smith said that when her curiosity was aroused by a very large sum being budgeted for the salaries of painters—and only a minimal amount being budgeted for the purchase of paint—she sought out the head of the division of painting who explained the apparent paradox—"Lady, paint don't vote!").

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The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt. By Otis H. Stephens, Jr. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1973. Pp. 236. $9.50.)

Supreme Court extensions of constitutional protections to pre-Court actors and processes have accelerated during the "Warren Court era." Issues such as search and seizure, self-incrimination, right to counsel, and exaction of confessions have been defined as within the judicial compass of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Each amendment has been relied upon, in varying degrees, to serve as a center point from which the compass arc has swung to protect confessions of guilt in federal courts, or in state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment. To draw police activity within judicial constraints has a logic which, despite cries of "handcuffing the police," the Burger Court may have difficulty disavowing.

In *The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt*, Otis Stephens has examined the search for standards to explain that logic in the particular area of confessions. His examination, given the variability of treatment accorded confessions, doubts neither the desirability nor the logic of constitutional protection. Yet the development of a judicial explanation, the interlocking of the various constitutional provisions, and the study of the impact of Supreme Court decisions on police in the area of confessions *could* provide the Court with potential avenues for retreat. Impact studies, as Stephens shows, will not give much support for retrenchment. Thus, any Burger Court modifications in the area of confessions can be located within the Court's development and interlocking of the changing constitutional justifications which Stephens has carefully examined.

We learn that the treatment of confessions—first from fragile Common Law roots dependent on judgments of "trustworthiness" and then grafted onto stronger due process stock, often with the intentional hybridization of search and seizure, self-incrimination, and right to counsel arguments—has been a slow process. Unwillingness by way of "incorporation" to extend applicability to local actions, perceived threats to "law and order" and to the independent professionalism of police, fears of "floodgates" (first of criminals back to the streets, and then of litigious habitual criminals on frivolous grounds up through the courts), and self-delusions that civil remedies would still correct and reverse police wrongs—all had served to delay early Supreme Court intervention.

Now, the Common Law "right" to be free from self-incrimination was no right at all. (In Hohfeld's terminology, it would be an "immunity," since the state disabled one from confuting God's judgment through trial by ordeal. That evidence and verdict necessarily became the law and the truth. To call it a "right" would be to misstate the purpose behind enforced non-self-confession.) It is hardly surprising that Stephens finds a similarly conservative Common Law cast given confessions of guilt prior to the turn of the century. He cites the *Bram* case (1897) as the only early foray from Common Law justification into more broadly based and constitutionally prescribed protections against self-incrimination.

Retreat from this early, if inchoate and muddled, reliance on broader constitutional language for protection against wrongful extractions of guilt was assured by 1908 when, in *Twining*, self-incrimination arguments were held beyond Fourteenth Amendment reach. Retreat was made to case-by-case evaluations, depending on the trustworthiness of the litigant.

When next the Court went searching for a broader and constitutionally grounded rule, it came to rely on "fair trial reasoning. No longer right or wrong depending on the "cut of his jib," but right or wrong depending on what shocks a common man's sense of decency, the confession was judged admissible or not. Stephens reminds the reader that the atrocities toward Negroes and exposes such as those contained in the Wickersham Commission findings of the 1930s demanded a firmer judicialization of confessions.

Judicial "fair trial" standards for confessions, based on due process, weakened, both for want of precision and because of increasing agitation from the more conservative wing of the 1940s Court. Instead of a return to "trustworthiness" standards, Stephens suggests the *McNabb-Mallory* rule accomplished judicial supervision of confessions in federal courts. Thus administrative, rather than either Common Law or constitutional due process, grounds became preferred. Fears of such administrative scrutiny of grass roots policing raised immediate hackles in Congress. These outcries, plus cold war fears and the losses of liberal Justices Murphy and Rutledge, tolled further judicial activism in the area of confessions. Not until the advent of Justices Warren and Brennan, and the ensuing 1957 *Mallory* reassertion of supervisory solicitude, did the Court again deal actively with confessions. Once more, Stephens observes, the congressional hackles against Court coddling of criminals rose in an anguished chorus, now led by Senator Ervin. (The "law and order" leitmotif of that chorus did indeed prove seductive in the 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns.)

By the time *Mapp* (1961) had pushed the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the states, *Escobedo* (1964) had expanded admissibility from a matter of case-by-case judgment to one of an absolute constitutional right, and *Miranda* (1966) had replaced circumstantial variables with broad constitutional commands, all these variegated and interlocking protections extended judicial theory into policing practice.

Stephens devotes considerable attention to the impact of these holdings upon law enforcement. All the fears of "judicial handcuffing" of the police find little verification, as Stephens's review of this literature, shows. Yet, despite the good tidings that the Warren Court did not immobilize policing functions, Stephens has prepared us for the realization that these protective integuments are again being pulled away. The beginning of the retrenchment has already been signaled by a triad of Burger Court cases in 1970, by the Court's greater willingness to overlook negotiated pleas of guilt as a variant of inadmissibly extracted confessions, and by the *Harris* decision (1971) (which upheld use of information to impeach *testimony* though stricter Miranda rules had proscribed *any* use—against a person *or* his testimony). Stephens has defined the protective petals surrounding litigants in the area of confessions though perhaps greater emphasis might have been given plea bargaining. Do such bargains "build in" their own due process, albeit at a pre-judicial level? Or is bargaining a derogation to some degree of the very protections against inadmissible confessions of guilt Stephens has so thoroughly and admirably examined?

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The Contexts of Social Mobility: Ideology and Theory. By Anselm L. Strauss. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. xiv, 263. $8.50.)

The book is organized into three parts. Part I develops a very brief, highly selective critique of research and theory on American mobility. Part II directs attention to traditional and contemporary ideologies (or images) about American mobility, drawing principally on the writings of foreign commentators on the American scene, such as the ever popular de Tocqueville, historians, social commentators and novelists; and Part III proposes a partial "theory" of mobility that focuses on important, but, in Strauss's judgment, generally neglected aspects of mobility. As a social psychologist and social historian, Professor Strauss has come to believe that contemporary, especially quantitative approaches to the study of mobility have slighted the psychological and historical contexts of mobility and have been especially insensitive to their own ideological preconceptions. In the hope of "transcending" these alleged deficiencies, Strauss first examines the "continuing public conversation about opportunities, equality, inequality, success, failure, mobility . . . along with the manifold cultural and institutional contexts within which the conversation has occurred" (pp. xii–xiii) on the grounds that it is not merely conversation but "precipitates individual, collective, and corporate action" (p. xiii). Borrowing from his general theory of "status passage" previously developed with Barney G. Glaser (*Status Passage* [Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1971]), he then examines "not only . . . the direction of mobility (up-down) and . . . distances of rise and fall, but also . . . other important issues such as: the rate and timing of mobility, the degree of commitment to mobility goals, the variety of tactics employed in mobility actions, the contests for control among interested parties involved, the personal meanings of mobility, and the articulation of mobility concerns with other concerns" (p. xiii). To accomplish these ambitious objectives, he employs a "special methodology of comparative analysis" and "theoretical sampling" (as opposed to statistical sampling) in the development of a "grounded theory" of mobility (see Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* [Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967]).

How successful is Strauss in achieving these various objectives? Strauss has generally been regarded as having made substantial contributions to the sociological enterprise, both in enriching our substantive understanding of such fascinating and important phenomena as the sociology of dying and also in broadening the range of methodological tactics in the development of theory. I was, however, very disappointed with this book which simply failed, in my judgment, to live up to its author's reputation.

While counting myself a member of the "quantitative camp" Strauss stigmatizes in the first part, I share somewhat his sense of the excessive limitations this group of researchers has imposed on questions about mobility in America. I was shocked, however, by the highly selective, excessively brief (a mere fourteen pages constitutes Part I), and dated portrayal of their work. There is surely something wrong with a critique and virtual dismissal of a tradition of research and theory that fails even to *mention* the classic statement of its position (Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967]), let alone detail its inadequacies systematically. The reader uninitiated in the contemporary developments in the field of mobility studies and the status attainment process (one of the most active and robust in contemporary sociology) would come away ill-informed and with a highly distorted notion of what is going on. The initiated reader would simply be left gasping.

We are informed that the analytic scheme of Part II is built around several sociological variables which Strauss admits sound more like labels for complex historical events or processes but which he hastens to reassure us "function as variables" (p. 15). This reassurance is, unfortunately, not convincingly demonstrated by his subsequent discussion. Two sets of variables (processual and ideational) and their interrelations are linked to the conditions for, and the behavioral and institutional consequences of, perspectives on mobility. The processual set of variables includes five major variables: the settling of the *frontier*, the peopling and building of the *countryside*, and the processes of *urbanization*; *industrialization*, and *immigration*. The ideational set of variables consists of three persistent American themes or imageries: the celebration of America as an *agricultural nation*, as the *land of destiny*, and as the *bearer and creator of civilization*. A chapter is devoted to each topic. The general format of each chapter is simply to summarize briefly the comments of selected observers on the "variable" in question, being careful to juxtapose conflicting views. Anyone reasonably familiar with American social history and historical and contemporary social commentators and novelists will encounter few surprises or new insights in this long and remarkably unprovocative middle section of the book. The compilation of authors and points of view is reasonably comprehensive, but the reader is left with the task of teasing out for himself most of the implications of the discussion.

Part III, by far the most successful section of the book, contains a number of provocative discussions about specific aspects of the mobility process sometimes neglected in contemporary research. To label this discussion a "theory of mobility" as Strauss does is to misuse the term, since it is not much more than an interesting shopping list of things one should probably consider in describing aspects of the mobility process for individuals and groups. Strauss assumes too much familiarity on the reader's part with his previous methodological and theoretical discussions and, as a result, does not adequately develop key definitions, assumptions, and rationales.

In sum, I certainly could not recommend this book as an adequate critical introduction to sociological work on mobility in America nor as an especially fresh or novel perspective on the topic more generally. Its value may lie in bringing into one place a synopsis of a variety of more qualitatively oriented discussions of mobility by historians and social observers, past and present. Drawing out the political implications of American ideologies about mobility and inequality is not an expressed goal of the book; but Strauss does provide relevant materials and observations for those interested in such questions.

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The Prevention of Racial Discrimination in Britain. Edited by Simon Abbott. (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1971. Pp. xviii, 502. £ 5.00.)

The Politics of the Powerless: A Study of the Campaign Against Discrimination. By Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1972. Pp. xvi, 244. £ 4.30.)

Race and Law in Great Britain. By Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 491. $10.00.)

The surge of publications in England about British race relations has begun to match the occasional but intense attention immigration and race have received in British politics since the mid-1960s. Together with Rose (*Colour and Citizenship*), Rex and Moore (*Race, Community, and Conflict*), and Lambert, (*Crime, Police, and Race Relations*) these volumes constitute a shelf sufficient to acquaint those concerned with the starkly similar yet markedly different nature of the race "problem" in Britain and the United States.

The least substantial of the volumes, although in many ways the most comprehensive is Abbott, ed., *The Prevention of Racial Discrimination in Britain.* The study was commissioned by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research at a time when research about race relations as an issue of public policy in Britain was just beginning to emerge from the reportorial stage. The essays fall into three sections: "The Immigrants and the Receiving Society," which includes historical background as well as recent demographic data; "The Process of Racial Discrimination" in employment, housing, and education; and, "The Prevention of Racial Discrimination," which describes British anti-discrimination legislation and its administrative apparatus. Complaints under the two legislative enactments, the mild Race Relations Act of 1965 and the more comprehensive Race Relations Act of 1968, are administered by a Race Relations Board, whose activities are described, and a Community Relations Commission, whose vague charge is to coordinate and give advice on community relations in the interest of community harmony. For want of data—the British did not then and still do not gather census information on the basis of race—and a predominance of description rather then analysis, the essays vary widely in value. Simon Abbott's concluding essay is analytically provocative; the essays by Brian Cohen, Nicholas Deakin, Louis Kushnick, and Bob Hepple stand out among the others. Overall it is a useful survey if one allows for the fact that the essays were written when the state of the research art in this field was just beginning to mature and that events were rapidly outdistancing the data and many of the conclusions.

The Heineman volume is a model of its kind. It is a case study of the rise and fall of a civil rights pressure group, The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination. Between 1964 and early 1967 C.A.R.D. was the only organization in Britain dedicated to the formation of an alliance between immigrant organizations and liberal activists. Heineman combines sensitivity to the complexity of his subject with knowledge of interest group analysis and its limited applicability to the politics of the powerless and the tensions which tore C.A.R.D. apart. A fragile consensus, based initially on civil rights goals reminiscent of the United States in the mid-1960s, was shattered when preferences for establishmentarian solutions came in conflict with a pseudo-Marxist-Leninism. The ideology shifted unpredictably, depending on personal preferences and the needs of the moment, from revolutionary regeneration of British society and the Third World to black separatism. C.A.R.D. could not resolve these differences, nor could it resolve the tension between the ambitious plans for a grassroots movement in Britain and the need to influence governmental policy in London. The leadership core, numbering hardly more than fifty, was split on personal, ideological, and racial grounds from the outset. The membership ambitiously estimated at 3000, was as divided as the leadership. The liberals in C.A.R.D. had access to the government, particularly to the Home Secretary and prime mover of the 1968 legislation, Roy Jenkins. Their more militant counterparts, as Heineman points out, represented only minuscule segments of the immigrant "community" which itself defied clear definition. Geographical dispersion was intensified by class differences, differing generational goals, varying degrees of political consciousness and Britishness, and, not the least, the mutual suspicions within and among Indian, West Indian, and Pakistani groups. Heineman concludes that the failure to aggregate such a diverse assemblage, split as it was by irreconcilable leadership styles and ambitions, rendered C.A.R.D. as powerless as its constituency. C.A.R.D.'s only legacy, beyond the legacy of failure, was experience in the tribulations of interracial organization and, possibly, an increment of awareness in Whitehall and Parliament about the need for more extensive antidiscrimination legislation. The liberal survivors turned to lobby for that legislation.

Race and Law in Great Britain is co-authored by one of the founders of C.A.R.D., Anthony Lester. His skill, together with Geoffrey Bindman's knowledge of the field, have produced a study of imposing scholarly quality. Lester is one of a handful of race relations professionals within the British bar. His expertise is enlightened by a Harvard Law School education and by on-the-scene observations of civil rights conflict in the United States in 1964. Bindman, a solicitor, is a legal advisor to the Race Relations Board. Both were active in forming the legislation they discuss. Their official involvement in no way diminishes their commentary, although evaluations of the performance of some persons involved in the attenuated network of the British race relations enterprise tends to be muted.

The study is, in part, a legal treatise which tracks the content and the reach of the Race Relations Act of 1968. Fortunately, it is also more. It probes what British readers in particular need to probe, namely, whether legislation against racial discrimination has any significant role to play. The debates in both parties about the desirability of the 1968 Act were filigreed with much the same rhetoric as when legislation was being contemplated in the United States during the Eisenhower years. The myth that law can have no effect, or should have no effect, is much alive in Great Britain. This fact accounts for the authors' careful rejoinder to a widely publicized lecture by an eminent jurist, Lord Radcliffe, some months after the passage of the Race Relations Act. He expressed doubt that racial discrimination was sufficiently condemned in British society (a premise about which British polls provide no real answer) to warrant prohibition by law. He reasoned that prejudice and discrimination in themselves do not necessarily carry associations of "moral ill-doing" and because law should extend only to matters in which the moral issue is viewed as beyond debate, legal intervention is questionable. Radcliffe's attitude is symbolic of a mood that affected the passage of the Act and that has had an impact on its administration. Where the issue has reached the courts the attitude has manifested itself in judicial literalism. The most recent decision by the Law Lords in a private club case (*Charter v. Race Relations Board* [1973]) may at first seem a distant echo of the Supreme Court's *Moose Lodge v. Irvis* [1972]. But the differences are more significant than the similarities; while *Moose Lodge* searches for the outer perimeters of what law may reach when state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is in question, *Charter* and other British cases search for what the statute read literally might in its own words seek not to encompass. As Lester and Bindman suggest, the Radcliffe view forgets the broader purposes of law and public policy. The judicial decisions, it can be argued, tend to mask a preference for traditional social patterns and common-law values and a narrow view of the judicial function as well as the function of law.

It is, then, all the more remarkable that the legislation has both substance and bite or, in fact, that it was passed at all. A relevant commitment to legislation was stirred by the accumulated though hesitant promises by the Labor Party that justice required concrete action by Parliament. More significant, however, was the realization that discrimination which immigrant parents might tolerate would not be passively accepted by the new generation of their native-born children soon to emerge from British schools. In the final weeks before passage, moreover, the Labor Party found it difficult not to match the severe restrictiveness of its own Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 with some symbolic assurance that those in residence in Britain should be free of racial discrimination. Lester and Bindman set out lucidly the legislative history of the Act. Just as effectively they analyze the scope of the legislation and its administration by the Race Relations Board in housing, goods and services, and employment. Significantly, the latter was to be dealt with initially by industrial machinery after the government yielded to the combined pressure of the TUC and CBI. Some of the exemptions sound familiar: exceptions for those employing small numbers of persons, and a Mrs. Murphy clause, for example. Some do not: there is no prohibition against religious discrimination, racial "balance" in industry can be applied against those not principally educated in Britain, and discrimination in assigning berths to passengers or employees is allowed on British ships. By the time the next edition of this volume is published, Parliament may have repaired serious deficiencies in the enforcement procedures including grants of power to the Race Relations Board to initiate investigations without depending on specific complaints and the use of restraining orders and compulsory processes to obtain documentation. Such a turn from voluntarism is unlikely in the foreseeable future, however. These defects aside, and given the British setting, it is easy to agree with the authors' conclusion that the legislation is at once a significant step forward in the law, and at last, recognition by the political system that a problem is at hand.

I find two deficiencies in this excellent study. First, although there is every reason to suppose that the authors are aware of it, they fail to emphasize the insufficient experience of race relations practitioners in Britain and the lack of purposeful recruitment of race relations professionals into government, the social services, the bench, and the bar. The deficiency is owing in part to the character of legal education in England and, in other sectors, the cult of the generalist. It is also a product of the social worker mentality. Civil rights professionals are rarities and the deficiency merits discussion. Second, I take exception to their conclusion that Section 6 of the otherwise innocuous Race Relations Act of 1965 prohibiting incitement to racial hatred (now by implication an integral part of the 1968 Act) serves any useful purpose. The authors appear to admit this and, in fact, seem to conclude that its impact has been negative. Yet they proceed to argue, unpersuasively, that the section should be extended, not repealed.

Race and Law in Great Britain will not be replaced as the standard volume interpreting legislation in this field. It will only need updating. It should be noted that this study, like the others, explicitly recognizes that there must be a change in the political atmosphere in Britain which encourages professionals, governmental officials in London and elsewhere, and established interests in the private realm, to become more profoundly alert to the needs of the new minorities in the allocation of privileges and benefits. Noblesse oblige or government by technicians will move matters only inconclusively. Minority power must develop. The burden of the Heineman volume is that interest must be harnessed to power. For the onetime immigrant, now citizen, this can take a variety of forms, or none at all.

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South Africa: Sociological Perspectives. Edited by Heribert Adam. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. vii, 340. $11.25.)

Dr. Adam begins his introduction by stating: "There is no paucity of publications on South Africa. Most of them, however, amount to little more than a polemical denouncement of the Apartheid system. Instead of socio-economic analyses, confessions are offered as to how unprejudiced the authors are" (p. vii).

Not true of this perceptive book. All fifteen contributing authors are critical of racial discrimination in South Africa. By and large, however, they do not substitute rhetoric for reason. To understand this volume's importance in the initiation of a new trend in social science analysis of racial tension in South Africa, it must be viewed within the context of a convergence of political thought by the three white political parties in South Africa. At the same time, there is also a convergence of political views of the whites and the largely disenfranchised majority.

A decade ago the Progressive party, favoring the franchise for all citizens who had a primary education, labored long to produce a federal plan for South Africa. The United Party has moved to a federal concept with some powers held by a multiracial body superior to the present all-white Parliament. At its 1973 Transvaal Congress, the "Young Turks," led by Harry Schwartz, for the first time invited black leaders to address them, and then applauded the concept of shared power. Although the National Party is not officially committed to federation, prominent intellectuals and key politicians now talk of the inevitability of a confederation or commonwealth.

On the other hand, the Bantustans, ridiculed by the white opposition parties and initially opposed by almost all African leaders, have become a dynamic force in politics. Alan Paton now welcomes the platform which Bantustans have given to the new generation of African leaders, such as Buthelezi, Mangope, Ntsanwisi, and Phatudi. The Progressives changed their concepts of federation to embrace the political realities of Bantustans. Criticism from Kaiser Matanzima forced the United Party to abandon the palliative notion that eight black M.P.s in the present Parliament could mean justice.

Although urban Africans dislike Bantustans, they do view various federal plans with some favor. Buthelezi's personal popularity in Soweto (black Johannesburg) stems mainly from his championing of the rights of all black men and women in South Africa.

When the Bantustan leaders talk of consolidating all the "Homelands," as Matanzima and Buthelezi have done, or of joining his Bophutha-Tswana with independent Botswana, as Mangope has done, they have introduced another political variable. The African labor strikes in Natal, the pressures on American companies to pay equal wages to Africans, and the campaign in Great Britain to shame British companies into better labor practices in South Africa have been followed by sharp increases in African wages.

Dr. Adam, formerly of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research and currently at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, has, therefore, produced this book at a propitious time. It not only perceives changes, but it possibly contributes to new ones. In his own essay, he does not envision sweeping changes in the power structure, but he does examine the prospects for change within the white oligarchy, specifically the Afrikaner. In a series of valuable tables on white attitudes, Adam paints a picture of paternalism toward Africans and a wide variety of racist attitudes. Although he does not hold out great hope for a smooth transition to a multiracial society, he concludes that "the flexibility of the South African power elite to adapt its system of dominance to changing conditions, to strengthen it economically, and to streamline it politically by concessions to deracialization, should not be underestimated" (p. 101).

Jordan Ngubane, former Vice President of the Liberal Party, points to the syncretic culture of black South Africans which has evolved from the meeting of the Hottentots, Xhosa, and Sotho-speaking people with the "whites." Countering this fusion are the efforts of the authorities to "retribalize" such Africans. Ngubane is only occasionally optimistic in his opinion of the future, but he calls for a new approach to a negotiated settlement: "Black and white in South Africa need to be pushed towards an arrangement which will enable them to cool their tempers and in that way pave the road to a purposeful and constructive dialogue . . . " (p. 21).

Gwendolen Carter's 1965 lecture on the distinctiveness of African nationalism in South Africa turns out to have been most prescient. She is concerned with the narrowness of white exclusivity because it would produce a black exclusivism. She predicts, albeit reluctantly, the current surge of black power, especially in student organizations.

Fatima Meer, whose home is in Natal, looks at factors inhibiting African nationalism: Why, she asks on p. 121, if a group includes 80 percent of the people and 70 percent of the workers, doesn't it bring about better conditions for itself? Dr. Meer sees the 1950s as the heyday of the African National Congress. She makes the shrewd point that "passive resistance is doomed to failure when the stakes are equally crucial to both sides, and the governing party believes that to yield is to lose all" (p. 146). She tells us that in the 1960s, organized efforts at violence failed, in part because "saboteurs approached their task with the temperament of martyrs, rather than as terrorists. . . " (p. 148). However, Dr. Meer had previously observed "In the Transkei, the impossible seems to have happened and freedom appears to be offered on a platter" (p. 123). She cites the seductive case of Verulam, where "for the first time in their history Indians run the affairs of a whole town . . . [and] see this as real power" (pp. 122–23).

Philip Mayer presents an excellent study of religion and social control in the African part of East London, in which he analyzes the "Bhenguist" and the "Red Migrant" from African rural areas. In a situation of change, doubt, and insecurity, Mayer posits a choice between control by a group or control by individuals. Rigid, exclusive, total control by some group, Mayer feels, counters the anomie of the individual, but personal choice is lost. He favors leaving decisions to individuals.

The development of "non-white" universities is traced by Kogila Adam. She describes the "repressive conditions" in them, but speculates that "education could become a disintegrative agent for the present South African system, displaying as it does such caste-like features, and lacking an integrative principle in the community of shared societal values" (p. 211).

Editor Adam has included nine additional authors: Richard Ford compares the urban trek in South Africa with that in America; A. S. Mathews examines security laws and social change; H. F. Dickie-Clark is concerned with educational dilemmas in a plural society; J. W. Mann and Ellen Hellmann write in turn on attitudes towards ethnic groups and social change among urban Africans; Pierre van den Berghe describes degrees and kinds of racial segregation; Stanislav Andreski makes a rather superficial comparison of the social order in South Africa with Latin America, the United States, and ancient Sparta; G. V. Doxey uses his extensive knowledge to describe racial stratification in employment; and the volume concludes with the examination by psychologist Kurt Danziger of the modernization and the legitimation of social power.

Dr. Adam has achieved his goal of making a genuine contribution to understanding the political and economic forces emerging in South Africa. The various contributions develop the theme of a rigid political and social order undergoing great pressure for flexibility. The outcome is difficult to foresee.

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The Country Party in New South Wales: A Study of Organisation and Survival. By Don Aitkin. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 343. $11.70.)

The Australian Country party is not, to say the least of it, everybody's meat. Yet it is an interesting organization and is now at an important, and perhaps critical, stage. Though it has had something in common with farmers' political organizations in North America, the only close parallel is with the Agrarian parties of Scandinavia, especially of Sweden. All these parties were formed at very much the same time, about sixty years ago, for much the same reasons; that is, a general grievance about neglect of rural interests, brought to a head by the disruption of international marketing by the First World War. All have been threatened by the subsequent decline of the rural vote. The Scandinavian parties met this problem in the 1950s by changing their names to Center parties and seeking support wherever it could be found. The Swedish party has since become by far the largest nonsocialist party, in terms of both votes and seats won.

The Australian Country party has for several years been agonizing about risking a similar gamble. Its leaders cannot agree or even make up their minds about whether to cling to a certain, though shrinking, following as an unashamedly rural party or to risk the loss of its traditional supporters in the hope of gaining many new ones. As Aitkin's sub-title implies, any worthwhile study of the party must largely be based upon the problems which it faced and still faces merely in surviving. And this is a very worthwhile study indeed—on the whole the best book to be written about any Australian political party. This despite the very major limitation that it is concerned with the Country party in only one of the four states in which it operates, although New South Wales is the largest of these states.

For one thing, the book is backed by a much greater body of evidence, from a wider variety of sources, than any other such book. Party officials at all levels have been remarkably helpful in making records of meetings available. The author has himself collected data and sought enlightenment from many local country party organizations over most of the state. He has made some use of data from national sample surveys of voters in 1967 and 1969, of which he was a principal organizer. In addition he has located and used a variety of private papers and other more familiar sources.

From all of this emerges a picture of a party whose strengths and weaknesses are almost equally obvious. The Country party has been able to draw on feelings of country separatism and distrust of the great cities which are both summarized and explained in an excellent chapter, "Rural Society." Yet, in themselves, explanations of this kind would explain altogether too much, since the Country party's support is far from evenly spread. It does not exist in two of the six states of Australia, and even in New South Wales it is not important throughout the countryside. In fact, in the South Coast area, which in some respects has the strongest traditions of geographical isolation, it has never gained any support.

Even within those areas where it can usually win elections, it has its strengths and weaknesses. As Aitkin establishes, its support is more vulnerable in those areas where dairy farming and wheat growing have predominated than in those devoted to sheep grazing. It is, indeed, only the grazing electorates in the north of the state that are really resolute in their support for the party. Moreover, the rural areas are studded with towns, some now declining but others with populations that increasingly tend to outnumber those directly involved in primary industry. And it remains the farmers and graziers themselves, proportionately a diminishing group within regions of diminishing importance, who still control the Country party and make up three-quarters of its membership.

With this rather limited base of truly committed support, the party has to repel the attacks of its rivals, who from time to time seek to carve off its weaker supporters. The Labor party seeks to add the less prosperous farmers and townspeople to the support it can expect from the rural trade unionists. The Liberal party, which has always hoped to eliminate the Country party and to become the one non-Labor party, would be an even more serious threat were it not inhibited by self-interest; its leaders appreciate that any all-out attack on the Country party would greatly benefit the common enemy, Labor. Therefore, the two non-Labor parties generally respect each other's established territory, and quarrel only over the disputed fringes.

Perhaps because of its domination by a traditionally stable and unexcitable rural elite, the Country party has an admirable record of internal tranquility and loyalty to its leaders, which contrasts with the record of both of its larger rivals and makes it, in a necessarily negative phrase, by far the least unpopular party in Australia. But it may be that this can be true only as long as it retains its traditional character; and in that case demographic changes seem almost inevitably to cause its decline. After many years in which, because of its cohesion, it has had much more than its share of influence over Australian government, it could quite suddenly find itself with almost no influence at all. Its leaders are making somewhat hesitant and uncertain responses, which are still very far from removing the threat.

All of this, and much else, emerges from Aitkin's account. At a more general level, this is a good book for those interested in party organisation and operation; in elites, especially rural elites; in the tenuous and shifting nature of party alliances; and even in such apparently marginal questions as the relations between rural pressure groups and governments. It would be of interest whatever the present circumstances facing the Country party. The fact, however, that the party is at present facing the choice between, on the one hand, a hazardous attempt at expansion and, on the other, the prospect of temporary safety but ultimate decline undoubtedly makes the book the more apposite.

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Aufstand der Jugend? Neue Aspekte der Jugendsoziologie. By Klaus R. Allerbeck and Leopold Rosenmayr. (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1971. Pp. 268. DM 14.)

Lebensformen Deutscher Jugend, vom Wandervogel zur Popgeneration. By Werner Klose. (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1970. Pp. 154. DM 14.80.)

Jugendliche und Parteien. By Peter Menacher. (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1971. Pp. 168. DM 16.)

There is an increasing convergence now of studies of political socialization in various European countries and the United States. Western Germany, too, is producing socialization research in awareness of and frequently following American models so that meaningful comparison becomes possible.

Peter Menacher's book is a rewritten dissertation on political socialization in the Federal Republic. It critically reviews some of the German literature and is based on interviewing a nonrandom sample of 538 Bavarian ninth-graders (*Hauptschule*), with particular emphasis on their attitudes toward the political parties. The author comments especially on the psychological and sociological literature on West German civics education and on the change from the "skeptical generation" of postwar youth to the increasingly politicized youth of the mid-1960s. His own research is prefaced with a survey of other German and American studies at various age levels. Menacher's questionnaire ascertained the level of political knowledge of his respondents in particular about the parties, their functions and organization, their strengths and coalitions, and the youths' willingness to participate in partisan politics.

His young respondents turned in 60–90 per cent more or less factually correct responses, and in doing so surpassed by far the respondents of earlier West German surveys. Only in the politics of their own state did their level of information drop significantly, and of local party politics. While they recognize the parties well enough from what appear to be well-learned civics lessons, the ninth-graders were almost completely adrift among typical samples of party program statements, an indication of the relative shallowness of their understanding of issues that accords with Greenstein's findings of the "late arrival of issue orientation." The author's cross-tabulations of political knowledge with other personal indicators showed up only sex and metropolitan residence as significant factors related to the level of political information. Menacher concludes that his respondents of 1970, represent "the politically most literate youth in German history."

The quantitative methodology underlying this study is quite sophisticated and shows a mastery in technique and presentation that is still rare in Germany. Menacher ends with a discussion of how political education can be most effective given the multiple factors of political socialization revealed in his study and their interrelations. It is to be hoped that someone will soon undertake to compare his findings with similar surveys in France, the United States and elsewhere in Europe.

Werner Klose's *Lebensformen Deutscher Jugend* is a popularly written survey of the evolution of German youth cultures from the early days of the Youth Movement. The author, a *Gymnasium* teacher, has written knowledgeably about the Hitler Youth (HJ) and also about German student life.

He describes the parental setting and the schools during World War One and later with telling vignettes. The rise of the politically radicalized youth of right and left under the Weimar Republic is chronicled and linked to the rising Nazi dictatorship and its youth movement. After World War Two, the "skeptical" postwar youth scene in East and West Germany is surveyed and contrasted with the gross materialism of the 1950s among German youth.

The last half of the book goes into current youth phenomena in considerable detail, surveying family life, education, jobs and training and the politics of youth; but his inclination toward popularization and his desire to help bridge the generation gap clearly get the better of him on most counts. His explanations are too broad to shed much light upon complex and subtle differences that exist between urban and rural families and among different urban youth settings. His account of the educational atmosphere shows little awareness of the ongoing debate over West Germany's "educational crisis" and various reform plans, nor of the literature on student revolt of recent years.

The Allerbeck-Rosenmayr book is an uneven collection of essays of varying sophistication on the student movements of recent years. The two editors, in their introduction, see at the core of the university upheaval a sudden renewal by newly awakened "leftist forces" of the attack on long-slumbering, archaic structures in parliaments, universities, and schools. The era of postwar reconstruction, the Cold War, and outdated taboos of authority and sexuality are blamed for what nearly all the contributors to this book seek to explain, namely the contrast between the "quiet 'fifties" and the turbulent 'sixties at the universities. This was the beginning of a historical movement, according to the editors, which now is proceeding to the next step, the infiltration and "taking root" of "radical and revolutionary forces at German universities and in the mass media." The editors realize, of course, that these new cadres of the technical intelligentsia are still very far from having achieved a following among the trade unions or the working masses.

The editors project their own strong opinion about their contributors in their introductory chapter. There is, for example, G. N. Wolkow, the director of "a large Soviet youth research and organizational center in Moscow," whose "interesting work" is said to "document how one can adjust reality to fit the Marxist theory." Indeed, Wolkow is predictably unkind to the student activists of the New Left: "Left-wing radicalism is characterized by the urge to destroy everything, an illusionary attempt to transcend the limits of one's hated existence . . . illusionary because they have no clear idea which way to go." He prefers to see in the student revolt "a typical phenomenon of capitalist systems," with strong elements of rightwing radicalism and attitudes favorable to capitalism.

The editors also give the cold shoulder to "a theoretical framework for the comparative analysis of student revolt" by Alessandro Cavalli and Alberto Martinelli, which is one of the better essays in the book, because such an undertaking "can be done only at the price of a superficial internationality and . . . represents no progress over the ethnocentric self-limitation to one's own country or continent." The editors apologize for not having included "any empirically valid work" on the Third World whose role in the student revolts of the 'sixties they evidently consider crucial. The absence of Japan in this context is even harder to understand. "Ethnocentric self-limitation" may indeed be the way to describe this myopic approach. As for Cavalli and Martinelli, their theoretical framework does in fact account for and differentiate non-Western student unrest from that of Europe and the United States. It is based on the conceptualization of structural changes in the international world (Cold War), domestic economics and social mobility, domestic politics, and mass higher education.

The "theoretical approaches" in the book are followed by four sound empirical, if somewhat differing, reports on the American (Keniston), French (Converse and Pierce), Italian (Statera), and West German (Kaase) student upheavals presented to the Seventh World Sociological Congress. Curiously again, Great Britain and the smaller European countries are completely omitted from comparison, not to mention the authoritarian systems of the Iberian peninsula and Greece. The empiricists tend to leave most of the historical and cultural contexts as a residual category, but at least they bring out clearly what makes the United States and France each so different in this respect.

A further empirical chapter, by Allerbeck, tests and rejects a series of common interpretations: student revolt as "the revolt of the privileged;" as a result of generational conflict; of permissive education; of dissatisfaction with the learning experience at universities; and as a reaction to the scarcity of jobs for graduates in the humanities and social sciences—all this against a background of careful structural and role analysis. Allerbeck's contribution is in certain respects the most illuminating in that he blends a sophisticated handling of critical social science method with the systematic exploration of the student role in contemporary society. This gives his analysis a depth that by comparison makes most of the other contributions seem onesided or superficial. Among other things, he relates the radical students' identification with their student role to their exaggerated perception of the hostility of the public toward student demonstrations and arrives at a striking correlation: The more radical the more identified with the student role and the more paranoid the more radical. This will strike a resonant chord of recognition in many of us here who were in close contact with students during the years of the upheaval. There is only a minor word of criticism to add about Allerbeck's assumption of the "totality" of the student role. The trend of the future, at least in the United States, appears to point away from such a "total role" toward the continuing education and retraining of adults, in other words, toward an increasing integration of the student role with other social and economic roles on a more age-heterogeneous scale. Seen from this perspective, perhaps the years of revolt have been the last gasps of the exclusiveness of the student role in the midst of societies that are similarly doing away with other total roles he mentions, "pure soldiers," monks, perhaps even the totality of the wife-mother role. If this should turn out to be true, the socially more integrated student of the 'fifties may actually have been more advanced than the militants of the 'sixties, an age when affluence permitted many European bourgeois parents to restore ways of life that were long believed dead.

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Brazil: The People and the Power. By Miguel Arraes. Translated by Lancelot Sheppard with an introduction by Yves Goussault. (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972. Pp. 232. $1.25.)

Born in the backlands of Northeast Brazil, Miguel Arraes became a member of the Pernambucan state assembly, later served as mayor of Recife, and finally in 1962 was elected governor of the state. The first socialist to hold this office, he had his mandate interrupted after 14 months by the repressive military coup of April 1964. In the aftermath of the coup he found exile in Algiers. This period allowed him to examine in retrospect the events of the past and to offer an in-depth analysis of the contemporary situation. The result is the present book, an easily understandable and readable discussion which nicely complements other recently available literature on Brazil by such North American political scientists as Riordan Roett, Ronald Schneider, Philippe Schmitter, and Alfred Stepan.

On a general level this book is concerned with elites and masses. Arraes was born in and associated with the elites of Brazil, but his concern and commitment lie with the people. Thus, appropriately his critique of past and present Brazilian society focuses on the role of the ruling classes, their interests and actions. In turning to solutions for the masses of Brazilians, he first directs attention to popular movements. He identifies these movements through the periods of colony, empire, republic, Vargas dictatorship, and up to 1964. He argues that the urban and rural masses both bear the weight of heavy exploitation. Since the dominating forces will isolate these masses from participation in national decisions, "the struggle for liberation of the country is also the struggle of the social classes for their very just demands since these can only be met satisfactorily with the winning of economic and political emancipation" (p. 211). The next phase of this struggle must rely on the support of various popular movements. While mistakes were made in the past and struggle lacked sufficient theoretical background, some victories were won, he goes on. Ultimately, "it is necessary to unite all the sectors opposed to imperialism to fight against it (p. 207).

In reaching this position, Arraes makes two substantial contributions to our understanding of Brazilian political economy. First, there is his analysis of contemporary developments, based on a number of propositions, and, second, some interesting theoretical perspectives. Arraes suggests several propositions in his analysis of the 1964 coup and its aftermath. First, the coup resolved the struggle between two factions of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. The outcome favored (p. 157) "the groups of financiers in league with foreign capital in association with groups of leading industrialists" who worked closely with imperialism and believed that the Brazilian economy should be integrated with that of the United States. Defeated was the national bourgeoisie, made up of groups of industrialists who desired economic independence for the nation. The ideology and actions of this latter faction had been institutionalized through the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB), whose ranks had included such well-known Brazilian political scientists as Helio Jaguaribe, Cândido Mendes de Almeida, and Alberto Guerrero Ramos. Second, the coup signified the removal "from political life of those connected with the popular movement who were occupying positions of responsibility" (p. 161). The 1964 coup represented a culmination of a series of incidents dating to the deposition of Vargas in 1945. Third, the coup brought to power the most reactionary military factions. Their aim being the integration with the United States, Brazil thus was subordinated to North American interests (Arraes carefully spells this out in economic, political, social, cultural, and psychological terms).

Arraes combines his analysis with a theoretical approach that is (1) both historical and contemporary; (2) economic as well as political; and (3) focused on class structure and conflict. Nearly a third of his book, for example, is concerned with the Brazilian economy, which he traces through commercial, industrial, and financial periods. His broadly sweeping discussion examines the significance of agriculture and private capital in the mercantile capital system of the colonial period, this leading to "large estates based on the cultivation of a single crop and directed towards external trade." With this foundation, economic history passed through "a monotonous succession of cycles." He clearly demonstrates how England came to replace Portugal as "the external center of attraction for the Brazilian economy" during the 19th-century empire period. With the coffee boom, capital shifted from the Northeast to the Center-South, resulting in the collapse of industrial projects and general economic imbalance. While these developments have been portrayed in greater detail in the writings of Celso Furtado and Caio Prado Júnior, Arraes offers a succinct analysis which explicitly ties economic to changing class structure. The interests of coffee planters, large estate owners, industrialists, and international financiers are examined from historical period to period.

Arraes also analyzes politics in terms of class structure. That the economy discriminated against the masses, he feels, is related to dominant interests inside and outside the country which decisively influence politics at all levels. This has been so "despite political independence snatched from Portugal in 1822 and despite the changes that have occurred in the nature of the parties in power in the central government. Those who held power were only able to do so through dependence on external factors which affected their conduct of the internal affairs of the country" (p. 93). Arraes does not let his discussion rest on this level of polemic, however. He goes on to offer an assessment of the Brazilian ruling classes. This is not a definitive assessment of the ruling classes; indeed there is no such study of his country. But it is provocative and stimulating, interesting and imaginative, synthetic and analytical. In short, Arraes has offered both the beginning and advanced student a useful interpretation of Brazil.

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Racial Minorities. By Michael Banton. (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972. Pp. 192. $1.95, paper.)

Racial Tensions and National Identity. Proceedings of the Second Annual Vanderbilt Sociology Conference, November 4–6, 1970. Edited by Ernest Q. Campbell. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972. Pp. x, 262. $10.00.)

These two books, though differing in origin, purpose, and organization, offer a common approach (theoretically informed case studies) to a common topic (race relations). Campbell asserts that there has been "far too much searching for comprehensive explanatory schemes and far too little careful attention to the structure and dynamics of particular circumstances . . . " in the social sciences (p. 4). Banton, whose book is aimed at introductory sociology courses, gives pedagogical reasons for the same method. Even if one disagrees with their reasons, the approach has obvious merit. Facts can suggest as well as test hypotheses, and both books show this.

Banton begins with an account of one historical event: the collapse of the Campaign against Racial Discrimination (CARD) in Britain in 1967–68. He asks why CARD collapsed and offers four possible explanations. What distinguishes *Racial Minorities* from most scholarly work is that the author does not choose and defend one explanation, but argues successively and successfully for all four. He similarly offers four points of view, labeled Outlooks A, B, C(i), and C(ii), for the sake of neutrality, on the question of whether racial integration is possible. These empirico-normative ideal types serve as the book's leitmotif, as Banton discusses their implications for explaining prejudice and discrimination, for the possibilities of intervention to change racial behavior, and for policy preferences.

Banton's analysis is directed mainly at elucidating the effects of environmental variables on individual behavior. These variables include types of racial categorization systems, relationships between racial and economic cleavages, patterns of residential race distribution, the urban vs. rural location of racial contact, the prevailing norms of racial behavior, and the cultural differences between the societies from which minority immigrants stem and the majority society.

In a sense, however, the book is a case study within a case study. CARD is used to talk about the study of race relations in general, and the study of race relations serves as a sample of the philosophical and methodological problems of social science as a whole. The book is studded with sensible remarks about definitions, cutting points in scales, causal interpretations, and so forth, applied to the literature being discussed. Banton also considers ethical problems: What effect will it have if I publish a finding that there is high social support for discrimination? What racial terminology should I use in analysis when participants are fighting about terminology?

The possible suggestiveness of case descriptions is even clearer in *Racial Tensions and National Identity*, for here we are dealing with a collection of articles, whose contrasts help make the point. Generally, those articles which present facts and secondarily ask what these facts suggest constitute the most coherent, forceful, convincing, and memorable chapters. Those which begin with a theory and claim to explain a case with it, on the other hand, most often fail to link the two, if at all, well enough to make it clear what is explaining what and how. Examples of largely descriptive studies that are still theoretically suggestive are Milton J. Esman's on Malaysia, John Saunders's on Brazil, Ira Katznelson's on England (which, unlike Banton's book, concentrates on the *politics* of race), and Martin Kilson's on the U.S. The articles that may raise the reader's explanational expectations too high include those by Harmannus Hoetink on the Caribbean, Austin Turk on South Africa, and Immanuel Wallerstein (who might, incidentally, benefit from Banton's discussion of definitions) on Black Africa. These all, however, contain analytical perspectives and hypotheses well worth a more extended data confrontation than these authors have naturally been able to manage in their essays.

Without attempting to do justice to all twenty authors, discussants, and editor, I shall mention just two of the questions on which more than one of the authors has something to say. One question is: Who gets discriminated against the most? Banton cites a previous study to argue not only that there is more discrimination in Britain against immigrants than the immigrants themselves believe there to be, but also that apparently "the more able and better qualified immigrants experience more job discrimination than their less skilled fellow-immigrants" (p. 91, 93). Saunders, whose study in Campbell's book is mainly designed to show that color prejudice (of a pervasive though unhostile kind) is alive and extreme in Brazil, also observes that this prejudice is more likely to be exercised against upwardly mobile colored persons, since they "leave a highly heterochromatic lower class and enter a much more uniformly white middle class" (p. 150). And with increasing prejudice goes increasing awareness thereof (p. 161). Werner Baer, however, comments that "racial antagonism seems much stronger among the lower classes than among the elites" in the U.S., a difference requiring explanation (pp. 167–68). But is this a difference? Prejudice is not the same thing as antagonism, as Saunders points out, and even prejudice, Banton notes (p. 103), can be operationalized in various ways. In this context, it would be useful for Banton to ask why minority members seeking accommodations suffered more discrimination when appearing in person than when telephoning in Britain (p. 93), since LaPiere and others have found personal contact resulting in far less discrimination than letter-writing in the U.S. Is it really the case that "It is impossible to know whether the person at the other end of the telephone is black or white" in Britain (p. 69)? At any rate, the findings of such field experiments mean little unless accompanied by precise details of the procedure.

Another recurring question is about the inherent salience of race. Banton, of course, straddles the issue by assigning to "Outlook A" the belief that race will necessarily always define conflict groups. But several contributors to the Campbell volume support the view that race is a natural, normal, or inevitable political barrier. Katznelson argues that race in England was bound to be politicized under any but a "legitimately colorblind policy" (p. 83), and that, failing such a policy, considerable effort had to be expended by politicians to keep racial demands out of the political arena. Stanlake Samkange sees no prospect for the success of interracialism in Rhodesia, and Turk is pessimistic about its chances in South Africa. Esman says that communal cleavages consistently prove stronger than economic ones in Malaysia and that throughout the world they "have an unexpected persistence and may even surface into political prominence after they have been long dormant . . ." (p. 241). Stanley H. Smith agrees "that race consistently takes precedence over class in most social situations." (p. 94). Wallerstein, arguing that for analytical purposes we can consider races, religions, languages, tribes, etc. all as status groups, which people manipulate in order to change their class, likewise asserts the primacy of status over class in ideology and popular consciousness, in almost all situations of social change (p. 219). I would hope that at least some of the frequent arguments in this direction could be subsumed under the generalization, "Scholars tend to inevitabilize the current." Kilson, alone, suggests that ethnic escalation (paradoxically) hastens ethnic assimilation, but the evidence is weak.

On the technical front, both books are to be congratulated. Campbell's volume is unusual for a collection of conference papers in that it does indeed include the (uneven but useful) comments offered by discussants and does indeed have a (fairly well done) index. (Maybe next year we'll even get abstracts.) And the (unsewn) Fontana paperback does *not* lose its pages after opening.

JONATHAN POOL

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Australia in the Nuclear Age: National Defence and National Development. By Ian Bellany. (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972. Pp. 144. $7.80.)

Dr. Bellany has written the first systematic treatment of the technical and economic issues involved in any Australian decision to develop nuclear weapons. The work is in two parts. The first, of some 45 pages, discusses the general technology of nuclear power and weapons and their relevance to national development. The second analyzes Australia's nuclear environment, the kinds of weapons which Australia might want to acquire and their possible cost as well as the chief categories of strategic concern for Australian governments. The author manages to squeeze some discussion of Australian attitudes to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty into his 113 pages of text but does not try to deal with the domestic politics of any of the issues involved.

In one or two places Dr. Bellany, formerly of the Australian National University and currently at the University of Lancaster, in England, has been overtaken by events. Australia has ratified the NPT, as he recommended it should do. The US and the USSR have concluded the SALT I and II agreements and are engaged in a further phase of SALT talks. Strategic circumstances have changed, not least in the matter of anti-ballistic missile systems, the deployment of multiple warheads, and the availability of more accurate methods of delivery.

Moreover Bellany, like everyone else who has considered the subject so far, is unable to specify who Australia's nuclear opponent might be, what kinds of pressure he might exercise in the pursuance of what precise aims, and what diplomatic arrangements either side might have at that time with third parties. He is also, like the rest of us, unable to make close predictions as to the ways in which weapons technology will evolve. These gaps create at least three kinds of difficulty. First, he provides no criterion for choosing between the view that sophisticated arms plus allies help to prevent war and are therefore in Australia's interests, and the view that they attract hostility and are therefore bad. Second, he does not say what position Australia might aim for in a world of more greatly differentiated nuclear capabilities, where US systems such as MIRV, Trident and surveillance satellites bear no relationship to the sorts of systems which an India or South Africa might acquire for quite different and local purposes. Third, he does not suggest a force structure in relation to a specific set of missions. This would lead to a systems analysis exercise involving problems of redesign in the light of changing hostile systems, problems of fuels, reaction times, and penetration capabilities which the book does not attempt. Partly for these reasons, and partly because of the constantly changing economics of nuclear technology, the figures he suggests for possible alternative Australian force structures also seem somewhat speculative.

Nor does Bellany discuss the dangers which the spread of nuclear technology poses for the monopoly of nuclear control by the governments of nation states. For these are territorially defined and have governments which can be called to account. But what if such materials come to be used, or their use is threatened, by liberation or terrorist groups of various kinds? These dangers as well as possible measures of defense against them, have been inadequately examined in the literature.

Within Australia, Bellany has come in for much criticism on the grounds that he has not merely ignored the domestic politics of these issues but has also failed to condemn those groups which have argued in favor of maintaining a nuclear option. For me however, the avoidance of *a priori* political and moral strictures is one of the strengths of this calm and sensible, if limited, book. Bellany points out instead that for Australia support of antinuclear weapon and antiproliferation measures is for the time being quite compatible with the acquisition of nuclear technology and the refining of nuclear options. His recommendation that Australia should ratify the NPT, written well before the new Labour Government did so in early 1973, is also on grounds which some of that government's supporters might find objectionable:

> . . . Australia is signing away very little. It may expect to get in return a more open-handed attitude on the part of the nuclear exporting countries, which will make the growth of an Australian nuclear industry easier, which will in turn make a threat, real or implicit, in the future to ignore the provisions of the NPT more credible and make a decision to acquire a nuclear force a rational policy alternative sooner. And yet an Australian ratification . . . if it contributes to the success of the treaty, will decrease the chances that Australia should ever have to become a nuclear power to protect itself from the effects of a competitive proliferation of nuclear weapons among its neighbours. . . . And the beauty of the NPT from Australia's viewpoint is that it does not preclude it or any non-nuclear signatory from taking steps, within limits, to insure itself against the day when the benefits of the treaty are seen to be outweighed by its disadvantages (p. 113).

Plainly, therefore, ratification does not of itself resolve the dispute between those who wish to "ban the bomb" and those who wish to refine Australia's technical capabilities. It is not the only respect in which Bellany's analyses and recommendations seem perceptive in retrospect. He points out that the US alliance is likely to become less important for Australia, that Australia is becoming readier to play a part in regional politics and that the machinery of the Australian federal government is, or was, quite deficient in its ability to understand and analyse the nuclear dimension of world politics. There have recently been some signs that Bellany's point has begun to be appreciated in Canberra. It is, indeed, time.

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The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization. By James Alban Bill. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972. Pp. ix, 174. $3.95, paper.)

Although conditions in Iran are hardly conducive to free inquiry by social scientists, this has not dissuaded determined and enthusiastic scholars from attempting to unravel the intricacies of its rapidly changing political processes. Indeed, in the last decade, literature on the Iranian political system has appeared with regular frequency. The relative impunity of Western, particularly American scholars, to restrictive governmental measures has partially compensated for the difficulties encountered by native and often highly trained western scholars to probe the present political system critically and scientifically.

After several years of fieldwork Professor James Bill has produced one of the most perceptive and intriguing accounts of contemporary Iranian political processes. His emphasis is on the appearance of a new professional middle class and its relationship to other classes. The process of social change and political modernization is analyzed in terms of its impact on group and class relations.

The rise of the new class is traced to the constitutional movement of the early 1900s, continuing through Reza Shah's rule in the interwar years, and becoming an explosive and critical new force by the mid-1940s and early 1950s. This "professional bureaucratic intelligentsia" rejects the traditional power relationships, possesses or is acquiring modern higher education, bases its power on its skills and talents, has been exposed to outside philosophical ideas, and is free from rigid religious dogmatism. It is, nonetheless, a heterogeneous class.

Intraclass differences have generated four distinctive groups that Bill presents as ideal types—the Uprooters, the Technocrats, the Maneuverers, and the Followers. The first group refuses to be bound by traditional patterns of relationships and is largely alienated from the present system. The technocrats are primarily concerned with carrying out the particular tasks for which they have been trained and wish to modify and repair the existing system in order to do so. The maneuverers are the defenders of the traditional power network who favor the ongoing relationship and use their modern skill and education to supplement their access to power positions. The followers are those who float in the safest and smoothest direction and gravitate toward the strongest personalities, groups and classes.

Analyzing the so-called White Revolution reforms, the author maintains that this new attempt as reform from above in the end will preserve the traditional power pattern. The Shah has concentrated the aristocracy in the city by severing its connections with the countryside and then allying himself with the peasantry against the professional middle class (p. 144). The first step buttressed his position in the system by weakening the upper-class challengers. The second was aimed at holding in check the challenge from the new middle class. This twofold goal has been plagued by the scarcity of technical and managerial manpower and the lack of commitment of large groups of the professional middle class. What economic progress has been achieved in the last decade has enabled the political elite to use its newly acquired wealth to attract the alienated intelligentsia. The use of economic incentives has created disaffection and rivalry, which in turn has cast doubts on the success of the reform program's basic objective of system preservation.

This work represents a happy medium between excessive preoccupation with methodological refinement and overdescriptive compilation of empirical data. Bill's conceptual and analytical framework is sound and indicative of the breadth of his knowledge in comparative political analysis. His empirical data reflect his profound familiarity with the Iranian political processes. One might question his categorization of various elements of the new middle class. The inevitable impression prompted by this type of analysis in which groups and subgroups fall in neatly designed categories, is that somehow politics in Iran is a highly rational enterprise offering its participants free and logical choice. In point of fact, in the mixed Iranian political culture, rationality is often conspiciously absent.

Positing the rise of a new class rather than the reallocation of traditional sources of wealth and influence among the existing class is also controversial. More significantly, the question of whether the numerical increase of the educated and literate segment of the population has dramatically changed class relationships remains basically unexplored. Thus a more comprehensive discussion of the transformation of the power bases of the landed aristocracy would be in order. Has the land reform contributed to a redistribution of wealth or merely its transformation from land ownership to commercial and industrial capital? Has the ratio of control of the national wealth by the privileged class begun to show a significant change?

A further area requiring exploration is the role of the military. Although Bill occasionally refers to it, a discussion of the military as the main prop of the present regime would have significantly enhanced our understanding of the Iranian system. Where does it belong in the scheme of the new class configuration? What have been some of the consequences of the recent changes in its recruitment and composition?

These remarks should be taken primarily as suggestions for areas of research rather than as a criticism of the present work, which is a welcome and valuable reference book for both the specialist and the student of comparative politics in general.

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Industry and Government in Britain: The Federation of British Industries in Politics, 1945–65. By Stephen Blank. (Farnborough, England and Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973. Pp. xiii, 256. $13.50.)

This is the long-awaited essence of Professor Blank's massive Harvard dissertation, one of the many studies of British interest groups stimulated by Professor Samuel Beer, who here contributes a preface. As a lengthy study of the Federation of British Industries (F.B.I.) derived substantially from original sources, the work is unique and will be indispensable. Professor Blank "charmed" Sir Norman Kipping, director general of the F.B.I. (who uses the term in the Foreword) into letting him loose in the archives. After the F.B.I. died in 1965 to rise again in the C.B.I. (Confederation of British Industry), Blank even won over Kipping's virtual successor.

The book has eight chapters. After a brief setting of the general scene, Professor Blank plunges into a history of the organization from 1916 (when it was founded) to 1945. Chapter 3 is more analytical: authority, leadership, behavior, including a brief account of the interaction with government, Parliament, etc. The chapter heading says "in 1945," but the material is actually garnered from later time periods as well, right up to the 'sixties. For that reason a little awkwardly, we are then turned back in time to the F.B.I.'s relations with the Labour Governments of 1945–51. The succeeding Conservative Governments are then summoned to the scene, after which the author examines the "revolution in industrial attitudes, 1961–65," meaning essentially business acceptance of something like indicative planning. With chapter 7 the focus is more on the F.B.I. as such, while the epilogue sees the F.B.I. joining hands with the National Association of British Manufacturers (N.A.B.M.) and the British Employers' Confederation (B.E.C.) to form the C.B.I. The F.B.I. and C.B.I. are then compared along a few dimensions and the C.B.I.'s relations with Labour Governments from 1964 onward are swiftly characterized.

What emerges from this narrative and analysis is not the power but the weakness of the F.B.I. as an interest group. Two classes of variables are adduced in explanation. First, cohesiveness. The F.B.I. was so structured that it had to operate without the City of London, which enjoyed its own privileged relationship with government; without many of the smaller industrialists, who had formed their own organization (known in advanced old age as the N.A.B.M.); without the B.E.C., responsible for industrial relations; and without the Association of British Chambers of Commerce (A.B.C.C.). Even within the F.B.I., divisions went deep—over industrial relations, international trade generally and tariffs in particular, economic growth, and so on. For most of the F.B.I.'s lifetime, these cumulative weaknesses tended to prevent the conversion of potential into actual political power. So, secondly, did the values of British society in terms of industry and commerce and as entertained even by the actors themselves. Industrialists and traders "enjoyed" relatively low status; conscious of that assessment, they lacked confidence in their approaches toward the seats of the mighty in Whitehall. "British industrialists did not walk easily of (*sic*) frequently in the corridors of power" (p. 208). (The number of "typos" in this book is excessive.)

In judging this thesis, one first notes that it covers only high policy. Toward the end of the book, against the grain of the argument, one learns that on the implementation of policy, the influence of the F.B.I. apparently was substantial ("could be," the author writes, p. 213). But ambiguity surrounds even high policy. To say that an association has fallen short in converting potential into actual power is not to say that the power it did manage to exert was not considerable compared with other groups. On this score we needed some sort of input-outcome assessment based on the minutes and correspondence, but the unique opportunity was not seized. In this context but also for students of public administration, the failure to discuss the precise nature of the F.B.I.'s relations with that semi-autonomous public body, the Import Duties Advisory Committee of the 1930s, is unfortunate. That de facto Tariff Commission, allegedly a focus of F.B.I. influence, is mentioned only in passing (p. 30).

This suggests that the book has some of the defects of its virtues. Anyone who has written official history, whether of a voluntary body or for a government series, knows that the main danger is not out-and-out censorship but the gradual acceptance of an official frame of reference. In terms of access, this work is not unlike official history, which may account for the uncritical tone, the apparent skirting of some sensitive areas, and some incompleteness in the record. Thus, the account of the de facto conversion of the F.B.I. to indicative planning in November, 1960, omits the important kite-flying speech the previous February by Mr. (now Sir) Reay Geddes, then managing director of Dunlop's, which was made against the advice and over the head of a high F.B.I. official. Still, the initial judgment remains unimpaired: the work is unique and will be indispensable for all students of British government and politics and of the comparative study of interest groups.

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Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840–1950. Edited by Jean Chesneaux. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972. Pp. 328. $11.95.)

Professor Chesneaux's book is a collection of fifteen articles describing the political and social role of Chinese popular voluntary associations during the period of transition to modernity. There is a long history in China of political and religious dissent based in groups variously called "secret societies" or "heretical sects." Early republican revolutionaries were quick to capitalize on this history, because in these societies of the people one can find indigenous antecedents to modern nationalism, class struggle, and communal utopianism. The central concern of *Popular Movements* is this: for all of their archaic patterns of organization and belief, in what ways did these associations provide support for emerging revolutionary tendencies? Were middle-class republicans influenced by popular forms, or did the "secret societies" adapt themselves to new goals? Would the 1911 revolution have succeeded without them? What was their role after its success? In short, in this very important area, how much does the new China owe to the old?

What we need on this topic is a good, overall history, written by a scholar sensitive both to political development and the *gestalt* of popular culture. Such a book does not yet exist, but much of the path to follow is indicated by *Popular Movements.*

Jean Chesneaux has already written a book entitled, *Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (University of Michigan Press, 1971; first published in French in 1965). *Popular Movements* is based on contributions made to conferences and seminars held between 1964 and 1967, most of them having been prepared for the "Seventeenth Congress of Chinese Studies" held at Leeds in 1965. (Is this the "International Conference on Chinese Studies"?) The original French edition of the book, entitled *Mouvements populaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine aux XIXe et XXe siècles* (Paris: François Maspero, 1970), included an additional nine papers not translated for the English edition. Both versions include a bibliography and glossaries listing secret society names, leaders, and terms.

While mentioning the frequent crises of modern Chinese history, the editor says, "Our object in this book is to examine the role of secret societies in these crises . . . [to consider them] as a subset of the general history of China during the nineteenth century" (p. 3).

This object is substantially achieved, though as Professor Chesneaux indicates, much work remains to be done. The book is at its best in studies of particular groups and individuals within limited settings, weaker in essays which attempt to delineate persistent patterns over time. What one misses most is long-range historical perspective and more precise typology. Though popular organizations with a potential for rebellion have existed in China from at least the latter Han dynasty (25–220 A.D.), the present work contains very little discussion of such groups before the nineteenth century. A more determined effort could have been made to set up the historical context. Typology is important because we are dealing with different kinds of groups whose traditions have a certain integrity of their own. Some were religious sects with histories going back to the Sung and Yüan dynasties (960–1368 A.D.), while others were generally secret societies in a tradition originating in the mid-seventeenth century. The role of messianic ideology, for example, was much more important in the sects than in the societies; their organization and rituals were also quite different. To be sure, during the nineteenth century there was some intermingling of these two types, but they deserve more precise analysis than our essayists supply.

The need for a clear grasp of structures and types is also revealed by the book's failure to define its own title. There were both "popular movements" and "secret societies" in traditional China, as well as a variety of bandit gangs and peasant riots. What were the salient differences between these forms? How did Triad leaders relate to mass movements? On this we find brief comments here and there, but nothing sustained.

In addition, the book omits without even mentioning it a whole category of Chinese voluntary religious associations which was not politically oriented at all, such as the Wu-wei chiao (Lo-chiao), the Chen-k'ung chiao, the T'ung-shan she, the Red Swastika society, and the Taiwan Tz'u-hui t'ang, to mention just a few. It is important to discuss popular phenomena from the point of view of political development, but surely this can be done without neglecting large chunks of relevant data.

Nonetheless, there is a wealth of interesting detail in *Popular Movements:* Frederic Wakeman discusses "secret society" invasions 50,000 strong accompanied by mass initiations in broad daylight. Ella Laffey contributes a rare biography of a rebel leader who started as a charcoal burner and ended as a Ch'ing general fighting the Japanese on Formosa in 1895. In another study, Lucien Bianco concludes that the real purpose of the Red Spears was self-defense against an oppressive warlord; the Red Spears were both too limited in vision and too much a part of the local power structure to be properly seen as a revolutionary vanguard. (In other situations, however, such groups could be quite aggressive indeed, so self-defense cannot be the whole story.) Mark Mancall and Georges Jidkoff give an interesting discussion of a proto-Communist republic in Mongolia during the last years of the nineteenth century. John Lust sums up the central concerns of the book in a good treatment of "Secret Societies, Popular Movements and the 1911 Revolution" (pp. 165–200).

One should perhaps also mention a few more specific problems with this collection, such as Boris Novikov's overemphasis on ideological factors in the Triads. The Triads had many different functions, depending on the needs of their local membership. Since there were popular rebellions in every dynasty, whatever its origin, risings against the Manchus did not necessarily involve nationalism. Some minor quibbles: the book needs brief résumés of its contributors, the bibliography is incomplete (as Professor Chesneaux recognizes), and some terms are not properly translated (the San-chieh chiao [p. 295] was

Buddhist, not Manichaean [cf. p. 26]; *P'u-tu* means "universal salvation" not "universal crossing," [p. 295], etc.).

The book is weakest in its treatment of religion, which was important to most of the groups discussed. The prevailing attitude seems to be that only sociopolitical activities and statements are significant; the rest is so much "shared superstition" (p. 43), and "spiritual mumbo-jumbo" (p. 20), (see also Professor Dunstheimer's statement on p. 28). The two articles which *do* attempt to deal with cultic and mythological elements at greater length—those by Guillaume Dunstheimer and Lev Deliusin—are sketchy and are based largely on secondary or tendentious sources. (in Professor Deliusin's case, hostile reports from government-controlled newspapers during the 1950s).

The issue here is nothing more than giving due weight to all aspects of the phenomenon at hand, without unnecessarily suppressing or distorting any. Surely modern scholarship should be able to enter without prejudice even so strange a world as Chinese folk-religion and to learn much there about why the people acted as they did.

Nevertheless, the book provides important and interesting information not previously available in such convenient form. It should be read by all who wish to understand more deeply the role of popular culture in the rise of modern China.

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Fifteenth Century England, 1399–1509: Studies in Politics and Society. Edited by S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross, and R. A. Griffiths. (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 192. $10.00.)

Historians who review books with an eye out for the interests of political scientists often cannot place a work into one of the subfields of the discipline. In the present instance the difficulty is compounded, because the work in question is not an integral account of anything but is instead a collection of essays. Moreover, the authors do not adhere to a single theme, at least on the surface.

Four have elected to focus on aspects of the reign of a monarch. A. L. Brown examines the establishment of the Lancastrian regime by Henry IV. B. P. Wolffe studies the rule of Henry VI in his majority. C. D. Ross looks anew—and skeptically—at the rising reputation of Edward IV among modern scholars. And Professor Chrimes summarizes the main points of his recent and definitive study of *Henry VII* (University of California Press, 1972).

The other contributors examine classes and regions. T. B. Pugh puts under the microscope the English magnates, knights, and gentry, in order to show how the magnates became a true peerage, the exclusively "noble" class, thereby ushering in a new epoch of English social history. R. L. Storey ranges over the northern terrain he knows so well, seeking to grasp why the aristocracy there exercised an influence disproportionate to its numbers and wealth; he finds the answer in its character as a genuine feudal warrior class, securing its power in exchange for protecting England against the real threat from Scotland. R. A. Griffiths provides a useful counterpoint by showing how the Welsh marcher lords built their power out of the much less substantial danger from Wales.

Brown's essay strikes the common chord—power and its exercise—when he demonstrates that the main problem facing Henry IV (and every other fifteenth-century king of England) was the widespread lack of trust in the monarchy among the landed classes. This lack of trust arose in part because English kings from 1399 to 1509 lacked both the wealth and machinery of government needed to assert real sovereignty and so make good Edward I's ringing boast: to see justice done for every Englishman. The other authors in turn supply the harmonics, in the form of evidence that the remedies close to hand and obvious as cures for the ills of royalty proved worse than the original malady. Kings had to resort to "generosity," or rather often heedless extravagance, as they tried to shape regimes able to take the high ground of good government, only to find themselves lost in the swamps and thickets of debt and resistance to taxation. Wolffe does not prove his case, that Henry VI truly exercised his power personally, but he does trace the ruin of Lancaster in its poverty and the resultant bargains made for political support. Ross will not allow the recently held view, that Edward IV succeeded where the Lancastrians had failed. And Chrimes denies even to Henry VII the laud usually thought due him: high praise for restoring law and order and putting finance on a sound basis. Pugh, Storey, and Griffiths, in quite different ways, reveal that while the crown was the only force with the potential to impose order on the factious society of the period, it fell far short of doing it.

Indeed, what comes through so clearly by inference is that sovereignty, which was a thing much written about in the fifteenth century, was an accomplishment of that sixteenth century revolution in politics and society we call the Reformation. Political scientists concerned with theory, comparative government, and the nature of politics, may study with profit the data pointing toward the conclusion I have stated and will now clarify. Sovereign power grew up in England only when great issues brought into fundamental realignment the classes weighty in politics. In the attack on the greatest of all private corporations —The Church—the crown finally forged the weapons needed to reduce lesser franchised groups and to shape one commonwealth out of the society of "orders" left over from the Middle Ages. And it was able to do so because ecclesiastical wealth, once diverted to royal purposes, supplied the nerve and sinew of effective royal government. This book is a very useful contribution to our understanding of the political circumstances that had inhibited royal power in the preceding century.

Arthur Joseph Slavin
University of Louisville

Teachers' Unions and Interest Group Politics: A Study in the Behaviour of Organised Teachers in England and Wales. By R. D. Coates. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. xiii, 138. $4.50, paper.)

This short study has two principal aims: to depict the relationship between changes in British government policy making affecting education and the activities of teachers' interest groups, and to "specify the determinants of the behaviour of organised teachers in terms applicable to the behaviour of interest groups outside the education sector" (pp. vii–viii). In meeting the first objective the author provides a most useful examination of the shifting interface of group pressures and national government policy. His attempt to achieve the broader objective is less successful.

Schoolteachers in England and Wales have long been organized into associations for salary bargaining and related purposes. Three-quarters of them now belong to one or more of eight white collar unions, of which the National Union of Teachers accounts for about one-half the total membership. Coates's study emphasizes the internal aspects of union activities less than the development of strategies for enhancing their impact on governmental decisions. The focus is not on teachers, schools, communities, or local authorities, but on national structures of education and economic policy. Rather than asking if there may have been politically relevant shifts in the composition, situation or needs of the teachers themselves, Coates treats these as constants and portrays union activities largely as responses to changes in the outside political environment.

The main value of the study lies in its demonstration of how the unions attempted to come to terms with new power relationships in the British governmental machine. From about 1870 to the early 1950s their strategic targets were Parliament, the Ministry of Education, and (more sporadically) public opinion; and the concomitant tactics were traditional lobbying, bargaining and consulting within the education ministry, and discreet public relations campaigns. In the first half of the century, as Parliament's role in policy making receded, the unions concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on the single salient department, which Coates describes as comparatively autonomous in the policy and financial areas prized by the unions. This strategy produced predictable, if seldom exciting, results. The waning in the early 1960s of the "educational boom," and the decline in the proportion of public expenditure devoted to education, unhinged the teachers' commitment to traditional pressure tactics and stimulated experimentation with techniques more congruent with newer power relations in overall public policymaking. Easy access to the ministry no longer sufficed, as it now became necessary to strengthen the minister at the Cabinet level in the higher-level competition for funds, and (even more difficult) to gain steady access to decisional points where national economic policy was being hammered out (chiefly in the consultations between major departments and organised capital and labor). This troubled awareness led the normally sedate teachers' groups to turn to what for them was increasingly militant behaviour—to strikes, mass campaigns for larger public investment in education, and finally affiliation with the Trades Union Congress. Coates's analysis of these adjustments in strategy leaves the impression that however radical they were in terms of the unions' traditions and memberships, they were not strikingly effective. On bread-and-butter issues, British school teachers, despite their advanced organization, appear to have fared little better than their counterparts elsewhere. The upgrading of education in public spending priorities has not been re-established by these newer methods.

Perhaps this was bound to occur in a period when the central problems of the nation were viewed by the governing politicians in crisis economic terms. To cite just one example: the unions' decision to affiliate with the TUC failed to gain them access to the critical planning arenas, as they were systematically shut out of top-level consultations done under corporatist formulas, while at the same time their uncertain attitude toward the strike weapon deprived them of the clout enjoyed by miners, dockers, medical personnel or others.

These developments are, up to a point, instructive to students of interest group politics, and are well presented in this study. The author's attempt to hang on them a re-evaluation of the state of interest group theory comes off less successfully. He finds that literature marred by two central tendencies: to confuse influence with behavior, and to emphasize either political environmental factors to the exclusion of organizational characteristics, or vice-versa. His own study, he believes, avoids the first pitfall by limiting its focus to strategy and tactics and not conjecturing beyond them into the question of impact. Happily for us (if not for his position) his case study demonstrates that this urge cannot be sustained even when it is pursued consciously; for he must, and does, introduce assessments of influence to explain shifts in strategy. But his reluctance to do so systematically leaves the issue unresolved. Coates's second heuristic point probably has more practical merit, but his method of advancing it—through devising a checklist of four sets of environmental and three internal group characteristics—is stated so generally that it is a doubtful guide for either designing or operationalizing future research in as diverse a realm as interest-group behavior. The more revealing question may still be how it is that some (but not all) kinds of groups not only adjust their behavior to changing patterns of government decision making, but also contribute to changes in those patterns.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH

Indiana University

The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888. By Robert Conrad. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. 368. $14.50.)

This is a detailed study of the events leading up to the legal abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, based on archives, contemporary periodicals, parliamentary debates and census materials covering the 38 preceding years. After the end of transatlantic slave trade in the 1850s, there was a sharp increase in the movement of slaves from the old centers in the Northeast to the newly booming coffee-growing areas of the Center South, which were also experimenting with immigrant labor. Against this background, Conrad explores the very slow building of abolitionist sentiment and then the final rush of activity in the 1880s. He does not venture deeply into race relations or social history, and rather severely limits himself to the dates in the title, which has the consequence of limiting the background information available to the reader, and providing no information concerning the results of the abolition, its implementation or social consequences. The emphasis is on positions taken and maneuvers made by the key actors.

Perhaps because there is a large and growing number of scholars writing on Brazilian slavery and race relations, Conrad stresses his own contribution only with respect to a relatively narrow historical issue. The presence of representatives of the coffee-growing province of São Paulo in the final abolitionist coalition has often been interpreted as a sign of their progressivism. Conrad shows convincingly that they were strongly pro-slavery (given their need for labor) until the very last minute, when they jumped on the bandwagon to save what they could.

Broader and more interesting questions receive less satisfactory answers. Conrad suggests basically economic motives for the choices being made by key actors—particularly in the contrast he emphasizes between the Northeasterners who became abolitionist as their slaves were sold to the South and the coffee-growing elites who were pro-slavery to secure scarce labor. He does not, however, provide any reasonable economic analysis for the decline of slavery in the Northeast nor its retention in the Center South, even, as he says (p. xiv) after it was no longer necessary. He flirts with economic history, but does not carry it through.

The political scientist will find much useful material here for an understanding of political processes in 19th-century Brazil. But again, Conrad does not really exploit it. In his preface he asks why the abolitionist movement formed only in 1880 and why it was so successful so quickly. Somehow the question is badly put. As he says, the conditions were in the making for some time, and it is only the formal and noisy aspects of the movement which were late, and only in comparison with the United States experience. He emphasizes the role of international pressures—rather direct from Britain, and more general as a result of Brazil's growing isolation as a major slave nation. There are fascinating vignettes of prominent leaders taking radical stands or changing their position dramatically. But these are unexplained, attributed to unfettered choice of men. Conrad does not use the available information to explore the structures of power which shape conflict and consensus. In short, the book shows the results of a method which sets out to collect all information available explicitly related to slavery, and not one which proceeds on the basis of even a tentative explanatory framework. Aside from the hints at economic advantage, the actors in this particular drama seem strangely detached.

In sum, then, the book is a useful source of detailed materials about an important decision in an important country. In the end, however, it demonstrates the need for a well-grounded approach to make the immense amount of work which goes into a study such as this more theoretically productive.

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS

Columbia University

Industrial Management in the Soviet Union. By William J. Conyngham. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1973. Pp. xxxvi, 378. $9.50.)

This book analyzes the rôle of the Communist party in managerial affairs during the Khrushchev period. Under Stalin, the Communist party was wholly political in function. To be sure, it exercised power at all levels of industrial management, but the function was supervisory, and party personnel were nonspecialized generalists. After the death of Stalin, the flaws of the economic system were brought to light guardedly. Soviet leaders acknowledged that growth rates had diminished, technical innovation had been thwarted, and workers lacked identification with goals of technical modernization. The role of the party under Lenin and Stalin forms the first part of this book. Part Two begins with Khrushchev's ascendancy.

Professor Conyngham points out that Khrushchev inherited a Stalinist system of two giant bureaucracies side by side—the Party and the state. The Party dominated the state, and both had centralized and hierarchical bureaucracies. Party personnel paralleled state personnel at each level of hierarchy. The two hierarchies were separated by function. Party personnel dealt with policy, with verification of goal achievement, with propagandizing of personnel. State personnel dealt with operation, production, accounting. The very concepts of management differed between the two. When the state managed, the noun was *upravleniye*, "the Weberian concept of the explicit and rational exercise of impersonal power" (p. xxviii). When the Party managed, the noun was *rukovodstvo*, "a paternalistic, personalistic conception of authority based upon the intellectual and moral superiority of those holding power" (p. xxviii). The focus of this book is the imposition of party *rukovodstvo* on the state (economic) bureaucracy.

The problems of the Soviet economy, Conyngham tells us, lay with the bureaucratic structure of both Party and state. That structure achieved a high degree of centralized power but stifled the spontaneous creativity necessary for economic efficiency. In the post-Stalin period, the Party's focus changed to economics, and the Party itself directed the change.

The reform of the Soviet economic system might have been addressed either to the Party or to the state-managerial apparatus. Khrushchev chose party reform. The second part of this book re-creates the party attempt to acquire and direct economic functions. Party membership was expanded. The new members were younger, better educated (especially in technical skills), less ideological, and were often volunteers. The opposition that developed protested the policies of "economics over politics." It decried the absence of ideological work, the preference of "technocrats over humanists." The Party, in an effort to assert an entrepreneurial role at the level of production management, sought particular new strength at the grass roots level. Conyngham concludes that this policy failed, that centralization was not threatened meaningfully. At the top, a Party-State Control Committee, frankly a party organ, sought to cement state and party decision making. This, too, failed and the Party retreated to its former political role.

The third part of this book is a richly detailed study of the moves and strategies of party reform directed toward economic hegemony. The economic goals were simply stated: growth in the chemical industry, revitalization of agriculture, technical innovation. Yet the economic incentive structure was relatively unchanged. Party and state officials coordinated their activities, but in order to enhance local development at the expense of regional and national. Jurisdictional disputes were rife. Economic crime occurred in interlocking webs between party and state officials. Professor Conyngham concludes that the managerial practices institutionalized under Stalin remained essentially intact.

In an epilogue on the period to 1970, the author notes that current leadership has "replaced the ebullient, personal and agitational style with a conservative, bureaucratic, pragmatic approach" (p. 254). Of course, the present regime has chosen to reform the state bureaucracy and to return the party bureaucracy to its original focus. The Party-State Control Committee died.

The audience for this book probably is limited to students of the Communist party in contemporary Soviet Union, who will find it rich in carefully documented historical detail. Its subject would interest students of bureaucratic reform, but the text requires a comprehensive knowledge of Russian materials and the Soviet system. The glossary is inadequate and the author uses transliterated abbreviations from the Russian far too freely for the non-Soviet specialist. Its subject might also interest economists, but the intensive use of political science technical vocabulary probably rules out this audience as well.

ELIZABETH CLAYTON
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Development Policy II: The Pakistan Experience. Edited by Walter P. Falcon and Gustav F. Papanek. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 267. $9.00.)

In 1953 Harvard University, under the aegis of the Ford Foundation, entered into an agreement with the Government of Pakistan for the provision of technical assistance to the newly established Pakistan Planning Commission. This was the beginning of an attenuated love-hate relationship between Harvard and Pakistan the consequences of which made Pakistan, for a while at least, the showcase of planned economic development.

While Pakistan's gain from the association was the more significant, students of development have gleaned a rich harvest from a series of publications emanating from the Development Advisory Service distilling the knowledge, and sometimes the wisdom, acquired in this undertaking. The eight essays of the present volume were completed in 1969. There is, therefore, no mention of Bangladesh, but the context strongly suggests that if the 1972 debacle was not inevitable it was clearly within the bounds of possibility.

An introductory perspective to Pakistan's development by Walter P. Falcon and Joseph J. Stern sets the stage. Economic development there certainly was, with an increase of GNP from Rs. 21.92 billion in 1954–55 to Rs. 72.06 billion in 1968–69. Social development there was not. In the latter year illiteracy was 85 per cent; three-fourths of the households disposed of monthly incomes of less than $42; the daily caloric intake was an unbalanced 2100; there was one doctor for each 7000 inhabitants; 6 per cent of developmental funds went for education, and 2 per cent for health. Stern follows with an essay targeted on disparities in developmental progress between the East and West wings. Gross regional product per capita in East Pakistan was Rs. 293 in 1950 and 325 in 1960—a gain of Rs. 32. In the West Wing the comparable figures are RS. 342 and 412—a gain of Rs. 70. Development, in short, seems to have exacerbated the inequities between East and West.

G. C. Hufbauer analyzes West Pakistan exports, and the promotional devices which government has employed. These include tax exemption, tax rebates, export performance licensing, "pay as you earn," and export bonus vouchers, all of which raise critical problems of sectoral discrimination and entail heavy political costs. Henry D. Jacoby develops a system-planning model for electric power in West Pakistan, designed to inform investment choices between independent and integrated market and technological structures. Falcon and Carl H. Gotsch look at West Punjab agriculture and find Punjabi peasants as sensitive as anyone else to price incentives, modern irrigation, and technology, and quite as able, as events have proved, to achieve spectacular expansion of production.

Two of the essays are concerned with what was then East Pakistan. Robert Repetto analyzes the economic aspects of irrigation design in the East Wing, where the problem is to reduce the capital intensity of irrigation projects and increase productivity per investment unit. John Woodward Thomas reviews the rural public works program initiated in 1962, which over a five-year period achieved highly salutary results in relieving rural underemployment, constructing and reconditioning roads, developing community water supplies, building embankments, digging drainage and irrigation canals, and providing schools, community centers, and health facilities. In 1967 Ayub's East Wing janissaries took over, the program degenerated into a political and utterly corrupt operation, and in due course it withered on the vine.

Papanek concludes the collection with a study of Pakistan's industrial entrepreneurs. He points out that the distinctive features of Pakistani industrialization were its rapidity, its structure (i.e., based on a llimited number of very large units), and its dependence upon imported technology. Commercial banks were almost unknown at the time of partition, and the principal—almost the only—sources of funds for industrial development were the merchant-capitalists. In short, those who had, got. Since the technology was imported, education and technical competence were not prerequisite. They sometimes came along as consequence. The industrial system is characterized by a high degree of structural concentration.

This and the other volumes from the Development Advisory Service constitute a worthy intellectual capstone to what was a distinguished experiment in development planning. They will be definitive in the literature for some time to come.

ROWLAND EGGER

Southern Methodist University

Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland: Education and Socialization. By Joseph R. Fiszman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 382. $15.00 cloth, $7.50 paper.)

Joseph Fiszman belongs to a small group of scholars well qualified to write on contemporary Polish affairs. Born in Poland, he has fluent command of the Polish language, a circumstance that not only permitted access to primary sources, but also allowed him direct questioning of relevant informants in his research, conducted in Poland. The book offers a summary and conclusion of his efforts, the partial results of which he presented earlier in a number of articles and lectures.

The book has a clear topical pivot, indicated by the subtitle, around which the author wraps a number of interesting problems relevant to the main theme. It appears that Fiszman was able to get to the roots of the basic question and to provide an honest, serious, and highly readable presentation of his findings. The volume deserves the attention not only of students of Polish and Communist affairs, but of people interested in American educational problems as well. Naturally, his report—like every scholarly enterprise—is partly subjective, and though he is too good a scholar to allow his prejudices to ensnare him completely, they show in a number of instances, especially when he refers to the past.

Fiszman's study focuses on Polish teachers' efficiency in transmitting Communist educational values to their pupils in Polish elementary and secondary schools. On the whole, he finds their performance less than overwhelming and points out several reasons for their ineffectiveness. First, they retain strong ties with the past and with "those same traditions that have prevented the larger society from embracing wholeheartedly the new socialist ideology and the radical cultural, social, and political changes that accompany it" (p. 317). Characteristically, the younger teachers trained after World War II demonstrate less degree of commitment to the values they are expected to promote than their older colleagues do. According to Fiszman this is primarily due to their attachment to the Church, representing "fundamental moral, political and philosophical opposition to the new regime" (p. 311). A second reason for the teachers' deficient performance is dissatisfaction with their status and material compensations. While enjoying relatively high esteem in the community, most teachers consider themselves deprived of proper professional recognition and fear further reduction in their status. The prestige problem is accentuated by the very low salaries of teachers, especially at the elementary level. In addition, Fiszman notes that teachers are unhappy with the attitudes of the regime toward educational needs, including their training to fulfill the demands the system imposes upon them. In Poland, as in many other countries, industrial development takes precedence over educational requirements. Consequently, many individuals are deprived of the major tool of social advancement, and the existing stratification system is perpetuated, putting a question mark on the Communist promise of a classless society.

Fiszman's findings lead him to make some predictions. Although their novelty is not very remarkable, they are worth stressing. Most significant is his view that in the future a *modus vivendi* will be reached between the Communist regime and the existing traditional institutions, including the Church, and that a blend of new and old cultural values will be achieved in time. When this happens, the rulers will stop viewing the teachers as agents of socialization and will demand from them only performance in support of an existing power structure. To this prognosis Fiszman adds a statement—somewhat contradicting what he said earlier about prewar teachers (p. 197)—that the Polish educational system is traditionally well-suited to perform this role.

Despite its value, the book does have its weaker points. One is a lack of "historical sensitivity." Throughout the book the author silently assumes that the traditional values and institutions, especially the Church, always acted as reactionary and retrogressive forces. This attitude appears to express more the ideological tendencies of Fiszman's sources than the complex realities of the past and the present. Another weakness is that when the author illuminates problems by contrasting them with prewar examples, some of them do not seem relevant to the main theme and present incomplete information. Take, for example, the case of Jewish students at Polish universities. While there was pressure to introduce *numerus clausus* because of the great number of Jews in the legal and medical professions (55 per cent of all attorneys in Warsaw and Lodz, 86 per cent in Cracow, 73 per cent in Lwow; 35.8 per cent of all doctors in Warsaw, 62.5 per cent in Lwow, 65 per cent in Cracow, 66.7 per cent in Lodz), restrictive practices of admission never became official educational policy as claimed by Fiszman on p. 57. In 1935–36 Jewish students constituted, 13.2 per cent of the entire student body, a proportion greater than the share of Jews in the total population of the country (9.7 per cent). More than one-third of them studied law (39.3 per cent), and close to 10 per cent medicine.

It would be wrong to infer from this evidence that Fiszman consciously manipulates the issue. One rather suspects that he was conditioned to accept unquestioningly information given him by interested advisors. While his predisposition might be excusable, it raises certain doubts in regard to his other sources. The perplexity becomes even greater when one realizes that Fiszman's findings are mostly based on a secondary analysis of material provided by research groups in Poland. Was he given access to all relevant sources? Why at no point can the reader examine the text of an entire research instrument such as questionnaires and interview schedules?

To raise these questions is not to minimize the effort of the author or to detract from the merit of the book. It is a valuable contribution, filling a gap in the literature of the subject and providing much new information—unfortunately some of it already outdated—in the area bordering on education, sociology, psychology, and political science. Once again it confirms the fact that the junction of various disciplines always presents a promising site of exploration.

Princeton University Press deserves credit for publishing such a useful study and doing it so effectively. But why allow errors in spelling Polish names (e.g., Sienkiewicz and Putrament)?

V. C. Chrypinski

University of Windsor

The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People. By C. P. FitzGerald. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 230. $8.95.)

This impressive attempt to survey the whole sweep of the southward movement of Chinese influence, culture, and power from the earliest times, and in its light to examine the situation today, should be studied by everyone concerned about the future of eastern Asia; and who is not? It is history not for its own sake but for guidance in the interpretation of a contemporary political problem bedevilled by guesswork. His aim, Professor FitzGerald tells us in his Introduction, is to provide the background facts of what he sees as "one of the most enduring features of all Chinese history" (p. xv). He starts with the Sinization of China itself, beginning with the flow of influence and culture from the original confederacy of states in the Yellow River basin into the Yangtze valley in the days of the Chou Dynasty (eleventh to third century B.C.). Then southward into what is now North Vietnam, with a big spurt under the T'ang (618–906), followed by the consolidation of the South under the Southern Sung; but without the Vietnamese, for with the T'ang collapse they gained their independence. The author contrasts the case of Vietnam, which absorbed Chinese culture but rejected incorporation in the empire, with that of Yunnan, a non-Chinese region, which after initial conquest by Kublai Khan was incorporated by the Ming (1368–1644). The two chapters on Yunnan, besides offering much that will be new to many students of Chinese history, outline a possible model, as Professor FitzGerald sees it, for further Chinese expansion, should it become feasible. His explanation of the Ming abandonment of the pursuit of sea power after the voyages of Ch'eng Ho into the Southern Ocean and beyond is the most adequate one has yet seen. Henceforward, he points out, China could intervene in South East Asia only by land, whereas most of the migrant Chinese, who flocked to South East Asia in such large numbers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, went by sea, settling in lands to which sea power was the key. Thus "the most impressive expansion of the Chinese to the south came at a period when the home government took no interest at all in any such development" (p. 216), and was too weak to play any part in it.

In his last two chapters Professor FitzGerald sums up the situation today and its prospects. He adduces ample reasons to show how supremely difficult a policy of intervention in the Nanyang (Lands of the Southern Ocean) would be for China, and how far from being a fifth column for Mao Tse-tung the Overseas Chinese communities have become. He points out that the policy of disembarrassing herself of the Nanyang Chinese enunciated at the time of the Bandung Conference of 1955 was not a trick, as the Western press insisted. And notwithstanding the excesses of the Cultural Revolution of 1966 nonintervention is still the guideline. But the hostility of the postwar governments of South East Asia toward their resident Chinese communities has to be faced, and the problems arising from the massive Chinese settlement in South East Asia must, sooner or later, become China's concern.

Regrettably in a book which one has read with enjoyment and profit there are too many errors in its references to South East Asian history. The Burmans entered Burma in the ninth, not in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (p. 3). Ko-lo-feng's conquest of the upper Irrawaddy valley in the eighth century did not result in "the more or less elimination of the Mon peoples" (p. 55). They were strong enough to halt the great Nanchao invasion, which destroyed Halingyi, the Pyu capital, in 832, and went on in the succeeding centuries to play a powerful role in the political and cultural life of Burma. Wu San-kuei, who drove the last Ming claimant into Burma, did not threaten Mandalay in 1661. That city was not founded until two centuries later. The Burmese chronicles say that he advanced right up to the walls of Ava, the then capital, and compelled the king to hand over the fugitive. Marshall Sogatu did not cause the Angkor kingdom to offer tribute to Kublai Khan: the force he sent into Cambodia for that purpose never returned. It would be well to check up on the book's references to South East Asian history when a new edition is planned.

D. G. E. HALL

Herts, England

Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe. The Johns Hopkins Symposia in History. Edited by Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Pp. 214. $8.95.)

Comparison of revolutions entails comparison of old regimes. And vice-versa, for a revolution may serve the student of an old regime much as a glass-bottomed boat serves the naturalist examining marine life. Old regimes are the primary topic of the five historical essays in this book. In their introduction, however, the editors classify not the old regimes but the outbreaks whose "preconditions" are analyzed:

- Two great national revolutions (the Dutch and the English, discussed by J. W. Smit and Lawrence Stone, respectively).
- Two national revolts which might have become revolutions (the revolt in Catalonia in 1640 and the Fronde in France, discussed by J. H. Elliott and Roland Mousnier, respectively).
- A large-scale regional rebellion with a limited potentiality of becoming a revolution (the uprising led by Pugachev in the middle Volga region in 1773, discussed by Marc Raeff).
- A secessionist *coup d'état* (through which Portugal withdrew in 1640 from the Spanish monarchy, discussed by Elliott).

- Two urban *jacqueries* (in Palermo and in Naples, in 1647 and 1648, discussed by Elliott).

The outbreaks with revolutionary potentialities (the first three categories) were all preceded by much the same kinds of conditions. The editors summarize in a list: "social tensions born of conflicts over status and authority more than of material stress, weaknesses in political structure, state ambitions, discontent with existing regimes and government policies, elite participation, an alternative ideology capable of uniting dissident elements, an institutional vehicle for opposition activity, and some prospects for success" (p. 17). A list is not an explanation, and this is not put forward as one, but it does designate some important dimensions on which comparison might be (and might have been) made.

For explanations, one turns to the essays. Each is by a well-known expert on the historical milieu in which one or more outbreaks occurred, and on its own terms each could scarcely be bettered. But, guided only by the distinction between "preconditions" and "precipitants," these historians vary greatly in the explicitness of their theoretical perspectives, in the emphasis accorded to description of structure or to narrative of process, and in the focus on durable and general preconditions vs. temporary and specific ones. Perhaps the comparability and differential explanations would have been better if the writers had begun with some such list as the editors eventually drew from the essays.

Still, what they offer is illuminating and suggests comparisons that range outside the historical boundaries of Europe between 1555 and 1774. For instance, it is evident that the Spanish imperial system was overextended for its technological and fiscal base, and in obsolescence began to fall apart; and it would be instructive to examine the contrast with the British imperial system after American independence.

Dutch independence was pivotal in Spanish history. The revolt of the Netherlands bears comparison, from another angle, with the English revolution of the 1640s. (Stone is not persuaded of this as much as Smit.) Considering the complexity of the events, Smit's 35 pages and Stone's 54 pages are masterly expositions. They therefore stimulate further questions which, putting aside geographic circumstances, would perhaps make clearer the character of the political forces at work. What might have been the fate of Philip II if in 1576 he had been in Ghent when the Spanish garrison there was forced to capitulate? What might have been the position of the parliamentary forces if in 1642 Spain or France had been able and willing to land men and supplies in Bristol for Charles I? Historians do not take happily to counterfactual analysis of political developments. But perhaps it would sharpen the discussion of causality and of comparability.

The historians in this book agree that class conflict was not primary in the events they are concerned to explain. They place different degrees of emphasis on this negative point and react divergently to the idea of a "bourgeois revolution." They might have explored more systematically the major alternative line of thought, which would center on conflict among local or provincial communities and on conflict between each of these and a central authority. Certainly this idea is not ignored: it is especially prominent in the essays by Elliott, Mousnier, and Raeff; and regional disparity between Holland and the other Netherlandish provinces appears to Smit a key fact, while Stone of course mentions county government and the rise of a "country" ideology opposed to "the court." But I would argue for promoting the community/outsider type of conflict to the status of an organizing theme. If we could account satisfactorily for the differing conduct of local units under the stress of Europe's modernization, we would be able to make better sense of the wide variety of revolts in this period.

PHILIP DAWSON

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Chinese Education and Society: A Bibliographic Guide. By Stewart E. Fraser and Kuang-liang Hsu. (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1972. p. 204. $15.00.)

This bibliography mainly covers English language publications and translations. A wide range of sources is presented from bibliographies to year books. The references are primarily to secondary rather than primary sources. Emphasis is on materials from the United States, Western Europe, and Taiwan. There is a superficial survey of Chinese Communist sources.

Beginning with a spotty, but general survey of materials on the Cultural Revolution, the bibliography focuses on a review of educational materials from the primary to the university level. In addition there is a listing of materials on teacher's training, rural education, and the impact of international relations on education. The latter topic is not too clearly defined.

The period covered in the bibliography, from 1966 through 1971, was a time when China's educational system was in transition from what Mao Tse-tung called a "bourgeois, revisionist" educational system to a "revolutionary" one. The decisions made on education were determined by political events and political debates. Though the bibliography concludes with a listing of more general political writings, the authors, Professors Fraser and Hsu do not give sufficient attention to the debates on education between the various political groups. For example, the views on education of Mao's opposition are not presented. As a result, the reader can learn of the sharp conflicts that occurred over China's educational direction only through secondary sources

In summary, this bibliography is primarily a wide-ranging survey of China's educational system in a period of transition. The reader who wishes to learn why the educational system was in such upheaval during the Cultural Revolution needs a listing in greater depth of the political debates on education. These debates, more than any other materials, reflect the controversies that have accompanied China's educational revolution.

MERLE GOLDMAN
Boston University

Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village. By Paul Friedrich. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. Pp. 149. $7.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

Introduced as the "first detailed and systematic anthropological study of the origin, development, eruption and conclusion of an agrarian revolt in one village," this brief volume encompasses the cultural background of a village in 1885, economic and social changes from 1885–1920, the life of an indigenous revolutionary, the years 1920–26, the causality of revolution, *ejido* statistics, diet, and the Tarascan language. What bears discussion, however, is not so much the book's marquee, for which the audience can recalibrate, but its architectonic. Had the book been substantially longer, Friedrich's thoroughness undoubtedly would have explored in more detail some of his fundamental premises concerning the agrarian revolt syndrome, premises with which a number of authors might disagree.

To others who also have tried to document the Mexican Agrarian revolution as "history" or as ethnographic reconstruction it may come as a surprise to read: "Beneath the political slogans and social confusion of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) there surged the peasants' urgent and implacable demand: '*la tierra*'." (p. 4) On page 91, however, both Professor Friedrich and his indigenous revolutionary Primo Tapia seem to be mystified by the actual behavior of the peasants: "Another immediate problem confronting Primo was the paradoxical refusal of most Narajeños to participate actively in any land claims. 'The *ejido* was for their own benefit but they didn't want it'." And on page 92 we learn that the signatures petitioning for the land were obtained by a ruse: petitioners for land had actually given their signatures for requesting a priest. Despite this evidence the demand for equity in land usufruct is postulated as one of "The Seven Causes" of local agrarian revolt. The remaining six are: ideology of agrarian reform, local agrarian organization, physical violence, gifted leadership, pre-existing patterns of local social structure, and "the encapsulating politico-governmental organization" (p. 136).

There are other problems with the above causes. Just as the demand for *la tierra* is not sufficiently demonstrated as a cause, the gifted leader of the revolt arrives in his village *after* the revolt to find the village deeply enmeshed in agrarian politics. Also, it is merely asserted, never demonstrated, that physical violence is a cause. As for local social structure, the author himself admits village events were always transformed by what went on in Mexico City.

On the positive side, however, the role of the cultural mediator or broker of social change is superbly instanced in the biography of Primo Tapia, the revolutionary. Primo, a longtime *bracero* in the States gets involved in Los Angeles with the Flores Magón brothers and their devotion to a Spanish anarcho-syndicalized version of Bakunin and Kropotkin and the IWW. Primo's original intellectual curiosity, and the modes for its expression he found amongst the few alternatives available to him, his attempt to feed it into the system as native son returned, and his tragic Promethean end constitute a fascinating and insightful account.

This reviewer's attitude toward the book is more positive than objections to the epistemology of the author might indicate (though they are real, and important). The author tells us, at the end, that "like Thucydides . . . the first scientific historian" he has "made fully intelligible the causes of (one) agrarian revolt" (pp. ix, 135). But Thucydides was "there" for his history of strictly contemporary events, in which he was both participant and historian, and the history of the Peloponnesian Wars spans eight books. Therefore, if read as a Companion Summa under the Bo tree for total enlightenment of (even one) revolt, some will find this book wanting. But if read as a collection of some of the results of those aspects of anthropological and linguistic inquiry in which Friedrich's scholarliness excels, it has great merit. *Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village* certainly belongs in the library of any teacher or student of Mexico of that period. It belongs, not as a piece of "Thucydidean Modern," but as a chest of drawers with some questionable improvisations in overall design, but with several genuine and elegant parts.

LOLA ROMANUCCI-ROSS
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Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics. By Z. Y. Gitelmann. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 573. $20.00.)

This book is not only first-rate but also, in all likelihood, original. It is an impressive tribute to the marriage of social science and history. Professor Gitelmann has used a framework taken from the political sociology of developing and modernizing states and used it to elucidate the history of the Jewish Sections of the Russian

Communist Party. These were units within the Bolshevik Party charged with the task of integrating the Jews into the new state. The area is defined as "the interaction between Bolshevik schemes of modernization and political development, on the one hand, and developments within the Jewish community, on the other." Gitelmann begins with a fifty-page description of the politics of the Jewish question in Tsarist Russia, a description which is itself a masterly survey of the proliferation of political parties and groupings within Russian Jewry in the two decades or so before the Revolution. It may be that the Zionists and the Jewish Kadets are somewhat overlooked, but the overwhelming bulk of Russian-Jewish political interest is, without a doubt, fairly represented. At times Professor Gitelmann also gives a psychological dimension to his analysis, as, for example in the portrayal of the "marginal man," the "non-Jewish Jew," and the general phenomenon of "Jewish self-hatred." He makes the useful point that amongst nationally conscious Jews who did not become "marginal men" the Bolsheviks had almost no followers. From a certain point of view Professor Gitelmann is undoubtedly correct in formulating the attraction of Bolshevism for the non-nationally conscious Jew in these terms: "Blocked by the majority from assimilation, refusing integration into the existent minority, they created another minority-culture, not defined in ethnic terms, which they were able to transform into a majority culture by political means" (pp. 108–110).

The Jewish sections of the Communist party were established in 1918 to work in concert with the Jewish Commissariat. Their main thrust, Professor Gitelmann tells us, was directed against the "bourgeois-clerical-Zionist camp," with the general aim of reconstructing Jewish national life on "a proletarian-socialist basis," giving to the Jewish masses the complete right to control all existing Jewish social institutions (e.g., schools). The Commissariat would also enable Jews to venture into agriculture, procure government relief for the needy and shelter for the homeless, and fight anti-Semitism, pogroms, and so on. What this meant in practice was the re-formation of the communal councils by way of administrative fiat combined with coercion or the threat of force. The Hebrew language, the Zionist movement, and the Jewish religion all had to be discarded or crushed.

The fight against Hebrew at least was successful, but some idea of the inner turmoil undergone, by Jewish Communists can be gained by these remarks, quoted by Gitelmann, from Shlomoh Yaakov Niepomniaschi. A former student at a rabbinical seminary, he was in 1917 secretary of the Poltava Zionist Committee. But two years later he joined the Bolsheviks and was swept up in the storm of the pogroms in the Ukraine. He served in the Cheka and in the Red Army during the Russo-Polish War. In a letter of the early 1920s he wrote: "We who have gone through so much terror are convinced that only the Soviet Government saves us from a blood bath. . . . The question is posed in a cardinal way: either with the Horthys and Mussolinis or with Lenin and Trotsky" (p. 282). So far so good, but what of the Communists' Jewish policy? Here Niepomniaschi wrote: "I will say, in Gordon's words [the reference is to J. L. Gordon, the famous poet of the nineteenth-century Russian Jewish Enlightenment reviewer] 'I am a slave to Hebrew forever' . . . I gave my best years to these old writings. . . . I cruelly choke these sentiments in me so that they shall have no influence on our political line. But how long can one be a tyrant over oneself? Ach, it is indeed bitter " (p. 283).

Professor Gitelmann is very illuminating indeed when it comes to describing precisely what the Jewish Sections offer by way of education. It could be Jewish in language only (Yiddish); instruction in culture was inappropriate because of its religious and Hebraic roots. Furthermore, such teaching of Jewish history as there was, concentrated on the conflicts between Jewish workers and their employers; even with respect to Yiddish literature, predominantly those writings were selected which made the ghetto community a target for satire, the better to point the contrast with the achievements of Soviet Society. It is not surprising, therefore, that Professor Gitelmann can talk of Soviet Yiddish culture as "a synthetic sub-culture created and supported largely by an intelligentsia-dominated minority and with a limited following among the Soviet Jewish population as a whole" (p. 500).

In his conclusion, Gitelmann seems to argue that, whatever the failings of the Jewish Sections in relation to the Jews, at least they were successful agencies on behalf of the Soviet government. In other words, in terms of assimilating the Jews as a society in process of modernisation, the Sections were at the least able to prepare the Jews for entry into the mainstream of Soviet Society (though this process was only completed by the forced industrialisation of the five year plans).

Although Gitelmann ends with the closure of the Jewish Sections in 1930 he is well aware that Soviet Jewish policy has ramifications and affiliations that extend, say, to the treatment of the problem of ethnic identity in the postwar communist régimes (e.g., Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) the vitality (or lack of it) of a secular Jewish culture, and similar experiments in Jewish life. This book is a model piece of historical writing and a contribution not only to Jewish history but also to that of the Soviet Union, no less than a guide to certain problems of the lesser communist states.

LIONEL KOCHAN

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Democracy in Crisis: New Challenges to Constitutional Democracy in the Atlantic Area. Edited by E. A. Goerner. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. 199. $9.95.)

Democracy in Crisis is a collection of ten short essays on a variety of critical problems confronting democratic governments in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. The editor, E. A. Goerner, is a professor of government at the University of Notre Dame, and the contributors, all of whom have published extensively in their fields, have backgrounds in either teaching, government, or journalism in the countries on which they have written. Because the book has a thought-provoking theme and the writing throughout is clear and concise, it is likely to appeal to the general public as well as to a specialized audience interested in comparative politics.

Some of the essays are provocative. Giovanni Bognetti, in "The Crisis of Parliamentary Government in Italy," explains political instability and governmental paralysis in the Italian parliamentary system during the Christian Democratic leadership of the 1950s and early 1960s as a serious challenge to constitutional democracy in Italy. He argues persuasively that a realistic alternative to the dangerous *immobilité* in Rome is an invitation to the antisystem opposition to participate with the center-left in government, namely an "opening to the Left," for the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the Cabinet. Robert H. Evans neatly complements Bognetti in a separate essay, "The Changing Role of the Communist Party in Italy," by suggesting how the PCI has gradually been readying itself for this move and why the party's growing electoral constituency, especially in the South, soon will mandate a decision-making role for it.

In "Judicial Power and Constitutional Democracy in Italy and West Germany," Donald P. Kommers presents a comparative appraisal of judicial review, a controversial yet often neglected aspect of parliamentary democracy in these two former authoritarian states. Kommers finds that judicial review, in spite of deep-seated suspicions of its compatibility with state sovereignty, has become a well-established aspect of democratic government in West Germany, more so than in Italy, where, Kommers suggests, politics in general and the democratic processes in particular enjoy little popular understanding or support. In contrast with widespread compliance in West Germany, public officials in Italy appear to ignore constitutional decisions, and regional governments, parliament, and the Vatican harshly attack the High Court.

Bastiaan Van der Esch in his essay, "The European Community and Constitutional Democracy," raises interesting questions about the strength of democratic political processes on the supranational level. He finds the European Parliament unable to monitor decision making of the EEC Council but does not believe that the legislature should be endowed with more authority until its representative character has been strengthened, perhaps by direct election of its members. He is also concerned with the ways in which the powers of the community conflict with the socioeconomic sovereignty of members and warns against community identification with any one ideology. Van der Esch believes the community's abandonment of political neutrality could jeopardize the future of European unification.

Other essays, though thoughtful, are pedestrian. Jean Blondel writes on challenges to constitutional democracy in Britain and France and focuses almost entirely on student extremism. He finds that French students are more active and anti-establishment than British students, though he offers no convincing explanation for this difference. He apparently sees no danger to constitutional democracy either in the overbearing and compulsive executive power and the weakened and servile parliament of the Fifth Republic or in the potential for Cabinet autocracy, especially under the Tories, in Britain. Gerhart Niemeyer examines in "The New Left" the revolutionary and cultural aspects of student extremism in the United States and West Germany and argues that this new antiestablishment counterculture can and will do much material damage to democracy because of the prevalence of intellectual and moral anarchy in today's free societies. For the conservative Niemeyer, it would appear, democracies dare not be libertarian in their attitude toward activist critics, lest they risk self-destruction. After all, he argues, look what happened to the Weimar Republic.

The book as a whole suffers because of the failure of editor Goerner to provide direction and coordination. The individual essays vary greatly in quality and in content. Several are based upon substantial research with rigorous documentation, while others appear to be little more than aggregations of casual and highly subjective reflections or reminiscences. Also, there is no apparent logic or editorial plan behind the sequence of essays. Some deal with political and constitutional challenges and others with economic, cultural, and foreign policy problems. The notion of crisis is never defined and seems to vary in meaning from essay to essay. There is no explanation of why some of the contributors have adopted a cross-national approach while others chose to focus on a particular country.

Finally and frustratingly, editor Goerner provides no answers to central questions in the essays. To what extent are political and constitutional crises more or less serious challenges to democracy than economic, cultural, and foreign policy problems? How and why have some democracies responded more or less effectively to the challenges confronting them? What are the implications of today's crises for the future well-being of liberal and democratic government in the Atlantic area?

MINTON F. GOLDMAN
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The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth. By Leon Goure. (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1973. Pp. 75. $1.00, paper.)

In 1967 the Soviets shortened the length of obligatory military service by one year and instituted an obligatory preconscription military training program in schools. This monograph reviews the latter "military-patriotic" educational campaign since then. Frank R. Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Center which sponsored the study, observes in the preface that a "whole generation of youth is being raised in an atmosphere of fear and hatred for the Western democratic countries, and imbued with the need for constant preparedness for an apparently inevitable conflict" (p. v). Or, as the author puts it: "Current Soviet efforts to instill in youth a sense of nationalism, militarism, and readiness for war are on a scale unprecedented in peacetime . . . and appear to be leading to the militarization of the Soviet education system" (p. 1). In other words, a warning is sounded to all those who support detente between the USSR and the West that the Soviets pursue policies and actions that run counter to this spirit.

The author proceeds admirably in his task. The study is well documented and the style of writing is factual. But somehow he never convinces the reader that a "new Soviet man" is really in the making. Toward the end of the study, moreover, he himself seems to have run out of steam: "It remains to be seen how much of this nationalistic and militaristic indoctrination will 'take'" (p. 73).

The trouble with Soviet reporting on patriotic, military and ideological themes is that they become so larded with inspirational optimism that things no longer seem what they are. The author could be faulted for accepting some of that reportage at face value. The preconscription training at school may include both military-ideological training and sports, with the former getting more publicity than the latter although the students' interest is in reverse. Or to quote a Soviet Lieutenant General from the monograph—"military-patriotic work . . . is considerably enlivened before festivals and jubilees, and dies down when there are no jubilees" (p. 61).

All of which is not to deny that preconscription training in Soviet schools should not be watched for possible danger signals. The Soviet educational establishment, however, was strong enough to torpedo the Krushchev school reform. It can easily dispense with any encroachments by the Soviet military unless, of course, the military takes over in the Soviet Union.

JAAN PENNAR
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Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years. By Alfred Grosser. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 378. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

For a reviewer to characterize a book as only the latest edition of an oft-written work would, in most cases, ensure an invitation to pistols at dawn. Yet there seems no more appropriate evaluation of Alfred Grosser's *Germany in Our Time* than to note its relation to a distinguished lineage. Quite simply, it is the greatly expanded, most mature product of what truly has been the work of a quarter century: Grosser's careful, complex, compassionate, probing of the German enigma. His purpose first and foremost has been the enlightenment of his fellow Frenchmen, but his contribution to the understanding of Anglo-Saxons and of Germans themselves has been scarcely less important.

All the virtues of the three earlier volumes are displayed in *Germany in Our Time* in even greater profusion and intensity. There are Grosser's easy, flowing style unmarred by jargon or extended treatment of abstractions; the wealth of historical, statistical, and biographical detail; and the extensive, most useful bibliographic notes covering the scholarly literature in three languages. The book's explicit target audience, the general reader with $12.50 to spend, will find almost too rich a feast—as in Grosser's ambitious but relatively successful treatment of major economic social and intellectual forces in the postwar evolution of the Federal Republic (carried off in less than one hundred pages). The expert, should he look, will find many a nugget of half-forgotten domestic political data or of linkage relationships between events, a masterful portrait of the Nuremberg-Occupation period, and myriad unique comparisons of contemporary French and German social/political development.

To repeat only what others have long observed: Grosser's approach, his perspective, are unduplicated among most students of German politics. He not only blends the skills of journalist and scholar, he has also in essence fused the role of objective observer, impartially allocating praise and blame, with that of the committed partisan of the Franco-German tradition, to which he is both heir and benefactor.

His book, nonetheless, contains many occasions for critical slings and arrows; indeed the expanded nature of this volume has made some earlier warts all the more visible. It is, for example, not at all clear whether a general audience will be able easily to thread its way through all of the dates, place names, scandals, and curriculum vitae, however exhaustive and interesting the collection may be for its own sake. Grosser's analysis also ends far short of the purported 1970 cut-off points; he gives embarassingly short shrift to the significance and the achievements of the first SPD-led coalition in postwar history. His treatment of German foreign policy in general and *Ostpolitik* in particular verges on the banal. And however laudable his all-German intentions, the chapter on East Germany, with its superficial and outmoded substantive discussion and the clear disinterested flavor stemming from Grosser's total detachment from this Germany, would have been better omitted.

On balance, however, the evaluation of *Germany in Our Time* must be positive. As a handbook introduction, a ready politico-historical reference, as a context-setting reading for undergraduate classes, it will be of considerable benefit to multiple audiences. And it may well serve as another stepping-stone to still another updated and expanded examination of the centuries-old question, "Who are the Germans and what is their fatherland?"

Even so, this reviewer longs for a different Grosser book, faintly evident here in the occasional deft aside or sweeping generalization. How and when will Grosser (now entered in the highest of French intellectual orders) be persuaded to write on the process and the limits of postwar Franco-German *rapprochement*? To be sure, it will not be a subject to be approached chronologically or an analysis which will smell as sweetly of undisputed or continuous success as the story of postwar German rehabilitation. But we will all be the poorer in this era of détente and transition if Grosser continues to deny us the analytic fruits of his sympathetic understanding of two long-warring cultures, of his unflinching objectivity and critical judgment in the face of questions on which European political history turns, and of his unique insights as a skilled participant-observer. The wait will not be made easier by further tantalizing in an expectable *Germany in Our time, 1975.*

Catherine McArdle Kelleher

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The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression. By Carlos María Gutiérrez. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Pp. 172. $6.95.)

Carlos María Gutiérrez is an Uruguayan journalist and "man of the Left" who spent approximately two weeks in the Dominican Republic in late April/early May, 1971. Although the book begins in the first paragraph with a number of provocative statements about Dominican politics generally, by the author's own disclaimer in the second paragraph no effort is made to develop these themes in the body of the work. Rather what we have is a collection of feature stories and vignettes written for a news service during the author's brief stay in Santo Domingo, reflecting both the pressure to turn out a feature-length piece every day and the brevity of the author's acquaintance with the Dominican Republic.

The book almost, but not quite, falls into the *APSR's* category of a work which is of too poor quality or not significantly relevant to the interests of political scientists to merit review. This is not because Gutiérrez is a man of the Left (in fact, as we shall see, that is what eventually makes the book worth looking at), but because the book is exceedingly superficial and full of errors. That, unhappily, is characteristic of virtually all reporting on Latin America by junketeering journalists, both North American and Latin American. Under pressure of deadlines and in the absence of any more solid acquaintance with the country to which they are briefly sent to cover "the crisis of the minute," the almost inevitable result is interpretations based on surface observation and preconceived notions that in the Latin American context are usually misapplied or simply wrong. This is unfortunately as true of the Marxist interpretations which Gutiérrez brings to bear as it is of the liberal-democratic prejudices with which most North American reporters seek to interpret Latin American events. Suffice it to say that the Gutiérrez book is frequently flawed by such factual errors and misinterpretations that its usefulness even in terms of its own limited goals is seriously diminished.

What ultimately makes the book worthwhile is the series of interviews Gutiérrez records with prominent Dominican Leftists. Included are interviews with Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) chieftain Juan Bosch (who has since resigned that party to form his own group); Marxist intellectual Juan Isidro Jiménes-Grullón; a spokesman for the "Marxist-Leninist" Dominican Popular Movement (MPD); Communist Party leader Narciso Isa Conde; and a representative of the Camilo Torres Revolutionary Committees. These interviews are provocative, for they not only show how different are the perspectives and strategies of the various Leftist groups, but also how deep are the personalistic and ideological divisions among the Left. They demonstrate the Left's weakness and fragmentation, its ineffectiveness in organizing trade-union and peasant support, and its frustration as a result of the political strategies pursued by President Joaquín Balaguer. The Left remains largely ineffective not only because of the terror and oppression inflicted on it by the Dominican military and right-wing terrorist groups (themselves made up of many ex-MPD members), but also because Balaguer has proved an adept politician and manipulator who has consistently outmaneuvered his opponents, co-opting or subverting the opposition leadership, undercutting their arguments by stimulating much economic growth and considerable social progress, and commanding not only the Right and Center of the political spectrum but, through patronage and his control of the governmental machinery, building his own strong backing among those groups, workers and peasants, to whom the Left looks for support. Particularly in the interview with Bosch, one senses the hopelessness of the revolutionary position, the frustration of a whole series of leftist strategies over the last decade, and the utter dependence on outside circumstances (Bosch concludes that the Dominican "oligarchic front" is unlikely to be broken by indigenous forces but will crumble only when the U.S. economy, on whom he says the oligarchy is dependent, itself collapses).

Having shown us where power and influence do *not* lie in the Dominican Republic, Gutiérrez's book is woefully weak on telling us where they do lie and how the increasingly complex Dominican system actually functions. Only three or four paragraphs in the book begin to get at the root causes of Dominican underdevelopment; the legacy of the Trujillo era; the competition of rival civil-military factions for the immense spoils that go with capture of the state machinery and economic enterprises; the fleeting, unstable, often nonideological nature of political loyalties, and hence the absence of virtually *any* kind of institutional structure, be it on the Left, Right, or Center. That is the kind of analysis the Dominican Republic calls for; sadly this book does not come to grips with these issues at all.

HOWARD J. WIARDA
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The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72. By James Pinckney Harrison. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 647. $6.95.)

Professor Harrison's book is synthetic history at its best. Harrison has acquired the craft under the steady hand of Professor C. Martin Wilbur, who is perhaps the most assiduous and persistent Western student of twentieth-century China. With solid grounding in Chinese language, Harrison has done the patient work of sifting through documents and checking through all relevant Western studies. He gathers the relevant information from a wide variety of diverse sources, and with an eye on the main thread, weaves a lucid tale. It is the best available text for an introduction to the history of the Chinese Communist movement before 1949.

Although Harrison began the work for this volume many years ago, he completed it at an opportune time. He draws heavily on a busy decade of monographic research. Furthermore, before going to press, he had the benefit of Chang Kuo-t'ao's massive recollections of the movement up to 1938, with rich personal detail never before available (and now happily rendered into excellent English by Robert A. Burton and published in two large volumes by the University of Kansas Press). He further benefited from the best of the Kuomintang studies of the Communist movement, a recently published three-volume history and collection of documents, *An Analytic History of the Communist Movement* (Taipei) by Warren Kuo. This work provides rich new documentation, albeit selective and not without bias. And the new work by Jacques Guillermaz (the first volume, translated into English and published by Stanford covers the movement before Communist takeover, and the second not yet translated from the French covers the movement after 1949) provides especially rich detail on the military side.

Harrison would have been well advised to stop the book with the Communist rise to power in 1949. The 100-odd pages on the Communist state from 1949–1972 does not compare with the richness of the 500-odd pages on the rise to power from 1921–1949. It is not that Harrison does not make a serious effort to give an overview, but state power brings new complications in all directions, and Harrison's own work has been concentrated in the 1921–1949 period. The part after 1949 is like a hasty appendage to a masterful study.

What then do we have from a first class American synthetic history of the Chinese Communist movement? We have a rich and judicious account of the role of Soviet advisors, of internal squabbles, of the changing policy lines, of the escape from the Kuomintang, the Long March, Yenan, World War II, and the Civil War. Some political scientists may complain that the work is lacking in theory, but we China specialists who have seen misleading and distorted pictures at the hands of "theorists" can only be delighted at seeing the basic story told correctly.

One frustration for any scholar of the period is that on many tangled issues, different documents tell conflicting stories; and there is always the nagging question of whether some partisans have invented or rewritten the documents. Harrison is a craftsman in checking the sources and judicious in giving the reader a sense of the nature of the documentation, but still, many statements have to be prefaced by "If these sources are correct, . . ." or "It may therefore be presumed that. . . ."

Another frustration is that the younger generation of American China scholars, in government and academe, lack a feel for Chinese politics. This deficiency is due not to their inclinations but to the nature of Chinese-American relations. Harrison, like most other Americans, has relied overwhelmingly on documents. He has gone through more documents than Guillermaz, who provides the only comparable integrative effort; but Guillermaz spent many years in China and knew many of the leaders personally, and through his sense of Chinese political life, he can often zero in on what was going on at the deeper level, when the good American historian is filling in with lots of detail which does not always separate the vital from the peripheral. At times, in reading Harrison, one gets the urge to rush back to Chang Kuo-t'ao with its richer, subtler personal picture even when Chang's memory cannot compare in accuracy with Harrison's documentation.

We have also not yet advanced our study to the point where the history of the Chinese Communist movement can be woven in with a rich overview of political events and of the broader social context. The documents of the movement do provide a view of the Communist leaders. But it will be some time before the general sociopolitical history of Republican China is sufficiently pulled together to provide the background that a historian of the Chinese Communist movement can relate to his own studies. In the meantime we can be grateful to Harrison for providing a reliable overview, a text to give students, and a guide for the more detailed studies and source materials on this history of the Communist movement.

Ezra F. Vogel

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***Soviet and American Society: A Comparison.* By** Paul Hollander. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 476. $12.50.)

Comparative studies of Soviet and American societies were much too long dominated by the convergence debate. Since for each two objects one can find a level of abstraction high enough for these objects to look exactly alike (or, conversely, sufficiently low to expose their distinctiveness), the ill-famed debate has been admittedly abortive from the start and reflected much more on the participants' political sympathies than on the substance of the matter allegedly under discussion. Paul Hollander—both by theoretical design and for the method of research and presentation he had chosen—swept aside the traditional idiom and offered an entirely new approach to the task of comparison. It is just as well that he did, since on the eve of Pax Kissingeriana it is only natural to expect many a political scientist to jump headlong onto the convergence bandwagon, thereby following the trail blazed by some of his predecessors inspired by the war-time alliance and, later, by the double luck of the death of Stalin and the dying out of McCarthyism. These old specters of convergence hung too high, in the rarefied air of grand theory (Sorokin's universal civilization cycles; Galbraith's industrial society type; Parsons's "democratize or perish" principle), to be effectively forced into a face-to-face confrontation with facts of a more mundane nature. Every future specter of the kind, if reborn, will have to face this legion of well checked, fact-like stubborn facts, which Hollander has so painstakingly and sedulously summoned and got straight.

To be sure, the relevance of Hollander's contribution as "a convergence debate to end all convergence debate" is somewhat diminished by his side-stepping rather than frontally attacking the main issues the preachers or adversaries of convergence tried to grapple with: whether the two societies *become* more similar or less similar to each other in the process of their respective evolutions. One of the few virtues one could concede to the convergence debate was that it judiciously underscored the necessity of the historical analysis. The outspoken neglect of this necessity is the paramount weakness of Hollander's analysis. To him, the two societies are firmly fixed types, rather than living and changing entities. He compares instantaneous snapshots rather than tendencies. He captures the two societies in the states which by historical chance happened to be contemporaneous, but he fails to monitor the paths which led to these states or the still unfolded prospects for the future. Having made this decision, he could only create a flattened, purely phenomenal picture bereft of temporal depth—

one which is not immediately translatable into the convergence idiom. If a convergence addict wishes strongly enough to do so, he can still, unfortunately, dismiss Hollander's erudition as a recording of a transient episode.

Worse still, the lack of diachronic dimension has not been made up for by a cohesive synchronic model which could assign relative importance to disparate facts collected in the book and recited in the same pitch. Thanks to the author's scrupulous homework and smooth, lucid narrative, the reading is rewardingly illuminating; but the question "so what?" will be inevitably asked by a diligent reader and, as far as I am concerned, will remain vexingly unanswered. The book's structure reminds one of a perceptive, but picaresque, traveller's diary: a series of sightseeings, each vividly and perspicaciously described, but subject to no other logic than the traveller's shifts of attention. Time and again, the reader is pleasantly struck by particularly insightful observations: when, for example, Hollander discusses the "projection effect" acting upon the perception of the other side (pp. 26, 153); when he picks the non perception of alternatives as a viable form of legitimation (p. 72); when he points out that all evaluations of the genuine role of coercion are inconclusive in the absence of free expression (p. 94); when he reveals the role of secret and secrecy as a factor of power (p. 104). The whole book is virtually ablaze with such scattered insights. Sometimes whole chapters rise to the level of delightful self-contained studies in their own right (like the one concerned with the phenomena of students' unrest and the "New Left"). But having finished the book and having enjoyed many intellectual delights, the reader cannot help asking whether Hollander has not gone too far in his obstinate intention to keep closely to the thin crust of phenomena and to stave off all theoretical commitment.

That Hollander's findings do not articulate into a comprehensive system is more than a minor irritant. Hollander seems to have little use for causal explanation, and consequently his occasional causal statements tend to be perfunctory, and sometimes even flippant. Thus, Hollander wishes his reader to believe that the character of political parties (in parliamentary democracy) is not determined by their exercise of power but, of all things, by their social base (p. 46); that the bureaucratization of the Soviet system was caused by the Leninist obsession with intra-party controls and centralization (p. 49); that the Soviet stratification system has been set up in a deliberate way (p. 214); Hollander assumes that there are "values of the society" (p. 123 ff), as if Shils or Stinchcombe never wrote a word; he thinks one can discuss the peculiarities of the Soviet social structure without paying any attention to the abolition of private ownership, i.e., of the non-political bases of social power, and the ensuing blend of the "public" and "private" power etc.

But even more important, theoretical models are particularly necessary in comparative studies —since they and only they can provide the guidance about what should be compared with what. Having located his task neatly and squarely on the phenomenal level, Hollander can rely only on the misleading similarity of institutional names and so perpetuates (though inadvertently) the thoughtless habit of taking the cognitive net produced by the dominant political science vocabulary for the "objective," immediately given, empirical and factual, reality. It did not occur to Hollander that the same functions may be performed in each society by entirely different (in look and in name) institutions. Should one compare political parties, or ways and means of mobilization, elite training, eliciting support, interests integration etc.? Should one compare the Supreme Soviet with the American Senate, or rather the latter with the Central Committee of CPSU? Should one compare elections, or rather the means the two countries apply to live up, or to pretend that they live up, to the shared assumption of the sovereignty ultimately vested in the people? Should one compare distributions of income or rather specific ways in which control of some people over the situation of others is generated and sustained? There is no end to such questions, and no one of them may be as much as posited without reference to some kind of a theoretical model. The idea that in order to embrace reality more feasibly one has to slip off his theoretical armor is an old fallacy which Hollander's book has in no way disproved.

All this said, Hollander's study provides more detailed, tested, and intelligently conveyed information on the two societies than any other book on a related subject. For this reason it will remain, and justly so, a most comprehensive reference book for everyone who may contemplate comparative analysis of the two societies most jarringly dissimilar and most perplexingly gravitating toward each other.

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The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America. By Gerrit Huizer. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1972. Pp. 237. $12.50.)

This book has a basic premise: "there is not a characteristic and generalized peasant mentality which is basically different from the mentality of other people" (p. 19). The main purpose—and value—of the book is to show that rural community development programs not only have to be designed *for* the peasant but also *against* the repressive structures and institutions that entrap and enslave peasants.

Huizer's argument runs on two tracks: the practical and the theoretical. Huizer, the seasoned activist, draws from his experience to criticize the use of compromise models of social change in the design and execution of community development programs. According to Huizer, the record shows that latifundio owners and rural elites are adamantly opposed to any effective program that is likely to undermine their economic power and political influence. And, by definition, the development of peasant communities cannot take place except at the expense of that power and that influence.

In the second—and best—chapter of his book Dr. Huizer narrates his involvement in community development projects in the villages of San Luis (El Salvador) and Partinico (Sicily), and in the Punitaqui Valley (Chile). In every case, peasant apathy and distrust evaporated (1) when the peasants realized that they would control the program, and (2) when the potential benefit of the program was perceived as greater than the cost of reprisals that it would elicit from the landed elites (p. 47). Huizer concludes this chapter by arguing that peasant apathy toward development programs stems from the realization that such programs are no match for the influence and control exercised by the landed elites.

Huizer's theoretical discussion is somewhat less satisfying. He criticizes a number of scholars for their inability to see the real causes and nature of the peasants' passivity and resistance to change. This critique includes Banfield's "amoral familism," Foster's "image of the limited good," the concept of the "patrón configuration" as formulated by Loomis, and the "encogido syndrome" of Erasmus. Huizer believes that these concepts fail to incorporate the nature of the social system in which the peasant is entrapped because

> Banfield, Foster, and Erasmus, although aware of some of the wider and political implications . . . limited themselves to the introduction of concepts . . . which only describe or qualify the behavior of peasants, but do not clearly indicate and explain the motivation behind it (p. 60).

Huizer stands on fairly solid ground in this evaluation, but he then turns around and introduces Holmberg's notion of a "culture of repression." The substitution violates the logic of Huizer's own argument, and introduces a great deal of circularity in the discussion leading him to claim that "only a dramatic change gives the peasants incentives to give up their distrust and resistance to change" (p. 65). If peasants are exposed to a "culture of repression," if they are part of that culture, how can one overcome their distrust in a short period of time? On the other hand, this substitution very much weakens Huizer's useful conclusion, namely, that the peasants' attitude is a healthy reaction of normal people to a pathological social climate (p. 65). In summary, Huizer dilutes his observation that the distrust of the peasant is a reflection of a power calculus with an unnecessary substitution of concepts.

In chapters four and five Huizer shows that peasants are capable of organizing reform movements responding to charismatic leadership, relative deprivation, and violent counter-reform moves from the landed elites. In these chapters he repeats several times the point that peasants utilize violence as a last recourse when they have already exhausted all other possibilities. He also emphasizes that most of the time, peasant movements have to "go it alone," and that these movements have been more successful when a regime has found it necessary to give them arms and a paramilitary organization.

In the vast expanse of subject matter that one may characterize as "the agrarian question," Huizer's contribution is limited to the specific point of how peasants can become "power contenders." But in this particular aspect the book is extremely useful. To the practitioner the book sounds less defensive than similar statements made by more prominent actors in peasant politics who find it necessary to justify some of their acts.

Huizer offers a nice blend of humanistic concern—short of the usual paternalism—and subdued radicalism. The title is deceptive; one finds no cries for immediate revolution, no sweeping generalizations about its inevitability. But this is a radical book: it correctly identifies the fallacy of nonradical rural development. Huizer's emphasis is on Coser and not on Marx, but he goes to the root of his subject: Rural development involves interest conflict and any program that ignores this is going to fall short of its objective.

ENRIQUE BALOYRA

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Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 330. $17.50.)

With the generally recognized demise of the usefulness of the concept of totalitarianism in studying Communist regimes, an effort has been made to find more appropriate analytic tools. In this book Professor Barbara Wolfe Jancar ambitiously but not entirely successfully proposes the concept of absolute monopoly of power, in the case of the communist regimes held by the Communist party, as a theoretical tool broader than totalitarianism yet more pertinent to Communist regimes than the basically democracy-oriented approaches of elite studies, group theory, and the like. In particular she advocates greater attention to the ideological factor essential to these regimes, yet does not herself devote very much space to this component, neglecting entirely those aspects of the Czechoslovak reformers' ideas devoted to Marxism-Leninism and a new approach to socialism. Within her model, many categories overlap and are insufficiently differentiated from the point of view of relative importance; moreover some of the basic assumptions are unclear (e.g., the idea that power is exclusive but not total is is probably true but not very helpful within the already posited framework of a one-party state). This lack of clarity may be due to a more basic flaw: the author states rather than proves that these societies are absolute monopolies of power and then asserts the obvious, that some of these monopolies were broken, while others were not. Some of Dr. Jancar's analyses of why the monopoly broke down are excellent (viz., the treatment of the Slovak Communists as a built-in faction) but in other areas (economic reform, the Party, the reviews of the trials of the 1950s) her analyses are confused and even contradictory.

To some degree the fault may lie in the failure clearly to distinguish between periods (pre-1968, 1968, post-invasion); for example, the conclusion on the erosion of the monopoly of power at the end of the chapter on the ruling group would seem to apply to the post-invasion period rather than the period discussed in the chapter. And the author somewhat surprisingly contends that the gap between the ruling group and the rank and file was identical in the Novotny era and throughout the Prague Spring. In one place she speaks of a "real revolution" (p. 278) while elsewhere she says that the erosion of the monopoly was "potential rather than actual" (p. 235) in the important area of law and state power; in yet another place that the monopoly eroded but the regime was "very definitely in command" (p. 279) and still elsewhere, without any indication of the period intended, "the ruling group found itself unable to exert exclusive authority over . . . the Communist Party" (p. 182). Paradoxically she claims that "Dubcek and his supporters were not absolute monopolists by conviction, for they shared with their people a democratic past" (p. 91) but later explains the failure of the Dubcek regime to abandon absolute monopoly thus: "The 1968 Communist leadership, *like its predecessors* (italics mine), was too narrowly trained in the principles of absolute monopoly." The paradox is not entirely the author's creation, but at the very least an explanation is called for.

One of the author's basic hypotheses is "that under pressure during the 1960s to de-Stalinize, the Czechoslovak leadership followed the common pattern of attempting de-Stalinization. To win an independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it has no other course than to mobilize popular support for liberalization" (p. 37). Such a thesis is astounding with regard to the 1960s until 1968 and inaccurate even for the Dubcek era. Pressures for de-Stalinization were met reluctantly and only partially by a recalcitrant Novotny (who, despite a brief altercation with Brezhnev, based his position on Moscow's support) leading finally to liberalization and democratization in the Prague Spring (for which popular support was absolutely vital). This drive for a type of socialism suited to Czeshoslovakia's needs and traditions stopped short of a demand for independence from the Soviet bloc, i.e., de-satellization, and, indeed, it was only the interference from the Soviet Union and its allies which prompted the eventual emphasis on sovereignty. Mrs. Jancar herself seems to realize this fact, for, despite the stated intention of proving her hypothesis, she refers to it almost nowhere in her study and even in her chapter on sovereignty presents a much more accurate image of a movement which only belatedly took on signs of national communism (desatellization) as distinct from what Brzezinski calls domesticism. Moreover, one of the strengths of her book is her grasp of those measures which alarmed the Soviets (the pluralism, signs of a breakdown of the leading role of the Party), with the possibility of breaking off from the Warsaw Pact or from the close alliance with Moscow remaining a potential rather than actual source of concern.

There are also a number of factual errors: on p. 187 it is inaccurately stated that the workers achieved their demand that Smrkovsky stay in office in December, 1968. The renegade Locomotive Workers Union did *not* achieve a *modus vivendi* with the railroad and the central trade union authorities (p. 185); in fact each side initiated sanctions and the workers eventually were completely defeated. The Slovak CP Congress during the invasion *did* (contrary to p. 178) approve the 14th "Vysocany" Congress, withdrawing this resolution only after Husak's intervention. Rudolf Barak, who challenged Novotny by the threat of exposing the latter's implication in the trials of the 1950s was not, as the author claims (p. 106) himself innocent of such a past. He became Interior Minister in 1953 (not 1964, p. 106) and was implicated, at the least, in the 1954 trials. Slovak Communist leader Clementis (sic) was *not* a Jew nor tried as such (p. 104); student leader Jiri Müller was expelled from the University and drafted in 1966, i.e., one year before the Strahov demonstrations, *not* in 1967 (p. 192). The workers (together with the "bourgeois intellectuals" p. 205) were not the major actors in the 1960s, for as the author herself pointed out elsewhere they were regrettably late in joining the reform movement.

The book is nonetheless eminently readable, and the author draws well on the post-invasion purges to prove her interpretation of pre-invasion events. She accurately if briefly pays tribute to the role of the mass media, and she shows a keen awareness both of the internal political problems faced by the Dubcek regime before and after the invasion and of the Soviets' concern over the direction of the Prague Spring. The analytic-theoretical approach is commendable if frequently weak and inconsistent. Its application to Czechoslovakia, with the intention of explaining the events of the 1960s is generally unsuccessful and often confusing.

GALIA GOLAN

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Inflation and Economic Development in Brazil, 1946–1963. By Raouf Kahil. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. xvi, 357. $32.25.)

In their search for explanatory precision, political scientists have been turning more and more frequently to economic determinants in the political policy arena. The power of economic factors to explain political outputs has led some writers to despair that political variables may make no difference at all. It is therefore interesting to find an economist, writing for other economists, who concludes a detailed study of Brazilian inflation, 1946–1963, by stating "There is reason to think that the factors ultimately responsible for the inflationary process were chiefly political, not economic" (p. 330).

Kahil's analysis is oriented by the structuralist/monetarist controversy of the early 1960s. He adopts the structuralist interpretation as a working hypothesis, though he is far from committed to that school. He identifies three principal characteristics of the structuralist argument. First, "the underlying causes of inflation in underdeveloped countries are to be found in their systems of production and/or trade organization" (p. 30). Second, in contrast to monetarists, who attribute inflation to "rising money wages, expanding bank credit and mounting budgetary deficits . . . structuralists maintain that [these phenomena] are not the causes, but the consequences of the rise in price" (p. 30). Third, given these conditions, "the attempt to apply stabilization policies in underdeveloped countries is not only futile, but positively harmful" (p. 31).

Kahil tests these propositions from both sectoral and longitudinal perspectives. In chapters II through V he provides a detailed analysis of four sectors considered crucial in the structuralist interpretation—agriculture, industrial development and urbanization, capital supply, and the external sector. In chapters VI through VIII he integrates the performance of these sectors into a discussion of the inflationary process which he divides into four phases: 1946–48, 1948–54, 1954–58, 1958–63. Contrary to the structuralist argument, he finds the economic conditions in each sector to have been favorable at critical points in time for the maintenance of economic development without inflation. Each phase was characterized by overall growth accompanied by a moderate inflation which responded well to briefly applied stabilization measures. Each was terminated by a rapid increase in prices which Kahil maintains was caused by the government's tendency to abandon stabilization measures just as they were becoming effective and to intervene in the economy with inconsistent, untimely, and generally counter-indicated policies. He can find no fundamental economic factors responsible for the inflationary spiral and no sound economic rationale for Brazilian governments' economic policies during the period. He concludes, therefore, that the galloping inflation which plagued the economy in the 1960s and which contributed heavily to the military coup of 1964 was the net result of politically motivated government policies, and not of structural weaknesses in the Brazilian economy.

The material in chapters VI to VIII is of particular interest to the political scientist because of the discussion of the rationale behind the selection of and the impact of government decisions. From a detailed reading of ministerial reports and special studies, the author culls indicators of the political considerations which confronted decision makers and which led to the policy choices. His interpretation of the political impact on economic policy making lends support to the expanding-sum game or grand coalition theory of Latin American politics advocated by Anderson, Kenworthy, Schmitter and others.

> So long as inflation remained relatively moderate and was accompanied by rapid growth . . . substantial resources could conceivably be diverted to one section of the population without any other section necessarily suffering, even temporarily, a significant reduction in welfare. . . . Thus Brazil's successive governments had little inducement to introduce measures of stabilization which, if successful, would have deprived them of formidable economic and political power afforded by inflation and which would have aroused the resentment of important pressure groups . . . (pp. 333–4).

The cumulative effect of the increasingly drastic distributive policies was both economic and political chaos, which led, ultimately, to the 1964 crisis and coup.

Kahil touches only briefly on these factors, being of the opinion that "psychological and political considerations lie outside the purview of economists" (p. 282). His study nevertheless provides a wealth of information for the scholar interested in the politics of Brazilian development. As a case study, couched in a framework of general development economics, the material is also suggestive of processes likely to be seen in other developing countries.

Given that much of Kahil's study is based on published material complete through the end of the decade of the 1960s, it is unfortunate that the author did not use it to carry his analysis beyond 1963. Effective control of Brazilian inflation was not achieved until 1969 or 1970, and we have few studies of recent Brazilian development, in contrast to the wealth of material available on the events which led to the 1964 military "revolution." The political scientists, suspecting at least a partial continuity of policy between pre- and post-revolutionary governments, would be especially interested in a comparison of the policies of stabilization and growth of post-1964 governments with those of growth and inflation of the earlier governments.

In conclusion, Kahil offers some very useful material, both data and interpretation, along with some very heavy reading for the political scientists interested in the politics of development. The study can be recommended to both Brazilianists and students of other Latin American countries. Unfortunately, given the outrageous price attached to the book, it is unlikely to reach the shelves of many scholars, economists, or political scientists.

MARGARET DALY HAYES

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On the Road to Communism: Essays on Soviet Domestic and Foreign Politics. Edited by Roger E. Kanet and Ivan Volgyes. (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1972. Pp. 212. $8.50.)

Originally presented in 1967, this collection of essays concentrates mainly on the Khrushchev period. There is no common unifying theme. Part I, "Essays on Soviet Domestic Politics," is concerned with various aspects of political socialization. "Ideological Administration Under Khrushchev" by Erik P. Hoffman, "A Conceptual Framework for Mass Political Socialization" by Robert Sharlet, and "The October Revolution and Soviet Education" by Nicholas DeWitt, deal with the subject directly; "Flexibility and Dogmatism; The Ambiguous Legacy of Leninism" by Paul Roley, "Capital Punishment in Soviet Criminal Legislation, 1922–1965: A Code Content Analysis and Graphic Presentation" by Will Adams, and "Soviet Historians Review Their Own Past; The Rehabilitation of M. N. Pokrovskii" by George M. Enteen, have some relevance to it. The theme in Part II, "Essays on Soviet Foreign Policy," (covered by "Changing Soviet Attitudes toward the Developing Countries" by Roger E. Kanet, "The Arabs, Marxism and Moscow: A Historical Survey" by Jaan Pennar, and "The Soviet View of African Socialism" by Arthur Jan Klinghoffer), is the development of Soviet policy toward selected Third World countries. "Strategic Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute" by Chae-Jin-Lee, examines China's perception of her power position between the United States and the USSR. Contributions vary from survey to analysis of empirical research.

Roley's short opening chapter analyzes the dichotomy in Lenin's thought between his inflexible emphasis on the "organizational principle" and his basic political pragmatism and tactical flexibility. Roley considers the former not "the essential characteristic of Leninism" (p. 7), but "a direct outgrowth of (Lenin's) political realism," considered by the author to be "the main characteristic" of the Leninist creed (p. 10). Regrettably the dichotomy is not traced in application to recent changes in Soviet ideological interpretations vis-à-vis arguments of revisionists and dissenters.

The framework for the socialization theme is provided by Sharlet's short contribution. It defines the term "mass political socialization," lists Soviet socialization agents, and briefly reviews the two main (according to the author) socialization periods in the USSR, with 1928 as the divider. No new ground is broken. One misses an attempt to single out the post-1956 period, and the socialization needs in an advancing industrialized society with its burgeoning pluralism.

It is the Hoffman chapter, dealing with post-1956 efforts to revitalize the ritual of the Party's ideological administration, that provides insights into the new needs of Soviet political socialization. Based on extensive empirical data this contribution analyzes the mechanics of the work of the Agitprop apparatus, its system of vertical and horizontal communications, and its "administrative efficiency." Hoffman finds that despite its formidable formal powers, Agitprop's ability to function effectively depends on its ability "to persuade provincial officials that what it wants of them is in their own best interests" (p. 40) and thus clearly links the socialization process to the pragmatic requirements of the Soviet state and its ruling elite. It would have been helpful to find an assessment of the reasons for the Khrushchev decision to intensify and improve the work of the ideological apparatus as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of new methods in changing political behavior of the Soviet populace.

The pragmatic character of Soviet socialization is also illustrated in DeWitt's interesting analysis of the evolution of Soviet education. Its main thesis is that following an initial period of experimentation, the Soviet educational system has been geared to meet the practical economic needs of the society—"to implant . . . some kind of basic functional skill or specialty which would enable the state to integrate an individual into productive employment and which would help to retain him in that employment" (p. 74), and that the Soviet citizen has responded by turning educational opportunities thus provided to maximum personal advantage.

The Adams chapter offers a labor-consuming analysis of the Soviet legal attitude to capital punishment as seen through content analysis of the 1922–1965 criminal codes. As Professor Adams cautions, methodological limitations allow for the assessment of formal legal attitudes only.

The final paper in Part I examines in depth recent efforts of some Soviet historians to rehabilitate Pokrovskii's views. While unresolved so far, the debate offers fascinating insights into the current state of Soviet historiography, in which elements of historical objectivity and legitimate differences in interpretation intertwine with the need to support past formulations. A short synopsis of Pokrovskii's views and the main thrust of Stalinist criticism of them would have been helpful for the uninitiated reader.

The Foreign Policy section is shorter and more cohesive than the section on domestic politics. The first three chapters basically cover the same ground, developing a general thesis that the evolution of the Soviet attitude toward Third World states followed closely the pragmatic needs of Soviet foreign policy. There are some redundancies, especially in reference to the interpretation of the political nature of the developing countries: from the Stalinist concept of "bourgeois-nationalist governments," through Khrushchev's "national democracies," to the current concept of "revolutionary democracies." Kanet concentrates on the evolution of Soviet policy towards the Third World in general; Pennar on the analysis of Soviet policy towards the Arab world; and Klinghoffer on the Soviet evaluation of African socialism. The three contributors empirically validate the thesis that *realpolitik* has governed adaptations of Soviet theory but demonstrate also the dangers of distortion in analysis of current events inherent in ideological bias. The case in point has been the Soviet persistence in applying class analysis to African politics (Klinghoffer, pp. 187–8). The three chapters all mention the existence of the Soviet Union's own model of development in Soviet Asian areas (pp. 151, 174, 186), but none develops the point. Domestic political implications (particularly in the theory and practice of the nationality policy) have been of considerable importance in the formulation of Soviet policy toward the Third World, particularly in its theoretical aspects. Minor discrepancies can be seen. Thus, Kanet (p. 148) quotes Professor Potekhin, the late Soviet Africanist, to the effect that "classes, as defined by Marxism-Leninism, did not exist in Africa"—a concession to the African leaders' own view. Klinghoffer, on the other hand, also citing Potekhin, asserts that African socialists' claim that Africa is a classless society is "disputed by Soviet political experts who aver that the African countries are now experiencing bitter class struggle . . . (p. 179). One may also question Kanet's statement (p. 143) that the *rapprochement* with non-Communist nationalist regimes was an entirely post-Stalin phenomenon.

The last chapter appears dated, after the Sino-American détente. In retrospect, however, Chae-Jin-Lee's analysis provides a good background for an understanding of Chinese motives behind the détente. A rapprochement with the United States seems a logical way out of China's strategic problem of power inferiority vis-à-vis both her "imperialist" enemy and her erstwhile ally. Where the author erred (along with most of us), is in his choice of which one was, to the Chinese, a "lesser evil." On p. 207 he says: "It is not entirely improbable that, as political realists, the Soviet and Chinese leaders, if faced with a vital common threat from the United States, might forge at least a temporary alliance." A substitution of "American" for "Soviet" and the "Soviet Union" for the "United States" in this sentence would have been warranted on the basis of the preceding analysis.

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The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. By Abraham Katz. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. vii, 231. $15.00.)

The title of this book is somewhat misleading, for the author focuses primarily on the economic aspects of various economic reforms in manufacturing, rather than on the politics in the broad sense of the term. Thus we learn a good deal about the nature of particular reforms and what some of the top political leaders were doing or saying at particular points in time, but little about politics within the party, particular conflicts and accommodations among different interest groups, or administrative dynamics. The book is based primarily on Soviet sources and covers the period from 1920 through 1971 in chronological fashion, focusing most attention on the period following the death of Stalin.

Professor Katz's forte is his close attention to specific policies, e.g., the introduction of particular types of bonus schemes for plan managers or the types of mandatory plan goals to be given to them. He tries to link the discussion and implementation of such measures to major trends in the economy. His analysis of some major policy problems such as the proportionalities question (the relative importance of investment and production in particular sectors) is lucid and interesting.

The major drawback of the book is that it tries to cover too much in too short a space. By focusing primarily on the industrial sector, it virtually omits considering policies in other sectors. In trying to sketch some complicated issues in a few lines, Katz does not do justice to the complexities of the subject he does discuss, e.g., his parallels between organizational problems in the '20s and in the post-Stalin period.

The first fourth of the text, which brings the reader from War Communism to 1953, includes few materials that are not available in other English language sources. The next quarter of the book, covering the period from the death of Stalin to the preparations of the 1965 reforms, is also too compressed. The reader, for instance, gets relatively little feel for the economic advantages or disadvantages of the Sovnarkhoz arrangement or the administrative changes that subverted this experiment.

The third quarter of the book focuses on the preparation and the announcement of the 1965 economic reform and covers some of the various reform proposals and experiments. These events have also been covered in earlier English language sources, although Katz is able to place these events in greater perspective; his discussion is also more readable because he does not feel it necessary to examine in detail the various schemes proposed by Soviet mathematical economics for optimal planning or functioning of the economy. The last quarter of the book is devoted to a discussion of the implementation of the reform and the process of retrenchment from reform. The reader is left with a number of unanswered questions about why this retrenchment occurred, and whether economic or political or more narrowly administrative factors played the most important roles.

The audience for this book is relatively small. The book focuses on too narrow a range of issues to be very useful to the reader uninitiated into the intricacies of the Soviet economy; and yet it is not detailed or comprehensive enough for the specialist. It is, however, a handy volume for political scientists who are knowledgeable about the USSR and who wish to have a compressed clarification of the recent economic reform proposals and implementation.

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Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics. By Majid Khadduri. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 255. $8.95.)

Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics. By Majid Khadduri. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Pp. 298. $3.00, paper.)

These are the latest books to come from the pen of Professor Khadduri, one of the pioneering scholars in the field of Middle Eastern studies in this country and one of the most prolific. In *Political Trends*, the author surveys the history of modern Arab political thought from the pan-Islamist revival to the contemporary period. The political ideas of this era have attracted the attention of several scholars and are the most documented and studied in the field of Middle Eastern studies. By undertaking to write yet another book on the subject, Professor Khadduri aims at a synthesis which highlights the main themes that have preoccupied Arab thinkers and influenced Arab politics. The result is a comprehensive and cohesive account of the diverse philosophies and variations on a theme that constitute contemporary Arabic thought. Professor Khadduri's success may thus signal the need for a new approach to the study of ideology in the Middle East. The study of intellectuals, the social forces that shape their thinking, and their political role are subjects that have not yet received sufficient attention. Similarly, the impact of formal ideology on ordinary people deserves attention. Nationalist and socialist ideas are spreading fast among the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa, the majority of whom are still without formal education. It would thus be quite enlightening for someone to attempt an explanation of this mass phenomenon, especially because most of what is written about the subject is of general and schematic nature.

In *Arab Contemporaries*, Professor Khadduri tries to introduce to the English-speaking world major political figures such as Nasser, King Faysal, Bourguiba, and Nuri al Sa'id, who have occupied the center of the stage in the Arab World. The author includes less-known but important statesmen and political thinkers who had a profound impact on Arab events and thinking in modern times (e.g., as Michel 'Aflaq, Khalid Bikdash and Kamal Junblat). In all, the twelve biographies of Arab leaders in Professor Khadduri's book constitute a welcome addition to the political biographies library. In contrast to political thought in the Arab World, biographical studies are still lagging, not only in English but also in the Arabic language in which the art of political biography has not yet come to its own. The reader will find Professor Khadduri's contribution to this field informative and useful but should not expect to find a study in depth. As the author states, his purpose is to introduce some leading figures whose ideas and activities have played an important role in Arab politics. However sketchy the various biographies may be, they are based on profound knowledge of Middle Eastern history and politics. Not only has Professor Khadduri been a careful observer of Arab affairs for a generation, but he has also personally interviewed many of the leaders about whom he has written. The result is sound, reliable, and informative.

ILIYA HARIK

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The Changing Brahmans: Associations and Elites among the Kanya-Kubjas of North India. By R. S. Khare. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. xxii, 251. $11.00.)

The Kanya-Kubjas are one of north India's most important and conservative Brahman castes. In describing and analyzing the formal organizations and elite behavior of the Kanya-Kubjas, this study makes a welcome, though limited, contribution to our understanding of the changing political structure of castes in contemporary India.

The first part of the study is a straightforward description of Kanya-Kubja (K-K) organizations. It is important because it shows how ineffectual and apolitical caste associations can be. Because political scientists have tended to direct their attention toward castes which have developed fairly effective organizations and assumed political prominence, their efforts tell us relatively little about what is typical of castes. Khare's case study also does not help us establish what is typical, but it does increase our knowledge about the range of caste behavior which must be taken into account by a general explanation of caste change. Khare is a social anthropologist who decided to study the Kanya-Kubjas because he happened to teach in one of the colleges associated with the caste. This simple and pragmatic method of selection leads into a world very different from that usually described by political scientists.

Although Khare is not writing to stress the unimportance of K-K organizations, there is little doubt that they are unimportant. For example, the all-India association has been unable to call a general meeting for the last thirty-two years; K-K educational institutions have been almost exclusively the work of individuals, not the caste; the monthly caste journal is a one-man effort which has only four hundred subscribers (probably much less than one half of one per cent of all K-K families, by my calculations). Khare's description of the K-K associations is not nearly as complete as one would like, but it is also apparent that caste association budgets are very small, that caste associations seldom if ever undertake to direct the caste in any matters, let alone political ones, and that any efforts at social reform which may have been made through caste associations in earlier years have been largely without effect.

The second part of this study examines how caste and class status systems operate to determine the prestige and behavior of members of the K-K elite. These chapters contain some good description: the routine and concerns of a traditional priest; the way government officers use parts of their residences as offices but still maintain a private portion for family and kin; and how government officers avoid responsibility by writing the most noncommittal remarks possible on government files. Much of what Khare reports is not specific to Kanya-Kubjas and will prove valuable to anyone wanting to better understand elite behavior in north India.

The problem with this part of the study is that the status of Khare's observations are unclear. We are told that intensive studies of more than eighty families support the analysis, but the evidence which Khare presents consists almost exclusively of selected illustrations. The range of data presumably at Khare's disposal is seldom explored.

More important, it is difficult to tell just exactly what group Khare is describing in these chapters. He often talks as if his observations were to apply to all Kanya-Kubjas, or at least all prominent (elite) Kanya-Kubjas, but his basis for doing so is not clear. We are not told how the eighty or so families were selected for study, but only that "no sample representation [of what?] is claimed" (p. xix). If, as it usually appears, Khare's studies are only of those families connected in some way with K-K caste organizations, we are dealing with observations that very well may not apply to most Kanya-Kubjas, even elite ones. In fact, one of the major shortcomings of the entire study is the complete failure to place those connected with caste organizations in the larger context of all Kanya-Kubjas. Obvious questions are never asked: Do members of caste organizations differ from other members of the caste? Why do the vast majority of Kanya-Kubjas apparently ignore their caste organizations?

In the final chapters Khare puts his descriptive material into theoretical and comparative perspective. Khare wants to call caste associations *interjacent* organizations. Interjacent between what is not always clear, but Khare views the caste association and the behavior of those associated with it as lying somewhere between home and office, informal and formal, tradition and modernity. Khare's basic contention is that the caste association cannot be considered "modern" because it pursues parochial objectives and because it does not measure up to Weber's ideal type for bureaucracies.

There are two problems with this approach. First, it fails to distinguish between a group and the way a group is organized for collective action. Thus Khare cannot view the caste as an ascriptively based [traditional?] interest which may be organized for limited purposes through the structures of a modern voluntary association.

The second problem is related to and probably helps give rise to the first. Khare discusses the contemporary organization of the Kanya-Kubjas without any reference to their traditional political organization. Khare does note that the Kanya-Kubjas, like most Brahman castes, have never had the traditional hereditary *panchayats* (councils) associated with lower castes. But from this lack of traditional formal organization, he seems to infer there was no political structure at all traditionally. He certainly makes no effort to describe how local units of the caste managed, and still manage, to boycott those who violated caste rules. Thus Khare ignores the intriguing question of how Brahman castes operated without panchayats. It appears that it is this failure to consider "traditional" political practices which leads Khare to overlook the discontinuity with the past and to describe caste associations as interjacent organizations. Structurally, caste associations represent a sharp break with the past. They are "modern" in form and there seems to be little to be gained by describing them as "interjacent." Caste associations fall short of Weber's ideal type primarily because they are small and unimportant, not because they are infused with "tradition."

In brief, Khare provides a wealth of descriptive material which should provide an antidote to those studies which perhaps attach too much importance to the role which castes play in contemporary Indian politics. Khare does not always handle this material in a way which I think promotes a more general understanding of the changing political structure of castes, but his efforts deserve attention and they should stimulate others.

RODERICK CHURCH

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The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy. By S. Clement Leslie. (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1971. Pp. 185. $7.50.)

During the past several years, the study of politics in Israel has, as it were, come of age. After an extended period in which most students sought to produce general texts—examinations of politics at the macroscopic level—a growing number of scholars, both Israeli and foreign, have devoted their attention to detailed examinations of specific aspects of Israel's political system. The articles and books which result are refreshing, and fill important gaps in our understanding. And the enterprise is sufficiently new so that we have thus far been spared the tediously detailed examinations of utterly trivial matters which have come to characterize much of our scholarship in other settings.

Against this background, this volume by S. Clement Leslie, a revered British academician and civil servant, at first seems something of an anachronism. It takes as its subject the theoretical tensions which underlie Israel's political and social life, ignoring almost completely, almost proudly, the specific knowledge of the system's inner workings now available. For this reason, it seems at first no more than a restatement of general themes long since familiar to students of Israel's politics, this at a time when the least we have the right to expect of macro-studies is that they build on the careful work that has now been done. But the surprising and happy fact is that Mr. Leslie has managed, after all, to say something new, and to say it with a sensitivity and grace that is quite compelling. It is rather more ambitious to seek wisdom, rather than knowledge, but Mr. Leslie's gamble pays off handsomely.

Specifically, Leslie seeks to interpret the major issues which confront Israel these days—the proper role of religion in the State, the viability of kibbutz utopianism, the place of the Israeli Arab—within a historical metaphysic that is commonly recognized but infrequently employed as an analytic tool. He sees Jewish history as an acting out of the tension between the particular and the universal, and he finds this tension at the heart of much that happens in Israel today. Which is to say that he describes an Israeli present, correctly in my view, that differs rather dramatically from the episodic events which crowd the newspapers. In this view, Israel is the latest and most dramatic example of a historic Jewish effort to deal directly with a problem all men, and nations, face, but none, save the Jews, has taken as its special task. In its current form, the problem is whether nationalism can be benign—or, in Leslie's terms, whether the universal moral code of individual conduct which the Jews have given the civilized world can now be extended to the corporate life of a nation, embodied concretely in the institutions and behaviors of a nation.

Leslie's effort to show how that problem is expressed in the most mundane affairs of state is, in the main, successful, and therein lies the strength of his approach. The book is not without flaws, among which the most upsetting is Leslie's sometime failure to drive a brilliant point all the way home, instead merely tempting the reader to imagine its full ramifications, a kind of hint-and-miss approach which can be quite irritating. Nonetheless, whether measured against other ambitious efforts or against Leslie's own goals, Leslie has created something new and most valuable, has provided us a vocabulary which responsibly and sensitively expands the boundaries of our consciousness. If Leslie is often more cryptic than one might wish, that is because he dares more than most, and is perfectly prepared to share his own confusions and gropings with his readers.

It is not likely that Leslie's book will often be footnoted; it does not contain the kind of "information" which lends itself to citation. But it is still less likely that it will fail to have an important effect on the conceptual framework of those who have read it, and that, of course, is the most important citation of all.

LEONARD J. FEIN

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The Shadow: Latin America Faces the Seventies. By Sven Lindqvist. Translated by Keith Bradfield. (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1972. Pp. 291. $2.45, paper.)

Recent scholarship depicts at minimum three alternative futures for Latin America: (1) imminent revolution, (2) evolutionary reform, and (3) no change. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara inspired the first, the Alliance for Progress the second, and several prominent scholars the third, among others Claudio Veliz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Of the three scenarios, Lindqvist argues the third, which hardly makes his book "a classic" as described by Richard Gott in his foreword to the volume. Nevertheless, the book is probing, albeit extremely pessimistic. It is based upon fourteen months in Latin America, recorded conversations, personal impressions, and Lindqvist's prior extensive experience of travel in and writing about third world problems. The conclusions bode ill for the approximately 80 per cent of the Latin American population that is barely subsisting.

Lindqvist's prognosis rests upon basic assumptions. First, Latin America's industrial growth is controlled by economic dependence on foreign firms, principally those of the United States. The key sectors of the economy are still in the hands of foreigners, as they were in the nineteenth century, resulting not in goods produced for a future mass market based upon mass needs, but in production of those industrial commodities compatible with the purchasing power of the ruling class with whom foreigners do business. This situation reinforces those conditions favorable to both foreign investor and the aristocratic class structure—low wages, liberal regulations, cheap state credits, tax relief for the companies, and continued low income, poor living conditions, and little purchasing power for the lower classes.

Lindqvist documents cases of undeclared and untaxed profits (coffee in Brazil), undervaluation of exports to pay lower taxes (bananas in Guatemala), and extremely high profits per year for the foreign concerns (oil in Venezuela). He argues that Latin American countries face rising debts through heavy borrowing and the cost of debt-servicing, at times when the capacity to tax the upper classes lags, alongside of mass unemployment, corruption, and little real economic diversification.

Second, Lindqvist is skeptical of reform groups in which other writers place faith. This includes the middle sectors, for "they are as parasitic as the old upper class" (p. 62), the church because of "the submissiveness of the great majority of priests" (p. 137), and the military owing to their entrenched politically conservative positions. Nor does revolution seem possible, given political fragmentation, guerrilla weakness, and military power. These projections are persuasive, lucid, and informative to new students of Latin American politics for whom the book is intended.

Yet one can question Lindqvist's extreme pessimism. While dramatic change in the 1970s may not occur, some cause for hope exists. Many Latin American governments now perceive massive low living standards as "problems" to be solved, rather than as "situations." This problem-solving orientation is matched by the gradual development of planning institutions to cope with poor health, housing, education, and undiversified industrialization, e.g., Cordiplan in Venezuela, and one finds a new interest in rational public administration among some leaders. Moreover, President Juan Velasco Alvarado and Latin America's Andean Pact should not be written off completely as attempts to break the dependence syndrome.

Lindqvist's stress on foreign economic dominance as the single cause for Latin American underdevelopment obscures other underlying forces. These include the authoritarian Iberian culture, patronage, organizational deficiencies, elite factionalism, and concern with the world of ideas rather than pragmatic action. This is not to conclude that development is impossible, given traditional values and the situation of foreign economic control, but that its conditions of change occur in unique settings not amenable to single-factor analysis.

W. RAYMOND DUNCAN

SUNY, Brockport

The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960–67. By Robin Luckham. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 376. $18.50.)

Dr. Luckham's impressively comprehensive and detailed inquiry into the Nigerian military is also a "book about human tragedy of terrible proportions" (p. xi). The military has been the commanding institutional presence in Nigerian politics since January 15, 1966. On that date, a small group of army officers staged a military coup against the constitutional regime. The officers did not succeed in taking control, but the civilian government collapsed, handing power over to the "legitimate" armed forces. The army General Officer Commanding, Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, became head of a Federal Military Government, with a military governor in each of the four regions. On July 29, 1966, a countercoup within the army displaced Aguiyi-Ironsi, and Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu Gowon emerged as Supreme Commander and Chief of State. On May 30, 1967, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region declared its secession as the Republic of Biafra. Federal troops invaded the East on July 6, 1967. Such is the bare outline of events marking the Nigerian tragedy.

The author's systematic and objective analysis not only instructively describes and explains the events in which the military was involved in the critical years of 1966 and 1967 but also critically tests current theories respecting civil-military relations in new nations and the transfer of institutions from one sociopolitical context to another. The study begins with a detailed account of the coups of January and July, 1966. The second part is a synchronic analysis of the organizational weaknesses and strains in the Nigerian Army. Part Three, returning to a sequential treatment, examines the course of interaction between the military and its political and social environment. The treatment throughout is informed by impressive research, although documentary materials and observational data—the latter obtained in 1967 in circumstances of considerable difficulty—are necessarily supplemented by "a certain amount of interpretative understanding of events" (p. 13). Dr. Luckham's interpretations are persuasive.

The painstakingly and judiciously assembled chronicle of events, though not played for dramatic effect, would be as fascinating, were it not so distressing, as it is rewarding. The major value of both the sequential and the synchronic treatments, however, lies in the methodical search for explanations of events.

In the climactic years of constitutional rule, 1964–1966, when the integrity of the civilian regime was steadily declining and national cohesion weakening, the Nigerian Army stood out as an acknowledged symbol of national unity, thought to be largely free of the "tribalism" which infected so much of Nigerian society and all the more respected for its political neutrality. After the coup in January, 1966, the army, which was now also the government, began to fragment and weaken internally, and the countercoup of July, 1966, marked the sundering of the military organization apparently by hostility between ethnic and regional groups in it.

The author's analysis "boils itself down in the main to the interplay of environment and the organizational cohesion of the military" (p. 7). Largely because of the pace of institutional transfer, notably in the form of rapid Nigerianization, the Nigerian Army did not develop the internal strengths of its British model. It was thus plagued by and vulnerable to a variety of structural strains and cleavages. Internal cleavages often coincided with and were aggravated by primordial—ethnic or regional—loyalties. Furthermore, ethnic and regional identities served as the main link with the political and social environment, and the heightened exposure to that environment which followed the events of January, 1966, accentuated in the military the very primordial conflicts which so severely strained Nigerian society as a whole. Thus this element was more explicit and important in the July coup than it had been in January. " 'Tribalism' was the symbolic master key which unlocked pent-up organizational tensions, communal rivalries and political conflict all at the same time" (p. 197). Although the army "intervened to put an end to tribal and regional disputes in the name of national unity, it ended up itself divided on those very issues it purported to resolve" (p. 204).

Luckham does not argue that tribalism made inevitable the fragmentation of either the army or the nation. Indeed, he stresses the multiplicity of causal factors throughout. Without the influence of primordial suspicions and hostilities, however, it is clear that the history of both army and nation would have been different. "The fragmentation of the army . . . not only reproduced the nation's cleavages, but brought them to their logical conclusion, by making secession a realistic possibility for a region which had the force of arms at its disposal" (p. 205).

Grady H. Nunn
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Money and Capital in Economic Development. By Ronald I. McKinnon. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973. Pp. 184. $7.50.)

This original and valuable study of economic development takes its start from the remarkable economic progress of South Korea since 1964. In

1964–65, there was a sharp devaluation and unification of exchange rates; an increase in tax collections and user charges on outputs from government-owned industries; and a banking reform which raised the official ceiling on interest rates from about 15 to 30 per cent. The decline in the rate of inflation which followed (from 19.5 per cent annually in 1960–64 to 8 per cent during 1965–69) raised the real rate of return on holding one-year time deposits from an average of −3.8 per cent in 1961–64 to +18.9 per cent in 1966–69, a figure which declined somewhat as expectations of relative price stability took hold. In the period of reform (1965–69) exports increased about tenfold, real output by 90 per cent. In this context of policy and progress there was a sevenfold increase in the money stock, corrected for price increases, and the proportion of the money stock to GNP rose from 9 per cent to 33 per cent.

This astonishing performance by a nation which appeared a poor development risk, indeed, in the early 1960s led Professor McKinnon to examine other examples of progress and frustration among the less developed countries and to reflect on monetary theory as it relates to development policy.

He begins with a stylized portrait of the dilemma from which South Korea escaped in the second half of the 1960s. He describes how the inherent fragmentation of a less developed country leaves most economic units dependent for investment on their own savings, incapable of mobilizing the resources necessary for a radical, discontinuous shift to technologies of higher productivity. He then considers the array of conventional governmental measures undertaken to substitute for a large, interacting, and efficient capital market, concluding that such measures distort the allocation of investment resources and income distribution, by failing to provide an equilibrium rate of interest: it is too low for the favored few, too high for the many dependent on rural moneylenders, etc. The endemic inflation to which such interventions contribute yields further distortions.

Professor McKinnon draws back at this point to isolate the particular assumptions of neoclassical monetary theory which do not fit the typical state of affairs in a less developed country and to demonstrate (mainly with Latin American examples) why the standard International Monetary Fund remedies for inflation have led to recession and frustrating stop-and-go policies rather than to sustained growth along optimum sectoral paths.

Turning to remedy, Professor McKinnon argues the generality of the Korean case, buttressed by references to postwar Germany and Japan, as well as Taiwan since the 1950s and post-1965 Indonesia.

The heart of his argument is that a disciplined fiscal policy can end highly inflationary expectations; in that setting, high nominal rates of interest will yield an increased willingness to hold assets in the form of bank deposits; the real size and competitiveness of the banking system will increase; and the distorting environment of both negative interest rates and credit shortage will give way to a more or less true (and rather high) equilibrium rate of interest. On this base, the rise in the money stock will exceed the rise in GNP; and the economy can move forward rationally, its fragmentation overcome, with steady growth itself yielding a rise in the propensity to save beyond that achieved by the initial Korean-type reforms. (The latter proposition is formally elaborated in Chapter 9.)

Professor McKinnon then extends his general theory to the foreign balance, advocating tax policies consistent with trade liberalization and a highly selective acceptance of foreign capital. He underlines the limits and frustrations of policies of import substitution; and with respect to foreign investors, his dictum is (p. 176): "Poor countries have been cavalier in their use of foreign capital, although a puritanical approach would have served them better."

There is a good deal to be said in favor of this somewhat libertarian analysis and boot-strap prescription. Professor McKinnon is correct in isolating the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical monetary theory and the policies that flow from it; in describing the distorting effects of inflation, including both negative interest rates and capital shortage; in underlining the capacity of even poor nations to expand domestic savings under a regime of high real rates of interest and relative price stability; in asserting (p. 149) that "the main restraints on foreign trade originate within LDCs [less developed countries] themselves" and that, with proper exchange rates (and other policies), the world trading framework permits large increases in diversified exports; in concluding that a great many public interventions in the economy are counter-productive, and that some forms of public and private foreign investment in LDCs can be counter-productive.

On the other hand, his portrait of the Korean case is incomplete and, by implication, the conclusions he draws are too sweeping. Korea was nursed forward with large external assistance for a decade after the end of the war to a point where the reforms of 1964–65 became practical. (In retrospect, one of the greatest contributions of foreign aid has been to buy time for some societies to find their feet.) The Korean economy was further cushioned by high if declining levels of foreign aid during the critical early years of its take-off; the Koreans exhibited (like the Japanese in the post-

Meiji Restoration period) a passion for education, remarkable entrepreneurial gifts, and a sturdy sense of national purpose; their precocious absorption of complex new technologies has depended substantially on private capital imports; and their economic progress has been framed by sophisticated aggregate and sectoral national plans. Much the same could be said of the miracle on Taiwan which was launched about a decade earlier.

In short, a rapid increase in capital formation, in diversified manufactured exports, and in the absorption of sophisticated technologies depends on many more factors than Professor McKinnon examined. The quality of private (and public) entrepreneurship, in particular, is a critical variable that cannot always be assumed optimal in LDCs or, indeed, in more advanced economies. And, in effect, this is what Professor McKinnon does assume in his general prescriptions.

Nevertheless, within limits, his analysis is valid; and his crusading zeal is not inappropriate, given the state of affairs in important parts of Latin America, India, and a good many other LDCs.

W. W. Rostow

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Pattern for Profit in Southern Africa. By Ian Mackler. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 120. $8.50.)

This thin volume dealing with the involvement of the United States in southern Africa is offered as a study in foreign policy. It contains for the author's frame of reference sufficient data from resources that are commonly utilized in this subject area, but it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the value of this work derives from empiricism. With a limited set of facts, Mr. Mackler displays a high degree of craftsmanship. However, he has clearly not attempted to produce a methodological *tour de force*. The study conforms to neither the monographic models of policy science nor the conventional renditions of diplomatic history. It revives memories of J. A. Hobson, Leonard Woolf, and Leonard Barnes. In part it reads like a pamphlet; in part it is a well-argued dissertation, depending heavily on deductive and syllogistic analysis. What the author has in mind he states directly and lucidly, and he is emphatic in the pursuit of his contentions.

Mr. Mackler roughs out a much abbreviated account of the conduct of American delegates at the United Nations on the question of the status of Namibia (Southwest Africa as administered by the Union and later Republic of South Africa). The account is neither thorough nor up to date, and thus it seems that the author has simply employed this topic to get to a more central matter, namely, the presence and posture of the United States in southern Africa as manifested by the operations of the multinational corporations and American government. He returns to the Namibia matter repeatedly, but he really has cast an extended net to catch a giant specimen, unmistakably a specimen of imperialism.

With clarity Mr. Mackler lays it right on the line when he articulates the thesis that in southern Africa the U.S. dollar and flag have inseparably combined to serve an intimate partnership of economy and state. Unlike certain writers he wastes no time asking whether the dollar follows the flag, or the flag the dollar. According to the author, the corporations seek great rewards in the form of profits, and Washington seeks strategic raw materials for the defense establishment. Together, reinforcing one another, they find in South Africa a favorable climate for investment, trade, and procurement.

Profitability is the magnet for American capital, necessity moves the United States government. Mr. Mackler portrays in this instance what Professor Andreas Papandreou has described as "paternalistic capitalism" (*Paternalistic Capitalism* [Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1972]). American leaders in both private and public sectors appear to be singlemindedly responsive to the opportunities afforded them to attain their first-priority goals. South Africa with *apartheid* meets their expectations. Mr. Mackler ascribes to American leadership no exceptional inclination to involve itself in southern Africa mainly to attain political hegemony, support white supremacy, or demonstrate cultural superiority. The implication is that American policy is distinctly practical.

As presented by Mr. Mackler, this is a point of considerable importance for policy formulation. It may very well explain why efforts to reverse the United States commitments in southern Africa and the leanings of the American delegation at the United Nations generally failed. Other considerations appear to be no match for the profits-and-strategy pattern that sustains American policy. Thus, little has come out of the appeals to the corporations and to the United States government to cease and desist operations in South Africa and Namibia on grounds that *apartheid* is immoral, that Africans are deeply offended, and that the United Nations obligates its members to sever economic ties with South Africa. Apparently none of these arguments is of sufficient relevance in the prevailing system to penetrate deeply into the American decision-making process. Only if South African profitability for foreign capital declines drastically or if the basis of the global foreign policy of the United States undergoes major transformation is there any chance for a shift in support of the United Nations posture regarding South Africa and Namibia.

Several times Mr. Mackler alludes to the "significance" of the South African economy for the American multinational corporations. His magnitudes are generally acceptable, although he understates the extent, as well as the diversity and complexity of their involvement. The trouble for the reader is that, while his position is incontestable, his criteria for "significance" impose narrow constraints on his assessment. There are several dimensions that he might have explored, but he has obviously set limits for himself, has made out a case as he sees it, and stops abruptly at the juncture. He ends the study without, for example, trying to apply his findings to the perplexing question of how to determine objectively whether American capitalism is dependent for growth on the operations of multinational corporations and overseas markets for capital, goods, and services, particularly in the Third World.

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN

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East Indians in Trinidad: A Study in Minority Politics. By Yogendra K. Malik. (London, New York: Oxford University Press for The Institute of Race Relations, London, 1971. Pp. xv, 199. $9.75.)

The author, a citizen of India who teaches at the University of Akron, Ohio, describes here the history of East Indian political organization in the island of Trinidad. Of the main ethnic population groups of Trinidad, the "Creoles" of Euro-African descent, who comprise some 60 per cent of the population, provide the power basis for Prime Minister Eric Williams's *People's National Movement* which has governed the country of Trinidad-Tobago since 1956. The descendants of East Indian immigrant workers (36 per cent of the total population), heavily concentrated in the rural areas of Southern Trinidad, are still mostly occupied as cane workers and small farmers. Yet since the last few decades, increasing numbers of this ethnic group have become successful in commerce and the professions. Both in the civil services and in the professions they are, however, still underrepresented.

Professor Malik notes that the East Indians suffer from internal divisiveness caused by differences in caste, color, and religion. Mainly on the basis of interviews with 89 members of the East Indian élite (selected for their "institutional leadership and reputation" [p. xii]) he concludes that in their attitudes toward the Afro-European group, the Christian East Indians are the most tolerant and the Hindus the least tolerant, with the Muslims in between.

Yet even allowing for these internal differences, the group as a whole is described as bent on maintaining its ethnic and cultural identity, and as conservative in its political and economic views. Its political organization reached a peak of cohesiveness during the first years of Dr. Williams's government, when the East Indians' fear of impending independence (which would put them at the mercy of the majority ethnic bloc) was greatest. Political independence became reality, despite East Indian stalling tactics; and when it did not prove to be so disadvantageous to the East Indians as they had feared—partly thanks to Williams's statesmanship—their party's leadership began to lose its vigor.

The book provides interesting details on Asian minority-group thinking in the Caribbean. Trinidad's East Indians clearly were concerned about the effects their political actions might have on other East Indian populations in the area. Their ambivalence toward Guyana's Cheddi Jagan (who as a fellow East Indian could claim their loyalty, yet as a political "radical" provoked some distrust) nicely illustrates the complexities that attend the admixture of ethnicity and ideology.

One may question the significance of opinions expressed by very small subdivisions of the interviewed élite, as well as the representativeness of the 89 out of the sample of 130 persons who consented to be interviewed; nevertheless, my overall impression is that Professor Malik, by adding participant observation and analysis of written sources to his interviewing method, has succeeded in reporting on the group's political ideas and organization with commendable perceptiveness and a strong effort at impartiality.

H. HOETINK

University of Puerto Rico

Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. By James M. Malloy. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. Pp. 396. $11.95.)

This is one of a growing list of books on the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, one of the three most basic revolutions to take place in Latin America in the 20th century. It is certainly one of the best. Professor Malloy knows Bolivia well, has visited the country a number of times for extended periods, and has studied the country's problems for almost a decade. This volume is the first installment in a series of Malloy's studies of the Bolivian National Revolution.

Professor Malloy, a young political scientist from the University of Pittsburgh, is particularly interested in tracing the political evolution of the revolutionary regime, and particularly of the party which led it, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). He seeks to place this evolution against the background of Bolivia's economy, society, and polity, devoting the first one-hundred fifty pages of the book to changes during the half century before the Revolution.

He discusses the era of domination of the Liberal Party from 1900 to 1920, during which the tin industry reached its apogee; in the same period the social discontent which culminated in the 1952 Revolution began to develop with the appearance of a modern working class and the core of a middle class. Malloy then traces the stagnation of tin mining after the middle of the 1920s, the impact of the Great Depression and the Chaco War, which gravely undermined the existing social order. Professor Malloy also traces the evolution of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and other parties which arose in the wake of the Chaco War. He is particularly concerned with the relationship between the MNR and the country's Trotskyist party, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR).

The middle section of the book deals with various aspects of the MNR regime and the transformations which it brought about. There are separate chapters on the first reforms undertaken by the MNR, the agrarian revolution, and "the problem of development." Two long chapters deal with the internal politics of the MNR during its period in power, 1952–64, and the party's relations with other parties and different segments of the community.

Although readers of this book will learn a great deal about the MNR and the Bolivian National Revolution, I feel that they will get a mistaken view of the forces at work within the MNR. The thesis of Professor Malloy is that there were three well-defined factions in the MNR—the right wing, the center core consisting of most of the old-timers of the party and led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, and the Left. The first two factions were predominantly middle-class, the Left was mainly working-class. This analysis is unobjectionable, but I do not agree with Malloy's picture of the nature of the MNR Left: Professor Malloy pictures the labor element which made up the bulk of the MNR Left as essentially outsiders, who joined the MNR during the six years between its participation in the government of Major Gualberto Villarroel (1943–56), and the 1952 Revolution. He also argues that these labor people were basically Marxist-Leninists and were sympathetic to the POR. He seems to imply that they looked upon the MNR regime as a transition to something more "fundamental."

This analysis is mistaken. Juan Lechin, the most important leader of the MNR Left was a member of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario virtually from its inception. His first political loyalty, and that of virtually all of the early MNR labor leaders, was first and foremost to the MNR until the last year of the party's tenure in power. Just before the 1952 Revolution and in the two years thereafter, important labor leaders who had theretofore belonged to the pro-Stalinist Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria and to the POR, joined the MNR. Most of them, however, had thoroughly broken with their old parties and in the case of the ex-PIRistas, at least, with whatever Marxist-Leninist ideas they had once had.

I was able to observe at first hand in 1952, 1953 and 1954, the way in which the MNR labor leaders dealt with the POR and the Communist party, successor to the PIR. Juan Lechin and other MNR leaders of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) acted in that body and in the unions which belonged to it, as disciplined MNR members, and I have seen them pulverize both Trotskyists and Stalinists in debates in the COB. When the POR sought to use the very substantial influence which they were able to obtain in the COB to have the COB go on record against government policies, Lechin and his friends moved massively to oust the Trotskyists, who never again during the 1952–64 period had any real power.

Some of Professor Malloy's confusion may arise from the fact that between April and October 1952 the Trotskyists largely dominated the COB, for two reasons: First, the principal MNR labor leaders were very busy in activities in the government—Lechin was Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Nuflo Chavez was Minister of Peasant Affairs, and German Buitron was Minister of Labor. Second, the COB had a system whereby provincial union groups named "permanent delegates" to attend COB meetings, which were held at least once a week, and the POR were successful in getting a number of provincial groups to name Trotskyists in this capacity. After the Trotskyists put the COB on record against the government's law to expropriate the tin industry in October 1952, the MNR leaders saw to it that POR permanent delegates were replaced by MNR ones, and Lechin, Chavez and Buitron began to attend every meeting of the COB.

Professor Malloy does not, I think, sufficiently recognize the basic loyalty of the great majority of the MNR labor leaders to their party and to its "populist" philosophy. He very considerably overestimates the real power which the POR had in organized labor after April 1952, and attributes to the MNR Left a Marxist-Leninist philosophy which it did not have.

These criticisms, however, should not dissuade anyone from reading Professor Malloy's book. His point of view is certainly a respectable one, and he provides much valuable information concerning the origins and progress of the Bolivian National Revolution.

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Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917–1967. Edited by Richard H. Marshall, Jr.; associate editors, Thomas E. Bird and Andrew Q. Blane. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. 489. $19.75.)

This book is dedicated to Paul B. Anderson, the remarkable YMCA official who became an eloquent interpreter of Eastern Orthodox religious developments for American Protestants. Dr. Anderson's own reminiscences about Russia, going back to June 1917, constitute a fascinating chapter of the book. The remaining seventeen substantive chapters (in addition to a useful bibliography and a documentary appendix of Soviet laws on religion) provide a much more unified treatment than is common in *Festschriften.* To be sure, the book could have been shortened considerably if the contributors had been convinced that the general aspects of their topics were quite adequately covered in the authoritative chapters on "Religion and Atheism" by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and "The Legal Status of Religion" by Joshua Rothenberg. As it is, each author seems to have felt obliged to present the general picture before getting down to his specific contribution on, for example, the Georgian Orthodox Church or the Mennonites. Still, even redundancy has its advantages. Most readers will probably use the book as a source for specific information on little-known aspects of religion in the USSR, rather than as continuous reading; they will therefore appreciate the fact that each chapter can be understood separately.

Four chapters are especially useful because so little material is available on the religious groups they treat. During the last few years several important books on the early development of the Armenian Gregorian Church have appeared, but not much material in English covers its position in the USSR. Mesreb K. Krikorian's chapter partially fills this gap by sketching the trying history of this church under Stalin, but provides only a few rather bland paragraphs on the post-Stalin situation. While the author mentions the highly significant role of the Gregorian Church among Armenian communities in the Middle East, it is regrettable that he did not probe the connection there between religion and politics. J. J. Gapanovich's survey of the Soviet regime's treatment of the animistic religions of the Siberian tribes has less direct political significance but is suggestive for comparative analysis. Religious missionaries (Moslem and Buddhist as well as Christian) in other parts of the world are often accused of destroying vital cultural complexes in their zeal to propagate higher religions. Gapanovich shows how, on a small scale, Leninist impact on the Siberian shamanistic cultures has probably been more severe, for Soviet persecution of religious leaders accompanied the extremely disruptive collectivization campaign. Evidently Soviet Marxism offers no solution to the painful dilemma arising from contact between tribal societies centering on animistic myths and the rationalizing drives of industrial civilization. Andrew Q. Blane's "Protestant Sectarians in the First Year of Soviet Rule" is a strictly historical discussion, but contains many implications for the contemporary plight in the USSR of fervent nonconforming groups like the Seventh Day Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses. Frank H. Epp's treatment of the Mennonites, chronologically more comprehensive, will be interesting to students of the occasionally troubled relations of this denomination with North American governments.

Zvi Gitelman's treatment of relations between Jews and the early Bolsheviks is a summary of his comprehensive, revealing book, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972), which I recently reviewed at length in the *American Jewish Historical Quarterly.* Joshua Rothenberg's analysis of the status of Soviet Jews covers much the same ground as Lionel Kochan, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917* (see my review in *APSR,* 66 [March 1972], 246–48). As summaries these chapters are valuable, as are Alexander Veinbergs's treatment of Lutheranism, Elie Melia's chapter on the Orthodox Church in Georgia, and Bernhard Wilhelm's on Moslems. Because it duplicates much of Rothenberg's chapter on legal restrictions, the article on "The Legal Position of the Russian Orthodox Church" by Alexander A. Bogolepov is likely to be less useful.

In a chronologically more limited framework, the chapters on "The Origins of Soviet Antireligious Organizations" (Joan Delaney) and "Khrushchev's Religious Policy" (Donald A. Lowrie and William C. Fletcher) provide some new interpretations of the role of the Orthodox Church within the general framework. Much of this ground was covered more completely in Fletcher's book, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy* (London, 1973), but even the professional observer will find new information in George L. Kline's remarkable survey of Christian perspectives in the writing of nearly all the most famous Soviet dissident belletrists.

Recent books on religion in the USSR, like those mentioned above, have devoted relatively little attention to Roman Catholics. Consequently, I should like to discuss the two articles examining the complicated situation of my own co-religionists at slightly greater length. V. Stanley Vardys's treatment of Lithuanian Catholics and the more general coverage by Paul Mailleux, S.J. make a case that during very recent years the situation of Roman-rite Roman Catholics (this cumbersome neologism is a result of the fact that "Latin-rite" became an anachronism after the Second Vatican Council) has improved in areas (Lithuania and nearby portions of Latvia) *where Catholics constitute a majority.* While stressing the lasting effects of earlier intense persecution, Professor Vardys concludes that "the situation among the faithful, interestingly enough, is discouraging but relatively not as bad," and "in the villages church attendance is still very high, reception of communion is frequent, and religious loyalties are still strong" (pp. 397–98). Father Mailleux appears to be more optimistic, noting recent permission for comparatively free communication with the Vatican.

Suppression of *Byzantine-rite* Roman Catholics, however, remains more harshly complete than that of any other large religious body. Analysis of the 1970 census strongly suggests that the latter (overwhelmingly West Ukrainian) are nearly twice as numerous as Roman-rite Catholics. Yet official church publications and (as far as one can judge) Vatican diplomacy have devoted far more attention to incremental improvement of the status of Roman-rite Catholics, and especially to ecumenical contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church. The paradox of this approach is that it was precisely the latter body which (in 1946) acted as an instrument of the Soviet regime in completely destroying the Ukranian church organization, persuading a small minority of the priests to avow Orthodoxy, and executing or imprisoning the recalcitrants (including the entire hierarchy). Today, Orthodox churches are open throughout the Western Ukraine (possibly with fewer restrictions than elsewhere in the USSR) while Byzantine-rite Catholic services are relentlessly suppressed.

The Jesuit order, acting through the excellent training facilities of the Pontifical Collegium Russicum in Rome, has been the major force behind the effort at reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchy. Indeed, Jesuit interest in "summit" contacts with Russian Orthodoxy goes back at least to Catherine II's sheltering of the Order while it was officially dissolved. Consequently it is to his credit that Mailleux (current Rector of the Russicum) candidly recognizes that "for those groups which have remained secretly united with Rome, these events [Vatican-Patriarchate negotiations] have caused no small amount of surprise and confusion" particularly when Orthodox clergy "have pointed to the change in the Roman attitude to demonstrate to Ukrainians and Carpatho-Russians who remain faithful to the Holy See that they are wrong in persisting in their loyalty" (p. 376). What Mailleux does not explore is the considerable evidence that these and earlier Orthodox attacks on Ukrainian Catholicism may actually have been instigated by the secret police. After all, if a devout Orthodox Christian like Solzhenitsyn must cry out that "a church [like the contemporary Russian] dictatorially ruled by atheists is a sight not seen in two thousand years" (*The New York Times*, April 9, 1972), negotiators of other faiths might reflect that the time is appropriate to combine the cunning of serpents with the innocence of doves. What has been most regrettable in the Roman Catholic approach is the scarcity even of extended, systematic analysis of the problem.

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Burma and Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Development. By Mya Maung (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 178. $13.50.)

Professor Mya Maung opposes economic theories of development that would impose on the study of less developed countries (LDC's) models derived from advanced industrial countries. Such models "cannot cope with the sociocultural matrix of development." For him the noneconomic determinants of economic development merit equal if not superior status when studying development in LDC's. Thus, he decided to compare Pakistan and Burma in order to understand why certain types of economic philosophy and policy are pursued and to examine their success or failure. He elected to do a macroanalysis, omitting as "irrelevant" the "intraregional and intragroup" cultural variations.

The significance of noneconomic factors in development has been long recognized by students of the developing countries. It is therefore questionable whether the author should have devoted his first chapter to a general, however well-written, restatement of it. He would have been better advised to have devoted his effort in this all-too-brief monograph to a closer analysis not only of the macrodata but also of some of the intraregional and intragroup cultural variations which despite his allegation of irrelevancy profoundly affect the outcome of development in some LDC's, especially those he has chosen to compare.

The treatment of Pakistan demonstrates the faults inherent in Mya Maung's macroanalytical study, published just before the recent tragedy in East Bengal. He concludes that because Pakistan had adopted "open" developmental policies, it was therefore "relatively successful in nation-building and development" (p. 37). Earlier students of Pakistan, not indifferent to intraregional and intragroup data, had noticed their dangerous implications *before* the eruption of Bangladesh, an event among others that refutes the author's optimistic conclusion.

When Mya Maung turns to Burma, he is on surer ground. His historical treatment draws on established sources, notably the work of British historian J. S. Furnivall who described Burma as a "plural society" in which the majority ethnic group, the Buddhist Burmans, were or felt they were deprived "outsiders" in their own country. Independence in 1948 was brought about largely by a nationalist, democratic socialist leadership, self-styled, the *Thakins* (i.e., those who had determined to be "masters" in their own "house"). The *Thakins* had been encouraged by politically minded members of the Buddhist *Sangha* and had easily acquired Burmese Buddhist mass support.

In a broad sense, Buddhism and some variety of loosely defined nationalism *cum* socialism have been the two dominant themes in Burmese life, prior to and certainly since independence. Development practices have necessarily incorporated in some way various measures of each from 1948 to present. To all this Mya Maung, again quoting Furnivall (p. 86), gives assent. His task is to discover what specific ways development has in fact responded to its "sociocultural matrix."

Chapter IV is crucial to the author's analysis, for in it he is concerned with demonstrating that the degree of societal openness accounts for the pace of development. He defines his yardstick as follows: "where social conflict and economic change are concerned . . . a social system can be viewed as closed with respect to the elasticity of social change, the intensity of social conflict and its policies of sociocultural insulation generated by the forces of a traditional social system" (p. 90). He points out that the traditional Burmese social system and Buddhism tend to support individualism (i.e., an egalitarian, socially mobile society with a resource base that easily avoided the extremes of poverty and exploitation); and that such individualism was or should have been compatible with an open economic system leading to development. Paradoxically, he holds that governments since independence chose to develop some form of evolutionary or "command" socialism because of the "social conflict and change that took place in the traditional social system during and after colonial rule" (p. 93). Hence Burma has failed to develop, especially under its more extreme form of "command" socialism. The "social conflicts and change" that resulted in making Burma more of a "closed system," and hence arrested her development, according to Mya Maung, were: (1) the cultural resistance of Buddhism to any new inflow of alien values and technology and the disvalue placed by Buddhism on desire for wealth, property, and worldly pleasure; (2) the indigenous training and education of the *Thakins*, the leaders of the nationalist movement; and (3) the impact of the Cold War on Burma, her unhappy geopolitical situation between China and India, and her "historic antipathy towards the West," all of which have caused her to adopt a neutralist foreign policy.

As a result of these factors, Burmese leadership since independence has apparently been willing to continue, if not to enhance, the sociocultural parameters of a relatively "closed" Buddhist society, adding to the latter in less or greater degree a "command" or closed economy in pursuit of development. The result is "economic stagnation" (pp. 119–125). The "closedness" of the society, "the illusive" but real "affinity" between Burmese Buddhism and Marxism, strengthened by the traditional nationalism and traumatic experiences under colonial rule, have been the main reasons for adopting socialism in Burma. Socialism, especially the total state command variety as practiced in Burma since the 1962 military coup, has resulted in developmental chaos because it has not been able to tune "the basic anti-materialistic tenets of Buddhism to the historical materialism of Marx" (pp. 136–138).

Mya Maung's *conclusion* about Burma's economic stagnation has long been generally recognized, even by General Ne Win, Head of State and government, who has described the consequences of the so-called "Burmese Way to Socialism" as a "mess." The author's causal explanation for it, however, as summarized in the above three essential sets of factors must be seriously faulted as being insufficient and partly inaccurate.

Although Buddhism's emphasis on nonaccumulation is, in theory, incompatible with one of the major requisites of economic development, it may be noted that Japan, influenced in major ways by Mahayana Buddhism, was able to transform its traditional economy into a completely modern one. Moreover, the Theravada Buddhist countries of Ceylon, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia have varied tremendously in their respective economic systems and in their degree of success or failure. Thus, from the standpoint of comparative analysis the religious variable may well be questioned as a determining factor in economic development.

It is true that the *Thakins* were almost all "trained at home," but they went to secondary schools and the University or entered the professions that were almost exclusively Western and British-oriented. Even their adoption of modified forms of Marxism in the middle 1930s and later was obviously of Western origin. There is no evidence that because they were educated in Burma they became initiators or supporters of a "realtively closed society." Though the present regime has adopted an absurd statist scheme called the "Burmese Way to Socialism," the reasons for its adoption can hardly be attributed either to the leadership's being Buddhist or to its being trained at home. The reasons for failure must be sought elsewhere.

There is no doubt that Burma, at least since 1949–50, has followed a genuinely neutralist policy in foreign affairs. But her reasons for this are only partially presented by Mya Maung. Before the Cold War reached mainland Southeast Asia, Burmese leadership sought the help of "big allies" when her fledgling independent government in early 1948 came under attack from Communist insurrectionists. She did *not* get the help she needed either from her then ally-by-defense-treaty, the United Kingdom, or from the United States. Under continuous attack from Communist insurrectionists (oriented toward Moscow or Peking or both) she has pursued a cautious international policy so as to avoid as much as possible the active enmity of powers whose domestic proxies *to this day* mount insurrectionary attacks against every Burmese government, including the present "command" Socialist one. Her neutralism is less a subspecies of the familiar Asian "closed" or "hermit" kingdom than a posture of self-defense in a world not always willing to support troubled LDC's.

Finally, the failure of development in Burma can in no small measure be attributed to the persisting problem of ethnic pluralism which has impeded national integration. A major weakness of the present study is that it fails to take such intragroup and intraregional issues into account in its analysis of the developmental process.

Burma and Pakistan: A Comparative Study in Development is worth reading even though it fails to fulfill its promise to explain why development does or does not take place in less developed countries.

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Southeast Asia's Economy: Development Policies in the 1970's. By Hla Myint, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 189. $2.95, paper.)

The reader should be warned that this interesting paperback is in essence the extended first chapter of a previously published report (Asian Development Bank, *Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970s*, Longman and Praeger, 1971). Having said that, one should quickly add that this chapter in its extended form was well worth making available to a wider public. Professor Myint's insight into and understanding of the problems in his home region—he is of Burmese origin—are excellent. His views as a well-known development economist are somewhat predictable, but no less serious and interesting for that. The report stands head and shoulders above the normal level of collective group reports commissioned within a tight time schedule by various international bodies.

Professor Myint's own convictions, as well as the Asian Development Bank/SEATO/Ford Foundation framework in which the original report was prepared, will make it clear that a fairly conservative or establishment point of view is presented. But it is a *neo*-establishment point of view with its emphasis on outward-looking development in place of import substitution and on development of markets and incentives rather than state control and regulation, as well as in its emphasis on getting factor prices right, which in one place is described as "more than half the battle" (p. 77). All these views are presented with a consciousness of the need to get away from élitist styles of development and to benefit the smaller farmers, and masses in urban shantytowns.

I have no real quarrel with this recent trend in development analysis (see the studies by Little et al. for the OECD, and Bela Balassa et al. for the World Bank). I do feel, however, that the approach results in some blind spots, such as an absence of any real analysis of some of the more harmful impacts of private foreign investment, or of the needs and problems of developing indigenous technological capacities, and a failure to specify the more active government policies required for a policy of redistribution with growth.

The benefit of hindsight produces some other nagging doubts: What will the oil crisis do to Myint's trump card, the projected rapid growth of Japan? Will the impact of the oil crisis on the rich western countries permit them to engage in the combined policies of trade liberalization and adjustment assistance which the author so convincingly advises? If the countries of Southeast Asia—and other countries—follow in the footsteps of Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in extending their manufactured exports, what resistances will be created in the importing countries? Will not the very success of the policies suggested provoke the resistance and obstacles which will force the countries of Southeast Asia back to other styles of development?

The original report was written in 1969 and bears the imprint of SEATO politics of that time. China looms silently in the background, only mentioned for the possibility (although stated to be improbable) of "massive assault or nuclear threats" (p. 132), not for any useful lessons for the countries of the region. The suggestion is actually made (p. 135) that international agencies should be less coy in financing projects connected with the military. Even given the author's emphasis that the military should be more closely linked with economic development—as of course it is in China, (although this is not discussed in the book) —this is a most dangerous suggestion.

Politically, the chapter dealing with the economic impact of the ending of the Vietnam hostilities and the reduction of British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore is particularly interesting. But as far as Vietnam is concerned, unfortunately the assumptions made at that time look very unrealistic now. It is assumed that "Vietnam hostilities will effectively end by 1973 through a Hanoi decision to withdraw and switch to a low-level insurgency" (p. 121). Alas!

The book is well written and can be recommended to all students of the Southeast Asian region. It is a pity, however, that in the editing there remain numerous references to the report in its original form, rather than to the published form which is much more readily available.

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Studies in Ibo Political Systems: Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger States. By Ikenna Nzimiro. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xviii, 287. $12.75.)

The Ibo of Nigeria have long commanded the attention of international scholars, expatriate missionaries, officialdom—and wary neighbors. An intelligent and energetic people, they were alert early on to the opportunities provided by colonial rule and mission education to establish a leading presence in the country. Following the Second World War, Ibo youth swelled the ranks of nationalist dissent, and their leaders helped spearhead the drive to independence in 1960. A restless people, they have managed to ingratiate and to offend, to inspire admiration for their diverse talents and fear of their ambitions—real and imagined. Defeated in Nigeria's recent civil war and packed into a shrunken homeland, they have begun to push outward again—albeit slowly and more cautiously than heretofore. Interest in this remarkable group is not likely soon to subside.

Ibo ethnography and political commentary have generally emphasized the acephalous, decentralized character of the indigenous social structure. Viewing the extended family or kindred groups formed by several such families as the core of social organization, Western scholars have tended to lay stress on the autonomous village or village group as the highest and most extensive political unit. Occasionally attention has been called to the existence of still wider unity—in Ibo consciousness and empirically. Many Ibo clans are organized across local jurisdictions, with the members aware of kinship deriving from a putative common ancestry and extending beyond family and village levels. And there is a tradition of hereditary kingship in some areas of Iboland, with kingdoms which are usually larger than the village group. *Studies in Ibo Political Systems* probes the articulation of monarchy and statehood in Ibo culture. Such a work is long overdue. The analysis by Ikenna Nzimiro—an anthropologist at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka—adds richly to Ibo ethnography by extending its parameters.

The study concentrates on four Ibo communities bordering the Niger River—Onitsha, Abo, Oguta, Osomari—and is organized in two parts. Part One, which draws on colonial records and on the author's field interviews and personal observations, examines each state's myth of origin; its political structure and overriding goals and purposes; and the ways in which the king and a graded hierarchy of chiefs execute the functions of policy making and implementation, adjudication, and defense. Whereas the founders of Onitsha, Abo, and Oguta modeled their new states after the Benin Kingdom, from which they reportedly fled east, the progenitors of Osomari copied key elements of the Igala Kingdom at Idah, from which they had journeyed south.

The second part of the book focuses on the monarchical institution, analyzing its day-to-day operations in the several states and its effective embodiment of the community's political values. The sacred character of the institution is also examined, as are the rituals which underpin it. Emphasis is laid upon the king's role as a secular political leader—bound by law and separable from his office in the event of misfeasance or infirmity. A hierarchically organized system of councils and courts is intended, says Nzimiro, to resist autocracy and to enhance the vitality of constitutional government.

Pressured on all sides by migration and by the need to operate within the larger and ever more constricting framework of modern government, each kingdom has nevertheless managed to maintain its identity and its essential institutions. The stresses of social change which have intensified since the early days of colonial rule are absorbed, in part, by the sense of continuity of kingship and statehood which dominates the members' consciousness. As Nzimiro tells it:

> At a reconciliation meeting organized by the former Premier of the Eastern Region to settle the chieftaincy dispute at Oguta, the Premier [who comes from a part of Iboland which does not have the monarchical institution] wondered how the two political blocks [*sic*] consisting of leaders with university training, profes-

sional men, such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and also wealthy businessmen, could dissipate their energies over an institution he regarded as "anachronistic" in the modern society. Someone, however, retorted, "You do not understand what kingship means in our life, because not being a member, you have not been nurtured in the emotional streams of life that pervade the office" (p. xvii).

Studies in Ibo Political Systems does not examine separately or in any great detail those values which Western scholars are wont to attribute to Ibo culture, viz., social status acquired individually, not inherited, and three main principles of role allocation: universalism; achievement-orientation; and to some degree, specialization, especially where, according to S. N. Eisenstadt, activities are related to the attainment of instrumental gratification and economic and social goals. Pertinent material which may be culled from the study does suggest, however, that that attribution may be overdrawn. Clearly not all Ibo communities are acephalous. Nor, as Nzimiro points out in his four case studies, is Ibo society without distinctions based on ascriptive, hereditary criteria: royals, commoners, slaves, and so forth. These two findings together underscore the existence of identifiable culture areas *within* Iboland. The conclusion which Nzimiro draws from all this is an appropriate one: "that to understand the political system of the Ibos, each of [their] culture areas should be investigated in detail and the pattern of [their] political structure[s] described and defined" (p. xiii). This caveat extends to other African peoples as well, including some in Nigeria. I have in mind, for example, Robert A. LeVine's comparative study of achievement motivation in Nigeria (*Dreams and Deeds*, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966]), wherein he imputes central tendencies in status mobility throughout Hausa society from a cursory examination of a single area, Zaria, in Hausaland. *Studies in Ibo Political Systems* is to be commended both for calling attention to the risks inherent in making such imputations in social research and for filling in the interstices of political life in four Ibo states.

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Peasants in Revolt: A Chilean Case Study, 1965–1971. By James Petras and Hugo Zemelman Merino. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972. Pp. 154. $6.50.)

This is an odd and unsatisfactory book. Although it is quite short and is, supposedly, a case study, there are many pages of theory, not always necessary or novel, and relatively few pages about the case under review, the seizure of the estate Culiprán by Chilean peasants in 1965. Though the subtitle indicates that the book covers the period 1965 to 1971, there are in fact three pages covering the period after 1965, which is a great pity. I would gladly have exchanged all the wordy speculation about psychological typologies of peasant consciousness for some examination of how the estate was run after the peasants took control.

One aim of the book (p. xi) is to dissent from the "standard image of peasants as passive, ignorant, submissive; in other words, traditional subjects." But surely this image, if widely held (even though not necessarily true for, say, Ecuador), was hardly widespread in Chile in 1965. Moreover, examination of an estate *seizure* is hardly likely to confirm an image of passivity. Professors Petras and Zemelman also equate the desire of the peasants for land after the takeover as a process of bourgeoisification. But why? In the first place this theory of *embourgeoisement* is hardly proven in the book, given the totally inadequate discussion of the post-takeover period. And a desire for land is surely a perfectly understandable desire for security in an unstable political and economic context, and one where, at least in the period before Allende, the predominant economic mode was capitalism.

How representative was Culiprán of similar upheavals in the Chilean countryside? This question is difficult to evaluate because we are given practically no information about the economy of the farm. In fact it was a relatively traditional farm, with a low level of mechanization and in serious economic difficulties (facts which are not discussed by the authors). The crisis represented a decline rather than a response to the pressures for a more commercial agricultural system. Where those pressures existed, the more typical response was to create a rural trade union and engage in collective bargaining rather as the urban unions do. Little in the book situates Culiprán in the context of Chile's agrarian structure and the changes of the 'sixties. There is a short and inadequate chapter on the political background, with some very misleading tables. For example Table 8 (p. 11) compares "Populist" and Socialist voting trends in the 1952 and 1958 presidential elections. But the so-called "Populist" candidate in 1952 was, in fact, supported by the majority Socialist party; the other Socialist candidate had the support only of the minor party, and of the Communist party which was at that time illegal and whose members were largely disenfranchised.

On the positive side, the book contains some interesting material, including some good case studies of individuals, but these remain at a rather abstract level of psychological speculation. There are also some interesting ideas, but they too remain at the level of abstract theory and are not really related to the process supposedly under examination. Reading this book is, therefore, a rather frustrating experience.

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The French Revolution of 1830. By David H. Pinkney. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 397. $16.00, cloth; $8.50, paper.)

Professor Pinkney's account of the French Revolution of 1830 has no obvious rival even in French, and it is most unlikely to be emulated, let alone superseded, by a work written in English for some decades. It records some novel and interesting research of Pinkney's own and it is agreeably, if unremarkably, written. It will be widely and deservedly used by students of French history. As a piece of historical analysis, it is competent, sensible, and at times very perceptive. There is one perspective, however, in which it achieves something less than a complete success. Political scientists can look to it for a number of illuminating insights into revolutionary processes and for some instructive items of skepticism: they will not be tempted to regard it as a model for the causal analysis of revolutionary processes. Indeed they may well conclude after reading through his narrative that Pinkney is unable to offer them any causal explanation of the occurrence of the revolution whatever.

It is not unreasonable in a historical work intended for a specialist audience tacitly to assume much knowledge as shared between author and readers and to cast one's explanatory account accordingly. A reader who came to the present narrative without a detailed knowledge of French political structures, society, and economy in the Restoration period might, by the time he had completed his reading of it, have arrived at a reasonably clear and vivid picture of the events of the revolution of 1830. He might even have an adequate idea of the sort of political and military process which plainly constituted the core of the revolution. But he simply would not have a sufficiently clear and systematic conception of the political, social, and economic structures within which this process took place to be able to offer any determinate explanation of why it was *this* and not some radically different process which *did* occur. This failure to provide any clear framework for his narrative shows up with particular sharpness when Pinkney himself essays a more ambitious level of analysis, particularly, for example, in chapter 9. Here he treats the well-known view that the revolution of 1830 represents the political displacement of the aristocracy by the *haute bourgeoisie* as a hypothesis solely about the social status of legislators and senior public officials. It may be that this hypothesis is badly conceived and it certainly is often none too clearly stated. But if it has any standing at all it is as a hypothesis about the relationship between changes in economic and social structure and changes in political power. Most of Pinkney's discussion fails entirely to address this issue.

Besides this more general analytical disengagement, there are two particular themes over which Pinkney passes with disappointing haste. For the first of these, the part played by the exponents of the French revolutionary tradition in the events of 1830, there are at least sound historiographical reasons for his decision. Revolutionaries do appear to have been less important in 1830 than they were in 1848 or 1871, let alone in revolutions of the twentieth century. But even so the treatment of the part played by republicans in 1830 is both skimpy and dubiously consistent, and it certainly gives a misleading impression of the relation of the revolution of 1830 to the French revolutionary tradition to omit a single mention of figures like Buonarroti and Auguste Blanqui from either text or bibliography. The other virtual omission, a discussion of the very interesting series of recent papers in which Charles Tilly has attempted to relate the process of economic and social modernization in nineteenth-century France to changes in forms of mass political violence is still more regrettable. (See esp: James Rule and Charles Tilly, "1830 and the Unnatural History of Revolution," *Journal of Social Issues*, 28 [1972] 49–76.) Perhaps the most substantial compensation for these omissions is Pinkney's graphic description of how the government lost military control over Paris in the three days of late July 1830, "*Les Trois Glorieuses*," and the ensuing explanation of why the new government contrived so soon to restore an admittedly rather shaky control. These pages bear the mark of an able historian of the city of Paris. They also provide a fair sample of the sort of insight for which political scientists may reasonably look to historians and for which they ought, after professional demarcation disputes are concluded, to be duly grateful.

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Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization. By Christian P. Potholm. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. 193. $8.00.)

Although he has ruled his nation since 1921 probably few students of comparative politics have heard of the ngwenyama of Swaziland, Sobhuza II. Yet anyone who is seriously concerned with the role of traditional authorities in the process of political change should read this slim book to learn about the success of the ngwenyama and his traditionalist supporters in maintaining and expanding their power during the post-1960 decade when "modernity" shifted the contours of politics in one of Africa's smallest states. Christian Potholm, Associate Professor of Government at Bowdoin College, argues convincingly that the Swaziland case offers "an amendment to that portion of developmental theory that stressed the basic incompatibility between 'modern' and 'traditional' political forces and the fragility of traditional authorities in postindependence Africa" (pp. 129–130).

When "modern" politics intruded in the form of (1) a British colonial administration seemingly determined to impose a one-man, one-vote constitutional monarchy oriented toward detribalized Swazis, (2) white settlers and their South African allies across the border eager to secure their privileged position while simultaneously advancing goals of the policy of separate development enunciated by Pretoria, and (3) political parties led by African political figures dedicated to the elimination of the traditional political system, Sobhuza and his supporters reacted by confronting their adversaries within the new political arena rather than retiring defensively within the traditional political institutions. Potholm delineates the successful utilization by the traditionalists of "moddern" devices, including political parties, associational groupings, and mass involvement, to entrench their position in the evolving political system so that at independence in September, 1968, the ngwenyama and a traditionally based political elite responsive to him held hegemony not only over Swazi national institutions but also over the machinery of state bequeathed by the departing British.

In Potholm's view the triumph of the Swazi traditionalists is attributable to a variety of factors. He points to the rejuvenative features of a traditional political system which contains structures and techniques for absorbing new elements and providing avenues of upward mobility within society. He recognizes that the demographic homogeneity of Swaziland prevented Sobhuza's opponents from utilizing ethnic divisions to undermine his position. Of further significance was the distinctive white-dominated southern African context in which Swaziland remained relatively isolated from the winds of change sweeping the continent to the north while at the same time the Swazi traditionalists could play off the conflicting views of the British colonial authorities and the South African government to their own advantage. But Potholm also gives great credit to the factor of political skill—both the abundance of it exhibited by Sobhuza and the lack of it displayed by the leaders of the "modern" political parties who consistently substituted "wishful thinking" for "political realism and organization" (p. 71).

Recent events in Swaziland testify to the continuing timeliness of Potholm's analysis. In a royal coup in April, 1973, Sobhuza assumed full state powers, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties, instituted a 60-day detention law, and abrogated the country's Westminster-style independence constitution. Subsequently he established a constitutional commission to devise political arrangements in keeping with the "Swazi national character." Sobhuza's moves were a response to a series of limited successes by the opposition in the "modern" sector commencing with the first post-independence general election of May, 1972, in which the major opposition party gained its first toehold in parliament (3 out of 24 elected seats). In the ongoing struggle with his "modern" opponents Sobhuza has again shown his determination to thwart any threat to the hegemony of traditionally based institutions. The almost complete lack of opposition to his measures bears witness to Sobhuza's present domination of Swaziland's political life. The ultimate test of Sobhuza's success, as Potholm notes in his concluding chapter, will occur only after Sobhuza's death. In Potholm's estimation the traditionalists will contain challenges from the "modern" sector, including stresses generated in the unevenly and rapidly expanding Swaziland economy.

In closing Potholm places considerable weight upon the convergence of interests between the present Swaziland government and its powerful white-led neighbors. Although he is careful to point out that the Swaziland government opposes *apartheid* and endorses African majority rule in South Africa (e.g., p. 122, 143), Potholm characterizes the Swazi leadership as "committed to the status quo" (p. 143) and unwilling to "challenge the structure of Southern Africa in the foreseeable future" (p. 156). From this perspective Potholm's volume is not only a case study of particular interest to students of comparative politics, but also an analysis significantly suggestive about the patterns of dependence in Africa's most racially troubled region.

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Government and Economic Development. Edited by Gustav Ranis. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. 567. $17.50.)

The volume contains papers prepared by staff members of the Yale Economic Growth Center for a conference organized by the Center on "The Role of Government in Economic Development." This collection is a by-product of the Center's country analysis program that has covered some twenty-five developing countries.

The papers have been classified according to particular governmental activities in the economic sphere in selected countries. These activities include the apparent priorities of the government (Colombia and Malaysia), the operation of the public enterprise sector (Turkey and the former British Africa), the regulating function of the government (Ghana, Chile, Argentina, and Israel), and public finance (Taiwan, Mexico, and Peru). Finally, comparative studies deal with topics such as changes in policy orientation during the postwar period, the effects of currency devaluations in developing countries, and the relationship between public sector saving and capital formation.

The comparative studies offer especial interest to the reader. The Cohen-Ranis paper describes the adverse effects of extreme import substitution policies and the move towards trade liberalization following the realization of the failure of these policies. In turn, Cooper shows that devaluations have been generally successful in developing countries without involving appreciable changes in the terms of trade and that they tended to be accompanied by increased foreign aid and domestic savings. Finally, Lloyd Reynolds reaches the conclusion that developing countries have a higher share of public investment than present-day developed nations and that such investment is sustained by an inflow of foreign aid.

While most of the country papers are limited to the discussion of a particular governmental function, several of them consider policy formation as a whole. Among the latter, Hymer provides an interesting review of policies followed in the colonial and the postcolonial period in Ghana, although he may be excessively harsh on the colonial government and is apparently unwilling to criticize the policies followed by Nkrumah. In turn, Diaz Alejandro correctly notes the deficiencies of both macropolicies and the public sector in Argentina and makes suggestions for future improvements. In view of Israel's excellent growth record, Pack, on the other hand, may overemphasize inefficiencies in resource allocation and in the use of macro policy instruments. Finally, Ho provides a balanced picture of Japanese policy in Taiwan during the interwar period and the Second World War.

These contributions, as well as papers by Land on the public enterprise sector in Turkey and by Frank on that sector in former British Africa, Mamalakis's discussion of the Chilean nitrate sector, and Clark Reynolds's study of public finance in Mexico emphasize the effects of governmental action on economic growth. Finally, Hunt examines the relationship between economic growth and income distribution in Peru, and income distributional considerations also enter into the discussion of governmental objectives by Berry in Colombia and by Snodgrass in Malaysia.

Despite these last three efforts, income distribution plays a secondary role in the volume, reflecting the general tendency in economics at the time the papers were written. It may be interesting therefore to speculate on how the role of the government might be approached today. First, greater attention would need to be paid to the objectives of employment and equitable income distribution and to the trade-off between these objectives and economic growth. Second, one should attempt to derive a preference function, expressing the relative valuation of these objectives. Third, consideration would have to be given to the appraisal of investment projects by the government, involving the use of shadow prices and an explicit preference function.

The last paragraph may be considered an agenda for a future conference on the government's role in the developing countries and should not be taken as a criticism of the volume under review. The authors of the papers have done a workmanlike job, and they deserve our gratitude for having examined various fields of economic action by governments in developing countries.

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The Making of A Model Citizen in Communist China. By Charles Price Ridley, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis J. Doolin. (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 404. $9.95.)

In the early 1960s the People's Publishing House in Shanghai published a set of Chinese language *Readers* for use in the first five grades of elementary school. The set comprised about 1,100 pages in ten volumes, there being two volumes for each grade. Assuming that the texts reflect the basic values which the Chinese Communist leadership wishes to instill in its primary school students, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare some time ago commissioned a research project to "determine the significance of the *Readers* as a means of socialization." The product of that undertaking, this book under review, consists of a content analysis of all the 385 lessons in the ten *Readers* and a full English translation of 155 selected units.

Constituting the second half of the book, the translation is superbly done and apparently provides a comprehensive sample of the complete set of the *Readers*. The analysis takes up seven chapters. The first one contains, among other things, a description of the *Readers* and a general appraisal of their role in political socialization. It is surprising that the authors fail to consider that language texts are not the only elementary school textbooks used to mold young children's value orientation and behaviorial patterns as well as to teach them factual knowledge, although they do point out that elementary education itself is but one part of Chinese children's interaction with the society. This oversight not only makes it virtually impossible to assess the relative importance of the *Readers* as a means of socialization but it may also have led the authors subsequently to engage in elaborate but unrewarding statistical exercises, especially those dealing with the frequency and distribution of informational, political, and behavioral themes by grade level, where differences seem mostly inconsequential. Besides, there is the assertion (p. 6) that Mao's distrust of the intelligentsia is based upon the realization that the core of China's intellectuals were educated in the West. If Mao eschews only Western influence, why has there been a concerted campaign against Confucianism and many other aspects of traditional Chinese culture?

The next chapter purports to examine "the spirit and content of elementary education since 1949," but it completely ignores all the important changes made since the onset of the Cultural Revolution. This omission, unremedied elsewhere in the book, is likely to give a novice reader the impression that all the fundamental values and behavioral patterns extolled in the *Readers* still represent current policy. For example, he cannot learn from this work that, instead of emphasizing "obedience and deference" as recommended behavioral characteristics (as the Peking regime did in the past through the *Readers* and many other media), the Maoist leadership since the Cultural Revolution has been vehemently condemning the policy of "training docile tools."

Chapter III inquires into techniques for "the teaching of reading" for the stated purpose of providing "further evidence that the stories in the *Readers* are used in the classroom for conscious political ends." Since Peking openly insists on the use of education, literature, and even arts for that end, is this piece of evidence really necessary?

Chapter IV lists, by categories, all the themes in the *Readers*, tabulating the frequency of their occurrence, and makes generally appropriate and helpful commentaries on the themes' significance to the attempt by the Chinese leadership to develop the nation's agriculture, industry, culture, and defense, while reforming man and society. Chapter V offers a statistical analysis of the kinds of "topics" or stories used by the *Readers* to project the themes identified in the preceding chapter. The effort, however, is more redundant than illuminating because of the considerable overlapping between "topics" and "themes," as the authors themselves admit (p. 162).

More redundancy afflicts the next chapter, where all the factual knowledge, beliefs, values, and personal characteristics that the *Readers* seek to inculcate are once again listed to yield the profile of the ideal child-citizen which could have been concisely drawn in the concluding chapter. What appears in the latter is a discussion of perceived "conflicting values in the *Readers*." In at least one case, however, the so-called contradiction clearly is the result of the authors' own inconsistency. I refer to the alleged conflict between "themes of achievements" and "themes of collective behavior." This point is raised in complete disregard of their own earlier remark on p. 140 which reads as follows: "It should be pointed out that 'achievement' in the sense used here, in keeping with the social character of the Communist ethic, refers not so much to *personal* achievement as it is related to wider social goals."

In conclusion, this book could have been far better if it had avoided the flaws I have mentioned and if it had included a comparison of the Chinese practice with that of other countries also utilizing school texts in the interest of political integration and social change.

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Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931–1936. By Richard A. H. Robinson. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. Pp. 475. $9.95.)

As in old Randolph Scott movies, so in the mainstream of historical writing about the Spanish Civil War it is always clear who the bad guys are. They wear blue shirts or red berets or khaki uniforms or black cowls. They issue jeremiads about the decadence of modern society, the evils of materialism, and the threat to order and decency posed by communism, socialism, and liberalism. Collectively, they are called the Right, and most non-Spaniards have very little good to say about them. Stanley Payne, of course, is a notable exception to this rule.

Some promising studies are on the horizon. R. Martin Blinkhorn has been working for a decade on what will surely be a first-rate study of the Carlist movement; and Payne has set his sights on the Basques, many of whom were quite conservative on every issue save one, regional autonomy. But most work on the Right to date has been either stridently polemical or seriously flawed.

Unfortunately, the new book by Richard A. H. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, fits into the latter category. Much impressive research has been used to poor effect in this classic example of the "one-damned-thing-after-another" school of historical writing. Robinson amply demonstrates that a large number of different groups with distinctive political views constituted "the Right," but he does not explain why there were so many, how they differed from one another (except in the most hair-splitting, ideological terms), what social and economic factors affected their development, and what their significance is in a larger time frame of Spanish history. For example, differences in political persuasion among groups on the Right are explained in terms of abstruse variations on the themes of Monarchy and Nation, not in terms of the social origins or economic interests represented among the various Rightist political factions. Robinson probably knows as much about the CEDA in particular and the politics of the Right in general as anyone in the world, but this knowledge is not employed to inform reasoned analyses which might clarify a dizzying picture of right-wing fragments coalescing to do successful battle with left-wing fragments. Robinson's bibliography is comprehensive, and his detailed notes are particularly valuable. His prose is pedestrian, and his organization of material is unimaginative.

At one point, however, Robinson's relentlessly chronological approach does serve him well. In the last chapter, which covers the period from December, 1935 to July, 1936, he presents substantial evidence to support his thesis that the military rebellion occurred in reaction to the Republican government's inability to maintain public order. In Robinson's view, the pattern of increasing street violence and social unrest in the months after the Popular Front's election victory in February, 1936, was more cause than effect of the increased militancy and willingness by groups on the Right to countenance armed revolt against the Republic.

But explaining the Rightist coalescence around plans for an armed uprising primarily as a function of the Popular Front Government's inability to keep the streets safe and to stop strikes is telling only half a story. Before 1936, the Left in Spain threatened the prerogatives of the Church and the Army. Rightist political factions bridled at this attack on cherished institutions but did not feel sufficiently injured to come together in support of General Sanjurjo's armed uprising against the Republican regime. Agrarian reform, the only serious threat to the economic power of the Right (and only a small segment of the Right, at that), was emasculated by proper parliamentary methods after the Right's successful venture in electoral politics in the fall of 1933. After February, 1936, however, the Left emerged as a clear and present danger to the most hallowed of institutions, Property. The ascension of Largo Caballero and his newly discovered radicalism within the Socialist Party, the eclipse of Prieto and Azaña, and the increasing independence of trade unions marked a shift in the focus of the Left's attack on the Right. An increasing number of Rightists came to use Spain as a euphemism for Property, thus clothing class interest in the regal garments of selfless patriotism. Members of the CEDA leadership and other erstwhile parliamentary rightists came together in active or tacit support of the military conspiracy and uprising because they had come to perceive the Left as a fundamental threat to their basic class interests. Under Azaña, the Left was a nuisance which could be fought within the existing parliamentary mechanism; under a radicalized Largo Caballero (and his even more militant supporters), the Left seemed to threaten what really counted: Property.

As a detailed chronology of the rise of the Spanish Right during the 1930s, Robinson's *Origins of Franco's Spain* is a useful addition to the bibliography of the Second Republic. But as an analysis of the causes and significance of that rise, the book falls short. The truly important story of the Spanish Right, one comparable to Edward Malefakis's superb analysis of the Spanish Left, remains to be written.

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The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970. By Ronald M. Schneider. (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 431. $13.50.)

In the late 1960s it became evident that democracy and totalitarianism provided inadequate models for both prediction and explanation in analyzing Third World political systems; political authoritarianism has emerged as an alternative. Ronald Schneider's workmanlike volume is one of the most recent efforts to use the authoritarian framework to explain Third World politics, specifically of Brazil since the *coup d'état* of March 31, 1964. When they combine Schneider's book with Thomas E. Skidmore's *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), social scientists with a yen for facts and figures about Brazil should be satiated for some time to come. Unfortunately, the search for the conceptual relevance of political authoritarianism will need to continue beyond Professor Schneider's volume.

Schneider provides an intelligently detailed chronological exposition of the emergence of the post-1964 regime. After chapter 1, which deals with the theoretical issues I discuss below, the author summarizes (chapters 2 & 3) the theme of a second volume in preparation: the historical role of the Armed Forces from the end of the Empire in 1889 to the overthrow of João Goulart in 1964. The first three chapters occupy almost one-third of the book.

The theme of "manipulated democracy" (1964–1967), and the central focus of the book, emerges in chapter 4. The details of the early jockeying for power among civilian and military leaders are carefully documented, and the author traces carefully the appearance of a "tutelary" regime. Divisions within the regime, austerity, and accentuated dissension emerge in Schneider's analysis of the post-1964 system. Chapter 5 discusses the Castelo Branco "dictatorship" and the period following the crucial elections of October 1965. The failure of "humanization" during the ill-fated government of General Costa e Silva from 1967 to 1969 (chapter 6) and "the descent into dictatorship" (chapter 7) follow.

Chapters 8 and 9 consider the sixth year of the Revolution, the first of President Emilio Garrastazú Medici, in terms of "disunity, succession, and the quest for viability" (p. 297). Chapter 9 treats in particular the issue of the institutionalization of a "new authoritarian order" (p. 330). Schneider interprets the state of the Revolution, in late 1970, as one in which "deeper cleavages appear to be developing within the officer corps on both questions of fundamental policy and who should occupy the seats of power and prestige" (p. 361). He tells us that General Medici's "prospects for serving out his full presidential term would seem to be no better than the average for the Brazilian Republic—less than a fifty-fifty proposition" (pp. 361–62).

As of this writing, Brazil has peacefully selected a new military president to succeed Medici without crisis or breakdown. Normalcy, within the framework of the authoritarian regime that has become rapidly institutionalized since 1964, is the order of the day. Deep divisions within the Armed Forces have not emerged; there appears to be little visible social and political discontent as the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime enters its second decade. It is fair to ask then, why were Professor Schneider's predictions excessively pessimistic? To answer that question we must turn to the theoretical assumptions of his book.

Utilizing a framework that emphasizes the imbalance between levels of institutionalization and social and economic change before 1964 in Brazil, Schneider states that the regime crisis in March 1964 resulted in "the replacement of a populist, albeit reconciliationist, regime by the military's first experience with direct exercise of governmental authority and political power since the 1889–1894 period" (p. xi). From the demise of the reconciliationist regime (which was at least superficially "semi-pluralist" by 1964), Schneider proceeds to catalog the emergence of an authoritarian regime that he equates with dictatorship, repression and depoliticization. Employing an authoritarian framework ostensibly, the author insists on comparing Brazil's authoritarian system with a democratic model. The volume is replete with references to the failure of the kinds of institutions and processes endemic in *democratic* regimes.

If Schneider had employed criteria other than democratic ones, he might well have evaluated regime performance differently and, in so doing, enhanced our conceptual knowledge of political authoritarianism as well as of Brazilian political history. There is sufficient evidence in the research of Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell, and others that there is indeed something distinctively different about authoritarian regimes. Such regimes are neither democratic nor totalitarian nor aberrations of either. By utilizing criteria represented by concepts such as corporatism, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, or patrimonialism, Schneider would have been able to analyze the dynamics of the regime and deal with questions such as why and how Brazil has been able to do what it has done, i.e., foster successfully its twin doctrines of national security and economic developmentalism. A record of "success" emerges if democratic criteria are held in abeyance and those of political authoritarianism are utilized: the regime had dealt successfully with three presidential successions; the economy flourishes; there is little discernible social discontent or political rebellion; and the armed forces appear as united as any such heterogeneous organization can be in a developing society. Employing the authoritarian framework rigorously, Schneider also could have dealt with the devastating criticisms of the regime that focus on social inequality, income distribution, repression, torture, regional imbalance and a host of other issues that can and should be examined in the context of the operating rules of the political system created post-1964.

It is of little relevance to state that the "modernization of Brazil under the aegis of the Brazilian armed forces might have become a possibility if military leadership came to accept the need for political institutions which are capable of integrating emerging groups, effectively articulating and aggregating interests (and thus mediating group conflict while building consensus), and fostering a sense of community" (p. 329). The military-civilian leadership of Brazil's authoritarian regime has determined that it is precisely the absence of these institutions and processes associated with democracy that facilitates their claim to and use of power. It also provides a sense of legitimacy based on economic performance and social "peace" that appeals to the middle and upper strata and it permits the development of Brazil on the regime's terms. The regime can best be dealt with as an example of an authoritarian order that has survived for a decade without serious challenge, having avoided critical social questions, emphasized economic growth at the expense of societal modernization, and created a new standard of state authority and centralized political control.

The criticism of the theoretical framework of the volume should not detract from its richness as a documented history of the Brazilian regime from 1964 to 1970. From this perspective, it is an invaluable reference work and an important contribution to our knowledge of contemporary Brazil.

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Collective Violence. Edited by J. F. Short, Jr., and M. E. Wolfgang. (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1972. Pp. viii, 387. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

We are nowadays offered so many grab-bag readers about everything and anything, that we are stirred when we come upon one which claims conceptual unity and editorial orchestration toward theory, or at least the advancement of research. The claim is not always substantiated by the offering. Such books should be submitted to the test of whether their component articles taken together yield a sequential narrative or analytic tendency coherent enough to engage the reader in a disciplined activity. This book fails that test.

Not to derogate the quality of individual contributions, whose usefulness the specialist reader will recognize, I conclude that when placed together under the loose rubric of violence and governed by a chatty editorial without focus, the papers yield no intelligible challenge to the reader. One simply does not know what to do with the book. In bringing together a set of papers previously published by the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science with those prepared for a symposium of the American Anthropological Association, and topping these up with several others prepared for different purposes but now published for the first time, the editors do not succeed in providing, as they claim, "one of the most comprehensive comparative examinations of the topic ever published," but they do offer, as they also claim, "a comprehensive and updated compendium." The dual claim in which a compendium is equated with a comparative examination reveals the perennial confusion that arrests the progress of comparative analysis.

In the following summary I have condensed the thesis of each chapter into a sentence, arranged in the sequence of the book, to give a picture of what is offered. I have tried fairly to represent the book, and to avoid parody. I have not been able to discover any sense in which it may be regarded as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

Superordinate-subordinate relationships based on social categories are, we are told by A. D. Grimshaw, inherently unstable, and social violence is very likely to occur when accommodative structures lose their viability. Gary T. Marx points out that failure to make distinctions among riots in terms of their relation to ideology, social movements, and social change, produces confusion about the meaning and significance of riots. Currie and Skolnick aver that conventional "crowd theory" mistakenly assumes that collective behavior is irrational and necessarily based on distorted beliefs, while in fact it should be seen as an outgrowth of social, economic, and political conditions. In rebuttal, Neil J. Smelser questions the methodological validity and sophistication of his critics. H. L. Nieburg then suggests that much political behavior is ritualized as a "low-risk energy-conserving method of experimentation," and ritual rebellion contains a self-limiting tendency since it is impossible to sustain the level of excitement. While much attention has been devoted to the manner in which people may learn violent actions through the media, it would be more useful, says Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, to investigate how evaluative reactions to violence are learned, that is, the manner in which the media influence the legitimation of violence. R. A. Berk points out that it is more difficult to gather data about episodes of collective behavior as they occur than about the conditions preceding crowd behavior.

The patterns of international warfare over the last century and a half, say Small and Singer, provide sufficient data for an assault [*sic*] on the causes of the war problem. T. R. Gurr offers the view that internal strife in "the West" could be predicted on the basis of factors relating to the scope and intensity of collective discontent, combined with the strength of normative justifications for rebellion and the coercive balance between contending groups; when these latter are held constant, non-violent strife increases when relative deprivation is diminished, while violence is more likely to occur when objective measures of relative deprivation show an increase. L. R. Schwartz concludes that in Mexico, where the legitimacy of the social system is solidly supported, and where high levels of violence and social conflict coexist but are not coextensive, strong social mechanisms operate to prevent violence between subordinate/superordinate groups. R. B. Edgerton finds that among tribal societies in East Africa which lack authoritative institutions capable of ordering force in maintaining social order, forms of collective violence evolve as mechanisms for maintaining social order. Similarly, L. L. Langness suggests that in New Guinea, violent self-help is prescribed as a method of social control, in the absence of authoritative institutions. In Burma, claims M. E. Spiro, when the British suppressed traditional forms of institutionalized aggressive behavior, increased insurgency and political violence ensued, attributable to a "restructuring of the traditional hierarchical order of the response repertoire for agression" (p. 191). (Is this perhaps synonymous with the observation that its victims violently resented British rule?) A study of five "exotic" societies together with that of New England by J. W. M. Whiting reveals that societies that induce a high level of sex-anxiety and inhibition are likely to permit and even ritually to require the sadistic treatment of prisoners of war.

H. D. Graham contends that so far as the United States is concerned, dissidents are likely to focus increasingly on political targets, thereby undermining the legitimacy of political institutions and increasing the likelihood of further violence. Sheldon Levy follows with the view that persons who feel unrewarded by the political system tend toward psychological rigidity and identification with authority as a means of reducing anxiety. R. B. Smith finds that Vietnam "doves" are more liberal on domestic issues than "hawks," and less favorable to repressive action by authorities. John P. Spiegel considers that campus unrest can best be understood in terms of value conflicts, and could be ameliorated by changes in university values in the areas of authority relationships, the time-dimension of decision making, and in the relation of man to nature and to activity:

> With respect to the man/nature dimension, Spiegel proposes greater emphasis on harmony with nature, supplanting mastery over nature as the dominant value and moving subjugation to [*sic*] nature to the lowest priority. He points out that the proposed change is consistent with the new awareness of environmental pollution and emphasis on the quality of life (Eds., p. 17).

R. B. Smith suggests that the macrosociology of violence, in terms of belief systems and the social systems surrounding the university, does not exhaustively explain the violent events, but should be supplemented by a microsociology of the cumulative effects of the events themselves, as they unfold. W. B. Morgan notes that youthful dissent, which has replaced labor antagonisms as a major source of political violence, shares with its predecessor a tendency to press toward formalized influence procedures, where these are lacking. As to ghetto violence, Rossi and Berk find that grievances about merchant practices and police conduct have objective bases in experience, which, although manifest locally, can be studied macrosociologically by viewing the local community as a social system. Berk, in a case-study of a tense situation in which violence did not occur, shows that it was avoided by the failure of protest leaders to alter the payoff expectations of followers. Gamson and McEvoy find that privileged groups tend to support police violence, while G. E. Misner's study suggests that although police response is often a contributing factor to the escalation of violence, the police can have only a marginal impact on the problems underlying collective violence.

The book concludes with two short explorations of possible alternatives to violence by A. P. Hare and J. S. Campbell, in which optimism is expressed about the contribution that might be made by further close investigation of the problems by social scientists and public commissions.

The book offers the reader a welter of stimulating ideas and hypotheses, among which he may well find something new and usable to suit his own interest. As a collective enterprise, however, it resembles a crowd rather than a group.

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When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization. By Milton Singer. Foreword by M. N. Srinivas. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 430. $15.00.)

Milton Singer reports in this book the results of seventeen years study of India. He first undertook this activity in the early 1950s as an associate of the late Robert Redfield in a project to describe and compare the great and enduring cultural traditions of mankind. Readers will find generous interpretations and precise detail in these discussions of modern Indian society and the social change within it, elaborated both with theoretical and empirical evidence. Meticulous readers will discover that this also is a record of intellectual debt to many in India and elsewhere who, over the years, have contributed to a better understanding of the text and context of Indian civilization. Finally, one notes that the remarkably able group of Indianists at Chicago, much of whose research also is cited in this book at appropriate places, was itself a creation of Milton Singer during the same period of research. Robert Redfield, we can be certain, would be most pleased with the results of his colleague's India venture.

Singer's book, however, will not appeal to most political scientists. Indeed, the chapters on the "Social Organization of Sanskritic Hinduism," on "*Bhakti* in the City," and on the "Rādhā-Krishna *Bhajanas*," while enormously well written and useful to specialists, will appear to others to be remote. These chapters, however, linked with others, form a logical sequence that comes to grips with major theoretical problems relating to social and cultural change in modern India. Singer chose to understand the social organization of Hinduism by a close observation, over time, of its working out in Madras City. In doing this job properly as an experienced anthropologist, he observed, sometimes participated, asked questions, sought interpretations, and then carefully recorded his findings before going on to the next procedure. The book, in this sense, is a formal record of field notes and interpretations laid out roughly in the chronological order of their development. Some parts have been published before. Some segments also contain preliminary remarks that are repeated in more than one place. Familiar references now and then are rather comforting, however, in an analysis as complex as this, and no harm is done by the repetition.

In my view the capstone comes in Chapter 8, "Industrial Leadership, the Hindu Ethic, and the Spirit of Socialism," a study of the behavior of leading industrialists in Madras City, in which Singer demonstrates convincingly, and contrary to Max Weber, that Hinduism does not impede modernization. Singer's conclusion is based on his observation of the individual and family adaptive strategies used by the Madras industrialists in solving situations of potential conflict between ritual duty and business acumen. Resolutions of conflict appeared to be made relatively easily, if necessary by compartmentalizing one part of life (ritual) from the other (business). It may be that Singer's theory has less a ring of the general to it than Weber's "law of ritual," but it has the still greater advantage of being plausible.

This is a book about India, but it is more a book about Madras. And in Madras, it is more about Smārta Brahmans than any other group. Fortunately, Milton Singer had many able advisers in Madras to help him sort out the complexities of ritual life in that great city. None was more important than Professor V. Raghavan, a humane and learned man whose knowledge of Madras and of Smārta Brahmanical lore is unexcelled. It is typical of Singer's work that Professor Raghavan's contribution is thoroughly attested, as is the influence of M. N. Srinivas on anthropological issues of an all-India character.

Milton Singer concludes in this work on India that there is no necessary schism between tradition and modernity. Change takes place, led by individuals and families, and this change, in turn, may have its impact on organized religious and social life. The legitimization of tradition seeks then to strike a balance in the changing scene. Even the very new prefers the patina of a heritage, if it can be managed.

The trouble is that this natural process of social and cultural change may prove to be inadequate to harness the strain of the new political and economic demands for change being placed on this old society at the end of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the pace of change is not discussed in this work. Nor are the objectives of change highlighted. To the most radical in India, a growing number, most or all of what Singer writes about is absolute mumbo-jumbo: a record of what should be scrapped, not revered. This is, of course, a minority view; more a cry of outrage than careful social science. Singer and others have demonstrated the linkage in India of tradition and modernization. Unfortunately, that does not help the human situation very much. It does force one to find other reasons to explain why nothing much happens quite the way it should in India

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Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development: An International Comparison. By Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 112. $3.75, paper.)

The question of the relative size of military research and development (R & D) programs in the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations has bedeviled defense planners and students of military affairs for many years. The field is plagued by data insufficiency, by analyses governed more by political objectives than by the canons of scientific investigation, and by conceptual difficulties concerning the meaning of fiscal comparisons among sharply differing economic and political systems. In 1971, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute undertook a comprehensive study of military R & D with a view toward clarifying some of these ambiguities and estimating total worldwide expenditures on military R & D. Their analysis, within the degree permitted by shortcomings in available data, is admirable. And this volume, which reports their findings and presents the supporting data, should be valuable to students of military affairs, arms control, and comparative politics.

Two kinds of data are examined. The main analysis focuses on published data regarding national R & D expenditures. Such data are available for about twenty nations—the United States, Canada, most of the states in Western Europe, plus Japan, India, and Australia. Unfortunately, this analysis, which would have provided the most satisfactory basis for the desired estimates, could not be extended to the Soviet Union, China, or their allies, because none of these states make public such detailed information on their military programs.

Analysis of expenditure data is supplemented by a survey of the number and kinds of weapon development programs under way in various nations. But this analysis too, which is based primarily on material appearing in standard, publicly available sources—such as *Jane's Yearbooks* and *The Military Balance*—also suffers from data deficiencies caused by the secrecy imposed on such matters in many states. *Jane's Fighting Ships*, for example, can report only those Soviet warships which have been developed to the point that they are readily visible to foreign intelligence systems, but plans for U.S. warships are discussed publicly long before the vessels themselves are constructed, and are reported as such in *Jane's*. Consequently, there is likely to be a bias in the weapon-system data leading to lower estimates of the size of Soviet R & D programs.

The authors are well aware of the difficulties involved in estimating Soviet R & D expenditures and treat the subject gingerly. In fact, a separate appendix is included on just this topic. And SIPRI's own estimate of Soviet R & D expenditures in the 1960s—three-fifths to two-thirds those of the United States—does not appear unreasonable to me.

The one weakness apparent in the report, aside from those traceable to insufficient data, is a somewhat excessive zeal to further the cause of reduced military spending. This bias leads the authors, for example, to ignore the possibility that some R & D programs may lead to less dangerous weapons (such as the slower reaction times made possible by modern ICBMs as compared to the first-generation liquid-fueled monstrosities). It also causes them to downplay the significance of the leveling off of investment in military R & D evident during the past several years.

On the whole, though, the SIPRI report is factual and even-handed. And in providing a comprehensive, empirically-based, and objective analysis of this highly political subject, the Institute has performed a valuable service.

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The Rope of Moka: Big-Men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen, New Guinea. By Andrew Strathern. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. 254. $17.50.)

Papua New Guinea has been a gold-mine for anthropological studies for some time now. *The Rope of Moka*, another anthropological undertaking cast in the context of the New Guinea Highlands, shows, however, that political scientists can find as much value in the study of preliterate societies as anthropologists can. The book examines the process by which "big-men" emerge in small segmentary societies and points to the role they play in intergroup diplomacy specifically in instigating, mediating, and settling disputes.

The New Guinea Highlands, until recently opened up to external western influence, has been one of the few areas in the world with societies still solidly caught up in stone-age technology. No tribal empires or lofty pyramidal authority structures exist here. The tribes are numerous and speak in most cases mutually unintelligible languages. The typical clan in which an individual defines most of his life contains 70 to 3,000 persons. No formal governmental structures with established offices or inherited echelons exist. The units are economically self-sufficient, and until the arrival of the *kiap* (the Australian patrol officer), clan communities were engaged in constant endemic warfare with at least some of their neighbors.

For the student of comparative politics steeped in the study of political processes that are associated with easily identifiable structures in more differentiated and complex societies, the absence of formal political bodies in New Guinea could be bewildering. The "big-man," one of the few visible political figures in these societies, is a person who does not himself hold a monopoly on collective community decision making, has no direct physical coercive method to implement his will, and is generally one of several "big-men" in the clan; above all, he may not remain a big man all his life, and even if he does so, usually he cannot bequeath his influence to his sons. These societies are veritable meritocracies in which influence and a following are derived from performance in accumulating and distributing wealth in the form of pigs, pearl shells, and, nowadays, Australian money.

The significance of Professor Strathern's book lies in its systematic analysis of how power and influence are acquired and lost in these segmentary societies. *Moka* ceremonies are the forum in which participants derive or lose prestige. "Moka" in a gift exchange ceremony is the excess that one partner gives over another. The *moka* gift is the stuff of political influence since it is regarded not as a disinterested presentation but a form of obligation. In a typical *moka* transaction, the person who gives the bigger gift is regarded as superior. A big-man is a skilled giver who wins prestige by manipulating networks of partnership exchange relationships within and across clan lines.

Strathern argues that while big-men win influence in clan affairs through *moka*-making, certain latent social functions are performed simultaneously by these ceremonies. Given that each neighboring clan is a potential enemy, *moka* exchanges initiated by big-men and extending across clan boundaries serve to establish and stabilize peaceful linkages between groups. *Moka* transactions promote social and regional integration, therefore, and big-men act as "international" diplomats who manage these relations. Further, the author contends that given the termination of warfare in the Highlands, *moka* transactions with their superiority-inferiority implications serve as surrogates in which warfare is carried out by other means: *moka* gifts "are a true functional alternative to warfare" (p. 128).

The *Rope of Moka* is a skilful description of how "leaders" are acquired in New Guinea's segmentary societies. For the political scientist unaccustomed to the language tools of the anthropologist, the book periodically becomes tedious, but this is partly overcome by the author's lucid style. The work could serve as a supplement for introductory students of political science as well as for comparativists to show how influence and power are acquired and exercised and how collective decision making is facilitated in polities which are diffused, informal, and sporadic.

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The French Pacific Islands: French Polynesia and New Caledonia. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 547. $16.75.)

Serious work in English on the French Pacific territories can be counted on the fingers of one hand, so Thompson's and Adloff's volume is a welcome addition to a small shelf of books. Welcome not only because it fills a gap but also because it is a careful compendium of information on the French territories which digests the only slightly more extensive French literature as well as English, and adds to them the results of the authors' own work on the recent politics of the two island groups.

French Polynesia and New Caledonia as territories have little in common with each other except common French control. That, of course, is a great deal. Because of the French policy of "assimilation," in the more limited sense of assimilating the political and administrative organization of both territories to that of metropolitan France, Tahiti and the scattered small islands of French Polynesia, and the continental island of Melanesian New Caledonia, have almost identical institutions of government: a local assembly with limited powers which can advise and sometimes in local matters decide, but not ultimately control, the French governor who is analogous to the prefect of a *département* of metropolitan France. But such a similar structure of government in French Polynesia and New Caledonia works not in a vacuum but in local circumstances which are quite different. In French Polynesia, as a result of missionary activity and French education, of intermarriage and interbreeding of legendary fame, a society dependent on primary produce and tourism, plus the incidental benefits of the establishment for the French nuclear testing programme, behaves in ways not very dissimilar from the remoter, non-Parisian areas of France itself. In New Caledonia, the administration and urban work force of the nickel mining industry, and a country population which has not experienced the inter-breeding of Polynesia, exhibit much more obvious cleavages in society, of wealth, life style and color. The real interest of this book is the careful documentation of the way in which these differences work themselves out in party politics.

On the surface, the authors' description of the formation, the splitting, the re-combination of parties and factions in the local Assemblies looks very much like the political life of France during the Fourth Republic, which continued, in these territories where de Gaulle was a distant Glory and his party only one faction, under the Fifth. But only on the surface. As I showed in 1961, *Political Advancement in the South Pacific*, (Oxford Univ. Press) the French electoral process in Tahiti, with such a charismatic figure as the majority party leader Pouvanaa a Oopa, might rather be explained as a cargo-cult than a modern political system. The authors extend this view to the workings of political parties, especially with the career of Lenormand, in New Caledonia where the countryside, beyond the one major urban and industrial settlement of Noumea, has much more in common, at election time, with the millenarian movements of Melanesia than Polynesia ever had.

This local analysis is the strength of the book, the more valuable because of the authors' previous experience with other colonial areas. As a case study of what has happened in these two French Pacific territories to the date of publication, it has no rival. As a case study, too, it contains few inaccuracies of detail in its summaries of geographical, historical, and contemporary descriptions. Such reservations as I have are not on the local content of the book but on the consequences of this otherwise admirable concentration upon the island territories themselves.

Europeans writing on colonial and former colonial areas, currently hold that the "wave of the future" is to emphasize the local (in this case the Oceanic) setting, the Oceanic reaction to what colonial powers have done. It is as surprising in the Pacific as it is in Africa to find that this emphasis on the local, as distinct from the metropolitan aspect, is peculiar to Anglo-Saxon historians. Of course the local setting—geographically and culturally—is important in any description of what happens, but so is the metropolitan setting, especially when the colonial power is France. It is quite as necessary to understand why French governments, French politicians and administrators, and individual French men and women behave as they do, if one is to explain their contact with Polynesians or Melanesians, as it is to explain the islanders' reaction. Both are part of the colonial and neocolonial situation. Indeed, given the concept of "France Overseas" it is particularly important to understand metropolitan attitudes and values. This is a dimension not exactly missing but certainly given much less importance than it deserves in this book. We may all agree that an Olympian view of colonial rule is misleading, but the proper alternative is not a "worm's eye view."

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German Resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle. By Ger van Roon. Translated by Peter Ludlow. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. Pp. 400. $12.00.)

The Kreisau Circle was a loosely constituted group of anti-Nazi Germans. Many *Kreisauer* were aristocrats; most were under 45 and held middle-level positions in the military or civilian bureaucracy. The name of the circle was derived from the Silesian estate of Count Helmuth James von Moltke where many of its gatherings were held.

Roon's book is a translation of a revised, abridged version of his *Neuordnung im Widerstand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1967). Most of the footnotes are deleted, as are entire chapters. None of the circle's memoranda on economic matters is included in a long appendix containing documents.

Roon seeks to demonstrate the diversity of the circle's membership and contacts, ranging from Social Democrats to Jesuits and Protestant clergymen. He insists upon the innovativeness of its political ideas, the intensely Christian character of many of these ideas, the circle's pro-Western attitudes, and the differences that set off its members from the mostly older and more conservative anti-Hitler conspirators associated with Carl Goerdeler. Although some *Kreisauer* participated in the plot to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944, Roon believes that Moltke, who had been jailed some months earlier, remained steadfastly opposed to assassination, a practice he thought as bad as those of the hated Hitler regime.

In an introductory chapter unfortunately omitted from the English-language version Roon seeks to dissociate his work from the moralizing tradition of dealing with resistance movements in Germany, but he is still caught up in this tradition in more ways than he may be aware. Although also written in the same tradition, the moving biography of Moltke by two of his British friends, Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby, *Helmuth von Moltke: A Leader against Hitler* (London: Macmillan, 1972), is superior because its authors indicate more cognizance of their own preconceptions. Yet neither this biography nor the English-language version of Roon's work will foster much awareness among their readers of the issues involved in the controversies of the past four decades over German resistance.

A few examples may help to set Roon's approach in perspective. He fails to acknowledge—as a conservative survivor of the circle complains (O. H. von der Gablentz in the *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, IX [1968], 592–600)—that most of the basic ideas of the *Kreisauer* had been developed by certain segments of the Right during the Weimar Republic. Indeed, anyone familiar with neoconservatism in pre-Nazi Germany will find little new in the programmatic statements drawn up by the circle. (See Walter Struve, *Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973].)

Other possible historical continuities are also slighted by Roon. He finds only an unbridgeable gulf between the policies of Nazi Germany and the circle's plans for a federated Europe in which Germany would play a major role. The effective presentation of his own case requires more careful consideration of the relationship of these plans to the assumptions and objectives of other middle- and upper-class Germans, both before and during the Nazi era.

He does not confront the class character of the *Kreisauer* plans for post-Nazi Germany. Roon alludes to the wishes of the circle to avoid class struggle, but he fails to relate this desire to the repeated attempts by Moltke and others to obtain agreement that there would be no nationwide trade-union organization in the new Germany—a demand rejected by some of the trade unionists in the circle. Using the term "socialist" freely and describing Social Democracy during the Weimar Republic as "Marxist," Roon glosses over the significance of the absence of Marxists in the circle. If he had paid more attention to the rapidly growing body of literature on working-class resistance, he might have been able to explain better why anti-Nazi workers and bourgeois seldom cooperated. Works such as Kurt Klotzbach's *Gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Widerstand und Verfolgung in Dortmund 1930–1945* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1969) suggest continuities overlooked by Roon in the social and political struggles under the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.

Still another issue has played too great a role in postwar historiography to be left unmentioned in this review. Although some Soviet and East German scholars have gone out of their way to emphasize pro-Soviet aspects of the *Kreisauer* (see, for example, Daniil Melnikow, *20. Juli 1944: Legende und Wirklichkeit*, trans. Friedrich Rehak [3rd ed., Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften 1971]), Roon tends to ignore most such evidence.

Despite its limitations the German edition of Roon's work made an important contribution to the ongoing study of resistance movements. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the English-language version.

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Rébellions au Congo. By Benoit Verhaegen. (Brussels: Centre de Recherches et d'Information Socio-Politiques [CRISP], 1966. Volume I: Pp. 568; Volume II: Pp. 830. No price indicated.)

Ten years have passed since tattered bands of rebel Simbas brought to the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire) the promise of a "second independence" and nearly destroyed the fragile edifice constructed in the aftermath of the first: like hot lava pouring from a volcano, violence engulfed entire provinces; in less than six months more than half of the Zairian territory had fallen under rebel control; hundreds of thousands were killed by the insurgents, perhaps as many by the National Congolese Army (ANC). Only recently, however, have we come to appreciate the full impact of these events. Now that the seeds of the Congo rebellion have germinated in other territories (as in Burundi in 1972), producing further upheavals and violence by "artificial insemination," as it were, Professor Verhaegen's massive study seems all the more essential for anyone interested in the recent history of ex-Belgian Africa.

The volumes under review provide the most elaborate account in print of the genesis, unfolding, and ultimate collapse of the 1964 Congo rebellion, or indeed of any comparable phenomenon in independent Africa. One would look in vain for a similarly detailed analysis of the Biafran civil war, of the Southern Sudan rebellion, or the Rwanda revolution. The nearest equivalent for Biafra is Anthony Kirk-Greene's *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source-book* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971, 2 vols.), which, however valuable, never reaches the broad sweep, meticulousness and clinical accuracy of the Verhaegen study. *Rébellions au Congo* is more than a richly documented, carefully researched case-study; it is a landmark in the literature on postindependence politics in Zaire, because of the imaginativeness with which the author collects, sifts, and utilizes his data, because of the extensive evidence he has to offer, and because of what all this tells us about the dynamics of revolutionary change in postindependence Africa.

Some of the themes explored by Verhaegen have already been treated in two excellent articles by Crawford Young ("Rebellion and the Congo," in Robert I. Rotberg, *Rebellion in Black Africa* [London: Oxford University Press, 1971], pp. 209–245) and Renée Fox, Willy De Craemer and Jean-Marie de Ribeaucourt ("The Second Independence: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VIII [1965], 93–118). Many of the hypotheses advanced in these and other articles—that the rebellion owed its initial successes more to the receptivity of the milieu in which it grew than to the solidity of its organizational apparatus; that rebel tactics relied very heavily on the use of magic and hemp; that much of the momentum behind the rebellion came from the ability of the rural cadres to capitalize upon local issues; and that its ultimate collapse had at least as much to do with military defeat on the terrain as with internal dissensions within the rebel leadership—are once again confirmed by Verhaegen. In support of these hypotheses, however, the author brings a mine of additional factual information, and in so doing suggests new interpretations and insights.

Each volume bears witness to the author's privileged access to a wide range of confidential documents, most of them drawn from rebel archives. Volume I focusses on the Kwilu, South Kivu and North Katanga rebellions; volume II deals with the Maniema rebellion: each is a model of painstaking research, providing the reader with unusual insights into many critical aspects of rebel behavior and organization. Volume II, for example, devotes no less than 50 pages to a discussion of the "Forms and Functions of Magic" (in which we learn about the variable degrees of immunity obtained through different categories of *dawa*, or magic, how much each type of amulet sold for, what the ritual of immunization consisted of, who the witch-doctors were, etc.). With the same meticulousness, the author analyzes the organization and structure of the rebel government in the Maniema, dissects the internal rifts within the rebel leadership and brings us in contact with the issues and personalities involved.

Verhaegen shows an uncanny gift for bringing to life the key personalities that made up the rebel leadership: Soumialot, the central figure in the eastern rebellion, is depicted not as an anonymous, faceless sycophant, but as a man who, shortly after the capture of Stanleyville (now Kisangani), enjoins his *chef de cabinet* to enquire about the 19 goats he had left behind in Kindu, and takes pride in notifying in his cables that he is supporting his mistress out of his own pocket, even though her promotion to the rank of *attachée de protocole* might have entitled her to a salary. His innumerable tiffs with Martin Kasongo, Minister of Press and Information, tell us as much about Soumialot's methods as it does about Kasongo's shifty and erratic behavior. Victor Tshombaz, Colonel in charge of military operations in the eastern region, emerges in a particularly sinister light; Ramazani, on the other hand, as *commissaire extraordinaire* in "liberated areas," strikes us as just the kind of a person some of us would like to have as departmental chairman—warm, fair, and intelligent. As the story goes on, the rebellion takes on the quality of an intensely captivating—sometimes nauseating—human drama. If this is what Verhaegen means by "*histoire immédiate*," it is history at its best.

Better than anyone else so far Verhaegen shows the complexity of the linkages between the local *focos* and the rebel movement. The incorporation of dissident local factions into the fold of the rebellion, its relationship to local and provincial arenas, its ethnic underpinnings and social bases are discussed in considerable detail. What all this adds up to is not one but several rebellions, each drawing strength from specific factors and circumstances, yet ultimately coalescing into a broad framework of revolutionary aspirations. Equally revealing are the chapters dealing with the organization of power in "liberated areas"; the impression one gains is that of an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus that never really gets off the ground, of a machinery permanently stalled by ethnic and personal rivalries and rampant corruption.

Seizing power is one thing; enlarging and institutionalizing revolutionary power is a very different matter. This is what the Congo rebels were never able to achieve; this is also where they shared disabilities very similar to those faced by the legitimate authorities. Ethnic favoritism, rampant corruption, overall inefficiency, and brutality characterized both the rebel and legitimate governments. The latter, however, enjoyed superior military power, thanks in part to the military backing of European and South African mercenaries, and that is what made the difference. In terms of sheer brutality one wonders indeed whether the ANC fared any better than the rebels. Unfortunately, the reader is told very little about the excesses of the ANC soldiery. Though it is a critical feature of the "crisis situation" described by the author, and therefore a legitimate area of investigation for any devotee of *l'histoire immédiate*, the impact of counter-revolutionary violence is nowhere adequately discussed. The "bad guys" are always the same in Verhaegen's story.

If for no other reason one is impelled to wonder whether the author's lengthy disquisition on the merits of *l'histoire immédiate* (appearing, oddly enough, at the beginning of volume II) is fully justified by his discussion. For if this new genre "always takes as its point of departure a crisis situation" (p. xxi), why not carry the story to its ultimate dénouement and look at the ANC repression with the same unprejudiced mind? Furthermore, if the aims of *histoire immédiate* are to deal with crisis situations in a variable time perspective, and on the basis of oral data, how different is this approach from that of behaviorally oriented political scientists? Is the label merely another term for what in this country is known as political science and in much of Europe still as constitutional history? Or is it a new kind of history? Merely to raise these questions is enough to cast doubts on the value of Verhaegen's theoretical effort; that they are being raised at the beginning of the second volume makes much of this effort sound like an afterthought, and at times like an apology for not having observed all the canons of *histoire immédiate* in the previous volume.

Once stripped of its pretentious theoretical wrapping, Verhaegen's study stands as a monumental contribution to our understanding of the 1964 rebellion. It is indispensable reading for anyone seeking to comprehend the genesis of Mobutu's Zaire, and indeed for anyone interested in comparative political violence. At a time when investigations of domestic strife are becoming increasingly fashionable among political scientists, Verhaegen's contribution can no longer be ignored. One hopes that each volume will soon be made available to American and English readers.

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Politics and the Power Structure: A Rural Community in the Dominican Republic. By Malcolm T. Walker. (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1972. Pp. 177. $9.00.)

This book is a case study of community life in Constanza, a municipality located in the mountainous central region of the Dominican Republic. It is based on the author's field research while living in the subject community with his family in 1967 and 1968, gathering material for his doctoral dissertation in Anthropology at Columbia University. This book is the result of a reworking of that material.

A need unquestionably exists for the study of local politics in Latin America, one of the major gaps in our understanding of this region. The paucity of case studies on this governmental level, not to mention the absence of full-scale comparative analysis, prompts an examination of Malcolm

T. Walker's modest discussion of a single municipality in the Dominican Republic. The general subject under investigation is an important one and the specific setting is well-chosen—as Lambros Comitas says in his Editor's Note, "the Dominican Republic is an anthropological *terra incognita*." But all in all Walker's book is a limited contribution. As I shall try to make clear, the work has shortcomings as an exercise in political analysis, not as an examination of Constanza culture.

Organization of the study is straightforward, logically arranged on a topical basis. After a brief introduction, a chapter sets the stage with a general description of Constanza and its environs. Other chapters assess the community's history, economic life, social patterns, and politics. Topics such as family and interpersonal relations and formal associations are examined. The book ends with a set of much too succinct conclusions (two pages). Maps and a number of "real life" photographs add to the interest of the study. A very brief bibliography (28 entries) is appended; there is no index.

On the one hand this work is stimulating as a professional anthropologist's first-hand observations of the cultural and social dynamics of a largely unknown corner of the world. The volume, well written, serious, broad in its topical concerns and containing a number of valuable insights, reveals the author as both an objective and sensitive scholar. But the title is misleading, for politics and the power structure are treated only briefly in the overall analysis. Only the last two chapters deal directly with politics, comprising a scant 41 pages out of a total 173 pages of text.

One of these chapters is on the power structure and patronage, assessing the process by which community elites maintain their favored positions and control local politics. The major theme is the competition for scarce party-directed patronage rewards. Walker found, not surprisingly, that friendships and party allegiance far outweighed job qualifications in securing appointments. The various forms of political coercion used to maintain and perpetuate the status quo are also described. The other chapter is a fascinating examination of the events and crises surrounding the campaign and municipal elections of May 1968, exemplifying political conflict in the community and its resolution. While these two chapters are well done, they inadequately cover the subject which a reader could justifiably expect to be analyzed. More "events analysis" along the lines of the treatment of the 1968 elections in other political contexts and situations would have gone far to make the political compass more satisfactory.

The rich descriptive material about Constanza life throughout the book is not connected by a logical unifying approach. What, for example, does the chapter titled "The Life Cycle," dealing with childhood, courtship, marriage, old age, death, and mourning, tell us about politics when the author does not link these cultural contexts to the political system? Walker states his intention to view "the aspects of Constanza life that are given the most consideration in this study" (i.e., "the power structure and sources of power") in "systemic terms" (pp. 1 and 2). But his systems approach is neither sufficiently explained nor explicitly followed. The development of a precise model would have avoided the inclusion of nonpolitical material and the slighting of important topics (such as the crucial area of decision-making activities). Part of the role of a model, after all, is to help select and organize data. It would also have improved the book by providing a basis for comparability with other locales and establishing a framework for further research. Walker's study is concerned with a highly specialized subject which, to enlighten those not primarily concerned with the Dominican Republic or the Caribbean area, should validate its relevance to a broader problem through a conceptual approach such as systems analysis.

Perhaps the work should simply have been titled differently and its purpose stated so as to conform with what the author actually did. But I regret that Walker did not devote his demonstrated skills of observation and analysis to a more comprehensive treatment of the political aspects of Constanza community life.

G. POPE ATKINS

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France, 1848–1945. Volume I: Ambition, Love and Politics. By Theodore Zeldin. (Oxford History of Modern Europe) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. 823. £6.00.)

What a good book! New facts and old facts in new perspective, thumbnail sketches of known and less known figures, fresh views and canny comments make this probably the best, certainly the freshest, volume so far in a distinguished series.

The best, and the most original. As the subtitle suggests, Dr. Zeldin has set chronology aside for a more topical and, as he calls it, analytical approach. The book is divided into three parts. *Ambition* treats of social groups, their ways and values: how did people make their way, their name, their money (or lose them), rise in their professions, introduce new techniques or ideas, use dowry or inheritance to achieve ambitions, live on *rentes* (at a time when money kept its value, and one could retire at 40 or inherit at 20, enough to last a lifetime). *Love* (?) deals with the private aspects of life: marriage, morals, how children were brought up, how women fared at one social level or another, how both sexes were trained to fear their parents and each other, the role of routine (that of love seems negligible), and that of disease (at the turn of the century nearly 15 per cent of all deaths were from syphilis). Finally comes the political dimension—longest section in the book—where ideologies and parties are brilliantly reflected by a number of representative individuals, from Thiers to Combes and on.

The great interpretative tradition, here, is largely set aside in favor of description. The concretization and personalization of his themes sprinkles Zeldin's chapters with portraits of doctors and notaries, bankers and peasants, intellectuals and entrepreneurs, whose different backgrounds, careers and personalities illustrate the true variety of faceless categories too often imposed on unruly reality. Historical writing inflicts an unreal order on shifting, diverse existence; it structures living incoherence into something comprehensible, hence probably false to life. By introducing an *ondoyant et divers* tone into his book, Zeldin accepts the risk of perplexing some readers the better to excite and intrigue others. The perplexed will do well to supplement Zeldin by reference to Brogan or to Gordon Wright. But the risk was worth the taking.

A second volume will pursue the analysis into the fields of personal behavior which, it is true, are only thinly treated in the section dubiously (or ironically) titled "Love"; of changing fashions and mentalities; of provincial diversity and national unity; and of relations with other countries and with colonies. It will also contain the bibliography, whose absence in this volume is compensated by copious notes.

Theodore Zeldin knows his France: its realities as well as its literature and scholarship. French society appears in its nuances and contradictions: the clash of innovation and prejudice, the temptations of change and the survival of traditional modes, the continuity preserved through apparent breaks, the diversity of a highly centralized nation where pursuit of the golden mean often made for meanness, the glorification of small men and small virtues for pettyness.

Discussion is thoughtful, discriminating, informed. Item: "The proportion of young people who were both healthy and attractive was comparatively small" (p. 304). Item: " . . . the child remained an instrument for the gratification of parental aspirations" (p. 327). Item: "To concentrate on the scandals [of the 1890s] is to give excessive importance to symptoms and to lose sight of continuities and breaks of deeper significance" (p. 640). Item: "French politics can become clearer if one investigates not simply what the parties demanded but also the seemingly incoherent, colorless, compromising realities which followed from their demands . . . " (p. 698).

There is a judicious treatment of the Dreyfus case, taken largely in its human context: social psychology rather than politics, unless that is what modern politics is! There are rather too many misspellings (as on p. 313 where Montesquieu should read Montesquiou), to be corrected in the next edition. And, in the end, there is the vigorously brushed picture of an exasperating, awkward, uncomfortable, angry people—a people of *routiniers* and of *bricoleurs*—engaged in seemingly endless family quarrels that sharpen intellectual faculties as they do suspicion, mistrust, and great capacity for contempt. Timid and aggressive, brilliantly prejudiced, logically absurd, deeply embedded in a confusion of clear ideas, using words to avoid communication and courtesy to avert familiarity, the French continue to offer a fascinating conundrum, not least to themselves.

Zeldin has gone far to document their ambiguities and illuminate the inexplicable. Now for volume II!

EUGEN WEBER
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Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest. By Hadley Arkes. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 395. $12.50.)

In these days when book titles are frequently characterized by pop rhetoric or shameless over-promising, *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest* is indeed descriptive of the content and major themes of this work. Professor Arkes's primary aim is to develop a theory of and practical methodology for describing the national interest. He argues that the national interest is fundamentally the preservation of an "essential core of values" and practices or the "way of life" of a political community (pp. 6–7). He employs the term "regime" from Aristotle via Leo Strauss to characterize this taproot of the national interest, defining regime as "the *character* of particular systems—the *particular* structure of authority and the *peculiar* pattern of values that distinguish one political system from another" (p. 7, emphasis in original). Drawing on Max Weber, he notes that "there is a fundamental relation . . . between the political regime and the character of the bureaucracy" (p. 13). Thus, if the choices made in creating and operating a bureaucracy like the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) are examined, then some of the policy values of the regime will be discovered. Further, since the regime is the basis of the national interest, examining the bureaucracy of a program like the Marshall Plan, which "stands out to us today as a significant program, a successful policy, and a wise construction of the 'national interest'," will bring to light at least part of a concrete definition of the national interest in foreign policy (p. 4). The independent variable for determining the policy values and priorities in the establishment and operations of the ECA are "presumptions." Presumptions "distribute burdens of reasoned argument" among rival actors and agencies, and therefore assign priorities to the values that these actors and agencies represent (p. 182). The bulk of the book examines the creation and operations of the ECA, arriving at a formulation of the policy values it embodied. These values are then linked to the regime and the national interest.

The student of American foreign policy will find this attempt to operationalize the national interest rewarding and interesting. The use of the concept "regime," however, seems to substitute a new slippery term for the already available collection of slippery terms such as "political culture," "organic constitution," or even Montesquieu's "spirit of the laws." While this book does not establish a new level of clarity and rigor in the general debate over the definition of the national interest, its focus on bureaucratic "presumptions" does offer a handle on what the national interest is in practice in a given program during the life of that program and the agency created to administer it.

It is disappointing that the author does not explore the relations between his attempt to operationalize with bureaucratic "presumptions" the concept of regime and the survey research techniques employed in the studies of political culture. Would or should the elite behavior that produces bureaucratic presumptions highlight the same policy-value hierarchy as surveys of mass attitudes, and of what significance would the differences be for a theory of the national interest?

The author also insufficiently emphasizes that his examination of the Marshall Plan allows him to make statements about the national interest in terms of the value priorities *for that program*. Presumably, to arrive at a more complete description of the national interest for any historical period, the bureaucratic presumptions in several agencies and programs could be examined. How then could the collection of values that would be discovered in the history of the founding and operations of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, which also began in the mid-'40s, be integrated with the values of the Marshall Plan to form this broader description ot the national interest?

Students of organizational theory will find the concept of "presumption" particularly intriguing and useful. Chapters 9 and 10, which develop and define this concept and apply it to the Marshall Plan as a technique for discovering priorities of policy values, are the most thought-provoking of the book. This concept is of interest and utility because it focuses on the behavior of political actors which they rightly perceive to be important in how they get their jobs done and what they can do. For example, who can act unilaterally, who can act only after consultation, and what are the rights of appeal to higher authority of a dissatisfied actor? These questions are central to this part of the book, which is written with particular skill and sophistication and is enriched by examples not only from the Marshall Plan but also from such diverse sources as President Lincoln's views of the Fugitive Slave Act, American constitutional law, and President Truman's orders to MacArthur.

Students of the Marshall Plan will find a well-developed argument for a position between those who view the program as a pure expression of American altruism and those who see it as naked capitalist imperialism. The author's mining of the files of the Bureau of the Budget and the Brookings Institution brings some significant new data to light on the organization and operation of the Marshall Plan.

Students of the Congress will find a case study of strong congressional initiative and activism in shaping American foreign assistance policy. The argument concerning how congressmen abandon the standard cliches of administrative theory in order to build their value priorities into a new bureaucracy like ECA is very insightful.

This book is intended to be an interpretative essay using the case study of the Marshall Plan to illustrate an approach and to make theoretical arguments, in much the same way that Allison uses the Cuban missile crisis or Wohlstetter the attack on Pearl Harbor. The major defect of the book is that the various audiences, noted above, who might find the book useful unfortunately will probably also find it inaccessible. In analyzing the organization and operation of the ECA, Arkes uses terms like "drawing rights," "counterpart funds," and "letters of commitment" with great frequency and without defining or explaining them. Those without a background in international trade and finance will find the case study material, and thus much of the book, difficult and obscure.

THOMAS R. WOLANIN
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The Role of a National Delegation in the General Assembly. By Peter Baehr. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Occasional Paper Number 9, December 1970. Pp. 90. $1.00, paper.)

Mr. Peter Baehr is a lecturer in international relations at the University of Amsterdam, and an editor of *Acta Politica*, the journal of the Dutch Political Science Association. In this monograph he seeks to take us inside the Netherland's National Delegation to the United Nations at the time of the twenty-third General Assembly session in 1968. His objectives are to expand the limited information available on the internal operations of a national delegation, on their decision-making processes, and on these delegations interactions with one another.

Mr. Baehr is aware that the usefulness of his findings is " . . . limited to those member states of the United Nations whose diplomatic practice is somewhat similar to that of the Netherlands" (p. 4). He indicates that most European states (east and west of the old iron curtain) would probably be included in such a grouping (e.g., those states with strictly instructed delegations). Delegations of many new African and Asian states would be excluded.

In examining the "Activities Within A National Delegation," Mr. Baehr notes that the Netherland's delegation is composed of professional foreign service officers and parliamentarians. In treating the impact of its composition upon the delegation's decision-making process he suggests the hypothesis that " . . . the more rigid a government's instructions, the more chance there is of tensions and conflicts between the professional diplomats of the permanent mission and those auxiliary members of the delegation who are not foreign ministry officials" (p. 25). Parliamentarians, he asserts, are less willing to submit to the discipline of a foreign ministry. Mr. Baehr also notes that a delegation's latitude in the decision-making process is enhanced when (1) a quick decision is required, (2) it is operating with broad instructions from its government, (3) the government asks the delegation for its opinion.

In examining the national delegation in "regional group" meetings (the Netherlands is in the Western group), Baehr states that "there are few definite rules as to which countries should participate in meetings of the Western group at the committee level" (p. 37). Meetings vary in their degree of formality, and informal meetings are sometimes used to exclude certain states when dealing with certain issues. Subjects of regional group meetings include "1. Requests for support in elections, . . . 2. Appeals for support or rejection of certain proposals, . . . 3. Exchange of information, . . . " (pp. 43–53). He also suggests that informal group meetings occur at the interregional level and are important in the life or death of any proposed resolution.

In an appendix Mr. Baehr offers a well-drafted "Proposal for a Study of Parliamentarians in Governmental Delegations to International Organizations."

This study is a worthwhile addition to the literature of the field. But it has problems. The use of the experience of the Netherlands delegation in 1968, as an example of the inner workings of UN delegations in general has its limits, as Mr. Baehr is well aware. The majority of UN delegations are, of course, not from Europe. But perhaps we should be satisfied to have a peek inside any fairly representative national delegation.

Early in the study Mr. Baehr acknowledges his gratitude to the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands which allowed him access to the meetings of the delegation and "confidential files." "It was understood that no quotation or substantive information from discussions within the delegation would be made public. At no point was the author requested by official sources to alter the text in any way" (p. 9). The lack of official intrusion is easy to understand, and it is not a reflection on the openness or tolerance of the Foreign Ministry. Rather it is indicative of the almost total lack of detail and insight which this observer feels is necessary in a quasi-case study of this type.

Finally, as an examination of the politics in UN decision making, the volume really contains little that is not already known via Hovet, Keohane, Hadwen and Kaufmann, Alger, and Kay, all of whom Mr. Baehr quite properly utilizes.

Specialists interested in the functioning of the United Nations and its decision-making process may find this a useful volume to consult, but they should not expect to be surprised.

JOHN O. LINDELL

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Problems of War and Peace: A Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories. Translated from the Russian by Bryan Bean. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. Pp. 390. $3.00.)

This book is the nearest approach to a serious Soviet academic work on international relations so far to have appeared in translation in the West. The authors, who are mainly members of the staff of the Institute of Philosophy in the Academy of Sciences, set out "to examine some of the most widespread sociological and socio-political theories of war and peace in the capitalist west, and confront them with the scientific Marxist standpoint" (p. 9).

The book falls into three parts. The first is devoted to "The Quest for Peace in the Social Thought of the Past," and reviews the theories of peace of the "utopian socialists," particularly Winstanley and Babeuf, and the "bourgeois humanists," from Erasmus to Kant.

The second part, on "The Origins and Essence of War" upholds the class analysis of the causes of war against theories which see its origins in human nature, national sovereignty, international "anarchy," Malthusian demographic processes, or the psychological factors adduced by Freud or Fromm. There is a strong defence of the view that nuclear weapons have not altered the relationship between war and politics. There is also a defence of the doctrine of just war against pacifist approaches, including that of Johan Galtung.

The third part, entitled "Against the Ideology of Militarism and Reaction," treats a series of standard Western approaches to international relations—"power politics," the theory of games, "ideological disarmament," bargaining theory, arms control theory"—as essentially justifications of Western imperialism. There are a few kind words about "progressive" Western scientists and intellectuals, and about the Pugwash movement.

What this book reveals is that Soviet specialists in international relations are aware of the main body of Western academic literature about international relations, and feel a need to come to grips with it. There is in fact a real need for a critique of this Western literature that would bring out, as a Marxist analysis best can, the ideological functions it sometimes serves. Unfortunately, this work does not provide a searching and probing critique but has all the characteristics that are familiar in less academically pretentious Soviet writing about international affairs. It is self-righteous and polemical; it contains no breath of self-criticism or of questioning of Soviet policy; and it relies on name-calling, ranting, and smearing, in place of argument.

As an attempt to work out a Marxist theory of international relations this book fails entirely. The core of this theory is that international conflict is essentially class conflict, and will not survive the coming to power of the working class in socialist states. The principal difficulty for this theory is, of course, the history so far of relations among the socialist states, particularly between the Soviet Union and China. This subject, however, is not even mentioned, let alone discussed. Intellectual advance can take place only by recognising difficulties and confronting them, not—as here—by pretending that they do not exist. The book, however, is worth reading as evidence of the need recognized by Soviet experts in International Relations to plot a position in relation to academic writings on this subject in the West.

HEDLEY BULL
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The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community. By W. R. Böhning. (New York: Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations, London, 1972. Pp. xvi, 167. $10.25.)

This book is primarily about the migration of workers to and between the original six member-countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), and the possible movement of workers between the U.K. and the other EEC countries consequent upon Britain's accession to the Rome Treaty. It is not about the migration of workers *in* the United Kingdom, and to that extent the title is perhaps misleading.

As the author, an economist, rightly notes, most discussion of immigration in Britain has centered on the presence of black immigrants from the "New Commonwealth"; consequently consideration of the impact of EEC membership on the movement of labor has largely gone by default. This obsession with black immigration has led to many misapprehensions concerning the EEC system; and, indeed, Böhning demonstrates that government departments concerned with migration policies have not been free from very mistaken notions.

Böhning aims to correct this situation by providing information on the EEC migration policies and experiences. Thus he takes us through the often labyrinthine EEC regulations on the movement of labor. This survey is followed by a detailed discussion of the experiences of migration of each of the original six member countries. Almost as a digression, Böhning constructs an exceedingly interesting model of migration "from low wage to post-industrial countries with a liberal capitalist structure" (chapter 4).

In the second part of the book he postulates the probable future developments, country by country, in terms of labor supply and demand. Finally, in Part Three, Böhning examines the impact of Britain's accession: the probable movement across the channel between Britain and the Continent; the "problem," as he puts it, of U.K. nationality, with reference to Britain's black immigrants.

This is a useful book. Into a mere 167 pages the author manages to pack a wealth of information. It is written dispassionately, from the perspective of a "convinced European." While Böhning claims to be writing neither as a pro-Marketeer nor an anti-Marketeer (p. 7), it is clear that he sees the EEC as at least one stage on the road to the "European ideal." At the same time, the essentially exploitative nature of the EEC labor system comes out very clearly. Similarly, the discriminatory treatment accorded Europe's—and particularly Britain's—black immigrants, as exceptions to free movement, is well documented. Thus Böhning's optimism does not quite square with the record.

Although I found the theoretical model the most interesting part, I do not mean to depreciate the value of the whole work. The text on the EEC regulations is exceedingly complex: this probably reflects the complexity of the material *per se*, though possibly some prior knowledge is assumed. An index, too, would have been a useful addition.

Given its subject matter, this book is bound to hold most immediate appeal for English readers. As a compact but well-documented summary work on EEC labor policies it might well find, and deserve, a wider audience.

DENNIS BROOKS
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Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s. By Alastair Buchan. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 116. $6.00.)

Armchair speculations about the future have a notoriously short life. Simple extrapolation of what seem to be the most important or salient current trends is a virtual guarantee of quick obsolescence. The first "surprise" significant enough to challenge the conventional wisdom about the shape of the near future cannot be long in coming: the sudden emergence of the oil crisis, especially in terms of the conditions of supply rather than the adequacy of demand, is merely the latest case in point.

Nevertheless, the demand for such speculations never seems to diminish, and in fact usually accelerates sharply in periods when the old order seems to be crumbling and the form of a new order remains hazy and obscure. Thus the onset of the Nixon presidency, the relative decline of American involvement in Vietnam, the SALT agreement, the attempts to restructure the international economic system, a perceived rise in the power and influence of China and Japan, the apparent détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the domestic political and social difficulties of the industrial states, among other things, seemed to call for a new image of the international system that would prevail in the 1970s and 1980s. In response to these developments, Professor Alastair Buchan of Oxford University was asked to deliver the Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures for the Council on Foreign Relations, subsequently published as *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s*.

Mr. Buchan's views are hardly novel, for they reflect the consensus that seemed to be emerging in the early 1970s on what the system would look like in 1980. He notes that "there are now five major centers of military, political or economic influence in the industrial world" (p. 48). This implies that "a multiple power balance is re-emerging" (p. 42), although it will be a balance more easily understood by the metaphor of the mobile than the traditional scales. While Mr. Buchan does make some effort to question the utility of the idea of the balance in the light of current trends, his analysis is too sketchy to be useful. Thus he never explains exactly what he means by a multiple balance of power: what conditions it rests on (beyond the mere existence of five centers of influence), what behavior it implies, and what norms must be accepted before balancing becomes something more than a metaphor that obscures reality.

At any rate, starting from the premise of a plural world, or what others have described just as loosely as a "pentagonal" world, Mr. Buchan briefly touches upon various transformations in strategic nuclear power, conventional military power, political influence, and economic strength. Most of his analysis concentrates on the level of political or psychological influence, for he believes that it is this level of interaction that will most sharply differentiate the 1970s from the 1960s (pp. 20f.). The underlying premise justifying this contention is a continuing decline in American influence, status, and will.

Whatever the accuracy of this judgment, it permits Mr. Buchan to treat a number of crucial strategic and economic issues in an extraordinarily superficial fashion. Economic issues are, in fact, almost ignored, despite the fact that Mr. Buchan believes that strategic and conventional force probably will not be used. In this circumstance, surely more attention must be paid to economic and social interactions.

Many of Mr. Buchan's other views are also debatable. For example, he contends, "I find it hard to see how any level of Soviet strategic power, except of a size that would bankrupt the country, can seriously threaten American security, and this view seems to have been ratified by the SALT treaty . . . " (p. 14). There are many strategic analysts, not all Pentagon flacks, who would disagree. Mr. Buchan is also very optimistic about controlling nuclear proliferation, even though his own argument about a sharp decline in American influence surely ought to limit his optimism. In any event, analysis of the problem rather than assertions of optimism might have been appropriate. And Mr. Buchan's belief that if Japan acquires nuclear weapons "Japan herself would lose much of the influence and respect she is slowly regaining in the small Asian states" (p. 103) can serve as a final illustration of judgments that are either dubious or unargued. After all, Great Britain, France, and China have become nuclear powers without losing influence and respect—at least not from the nuclear decision *per se*.

Perhaps it is the task itself, rather than any shortcomings in Mr. Buchan's imagination and insight, that is primarily responsible for the inadequacies of this book. The form of analysis that the author has relied upon—very traditional speculations about emerging political configurations—simply cannot deal with a world increasingly dominated by very complex interdependencies between different levels and forms of interaction between states, individuals and groups.

Description and extrapolation of a few political trends is clearly insufficient; at the very least, a more substantial effort to look at where we want the international system to be going (and what we can do to get there) might have been helpful. The failures in Mr. Buchan's approach should also alert the rest of us to the need for new and more imaginative approaches to the problem of political forecasting.

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN
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A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945. By Oliver J. Caldwell. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972. Pp. 218. $5.95.)

Dragon by the Tail. By John Paton Davies, Jr. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972. Pp. 448. $10.00.)

General Stilwell in China, 1942–1944: The Full Story. By Chin-tung Liang. (Jamaica, New York: St. John's University Press, 1972. Pp. 321. $6.95.)

Sino-American Relations, 1949–1971. Edited by Roderick MacFarquhar. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 267. $2.95.)

Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927–1945: A Persuading Encounter. By Kenneth E. Shewmaker. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971. Pp. 387. $10.00.)

Partly by coincidence and partly by design, a spate of books on the interaction between America and China has followed President Richard M. Nixon's historic trip to Peking. This latest group includes two scholarly histories (Liang and Shewmaker), two personal reminiscences (Caldwell and Davies), and one documentary textbook with interpretative essays (MacFarquhar). Their utility for political scientists is twofold. First, except for the last named, they enhance our historical knowledge by offering heretofore unavailable information. Second, they provide a wealth of data that may be fruitfully recast according to different models of political analysis, whether perceptual, organizational, or bureaucratic, breaking through the convenient but confining monolithic mold of the national state as actor.

For unique source material Professor Liang's volume is the most valuable because it draws extensively on the personal archives of Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist materials previously published in Chinese. An explicit rebuttal of Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience In China, 1911–1945* (Macmillan, 1970), it presents a Chinese view of events too often seen from an exclusively American perspective. By comparison with Davies's acerbic memoir of the same period, Liang, like the White Rabbit, takes one through the looking-glass of politics where praise and blame are precisely reversed.

Unfortunately Professor Liang's study has limited reliability as a historical account. Its inaccurate use of English-language sources vitiates the validity of voluminous footnotes which seemingly document every statement. In a negative characterization of Stilwell, the author claims, "When Stilwell was in France and saw many of his classmates ranking above him, he nicknamed them the Peanut Club (see Tuchman, p. 53)" (Liang, p. 28, footnote 24). However the original reference specifically notes this "was Stilwell's designation for millionaires, politicians, and social darlings who have been given commissions of Major and up and soft jobs," with no implication of "classmates" being the category from which these were drawn. Similarly Liang asserts that Stilwell "regarded Chang Tsung-chang as China's best strategist" (Liang, p. 28, footnote 27), but the original Tuchman citation (p. 118) obviously employs sarcasm in alluding to Chang as "the greatest Chinese master of 'the strategic retreat' [which] was to be a major source of Stilwell's own future frustration."

More substantively serious is Professor Liang's paraphrase of U.S. foreign service officer reports. A lengthy summary of dispatches purports to show how the "Davies-Service [John Stewart Service] group in the headquarters of General Stilwell apparently were working under American Communist influence, whether consciously or unconsciously, in furtherance of major efforts to establish a 'Red China' " (Liang, p. 231). Thus Davies's lengthy analysis of June 24, 1943 (incorrectly given as July 24) allegedly claimed the Chinese Communists "are agrarian reformers rather than Communists" (Liang, p. 199). The original report, however, only asserted that "*Foreign observers* who have recently visited the Communist area agree that the Communist regime *in present policy* is far removed from orthodox Communism . . . that it is described less accurately as communist than as agrarian democratic" (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943: China*, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 260, italics added). The shift in attribution and nuance is important in assessing Davies's judgment and reliability.

In parallel fashion, Professor Liang omits Davies's warnings of Soviet influence in the CCP, such as the observation "It is suspected that the political leaders of the Party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow direction" (*Foreign Relations*, p. 260). The omission grossly distorts his subsequent allusion to "the trend toward nationalism . . . among the troops and guerrillas" (Liang, p. 199). Whereas Davies recommended an American "*readiness to support* a new coalition" regime Professor Liang paraphrases this as "*prepare to set up* a coalition government" (Liang, p. 201; *Foreign Relations*, *op. cit.*, p. 399; italics added). He similarly summarizes Service's careful itemization of suggested restrictions in aid as bluntly urging "support to Chiang's government be discontinued" (Liang, p. 203; John Stewart Service, *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations*, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1971, p. 203). The cumulative effect of these errors is to caricature the foreign service reports as written by fools or knaves, giving them a leftward bias as compared with a full reading of the original dispatches.

Presumably Professor Liang is more careful with Chiang Kai-shek's memoranda and cables. In any event since these clearly are translated, their tenor rather than their specific wording provides reliable evidence about how a dependent power views and manipulates a donor relationship. The vantage-point of Chungking shows American and British behavior in quite a different light from that of the White House and Whitehall, although too much attention is given to purely military matters without even minimally useful maps for the armchair strategist. The book sounds a series of complaints, some justified and many plausible, which anticipate the later litany of accusations leveled by Peking against Moscow's handling of aid programs and alliance issues. Indeed, to the extent that the Russian and American roles were analogous, additional insight into the Sino-Soviet dispute may be gained from Professor Liang's account of Chinese perceptions and reactions.

Despite their obvious differences, Liang and Davies complement one another in their detailed recounting of the organizational and bureaucratic battles fought within and between Chungking and Washington. The Chinese exploitation of American disputes, widely reported at the time through the Chennault-Stilwell feud, is now susceptible to cross-verification and amplification from opposite sources. Davies's diary and his family letters add a human touch of wit and urbanity to the internecine conflicts but do not conceal the mixed coalitions of interest which joined Americans and Chinese in transnational but opposing camps that fought within both governments.

Particularly titillating in this regard is the "secret war" of Professor Caldwell, a self-defined "triple agent . . . an American army officer assigned to OSS, which had detailed me to Tai Li's Secret Military Police [where] . . . I worked with the secret societies . . . dedicated to overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and Tai Li" (p. 77). Despite the purple prose which overdramatizes and exaggerates his activity and attitudes, the author nonetheless provides a glimpse of how Tai Li maneuvered in the conflict between the OSS and the U.S. Navy which won a secondary role in supporting Chinese Nationalist covert operations far from the Pacific Ocean. Caldwell is long on assertion and short on documentation, but he gives a sharp counter to the claims of Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles who was personally assigned to Tai Li (Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, Doubleday, 1967).

Caldwell reflects with considerable self-criticism on how the preconceptions of Americans in China distorted perception and policy, a theme which looms large in the Davies and Shewmaker volumes. No less relevant, however, is the implication of his narrative for Chinese perceptions, both Nationalist and Communist. The ability to manipulate interagency rivalries, endemic in interaction among governments, was enhanced by the unique relationship between the Chiang regime and the U.S. Navy. Dating back to the 'twenties, this relationship crystallized through the Tai Li operation into an affiliation which was to provide leverage for Chiang down through the 'fifties, as reflected in the positions of Admiral Arthur W. Radford during the crises of the offshore islands during 1954–55. The obverse relationship necessarily applied for the Chinese Communists because of the way in which SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization) provided men, money, and munitions that resulted in anti-Communist rather than anti-Japanese forces. Whatever hands-off policy may have been designed in Washington with respect to the nascent civil war, the covert cooperation among Chinese Nationalist, U.S. Navy, and Japanese elements under SACO aegis in 1945 contributed to Yenan's assumptions that American policy was basically antithetical to CCP interests and committed to the survival of Chiang's government.

Davies and Shewmaker are nicely paired in their explicit examination of how perceptions determine postures and ultimately policy, a framework within which Liang and Caldwell are also useful. Davies is the more far-ranging and less systematic, embracing "American, British, Japanese, and Russian encounters with China and one another." Damned by Professor Liang as a pro-Communist conspirator, Davies wears his martyrdom as a victim of Senator Joseph McCarthy lightly. He combines an incisive pen, a brilliant intellect, and many years in China as a missionary child and foreign service officer, to produce the most detailed, dispassionate, and damaging account of bureaucratic infighting, Chinese and American, yet to come from a first-hand participant.

Professor Liang's attribution of "agrarian reformer" to Davies's description of the CCP highlights a central point in the polemic between Left and Right (within which the Center was crushed). Ironically, Chou En-lai took personal exception to the term when speaking with Ambassador George Marshall in December 1945, "You must realize we are not that; we are Communists and Marxists with all that means now and for the future" (John F. Melby, *The Mandate of Heaven*, Anchor, 1971, p. 76). Professor Shewmaker has written the definitive analysis of this controversy over who wrote what about China and why, submitting the writings of Americans and Europeans (in English) to the most systematic and scholarly analysis possible, short of using quantitative techniques. He destroys completely the accusations of conspiracy and concealment leveled against the majority of journalists and commentators who addressed the subject of China and communism during the years 1927–1945. Instead he indicts the accusers as well as the accused for failing to understand and articulate the complex interaction of values, personality, and politics which plague American communication on China with a resultant distortion of reality that has proved hazardous, and at times disastrous, for both audience and communicator.

Professor Shewmaker has pursued his subject with diligence and discipline. His footnotes reveal a wide range of sources, including correspondence and interviews with most of the persons under examination. He hews to his line, letting the chips fall where they may on radical, liberal, conservative, and reactionary alike. He focuses on public communicators whose output helped to shape public images and therefore excludes private official writings. But in so doing he gives a useful template to lay over the dispatches of Davies, Service, and others for comparison with those of their journalistic cohorts.

What Professor Shewmaker calls "the American perspective" consists of three fundamental determinants, "a bias toward social egalitarianism . . . a concern for promoting the welfare of the common man, especially through the elimination of hardship and poverty . . . and a strong preference for democracy . . . different to each individual but cherished by all as an ideal" (pp. 299–301). This explains both the near-universal negative reaction to the Chinese Nationalists as well as the more varied but basically positive reaction to the Chinese Communists among two dozen American writers and correspondents of extremely different political viewpoint.

The coverage is encyclopedic—first chronological, then topical, and finally retrospectively analytical. Shewmaker has relied on an impressive array of scholarly works which emerged subsequent to the writings under analysis, finding they generally support the impressions given by wartime reporting. He also provides sensitive portraits, warts and all, of such stalwart but often stereotyped journalists as Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong, and Agnes Smedley, whose work provided a unique if biased view of what was to become the most important revolutionary movement in Asia.

These books are not merely for understanding the past. Since 1971 American writing on China has produced a surge of "love literature" after two decades of "hate literature," both based more strongly on emotional perception than on objective reality. The preconceptions and misperceptions chronicled by Liang, Davies, Caldwell, and Shewmaker, are echoed by more recent travellers to the Great Wall. An excellent bridge between the two periods is the MacFarquhar reader with introductory essays by Morton Halperin, A. M. Halpern, and Donald W. Klein on foreign policy in Washington and Peking *circa* 1968–71. The volume excerpts a wide span of Chinese and American documents which trace official perceptions and policies over two decades of confrontation. Although this treatment omits the actions, covert and overt, of cold and hot war, it provides valuable teaching material for examining how public rhetoric and political rationalization all too often become reality for domestic and foreign audiences.

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Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. (New York: Columbia University Press; **Vol. 1: Trygve Lie, 1946–1953.** [1969, Pp. xiv, 535. $15.00.], **Vol. 2: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953–1956.** [1972, Pp. xiv, 716. $22.50.], **Vol. 3: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1956–1957.** [1973, Pp. xv, 729. $22.50.])

These are remarkable volumes. One must not be misled by the title "Public Papers"; this is no mere collection of documents. It is an unusual type of biography, especially of Dag Hammarskjöld. It is also a history of the United Nations—not to be taken alone but as an absolutely essential supplement to more conventional studies of the organization. The work could not have been done, as it has been fascinatingly done, by anyone who was not an intimate participant in the activity of the UN during its early years. They call themselves "editors," but they exceed the limits of what one might anticipate in confronting the editing of "public papers." Andrew Cordier was executive assistant to the secretary-general, with the rank of under-secretary, from the beginning of the United Nations until 1962. Wilder Foote was assistant to the secretary of state at San Francisco in 1945, and from the early days of the United Nations until December 1960 was its director of press and publications and spokesman to the press for Secretaries-General Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld. Both of the "editors" subsequently were at the School of International Affairs at Columbia University, Cordier serving as dean of the school and later as president of the university. The "public papers" or documents included in these volumes seem to me like photographs one finds in biographies, but the story, the history, is in the voluminous notes in which the editors not only give the setting for the documents, but supply hitherto unpublished material which reveals what often happened behind the scenes. Any twentieth-century practitioner of diplomacy (which includes multilateral or "parliamentary diplomacy" in the United Nations) will find here a record of remarkable skills in negotiation, in press relations, and in human relations. In picking up one of these volumes and glancing at the Table of Contents, a reader will not be aware of how many pages of smaller type contain the intimate record of what occurred and why. These notes are scattered among the documents and they supplement—sometimes, indeed, a bit repetitiously—the editors' formal "Note on the Series," and their "Introduction" to each volume.

The editors have been skillful in their selection of the papers. Many of them are reprints of United Nations official documents, or of essential parts thereof. Here one counts the secretary-general's introduction to his annual reports which were originated and given their cast by Trygve Lie. Here also are public speeches or interventions in UN debates in the General Assembly or in the Councils or in some of the specialized agencies. Of course, such documents had to be included, but they are not necessarily so revealing of the man since, as noted by the editors and by Lie and Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General obviously had to have the help of his staff in putting together these statements. Although detailed authorship is not generally revealed, one can be confident that Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote both were often involved in either drafts or final texts. I think it can be said also that on technical matters, for example legal points, Lie depended on Abraham Feller (cf. Vol. 1, p. 485), and Hammarskjöld on Oscar Schacter, both international lawyers of skill and standing. Some of the speeches, however, are illuminating glimpses of the inner man; prime examples are Hammarskjöld's contribution to Edward R. Murrow's "This I Believe" (Vol. 2, p. 194) and his inaugural address in taking his seat as a Member of the Swedish Academy (Vol. 2, p. 399).

The editors had the advantage of Trygve Lie's own memoirs (*In the Cause of Peace*), and they cite other writings, especially about Hammarskjöld, including Brian Urquart's full length biography. Notably in Volume 3, which covers the Middle East and Hungarian crises of 1956–57, they make good use of published memoirs of Eden, Eisenhower, Nutting, Truman, and General Burns. They acknowledge their debt to archival material in the UN Dag Hammarskjöld library and in the Columbia School of International Affairs.

Volume I covers the Secretary-Generalship of Trygve Lie from 1946 to 1953; Volumes 2 and 3 are the first two of four volumes dealing with Hammarskjöld from 1953 until his death in 1961. Volume 3 carries the story up through 1957. Although Lie is covered in one volume, his role is by no means played down, and indeed, the first secretary-general of the UN emerges as a man of stature. In his term he did not face developments as dramatic as those which his successor confronted. He did not have Hammarskjöld's flair and was not, as Hammarskjöld mentioned he had been styled by a New York newspaper, an "unashamed intellectual." Lie's memoirs in style and philosophy, bear no resemblance to Hammarskjöld's posthumously published *Markings*, (cf. Vol. 2, pp. 20–21). The editors' introductions give sketches of the two men and there is no need to elaborate comparisons here, although I did have the privilege of knowing and working with both of them, more with Lie than with Hammarskjöld, since I represented the United States at the UN in the period 1948–1953. Especially revealing, I find, are the abundant transcripts of press conferences which are not only illuminating commentaries on historical episodes but are also portraits from life of the two secretaries-general, both of whom handled the press well.

Lie's term did include the Korean War and it was his firm stand on the need for United Nations action that resulted in the Soviet Union's refusal to recognize him in his last years as secretary-general when the General Assembly (with dubious legality) extended his term for an additional three years. Before that, Lie was diligent in trying to minimize the cold war, and the cold warriors in the State Department at times felt he leaned too far in the direction of Moscow. In the spring of 1950, before the Korean War, he began "a one man campaign" for a Twenty-Year Program for Peace, which at first had a more friendly reception in Moscow than in the Western capitals, but it came to nothing. (See Vol. I, pp. 268 ff. and 376.) During his last six months he suffered from the McCarthy-McCarran attacks on the UN and perhaps yielded too much to pressure from Washington. It remained for Hammarskjöld to complete staff regulations to cover the role of the secretary-general in determining criteria for "loyalty." (See Vol. I, pp. 487 ff. and Vol. II, pp. 110 ff.).

Since Hammarskjöld was a more dramatic personality than Lie, Volumes 2 and 3 are more exciting. In many respects they contribute new information based on the inside knowledge of the editors. One senses this at once in Volume 2 at pages 23 to 28 where the editors tell how Hammarskjöld came to be selected and elected. The account of his mission to Peking in January 1954 to secure the release of the American airmen who were held prisoner by the Chinese contains insights not previously available, and the editors properly stress the extraordinarily skillful diplomacy which eventually led to the success of his efforts (Vol. 2, pp. 415 ff. and 572), although Krishna Mennon of India tried to steal the credit (*cf.* pp. 491 and 580).

In Volume 3, the editors deal with the Suez and Hungarian crises which simultaneously imposed on the secretary-general and his advisers an almost inhuman burden. The editors properly separate the material on the two cases while pointing out to the reader that the events were contemporaneous. Here is authoritative description of the plot of Israel, France, and England in 1956 to eliminate Nasser by their combined illegal attack on Suez. The continued recalcitrance of Israel in the face of resolutions by the Security Council and the efforts of the secretary-general stand out, as does the support which President Eisenhower and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge gave to the United Nations despite the propaganda pressures and lobbying on behalf of Israel. According to Michael Guhin (*John Foster Dulles, a Statesman and his Times*, p. 292), Lodge used his close relations with Eisenhower to ignore instructions from the State Department. As this review is written in the midst of new conflict between Israel and the Arabs, there is much which reveals parallels, as in the Saudi-Arabian oil boycott against Britain and France (p. 340). Here, too, in intimate detail, is the story of the creation of UNEF—the United Nations Emergency Force, set up by Hammarskjöld almost overnight on novel principles. The editors print Hammarskjöld's "private aide-memoire" of August 5, 1957 giving his own interpretation of the agreement with Egypt on the stationing of UNEF on Egyptian territory, It was this document which Ernest Gross made public in 1967 after the Six Day War in connection with Secretary-General U Thant's controversial withdrawal of the Force. (See pp. 369–382.)

It is not possible within the scope of this review to refer to the details of the Hungarian crisis, to the remarkable success of the UN's clearing of the Canal, or to the personalities, including the Editors and especially Ralph Bunche, on whom Hammarskjöld relied. Hammarskjöld was marvelously inventive, wise and skillful, but as the editors note in connection with the Hungarian crisis, he could not pass miracles (p. 415). It is also impossible here to do justice to important discussions of UN administrative practices and to such activities as those of ECOSOC and the Atomic Energy Agency.

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International Disputes: The Legal Aspects. Report of a Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. (London: Europa Publications, 1972. Pp. 325. $11.95.)

If war is too important a matter to be left to the generals, then, on the evidence of this volume, international disputes are too important a matter to be left to the lawyers. While not all international lawyers are as hidebound in their views as those in this volume it is disquieting that in their discussion of "the traditional means of settlement and how they might be improved" (p. x) the contributors have managed to be both timorous and unrealistic. In his introduction Sir Francis Vallet lets the cat out of the bag (but is unheeded by his colleagues) by arguing that "it must never be fogotten that the legal element in international disputes is by no means always predominant. Consequently, not all international disputes lend themselves to judicial or quasi-judicial settlement. Even disputes in which the legal element predominates may respond more readily and more satisfactorily to some other approach" (p. x). But this volume cannot be dismissed out of hand since its intention is serious, it represents a long-standing, if old-fashioned approach, its contributors are respected in their field, and it is part of a large project involving a parallel examination of the political aspects of international disputes.

The volume is made up of a report by a distinguished study group chaired by Sir Humphrey Waldock, together with the memoranda prepared to assist the group in its deliberations. The present report and memoranda constitute a revised version of those first published in 1966. The *déjà vu* element, however, arises not merely from their long period of gestation and revision but rather from their concentration on failed techniques and their inability to generate new and more relevant techniques.

The legal aspects of international disputes are worth discussing, but the contributors to this volume seem at no time to have addressed themselves seriously to the wider implications of their chosen topic. For example, if legal judgment is behaviorally an integral part of the political process, then reactions to it will be political and will need to be analyzed as such. Any analysis which ignores the political and sociological functions of law, especially in conflict situations, is irrelevant. Most legal systems reflect and protect values of a past era. In the case of international law these are capitalistic, imperialistic and European values, and since values in world society have changed, then, to the extent that the legal aspects of international disputes reflect old values, they will be rejected by some of the participants. Again, international law deals with interstate relations, but many conflicts are only partially interstate in their conduct and origin. Unless the international legal aspects are seen as part of, or adapted to, the whole, they will be ignored. The world will not be made to fit the pristine exigencies of international law as interpreted by many of the contributors to this volume. Moreover, the volume almost totally ignores the techniques used for handling disputes in domestic society, despite their increasing use in the context of international disputes. Such techniques rightly stress participation and responsiveness; and it is only when the legal aspects of the disputes enhance these values that they become supportive and resolution-oriented rather than repressive and, ultimately, self-defeating or ignored. Basic considerations such as these are absent from this volume. What, then, are its principal areas of concern?

The report is essentially a description of the existing legal aspects. No international lawyer will learn anything new, although he might want to suggest it to a beginner. The presentation is old-fashioned and unimaginative besides being devastatingly platitudinous. (For example, the reader is grandly informed that "negotiation unalloyed by any third influence tends to favour the stronger against the weaker Power" [p. 36].) Four of the memoranda are prepared by H. G. Darwin: General Introduction, Negotiation, Mediation and Good Offices, Fact-finding and Commissions of Inquiry. Like the members of the study group, Mr. Darwin is politically naive and often deals in platitudes, (e.g., Section IV, p. 64 ff; p. 71, para. 42; p. 75, para. 49). He never faces squarely the implications for a legal system of its existence in a society characterized by a fundamental value dissensus. When Mr. Darwin turns to Negotiation he deliberately omits many of the most interesting questions, so it is hardly surprising that his effort is banal and formalistic (e.g., p. 78, para. 3) as well as revealing a considerable ignorance of the literature. He is a little better when he gets to Mediation and Good Offices but on Factfinding and Commissions of Inquiry he can only offer a string of examples with no analysis. Mrs. Hazel Fox's two memoranda comprise a piece on Conciliation which is a long and uninteresting exercise at definition, and one on Arbitration, which is both more realistic and a genuine survey.

Mr. Allott is assigned the ICJ. He tells us nothing new, but his views will hardly go unchallenged if he insists on arguing that international law is not a means of asserting interests or that negotiation is an "essentially primitive situation" (p. 128). Moreover, his discussion of the role of law is naive, confusing description and prescription, and he appears to be blissfully unaware of the extent to which his discussion is value-laden. For Mr. Allott "the success of the Court must to a large extent depend on the quality of its decisions . . . on the quality of its judges" (p. 139). But what of the relevance of the law and the values it incorporates? They reside in the "instinct in relation to the concretisation of values into rules of law" (p. 145) which Mr. Allott ascribes to International Court judges and international lawyers in general. No wonder parties will not accept such a farcical lottery.

Happily, the final two memoranda have more merit. Mr. Bowett contributes a sensible, if brief, analysis of the legal background to peacekeeping and to the work of the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General. Likewise the survey of Settlement of Disputes in Special Fields by Messrs. McMahon and Akehurst is a balanced, realistic, and extremely useful reference survey. The organizations and subjects covered include eleven specialized agencies, five regional organizations, foreign investment and property and the GATT, International Commodity Agreements, Fishing Agreements and International River Commissions and Boundaries. These contributions are well done.

This is on balance, a very disappointing volume, but at least it causes us to reflect upon the inadequacies of this approach to the legal aspects of international disputes. Fortunately, we can turn to others for better guidance both in Britain and, more especially, in the United States.

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Roosevelt and World War II. By Robert A. Divine. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969. Pp. 107. $5.95.)

During the first two decades after the Second World War, two schools of thought dominated the debate over Franklin D. Roosevelt's diplomacy. Generally, so-called "revisionists" asserted that a devious President led the United States into the European war through the Pacific backdoor and then surrendered the fruits of victory in Eastern Europe and Asia to the Soviet Union. More traditional analysts (sometimes dubbed "court historians") usually envisioned Roosevelt as a latter-day Wilsonian who was constrained by the legacies of the First World War and by isolationists but who nonetheless gradually led Americans to intervene against Axis aggression and then, while mediating and moderating British and Russian imperial designs, to the brink of victory and establishment of the United Nations.

Divine's *Roosevelt and World War II,* four brief essays presented as the Albert Shaw Lectures in 1968, provides correctives for revisionist and traditionalist views. Divine's central thesis is that Roosevelt was neither especially devious nor naive, nor especially prescient or idealistic, but a cautious, pragmatic, and realistic politician who applied the techniques with which he had succeeded so well in domestic politics to international affairs and achieved mixed results. "Roosevelt the Isolationist" sought to avoid foreign involvements at almost any price during the 1930s, Divine asserts, primarily because he feared and hated war. His "moral embargo" during the Italo-Ethiopian war was intended less to buttress collective action than to keep Americans from the entanglements of a war trade. Divine holds that the president's fulminations against war in his 1936 Chautauqua speech were sincere, his "quarantine the aggressor" speech in 1937 only a groping for some new policy, and his eschewing any political commitment during the Munich crisis provided Hitler with one more "green light" (p. 22).

In 1939, and especially after the spring of 1940, "Roosevelt the Interventionist" grew bolder, but whether the issue was neutrality revision, destroyers for Great Britain, Lend Lease, convoys, or undeclared war in the Atlantic, he proceeded obliquely and sought to convince himself and everyone else that these actions would keep America out of war. Probably he half believed this, but as Divine writes, when Roosevelt finally concluded that entry into the European war was a matter of American national security, his earlier disclaimers about avoiding war precluded his being direct, and he could only edge toward war.

As for organizing a structure for international peace, Divine asserts that "Roosevelt the Realist" was never a true believer in an idealistic Wilsonian-style League of Nations or collective security, but preferred the concept of the "Four Policemen" who would form "a new Holy Alliance of the victors to preserve the status quo" (p. 65). In dealing with the Russians, Divine insists that "Roosevelt the Pragmatist" had few illusions, but since his primary concern was preserving the wartime alliance, he postponed crucial decisions which contained the seeds of discord. Hence, while inclined toward having the British reach a political settlement with the Russians in 1942 over the Baltic and Eastern Europe, he gave in to State Department strictures about the Atlantic Charter, which only heightened Soviet suspicions. Nor did Roosevelt deal forthrightly either with the issue of Poland's boundaries or with the question of who would constitute Poland's new government because he feared the domestic political reaction of the American Polish community. This temporizing led to the vague Yalta declaration which the Russians regarded "as a veiled American surrender of Poland to the Soviets" (p. 97). In short, Divine insists, Roosevelt's postponement tactics led only to the misunderstandings and the "cold war" he had sought to avoid.

Most of Divine's points are well taken, though it is unfair to link Roosevelt's vague Four Policemen idea—his proposal of modest means to police unprovoked aggression—with either the concept of a Holy Alliance (which aimed at a domestic and international status quo for the privileged) or Fortress America, which also had conservative sociopolitical roots. Nor is it fair to assert that "unlike Churchill, the President had little genuine concern for the fate of Poland" (p. 97). That alleged tragedy resulted as much from the intransigence of the London Poles (to which Churchill attested) and military realities as anything else. More important is the fact that Divine has not grappled with many truly significant issues. How did Roosevelt view other societies and how did this influence, for example, his attitude toward Anglo-Japanese negotiations in 1933–1935, or his own efforts to appease Germany during 1937–1940, or his negotiations with Japan in 1940–1941, or his assessments of China's political stability despite ominous reports as early as 1935? To what extent was Roosevelt in accord with, or overcome by, the anti-imperial, anti-British and anti-Soviet views of Secretary Hull and the State Department whether applied to the Far East, Eastern Europe, or even the Eastern Mediterranean? Since the publication of this book in 1969, historians and political scientists have been probing these and many other questions which must be answered before anyone can approach an ultimate judgment about Roosevelt's diplomacy.

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Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences. By Glen H. Fisher. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. Pp. 180. $6.00.)

This slim book is an interesting but not entirely successful effort to bring the findings of the behavioral and social sciences to an audience of foreign affairs practitioners. Written by the Dean of the Center for Area and Country Studies of the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, it deserves our attention because of its concern with bridging the gap between behavioral and social scientists and policy officials.

Let us deal first with some of the problems of the book, and then consider the matter of transmitting behavioral and social science knowledge into practice. "Public diplomacy," posited as a major change in international affairs in recent years, concerns the interaction between public attitudes and opinions and the development and execution of foreign policies. This "public psychological dimension" has arisen as modern communications technology has led to the increased participation in foreign affairs by the public in all countries. But Fisher's use of "public diplomacy" poses the following difficulties: its meaning is not well defined; its determinants are asserted and not established; its scope is not clearly delineated; its relation to traditional diplomacy is not clarified; and critical problems of elite-mass interaction and relationships among elites are not explored.

The basic proposition of the book is that the behavioral sciences—especially sociology, cultural anthropology, social psychology, and "the new [behavioral] political science"—have "scientifically developed concepts, knowledge, analytical procedures, and data which have been well-matured and tested" (p. 10). Though large portions of these disciplines are not regarded as directly applicable to foreign affairs, Fisher believes that "with proper selection and adaptation [they] suggest an intellectual orientation which could contribute considerably to modern diplomacy and make it a more precise and professional field" (p. 10).

Fisher deals with a number of behavioral science concepts—perception, cognition, personality, culture, social structure, stratification, and role—in a cursory manner which social scientists will not find especially helpful. Further, his analysis is largely social psychological in nature, and he has attempted an excessively bold leap from the behavior of individuals and groups to the behavior of nations. In this he demonstrates again that the micro models of individual and group behavior have yet to be linked effectively with macro models of organizations, social systems, or nations.

The intended audience for the book is Fisher's colleagues in the foreign affairs community and students interested in the psychological and cultural aspects of foreign affairs. The likelihood that social scientists will find the book disappointing, therefore, is not an entirely adequate criterion for judging its merit. Its utility must be considered relative to its intended audience.

One might well ask how training in the behavioral and social sciences is better for foreign affairs professionals than the training they now receive. One might also consider how such training leads to improved performance of these professionals. These questions are not adequately dealt with in my estimation.

The examples in the book of how behavioral and social science knowledge has been used to increase understanding of particular events and developments in foreign affairs reveal two fundamental difficulties. First, the examples demonstrate clearly that the behavioral and social sciences have not developed to where they can be used by policy officials for prediction of foreign policy-related events in any complex society. A more reasonable criticism, however, is that the behavioral and social sciences have not led to the development of decision rules, including rules of thumb, which policy officials might apply in the many contingent situations they confront. In other words, knowledge of the behavioral and social sciences does not necessarily lead to an increased repertoire of behavioral strategies and tactics for policy officials in foreign affairs. What such knowledge does contribute, apparently, is an increased capability of understanding what is happening, not one of extended operational skills. But this outcome, however, merely re-raises the need for evaluating the training of policy officials in the behavioral and social sciences relative to other forms of training.

We are thus led to two observations, neither of which can be explored here. First, relatively little investment is made by the behavioral and social sciences in translating research findings into operationally useful knowledge. Analysis, not synthesis, is what the reward system supports, but synthesis is what is needed far more by the policy community. Fisher comes off rather poorly in this regard, but he cannot be faulted for the effort. Second, relatively little attention is paid by the research community to the organizational and institutional processes by which behavioral and social science knowledge is transmitted to policy officials. One institutional channel of communication is represented by the movement of people between the academic world and the policy world. Fisher, again, is an example of this process at work, having developed his current concerns in part while on leave from the Foreign Service to Tufts University. But both the conceptual and institutional problems of translating behavioral and social science knowledge into practice need substantially greater attention by the research community, as well as the policy community, if we are serious about making the results of our research useful to society.

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The United States and Malaysia. By James W. Gould. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 267. $8.00.)

James Gould, a former Foreign Service Officer in Southeast Asia and for several years Director of the Peace Corps Program in Malaysia, has produced the first Southeast Asian study to appear in the 28-year history of Harvard's American Foreign Policy Library series. In nine chapters Mr. Gould takes us through the ecological, anthropological, and historical settings (chaps. 1–3), politics and political integration (4 and 5), economy and society (6 and 7), and international relations, with special attention to U.S.-Malaysian relations (8 and 9). A much abbreviated "conclusion" (pp. 240–41) is followed by a six-table appendix presenting factual data on Malaysia and a brief but useful bibliographical essay suggesting further reading (pp. 247–52). The style is light and readable, and except for the occasional piece of misinformation, the material presented is factually reliable. There are problems, however.

Presumably the Foreign Policy Library is not intended for the specialist, and persons with a sound grounding in the Southeast Asian area will find little here of value. (Indeed, they may be surprised to learn on p. 209 that Carlos Garcia succeeded Diasdado Macapagal as President of the Philippines in 1965, when history records that Macapagal defeated Garcia in 1962 only to be beaten by Ferdinand Marcos in 1965.) Much of this volume should be useful and interesting to the inquiring lay reader, but several words of caution are also in order for the unsuspecting layman. First, while Mr. Gould writes with understandable pride about the accomplishments of the three states (the author includes Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei in his definition of "Malaysia"), he paints such a rosy picture that readers may understandably come away wondering how such idyllic third-world nations have failed to gain due recognition.

Second, the study appeared dated as soon as it came out in print (1969), and five years later it often seems painfully out of touch with present-day Malaysia. A review written in 1967 or 1968 when this manuscript was apparently completed would probably have been considerably more favorable than one written today, for much has happened since publication. The author was unable to consider the Kuala Lumpur riots of May 1969, the ensuing 21-month suspension of Parliament, the 1971 retirement of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, the long postponed elections in Eastern Malaysia, British "disengagement" east of Suez, the toothless Five-Power Defense Agreement, the openly pro-Malay New Economic Policy, the demonstrated economic successes of independent Singapore, and many other significant events that had not yet occurred at the time this manuscript was completed.

Malaysia, Singapore, and to a much less extent Brunei, are all healthy today on almost any measure applied to the developing countries, but the often romantic optimism of Mr. Gould contrasts sharply with the hardheaded realism of most politicians, businessmen, bankers, and economists in the area. Given the climate of the day, the late Minister of Interior of Malaysia may have been excessively emotional when in the midst of the 1969 riots he proclaimed on the state radio that "democracy is dead in Malaysia," but he was at least as close to the truth as was Mr. Gould when he concluded that "democracy seems fully established" (p. 240, and implicitly and explicitly throughout the book). Democracy was not, and is not, "fully established," and indeed there are many persons in and out of the three governments who think that "democracy," as Americans often view it, is not even appropriate to their situations. Malaysia and Singapore have impressive though brief histories, and they have many strengths favoring them, but the obstacles and pitfalls are so numerous that constant efforts to avert disaster are essential. Happily there are many Malaysians and Singaporians who are fully aware of this and who will not be lulled into complacency by interesting but overly optimistic studies such as this. American readers should be equally cautious.

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International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research. By Charles F. Hermann. (New York: Free Press, 1972. Pp. 334. $12.95.)

One problem confronting those engaged in developing a scientific approach to the study of international politics has been the lack of cumulative research. A significant contribution toward remedying this situation by aiding the cumulative growth of systematic knowledge in one field of international politics, namely the study of crises, has been made by this collection of essays edited by Charles Hermann. The essays in this volume were first presented at a symposium at Princeton University in 1967, which brought together some of the major scholars actively engaged in empirical research on international crises. The resulting book presents some of the best examples of this research in a format which provides an unusual degree of coherence for a collection of research studies. A series of introductions by the editor relates each selection to the work of other researchers and includes elements of the discussion from the Princeton symposium.

The major contribution toward cumulative research from this book is found in the excellent concluding chapter by Charles Hermann and Linda Brady. They have abstracted 311 propositions from the preceding eleven chapters and have attempted to integrate them, first, into four alternative models of crisis behavior, which are, in turn, combined into one integrated framework for the analysis of international crisis.

The first model, called the "individual stress model" is based largely upon the survey in one chapter by Thomas Milburn of relevant propositions from the social-psychological literature on stress as well as Ole Holsti's excellent application of some of these propositions to the crisis leading up to the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The model assumes that crises threaten both national goals and the goals of individual decision makers, inducing high levels of stress. Beyond some threshhold this stress tends to disrupt the decision makers' coping mechanisms and their cognitive processes. One result is that decision makers may make inadequate analogies to past situations and repeat actions which were successful in the past, so that innovative and adaptive responses are unlikely. Thus the individual stress model often accounts for crisis escalation.

The second approach, called the "organizational response model," is reflected in Glenn Paige's comparison of decision making in the United States in response to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and in response to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and also in Howard Lentner's analysis of perceptions of crisis held by U.S. State Department officers who have served in the Operations Center. This model predicts that crises will cause the locus of decision to move quickly to the top of a decision-making hierarchy, thereby reducing the fragmentation of decision making which often occurs in large complex organizations. These and other similar organizational characteristics may contribute to effective crisis "management."

Third, the "hostile interaction model" assumes that crises escalate through a stimulus-response pattern in which nations respond to threats and hostility eminating from others by increasingly hostile behavior on their own part. Thus actors may readily become "locked in" to a conflict spiral. This approach is reflected in this book in the study by Dina Zinnes, Joseph Zinnes, and Robert McClure of the escalation of the 1914 crisis in central Europe, and in Charles McClelland's analysis of uncertainty in interactions in the continuing series of crises over Berlin and the Taiwan Straits.

Finally, a "cost calculation model" attempts to apply assumptions of "rational" choice by actors engaged in a bargaining situation to the analysis of crisis. Glenn Snyder's comprehensive chapter on crisis bargaining suggests that decision makers will respond to those elements in a crisis situation which threaten essential national goals in order to protect those goals at the expense of nonsurvival goals. In order to do this, they will seek to negotiate a solution, including accommodation if necessary, and to refrain from actions which might reduce the likelihood of a settlement. On the other hand, if survival goals are not initially threatened, hostilities are likely to increase as each party tries to coerce the other into submission while avoiding disasters if survival goals do become threatened.

Hermann and Brady have tentatively merged these four "models" into one general framework, which provides a useful first step towards an integrated approach to the analysis of international crises. Their synthesis makes use of "branching points" or "switches" which determine which of several paths a crisis will be likely to follow. Two primary factors affect these switching points. First, the degree of threat to survival goals greatly affects the risks that actors will be willing to take. Second, the presence of disruptive stress greatly affects how the decision makers will respond, especially whether they will tend to get "locked in" to the escalation spiral or be able to bargain rationally for solutions which do not endanger their survival goals. At this point in the development of this framework, however, the specifics of these branching conditions and the long-range processes which are likely to result have not been specified sufficiently. For example, the branch in the framework (diagrammed on p. 302) in which survival goals are not threatened and in which decision makers do experience disruptive stress leads to the outcome that one actor initiates hostile behavior. Yet this is certainly not a complete analysis of the processes occurring in such a crisis, as the initiation of hostile behavior may only mark the beginning of the crisis, eventually producing conditions in which the survival goals of one or more actors do in fact become threatened. In short, interrelations among alternative branches must be specified with greater precision, and the dynamics of crisis from onset to outcome must be included in the framework before the synthesized model has much power in explaining and predicting the etymology of international crises. Nevertheless, the Hermann and Brady framework is a definite step in the right direction. In combination with the extensive propositional inventory, where interrelated and contradictory propositions may all be found, the foundations have been laid for improved communication among those exploring empirically the phenomenon of crisis.

The individual studies within this volume also frequently contribute to this overall effort. Nevertheless, there are a few major limitations to some of these studies, often arising from problems of indicator validity, which may limit the cumulative value of the work reported here. For example, Charles McClelland's chapter on the crises in Berlin and the Taiwan Straits is based upon a measurement of crisis interactions in terms of increases in "uncertainty," defined in information theory terms. While this is an interesting model of crisis behavior, the operational measure of uncertainty employed in this research is directly associated with an increase in the frequency of high conflict events. In this instance, it is not clear that much is gained from the employment of a sophisticated model of uncertainty. Another example is found in the article by Dina Zinnes, Joseph Zinnes, and Robert McClure on escalating hostility in the 1914 crisis. They employ an interesting Markov process model to analyze the effects of hostile interactions in crisis escalation and to try to refute the hypothesis that escalation is based upon misperceptions of hostility. Yet they operationalize hostility in a dichotomous fashion which makes it impossible to draw inferences about the *intensity* of hostility, upon which most of the research they have tried to refute is based. In this manner, these and other authors in this collection of essays too often claim to be testing comparable hypotheses when they are in fact not doing so, because of significantly different measures of the central concepts. This often limits the cumulative nature of the research reported in this book.

Furthermore, there is little agreement even about the definition of the central concept itself—namely, crisis. Charles Hermann, for example, views crisis from the perspective of the decision maker as a situation in which there is a high threat to central values, short time for response, and surprise. Charles McClelland focuses on crisis more from the perspective of the international system, viewing it as a situation in which the normal equilibrium of international interactions is interrupted. Glenn Snyder tries to synthesize these two perspectives by defining a crisis as occurring when there is a perceived increase in the probability of war. While these disparate definitions and operationalizations do detract from cumulative research, the authors must be congratulated for making these sufficiently explicit so that differences can be evaluated by the reader and perhaps eventually resolved.

International Crises, therefore, reflects the current state of progress in the scientific study of this important topic. It presents some of the major middle-range theories and empirical findings arrived at to date. Furthermore, through some of its limitations, it suggests some things which need to be done in order to improve the cumulative study of international crises. First, we must identify scope conditions which will determine the circumstances under which alternative models and sets of propositions will be applicable. For example, we do not yet know with any reliability under what conditions crises will subject decision makers to such stress that their cognitive processes will be adversely affected or under what alternative conditions they will be able to respond to the crisis in a relatively "rational" manner. Second, we need to develop further integrated deductive theories, with greater attention to modeling the *processes* which occur throughout crises, a point noted also by James Robinson in one of the introductory essays to this volume. Third, greater attention must be paid to variable operationalizations in order to make findings more valid and more comparable. Finally, there is a need to explore further the linkages between findings based on empirical theories about crisis and applied policy analysis; Thomas Milburn's effort in one chapter to derive a set of decision rules based on a set of empirically based propositions about crisis is an excellent example of how we might begin in this direction. This book, therefore, represents essential reading for those who are interested in undertaking further empirical research in the directions just noted in order to improve our ability to understand, to cope with, and to avoid serious international crises.

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American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937–1969. By Alfred O. Hero, Jr. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973. Pp. 552. $9.75.)

Alfred O. Hero, Jr., of the World Peace Foundation, has for nearly two decades pursued single-mindedly the influence of religious institutions on American foreign policy. This study, the culmination of his work, is based on interviews with more than 150 religious leaders, congressmen, and policy makers, as well as the secondary analysis of survey data from Gallup, Roper, NORC, and the Survey Research Center. It traces the attitudes and shifts of thinking of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews on leading international issues from World War II to the present. It provides a gold mine of information often at odds with hunches and first impressions about dominant religious groupings. For example, Catholics, on the eve of World War II, were probably the most isolationist and least well-informed, but by the 1960s this had changed. By then Catholics were more optimistic and affirmative than the other groups on negotiating the relaxation of tensions, the admission of China to the United Nations, and nonmilitary foreign aid. Moreover, the differences were sustained at each of the educational and socioeconomic levels studied. Within Protestantism, nonwhites who, in the 1950s were less aware of international developments than whites, had by the 1960s become at least as aware; and on certain issues, such as the United Nations, negotiating with the Russians, and economic aid, they were more liberal than whites.

These and numerous other findings bring a degree of understanding and comprehension that most of us have lacked, and this is the unquestioned merit of the book. Its methodological subtlety and sophistication and cautious use of data are further strengths. The concluding chapters on "Explanations and Interpretations" and "Toward More Effective Churches" are no less important than the heavily documented earlier sections. Indeed, one might have wished the author had been somewhat freer and more boldly analytical, especially in philosophical terms, throughout the book. On the most important issues he tends to list and enumerate the factors which might explain behavior, but rarely does he come down strongly on priorities among the factors. I have in mind his discussion of "Why Jews are Liberal," "Why the National Council of Churches' Programs in International Affairs Are More Often Judged to be Failures than Other 'Social Action' Programs," and "Why More Liberal Forms of Catholic Leadership are Acceptable for High Church Leaders but have Little Impact on Rank and File Catholics?" (Incidentally, if the latter is true, how does Hero explain his view that Catholics as a whole have moved well beyond Protestants in a more liberal internationalism?)

In reflecting on Hero's approach I am reminded of two great professors of International Relations in "the Golden Age" at the University of Chicago. Quincy Wright followed the practice of seeking multiple explanations for every phenomenon; Hans Morgenthau sought to explain by rank ordering the factors and subordinating for analytical purposes all others to the overwhelmingly most dominant one. Hero is much closer to Wright than to Morgenthau, and this largely determines what he contributes. He gives more attention to quantitative than qualitative factors. He uses standards of selection that are hard to fathom in his choice of witnesses on ethics and foreign policy. For example, he has one passing reference to Reinhold Niebuhr and six to Richard Nixon. His case studies of organizations which in religious sectors may have pointed the way are more often footnotes than serious discussions or evaluations. (For example, if Hero feels seminars and training in ethics and foreign policy are important for clergymen and churchmen, he ought to do more than lump the Council on Religion and International Affairs, whose Dr. William Loos has pioneered in this area for 15 years, with "other sophisticated groups.")

In short, Hero's book is an invaluable resource for enhancing our knowledge of what religious groups have done in international relations. If he were to write a sequel, I could wish he might begin with his valuable single page on ethics and foreign policy (p. 250) and test the extent to which anyone has used this proposition as a basis for generating sustaining interest in foreign policy among church groups. What would happen if one group at least did not begin with the aim of producing resolutions on each successive world issue but proceeded on the assumption that "no clear demarcations between right and wrong are readily apparent"? (p. 250).) My suspicion is that this could be more fruitful than inaugurating ten new programs in seminaries or bringing in experts on pedagogy, two of Hero's recommendations. But unless both Hero's prescriptions and mine are tried, we shall never know.

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Soviet Russia and the Middle East. By Aaron S. Klieman. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Pp. 106. $6.50.)

This study is an essay in interpretation based solely on the literature available in English. With this restriction, Professor Klieman makes a fair attempt to identify what he considers the signposts of Soviet Middle Eastern policy—their penetration into the "revolutionary" Arab world and their tactics, i.e., exploitation of internal Arab diversity and of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What follows is a well-digested and sometimes irrelevant summary of the historical perspective of Russia in the Middle East. The weakness of this monograph, however, is in the analysis of the relationship between Soviet purpose (policy) and the dynamics of Soviet intervention. Although Russia's purpose may have had "historical" orientations, the dynamism of policy did not follow purpose. Instead, it exploited rather pragmatically the weaknesses of Arab regimes, their diversity, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The narrative sets out to capture "the full extent and swiftness of Soviet penetration" (p. 39). No serious attempt is made, however, to analyze the swift Soviet penetration in Egypt, which, since 1967, has provided the key issue in Soviet-Middle East relation. It was Russia who exploited Arab-Israeli animosity, thus inspiring the "war of attrition" between Egypt and Israel (March '69–August '70).

The author interprets Soviet strategy (since June, 1967) as aimed at remedying the 1967 failure via U. S. pressure on Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied Arab territories. She pursued this goal through diplomacy bolstered by a Soviet inspired war of attrition, which served as a gentle remainder to the United States of the conflict's potential explosiveness. In terms of the U. S. response, the Soviets were successful. The Rogers Plan, which closely resembled Soviet-Arab interpretation of the "67 UN resolution, was produced in December, 1969. In two respects, however, the Russians failed: (1) The Russian-trained Egyptian army collapsed and the Israelis turned the war of attrition against Egypt. (2) The Israelis refused to budge. In other words, Russia's "background music," the war of attrition, once again, lent legitimacy to Israeli claims to the territories. And those Israelis, who in 1967 were willing to relinquish all territories save Jerusalem, began to sing a different song.

Analyzing Soviet-Arab relations in the Middle East, Professor Klieman states:

> The Soviet-Arab relationship is thus the interplay of regional, and global conflicts and alignments with inherent contradictions. The Russians aspire to a special status in the southern tier of the Arab Middle East. The Arabs strive for unity and freedom and have been under the mistaken impression that Soviet friendship can be exploited for such ends. The Soviets, for their part, emphasize the need for integration in this relationship, while the Arabs view it as the foundation for greater independence (p. 82).

The question, however, "Will the Arabs manage to have the Soviet Union commit itself fully on their behalf?" is not analyzed within the context of Soviet-Arab dynamics. And in discussing the Soviets' ability to exploit Arab diversity, the author fails to mention three important debacles.

(1) The Soviet failure to reconcile the two wings of the Syrian Ba'th. Soviet failure to create a "popular" government Ba'th-Communist alliance between 1968–1970.
(2) The Soviet failure to strengthen the left wing of the Egyptian ASU and Sadat's elimination of ASU's Soviet clients and its left wing.
(3) The most colossal failure—the communist abortive coup in the Sudan.

The important issue, which should be analyzed, has to do with Soviet expectations and goals in the Middle East. In terms of what Russia can achieve short of paying the price of "Vietnamization" of the area, are these expectations high, middle or low? Most important, given the dynamics of the post-Krushchev era, is the collective leadership in a position to harness the forces it has unleashed in the Middle East? This question is particularly pertinent given the lack of Soviet bureaucratic consensus (civil-military and military-intelligence) concerning the opportunity versus risk in their Middle East adventure.

My overall judgment is that this monograph has failed to achieve a coherent introductory analysis of the role, the dynamics and the types of options available to the USSR in the Middle East. The important Soviet problem in the Middle East is not whether the tails of its clients will wag, but the business of defining its political purpose in the area.

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International Law: Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht. Volume I: General Works. Edited by E. Lauterpacht. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. xxiii, 539. $37.50.)

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960), for a long time Whewell Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, and in his last years judge of the International Court of Justice, was during the period 1930–60 one of the most outstanding authorities on international law. His voluminous output of monographs and articles was crowned by his elaborate revisions of the classical book on *International Law* of L. Oppenheim, the most popular introduction to international law in the whole English-speaking world since 1905.

At the time of his death, Judge Lauterpacht was engaged in the preparation of the ninth edition of Oppenheim and completed a complete revision of its general part, which fittingly forms the introductory part of the first volume of his *Collected Papers*, edited by his son, E. Lauterpacht. This introduction, for the first time printed here, is accompanied by two other general works of Judge Lauterpacht, the original English version, not hitherto available, of his lectures in French at The Hague in 1937, and the *Survey of International Law* prepared by him for the International Law Commission of the United Nations in 1948. These three pieces are uneven in character; to some extent they are repetitious and to a limited extent complementary. Being written at about ten-year intervals, they are not necessarily consistent, and as they are not arranged chronologically, the evolution of the author's views is not too easy to follow. Nevertheless, it is good to have them here together, and to be able to compare them.

Of the three pieces, the first one, representing the author's final crystallization of his most important contributions to the theory of international law, is certainly the most important. On the other hand, the Hague lectures on the *General Rules of the Law of Peace* are the most readable, as they represent Judge Lauterpacht's ebullient self, not constricted by the rigid structure, positivist approach, and formalistic style of Oppenheim or the neutral aloofness of a United Nations study.

The main impressions one gains from reading these volumes are two: Judge Lauterpacht was a great compromiser, always trying to find a middle road between two opposing points of view; he was also a great humanitarian, putting the need to protect the rights of the individual and to achieve justice close to the center of the picture. A few examples might be useful.

Lauterpacht's predilections are reflected in his definition of international law. It reads as follows:

> International law is the body of rules of conduct,

> enforceable by external sanction, which confer rights and impose obligations primarily, though not exclusively, upon sovereign States and which owe their validity both to the consent of States as expressed in custom and treaties and to the fact of the existence of an international community of States and individuals. In that sense international law may be defined, more briefly (though perhaps less usefully), as the law of the international community (p. 9).

While he admits the controversiality of this definition, he includes in it elements reflecting several normally incompatible theories, trying to resolve the differences by qualifying phrases. Lauterpacht endorses the conservative position that international law is based on the consent of States, but at the same time he stresses the equal importance of an international community of both states and individuals. Out of the existence of that community he later derives the supplemental applicability of such more controversial sources of law as "the reason of the thing" and "the law of nature," and their modern equivalent, "the general principles of law" (p. 54). Admitting that the rules derived in that fashion cannot normally override rules based on express consent of states (treaties and custom), he nevertheless insists that it is against the background of these jurisprudential concepts that positive international law is interpreted (pp. 28, 52, 54, 76, 92–94, 267–68). In his characteristic fashion, he refuses to accept the rigid alternatives of "law conceived as will (whose validity is independent of its ethical content) and law conceived as reason rising sovereign over the sovereignty of States" (p. 52).

When Lauterpacht considers the controversial issue of compensation for property taken away from foreigners as part of a program of fundamental social reforms, he emphasizes the need to balance and adjust conflicting claims "by reference not only to such law as is already generally accepted but also by reference to justice and to the needs of the international community." It is not a question of either refusing compensation altogether or awarding full compensation; an international tribunal can choose "a middle course" (pp. 388–89, 524).

The other main theme of these essays is the need to reassess the role of individuals in the international community. This is not merely the question of "subjects" of international law but goes much deeper than that. In his very definition of international law, as was noted above, Lauterpacht postulates that the international community is one not only of states but also of individuals (pp. 9, 30–31). Many rules of international law are based on analogies from private law, on general principles of law first developed in municipal law. This is due not only to the judicial fiction that states are like individuals and enter into legal relations analogous to individuals, but also to the fact that states act through individuals and consist of individual legal beings (p. 34). Consequently, he disagrees with the view that individuals acting on behalf of a state can apply standards of morality less exacting than those obtaining between individuals; this is inconsistent with the basic postulate that "the essential and normal, though not exclusive, substance of all law is morality reduced to rules and principles of a sufficient degree of clarity, precision and enforceability" (pp. 46–49). He also rejects the idea that no punishment can be meted out to sovereign states, as its acceptance would mean that

> individuals, when grouped in the form of a State, acquire a degree of immunity in respect of criminal acts against the life and safety of their neighbours which they do not possess when acting in isolation; it is an immunity covering acts which, because they are collective and assisted by the almost infinite power of the modern State, are potentially of an unlimited destructiveness. . . . There cannot be much hope for international law or morality if the individual acting as the organ of the State can, in violating international law, screen himself effectively behind the impersonal, metaphysical State; and if the State as such can avoid punitive responsibility by invoking the injustice of collective punishment (pp. 391–93).

He concludes that "the true subjects of the duties imposed by international law are not the metaphysical entities of the State but individual human beings"; and that

> the principle that the rights and duties of States are but the rights and duties of man is of importance inasmuch as it lends emphasis to the idea—with which is bound up the progress of international law—that the individual human being is the ultimate unit and end of all law, national and international, and that the effective recognition and protection of "the dignity and worth of the human person" and the development of human personality is the final object of law. In a different sphere, the recognition of the inalienable rights of the individual in relation to the State signifies the recognition of a legal authority, however impersonal, superior to the State itself—a notion which is congenial to the view that international law as a legal system can be understood only by reference to the principle that the State is subordinated to the international legal order. It signifies the establishment of a direct relationship between the individual and international law similar to the manner in which within a Federation the individual benefits directly from and is subject to federal law. To that extent it constitutes an essential stage in the progression of the international community towards the goal of federal integration (pp. 148–49).

Finally, despite a few difficult paragraphs, this is not a dogmatic book, and the author's innate sense of restrained humor makes its appearance from time to time. For instance, in commenting on the deference of courts to the executive's determination of questions of international law, Lauterpacht notes that "in other spheres the desire not to embarrass the Executive has not been a feature of judicial activity" (p. 162, n. 1). In a discussion of Jellinek's statement that international law "may properly be described as an anarchical law," Lauterpacht ventures the dry comment that "that great lawyer probably realized that anarchical law is as difficult to conceive of as immoral morality" (pp. 210–11). In a similar vein, he deflates Kaufmann's pronouncement that the eternal ideas of law and justice constitute sources of law which are super- or extralegal, which States can invoke extrajudicially and which other States are "obliged, by law, to recognize," with the remark that "some may perhaps find it difficult to understand what are extra-legal rules of law which others are legally bound to recognize" (p. 213).

It is the intention of the editor to publish in the following volumes Judge Lauterpacht's other writings, including some unpublished papers, arranging them in a systematic fashion, as if they constituted a textbook. It may be hoped that they will provide a more detailed treatment of crucial issues of international law, weaving together theory and practice in the same masterly fashion as has been done in this introductory volume.

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Regional Integration: Theory and Research. Edited by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 427. $12.50.)

This comprehensive collection of articles offers a good summary of regional integration theory, in particular of the "neo-functionalist" school inspired by Professor Ernst B. Haas.

As the editor's preface observes, regional integration is "an increasingly elusive dependent variable" (p. ix). Haas, in the lead article, finds "authority legitimacy transfer" a useful, but insufficient definition. He postulates three heuristic ideal types: the "regional state," which has a centralized supranational authority; the "regional commune," which lacks such a central authority; and "asymetrical regional overlap," a system in which national units link themselves to a variety of functional groupings, not all of them restricted to the region. With these three ideal types as guides, independent variables can be linked into "action paths," which explain the past and predict the future of a particular regional grouping.

Armed with this methodology, Haas exhorts his fellow scholars to move from case studies and reconstruct a general theory. Such a theory must account for new forces entering various stages of the process, be sensitive to the differences between national and regional integration, and broad enough to extend to integration among less-deveoped countries. New attempts at mathematical formulation, especially computer simulation, will compel students to decide relative values for hitherto independent variables, and thus break the current stasis.

Why the hurry? Haas suspects that world peace lies in achieving the third of his ideal types, the asymmetrical regional community. By contrast, new regional states, as national states writ large, will heighten the dangerous confrontation of great powers. Haas, therefore, invites his students and disciples to turn to computer simulation: "Simulation would truly stretch, if not blow, our minds and give us a purchase on the future" (p. 42).

The uncertainties of such an exercise become apparent in Hayward Alker's article, "Integration Logics." Alker demonstrates his usual technical virtuosity, but discourages extravagant expectations. Theories of the integration process, he notes, assume the constancy of a large number of critical variables. Even experienced judgments on the relative significance of independent variables lack adequate data. Nevertheless, Alker tries to illustrate how mathematical models and computer simulation, by providing "metaphorical utopias," can at least make analysts more imaginative.

No doubt. But there is the corresponding danger that, as historical reality continues to prove inhospitable to a general theory, the more tractable medium of mathematics and computer simulation may tempt more and more theorists, like the supranational bureaucrats they study, into some form of "self-encapsulation." It might be as effective, and much cheaper, to enrich current models by a sympathetic study of the great theorists of the national state, in particular Rousseau and Hegel. Greater consideration of Marxist theory about the political consequences of international capitalism might also prove rewarding.

Several other contributors propose refurbished models and theories. Leon N. Lindberg's paradigm is a lengthy catalogue of the properties and subproperties of collective decision making, along with suggestions on how to define and measure them, with voluminous refinements and qualifications drawn from the author's great knowledge of the Common Market and the bibliography of integration.

J. S. Nye produces a sensible and hopeful critique of the neofunctionalist approach, as well as a concise model of his own. Nye is particularly impressive in reformulating "spillover." Automatic integration, stealthily manipulated by a technocratic elite, has not, he notes, proved a realistic expectation. Instead, the integration process is more likely, in time, to slow down than accelerate—especially in less-developed countries. In general, "most political decisionmakers will opt for the status quo at any level as long as the process forces or popular pressures are not strong enough to make this choice unbearable . . . " (p. 225). But integration may still move forward by "cultivated spillover"—"package deals not only on the basis of technological necessity but on the basis of political and ideological projections and political possibilities" (p. 202). Nye's formulation, by emphasizing political will and varying circumstances, is surely closer to the reality of the European Communities.

Philippe C. Schmitter, who also revises neofunctionalist theory partly on the basis of comparative studies, arrives at somewhat the same conclusions, although by a more circuitous and tendentious route.

Andrzej Korbonski's discussion of Comecon's failures—interesting, but little related to the general theory—at least illustrates the determining role of general economic and political circumstances.

In a beautifully constructed article, Donald J. Puchala discusses the possibilities and shortcomings of transactions analysis. While an excellent case is made for measuring "community formulation," "political amalgamation" seems far more elusive.

Ronald Inglehart's abstract discussion of public opinion and political leadership is unexceptionable, even if obvious and cluttered with meretricious theoretical apparatus. His case study—linking the Common Market's agricultural and constitutional crisis to the French election in 1965—propounds a familiar but unconvincing thesis.

According to Fred M. Hayward, the processes of national and regional systems are not so different, and much can be learned by relating their study. Mr. Hayward's timidity in elaborating his obvious point suggests a fundamental bias in current integration theory. It does seem time for at least this generation of theorists to shake loose from an inherited and thoroughly unscientific ideological prejudice against the nation state. The simple-minded creed that is always ready to believe nationalism wicked and transnational integration (or disintegration) good simply will not do for serious analysis of those great domestic, regional, or international issues gradually coming to a head in Western Europe.

Stuart A. Scheingold's closing article argues that students of European integration should pay more attention to the social and international consequences of the European Communities. He asks the questions which economists have asked since the 'fifties: Does the Common Market genuinely encourage trade and growth, or does it harm other regions, especially the less-developed countries? Impressed by the new socialism in the journal *Agenor*, Scheingold wants to know about integration's effects on the prospects for radical economic, social, and political reform. And, like Haas, he worries about the danger of a new European nationalism which could disrupt world politics.

Haas, of course, fears a European bloc and promotes instead his asymmetrical regional community. Such views are now fashionable, but I would suggest caution. No doubt a strong European grouping will disrupt the present pattern of world affairs. But why not? Is perpetual American military and monetary hegemony over Europe a viable arrangement, likely to promote long-range stability and prosperity? Functionalist theory opposing a European bloc risks becoming a rather sophisticated ideology for American imperialism.

In any event, Scheingold's main point is salutary. Regional integration should not be studied in isolation from the region's broad economic and political context. Is this to affirm the priority of "high" over "low" politics? Despite frequent disclaimers, this distinction has perhaps too easily lent itself to models which emphasize the separation of economics from politics, and postulate a separate logic for each sphere. Thus economic integration, based on rationally calculated greed, is meant to go forward except where interrupted by irrational addicts of grand politics. But as Mr. Nye tells us, "low politics," or the interaction of private economic and bureaucratic interests, does not offer a convincing explanation for economic integration. Instead, without political "cultivation," integration ceases. That cultivation, as I see it, springs from a broad view of national interest, a general will which includes inextricably mingled notions of economic welfare and political and economic self-determination.

Perhaps the high-low distinction should be drawn between public and private interests—or, to be more old-fashioned, between general and private wills. Such a Rousseauan formulation is doubtless alien to most people in this volume, indeed, to anyone predisposed to shrink from concepts like national interest and accustomed to explain national politics almost exclusively as a marketplace for competing private and bureaucratic interests. Such a view of politics, borrowed from the economist's market, tends to have trouble accounting for a general will, which perhaps has more than a little to do with the persisting difficulties of integration theory.

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History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945. Compiled by Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai. (Taipei, Taiwan: Chung Wu Publishing Co., 1971. Pp. 642. $15.00.)

Historians of World War II received a windfall of rare proportions when Japanese governmental archives were made public in the wake of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in the nineteen-forties. Since then, but especially in the decade of the 'sixties, hardly a year went by when fresh archival material was not made available. Still, there has been nothing approaching a definitive study of the Sino-Japanese War segment of World War II. Nor will there be until scholars have a far greater access to Chinese archival resources than has been the case thus far. Books published in Taiwan with titles like *History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945* arouse the hope that perhaps, at long last, a breakthrough has been achieved. These hopes are quickened when one discovers that the compilers have based their work on a hundred-volume study of the Sino-Japanese War published (in Chinese) by the Military History Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense on Taiwan.

Regrettably, however, the *History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945*, soon dashes any such hopes. It is so transparently self-serving that one cannot read more than a page without feeling a mixture of disappointment and anger. The Nationalist Chinese propagandists who issue such books would be well-advised to realize that most readers interested in plowing through 600-odd octavo-sized pages of turgidly served data on the Sino-Japanese War probably have at least a passing acquaintance with what was going on in China during those years. Unless they were charter members of the China Lobby, these readers are not likely to swallow the central thesis of this book, relentlessly hammered home, that the battlefield skills, wisdom, compassion, and inspirational leadership of the Generalissimo accounted for all that was good, beautiful, true and victorious that transpired in China in the years under discussion in this book.

The level of analysis in the book is woefully poor. The chapter on the "causes of the war," for example, is slightly less than two pages long and is nothing more than a chronology of events beginning with the "Shoguns' Revolution of 1868" and ending with the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The complex and fascinating Sian Incident in 1936, involving the kidnapping of the Generalissimo by Chang Hsueh-liang, is reduced to a single sentence. The compilers make no mention of the Communists' mediation efforts, which were instrumental in causing Chang Hsueh-liang to release his captive. Instead, we learn that Chang was simply "inspired by" the Generalissimo and thus freed him and returned with him to Nanking (whereupon, though the authors neglect to mention it, Chang was placed under arrest for the next twenty-five years).

The epic struggle between General Joseph Stilwell and the Generalissimo, with all of the rich insights it offers into the wartime styles of the Nationalists versus the Communists, is dismissed in two crisp sentences. "Regrettably, he [Stilwell] lacked a deep understanding of the Chinese Communists. On October 21, 1944, he was relieved and recalled to the United States" (p. 555). Scorched-earth tactics such as the intentional alteration of the course of the Yellow River and the burning of Changsha (both occurring in 1938) which have been the subject of speculation and criticism of the Kuomintang are not discussed. Adversaries of the Generalissimo like Marshal Li Chi-shen are too embarrassing to mention even in passing (and this in a book whose index of names reads like the Hong Kong telephone directory) because their strongly registered complaints in 1944 suggested to American diplomats in China that the Generalissimo was not effectively prosecuting the war against Japan and was in fact denying supplies and munitions to generals who were. Those who collaborated with the Japanese are uniformly dismissed as traitors, although recent studies by both Chinese and American historians argue that many insights into the dynamics of wartime behavior and Sino-Japanese relations in general can be learned if we repudiate such a one-dimensional analysis of collaborators.

The authors ignore uncomfortable facts which do not fit into the picture of the Soviet Union as a relentless foe of the Nationalists, always undermining Nationalist causes and shoring up the sagging Chinese Communist movement. There is no hint, for example, of any aid from the Soviet Union until June 1939; the aid received after that period is dismissed in one grudging sentence. The fact, as documented by Chinese and Westerners alike (for instance, F. F. Liu, *Military History of Modern China* and Arthur N. Young, *China and the Helping Hand*), is that Soviet Russian aid was very large indeed in the early months of the war. It was not until December 1938 that the Western nations gave China anything more than sympathy; by that time the Soviet Union had extended $100 million of credits in the form of munitions, planes, and supplies and had despatched a group of advisers and volunteer pilots who anticipated Chennault's Flying Tigers by three years. Prior to 1940, the total Russian credits authorized to China were more than three times those provided by the Western democracies.

The Japanese are treated with such a heavy hand that the effect becomes comic: "On November 3 and 22, 1938, the Japanese prime minister issued two absurd statements" (p. 34). In February, 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoye issued his ridiculous statement . . . " (p. 35). One might at least expect that the names of the Japanese would be rendered in some recognizable form, but it is unusual for the family name to be given with accuracy and a cause for rejoicing to find both surname and given name accurately rendered. The quality of the English leaves much to be desired. Sometimes you simply have to know beforehand what the authors mean. Thus, when they accuse the Japanese of "attempting to achieve the specialization of the five provinces in North China," it helps to know that Japan was aiming at creating an autonomous North China (p. 2).

Despite all these defects, the book does have a place on the shelves of specialized libraries. There are 47 multicolored maps which are excellent and almost 400 pages of detailed data concerning military operations. If you want to know who commanded the 5th Reserve Division of the New 3rd Corps of the 19th Army Group during the Second Battle of Changsha, this is the book to consult.

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Colonial Sequence, 1930 to 1949: A Chronological Commentary upon British Colonial Policy, Especially in Africa; and Colonial Sequence, 1949 to 1969: A Chronological Commentary upon British Colonial Policy in Africa, 2 vols. By Margery Perham. (London: Methuen and Co., Vol. I, 1967. Pp. 331. $8.80; Vol. II, 1971. Pp. 377. $12.00.)

African studies in the Commonwealth owe a great deal to women. During the 1930s and 1940s a considerable number of able and determined women carved out careers for themselves in African studies, which at the time was an intellectual frontier. These pioneers included such scholars as Audrey Richards, Lucy Mair, Margaret Green, Monica Hunter, Hilda Kuper, and Dame Lillian Penson, who left their mark on research, teaching, or academic administration. In a similar fashion, Lady Selwyn-Clarke, Margaret Roberts, Rita Hinden, and Marjorie Nicolson attained prominence along that turbulent border linking politics, especially Fabian politics, with the world of learning.

The most eminent of these women was, without a doubt, Dame Margery Perham. A prolific author, she has produced numerous books, the principal one being her biography of Lord Lugard, a massive, two-volume work cast in the "Life and Times" tradition of the Victorian era. She has turned out constitutional and academic inquiries, anthologies, polemics, and even light romantic novels. Within the British university system she wielded formidable authority during her teaching career. To be examined *viva voce* at Oxford for an advanced degree by Dame Margery, magnificently arrayed in a red doctoral gown, was a daunting experience for even the most hard-bitten candidate. Dame Margery also played an important part in the training of British colonial officials and in the provision of education, expansion of research, and development of universities within Britain's former African empire. She had, moreover, a voice in colonial policy making at large.

Part of this influence derived from her skill as a journalist writing for *The Times*, *The Observer*, *The Listener*, and *The Spectator*. Her articles and letters reached a wide audience and helped to mold a good deal of educated British opinion about Africa. The present volumes, a collection of ephemera written mainly for British newspapers and prestige journals, show the way in which her ideas progressed from the early 1930s to the late 1960s. They deal with a great variety of topics, primarily African: the theory and practice of "indirect rule"; race relations in Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa; German and Italian colonial claims; dilemmas facing Nigeria, the Sudan, and Ethiopia; problems of decolonization; African socialism; and so forth. These short pieces are almost devoid of footnotes or statistical tables. They lack the rigorous analysis and the specialized terminology that would be expected in a political science course today. The writer does not show any great prescience. During the 1930s, for instance, she shows no sense of the speed with which decolonization would come about. During the 1950s, she is quite unable to foresee the problems of decolonization, including those connected with the creation of military dictatorships, the expulsion of ethnic minorities, or the nationalization of foreign property. Dame Margery, like a stern but just headmistress, instead hands out term reports; these are generally favorable. She acknowledges, for example, that the Sudan on the edge of independence faces serious problems, but notes that "in all the tension and uncertainty, the great majority of the Sudanese have remained amazingly calm and orderly. This is due partly to their own steadiness of character and partly to their faith in their British administrators" (vol. 2, p. 40). In making her points, the author relies on good narrative, on anecdotes, on personal reminiscences. She is also apt to strike a hortatory note, founded on a sense of moral certainty, that today would sound strange in most British lecture rooms. "The evidence suggests," she thus concludes firmly in a letter to *The Observer* on "The Motives for Man's Cruelties," " . . . that God is more interested in individual than in communal sin" (vol. 2, p. 257).

For a political scientist, these essays will serve above all as a source book. They provide evidence on how the author's thinking developed from a solid belief in imperial trusteeship and "indirect rule" in the 1930s to support of African independence movements after World War II. They also offer an interesting commentary on the evolution in Great Britain of what Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher have called "the official mind of imperialism."

To the average white Kenyan or white Rhodesian, this colonial Establishment gradually became anathema. Insofar as a white colonist was aware of Dame Margery's work, he would regard her as an archenemy, part of that detested academic and bureaucratic gang hell-bent on wrecking the empire. She first acquired prominence during the 1930s through her pointed critique of the Kenyan settlers' demands for political supremacy within Kenya. She continued to follow the British missionary and humanitarian tradition that regarded British governance in Africa as a high moral trust to be exercised on behalf of the African majority. Africans, as she saw it, should be protected against oppression from immigrant settlers, from foreign (that is to say, German and Italian) Fascists, and also from home-grown tyrants. British Africa should be advanced, slowly, gently, inexorably, along the road to self-government and British parliamentary liberties. (It was not for nothing that—in addition to serving as vice chairman of the influential Oxford University Summer School of Colonial Administration, as a member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies and of the Executive Committee of the Inter-University Council on Higher Education Overseas—she was a president of the Universities Mission to Central Africa, a body distinguished for its traditional High Church links.) Dame Margery thus bitterly opposed all British concessions to the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a surrender to white settlerdom. She was even more uncompromising to Ian Smith's UDI in Rhodesia. While she was able to sympathize with upper-middle-class whites in Rhodesia—men and women who were willing to take a liberal stance in politics and who she believed had sprung "mostly from the families of earlier settlement, sometimes of missionary origin"—she had little patience with "the newly arrived clerk or hairdresser from Britain [who] quickly absorbs a spirit of independence" (vol. 2, pp. 295–96).

Dame Margery has never lost academic credibility. Even during the height of British student unrest during the 1960s, she did not become the target of the defamation campaigns directed against personages like Walter Adams and Terence Miller, both former principals of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and convicted therefore by left-wing militants of guilt by association with white settlerdom. Yet this redoubtable woman, as these volumes show, in fact had much more in common with a Rhodesian pioneer than with a British progressive. In her Edwardian childhood, she had been drawn to Africa by a romantic interest in hunting stories and the novels of Rider Haggard. She first came to Africa just after the "Mad Mullah" campaign in Somaliland ended. "Here I found all and more than childish dreams had promised—long days on camel or pony; camp-fires at night to keep off the lions; wild-looking but beautiful tribesmen . . . ; and, best of all, perhaps, the word 'unexplored' printed across our very reticent map" (vol. 2, p. 267). Something of these attitudes has remained with Margery Perham all her life. And surprisingly enough, few dared to upbraid her when she continued to glorify Britain's imperial mission in terms that would have done credit to Kipling. Even by the 1930s, she writes, European rule in the remoter parts of Africa had just managed to "stop slave-raiding and inter-tribal war; it had checked ritual murder or the killing of witches and twins, and alleviated famine, sleeping sickness, rinderpest and other dramatic scourges. . . . In south-eastern Nigeria, I read court records of cannibalism, sometimes carried out for magical purposes upon a commercial scale" (vol. 1, p. xv). The British rulers might have been guilty of doing too little and doing it too late; they might not have done enough to check the ambitions of white settlers; but essentially, Dame Margery admired the British administrator—at his worst an honorable if somewhat overcautious gentleman, at his best a statesman of heroic proportions, cast in the mold of Lord Lugard, whom her biography tended to idealize.

At the same time, she found Ian Smith and his friends utterly intolerable. She did not, of course, oppose white farmers as such. As these articles show, she was always willing to admit that European settlers, say, the Kenyan colonists, might justly feel proud "when they survey the statistics of coffee, maize, sisal and wheat exported from their country," and when they consider their role as pioneers of modern civilization (vol. 1, p. 40). But political power for settlers should never be countenanced—in Kenya, Rhodesia, or anywhere else. Raised to the rank of rulers, they would stand in the way of progress. For, essentially, these essays reveal Dame Margery as an optimist by temperament and a reformist by conviction. The Empire seemed to her, in Tennyson's words,

> A land of settled government,
> A land of just and old renown,
> Where Freedom slowly broadens down,
> From precedent to precedent.

Let reform do its beneficent work in Central Africa and the future would be bright. To Smith and his followers, this interpretation seemed unrealistic. They saw their world in the mirror image of a black revolutionary. Any major political changes, they were convinced, must inevitably entail a revolutionary transformation, an all-out redistribution of property and the economic liquidation of the white minority. Between these two concepts, there could be no compromise. And only the future can show whether Dame Margery will turn out to have been right.

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The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War. By Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle. (New York: Dunellen, 1970. Pp. xxxii, 189. $7.50.)

This is a contentious book. At a time when many writers on defense policy and armaments issues detect a great deal of symmetry in motivation as well as strategic opportunity between the United States and the Soviet Union, Drs. Possony and Pournelle stress asymmetry. The United States, they declare, has no intention of invading Communist territory (p. 152). The Soviets, on the other hand, will launch a surprise attack on the United States whenever a technological breakthrough gives them the prerequisite military superiority. It therefore is crucial that the United States devote more attention and resources to staying superior in such technology, even if this means sacrifices in slum clearance or pollution control, for any resignation to strategic parity runs an unacceptable risk that the Russians might suddenly have a military superiority to exploit.

This model of the Moscow-Washington arms confrontation is not new; it served as the conventional wisdom in the years after 1945 when Americans were shocked by Stalin's behavior, and genuinely assumed that Truman's failure to exploit and maintain the American nuclear monopoly had demonstrated once and for all that the United States was itself not an aggressive power. Possony and Pournelle's special contribution is rather to argue that this model is still appropriate today, when most of us have come to stress the need for détente and the dangers of American unconscious imperialism, when many of us have turned to the opportunities offered by the end of the Communist monolith, or by assured second-strike retaliatory forces—forces which might make it less necessary "to run the race."

The authors of *The Strategy of Technology* make almost no mention of Sino-Soviet conflict or the possibility that such conflict might distract the two Communist powers from hostility to the United States. We must continue to worry about Russian capabilities, Possony and Pournelle warn us, for we can never rely on their intentions. Assumptions about arms races based on Lewis Richardson's theories of mutual provocation are to be rejected. The ABM should be pursued, as should the neutron bomb, and numerous other weapons. Nuclear weapons should have been used in Vietnam (p. 149), although these should have been the neutron-bomb variety which might have been developed long ago but for the naive reasoning of McNamara and others. The authors indeed display a most remarkable open-mindedness and creative ingenuity on thoroughly hostile ideas; why not drop cheap handguns all over Cuba to make life hard for Castro (p. 28), or invest in possibly unrewarding new weapons technologies if only to mislead the Russians into wasting their money in the same technologies (p. 119)? Notions of limited war are misleading, the authors contend, because they imply more cooperation and community of interest with the other side than is warranted. Guerrilla wars should be avoided, but mainly because they sap American energies that must be devoted to the all-important technological race against the Soviet Union.

Possony and Pournelle make no mention of another possible "enemy," the self-serving military officers who might try to sell us weapons we don't need, in the simple empire-building machinations of bureaucratic politics. Rather these are portrayed as far-sighted advocates of national preparedness, trying to overcome the short-sighted naivete of the arms-controllers.

If one boggles at accepting the authors' picture of comparative intentions in the two superpowers, one might more readily, however, accept another of their caveats, against assuming that nature will always be so kind as to make decisive breakthroughs in new weapons technologies impossible. We have too often in the past been told that obnoxious weapons, e.g., the H-bomb, or very accurate missiles, or ABM's, would be impossible. What if anti-submarine warfare (ASW) turns out to be less difficult in the future than is currently predicted; won't we all be in a lot of trouble? Yet the authors hardly mention a much more dangerous technological possibility, the spread of nuclear weapons. Should we really brood about Soviet weapons breakthroughs more than about nuclear weapons in the hands of the IRA or Mafia or FLQ?

Of course, the rest of us can easily have gone overboard on detente and mutuality of interest. The Possony and Pournelle book may look less antimainstream if the current detente turns sour, perhaps with new Russian provocations in the Middle East, or with new rounds of strategic weapons procurements making impossible any acceptable SALT II. If so, the authors will draw congratulations for having kept the faith when so many others had deserted it. As things stand, however, I do not predict that history will come to Possony and Pournelle's rescue.

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The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. By Rouhollah K. Ramazani. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972. Pp. 157. $7.50.)

In the preface to this book the author states that his primary aim is "to clarify the role of Iran in the Persian Gulf by examining the relevant foundations and development of Iranian interests and policy" (p. x). The result is a general and quite useful survey of how Iran came to achieve its current position of local dominance in that area, but readers who seek information about how Iranian foreign policy is made will find little enlightenment within these covers.

The existence of oil and the need for security along its trade routes are, as the author points out, the real reasons why the Shah has displayed such an interest in Gulf affairs over the last decade. What Professor Ramazani does not, however, stress sufficiently is the way in which Teheran was aware of the potential dangers in the Gulf long before either the oil consumers or the other littoral states woke up to the realities of the situation. From the moment when the threat of militant Arab socialism deriving its inspiration from Cairo—and finding concrete expression in the existence of Egyptian troops in Yemen—made itself felt, the Shah took steps to coordinate foreign, economic, and military policies with a view to protecting Iranian interests. This action certainly stemmed from an understandable desire for self-preservation on the part of the Shah, and Professor Ramazani is at pains to make this point. An equally important factor in the situation—and one that receives much less attention in the book —was Iran's realization that her erstwhile allies (particularly the U.S.A.) might not be willing to come to Iran's aid during a moment of crisis. Washington's speedy recognition of the republican regime in the Yemen and the western countries' apparent reluctance to grant economic aid at a time when oil revenues were still low certainly strengthened the Shah's desire for greater Iranian self-sufficiency.

This desire for greater local autonomy gave Teheran a headstart when British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf was announced in January 1968. It was then that many of the problems which had remained more or less dormant during the period of British dominance began to re-emerge as subjects of immediate dispute. Iran could seize the diplomatic initiative in this situation for she had already begun to exercise greater control over her own Gulf provinces. This period of preparation, though not always smoothly successful, was the key to Iran's later achievements; unfortunately, it is not given sufficient prominence in the book.

The perceptive nature of Teheran's policies has found reflection in the Shah's awareness of the dangers posed by the revolt in the Dhofar province of Oman—a subject all but ignored in this book. The existence of Soviet, and later, Chinese assistance for the rebels shows that the significance of this movement was not lost on Moscow and Peking, but such aid is not mentioned by the author.

In discussing the former Trucial States, Professor Ramazani adopts the widely prevalent view that these small states are not really viable political entities. No realistic commentator on Persian Gulf affairs would wish to belittle the dangers which these new states face, but to say baldly that they "lack the human and natural resources necessary for the creation of a powerful union" (pp. 89–90) is misleading. A powerful union could very well be a threat to peace in the Gulf, whereas an adequate but wealthy union, which derives its strength from the minimal nature of its demands for political loyalty—and in an area of old tribal rivalries minimal demands are the ones most likely to be successful—could well continue to live at peace with its larger and more powerful neighbors. This tendency to discount, if not altogether write off, the value of the small states of the Gulf is a common but dangerous error.

For that somewhat rare person, the general reader, however, the book makes several good points: that Iran's role in the Gulf has been a reflection both of the character of her ruler and of her internal political situation; that internal security has helped foster a more self-confident foreign policy; that the historical myth of a continuously active Iranian interest in the Gulf powerfully affects public attitudes in Iran. The point that any regime in Iran, be it royal or otherwise, would have, under current circumstances, to take a growing interest in the Gulf is infrequently made but is very important for a realistic appraisal of the future.

One final but necessary criticism. For an academic press to publish a book in which there are errors in the bibliography, in which the same bank of a river is described as the North bank on page 4 and the East bank on page 19, and in which the place name spellings on the maps differ misleadingly from those in the text is a disgraceful reflection on present standards of proofreading and book production.

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The Diffusion of Power, 1957–1972: An Essay in Recent History. By W. W. Rostow. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972. 739 pages. $12.50.)

Walt Whitman Rostow inhabits at least three *personae* that contribute to his massive new book on foreign policy. After early government service, he became visible as a Cambridge (Mass.) professor who wrote books and advised princes. Like the original Florentine consultant, his writings and advice were often influential. He then moved into the very center of princemanship, becoming successively Deputy Special Assistant to President Kennedy, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, and from 1966–69 Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Johnson. The third Rostow *persona* is as theoretician and ideologist of national strategy.

The author calls his book "One man's view of the years 1957–72." The first 129 pages review the postwar world, and in the light of Revisionist distortions it is useful to be reminded again of the Stalinist power-grabbing years and the appropriate U.S. response.

The next 175 pages cover the Kennedy administration, and the 225 pages that follow, the Johnson administration, with chapters on the organization of national security affairs, military policy, the nonproliferation treaty, SALT, development, crises, and of course Vietnam.

The present book is of great value in comprehending the past 16 years as seen through the eyes of a brilliant if controversial economic historian who also enjoyed a rare vantage point inside the policy machine. It is written with clarity and élan, and covers with sweeping strokes a broad spectrum of men, places and events, colored with the always-stimulating Rostovian interpretation.

At the same time, this presents serious problems flowing from its dual nature as history and memoir. Walt Rostow has been singled out for an uncommon amount of abuse because of his role in the Vietnam War, and I do not want to add to that painful controversy. Nevertheless, this book seems to me to labor, perhaps inevitably, under certain deficiencies in terms of objectivity and sensitivity which require recognition along with its positive qualities.

The problem for the reviewer arises when Professor Rostow gives evaluative judgments of the main actors and events of the era. By uncritically praising virtually all that was done, he not only suspends the historian's critical judgment, but also revives in the vulnerable medium of scholarship some of the sharpest edges of the quarrels of the recent past.

Uniformly complimentary toward five presidents, each seen as responding appropriately to challenge, he ensures that none of their underlying premises about the nature of the world or the U.S. role is seriously examined. The book becomes a downright apologia with President Johnson, who "will rank among the greatest" (p. 533). Critics to the contrary, LBJ was "a thorough professional in foreign policy" (p. 366). What many perturbed (and equally loyal) Americans were finally forced to consider a brutalizing, tragic, and eventually demented period in our national history, our Dr. Pangloss assures us was a "creative period" in which Johnson left to Nixon "an agenda potentially more manageable than he or his predecessor had confronted" (p. 312). Lest either Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Johnson might ever consider changing a policy because wrongly conceived, on his own proud testimony there was Professor Rostow at their side to reassure both men of their greatness, and of the wrongness of their "liberal" critics (p. 300).

Playing this role evidently forces suspension not only of critical judgment but of even the ordinary categories of inquiry. For example, the Dominican Republic in 1965 is not worth much discussion because "morally, the question was not difficult" (p. 413). One-time analyst of Soviet affairs Rostow refuses to acknowledge that to intervene militarily in an allied country to prevent an unwanted change in regime is an equally valid description of the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Rostow's discussion of the Dominican Republic deals only with calculations of national interest and the tactics of success, and if it is all any different from the ends-means calculus of a Khrushchev or a Brezhnev, I'd like to have it explained.

On Vietnam the author's vision remains undimmed by nuance or misgiving. The only issue he reports having encountered in his famous 1961 trip with Maxwell Taylor was "Communism or unification under Hanoi" (p. 274), plus an exaggerated linkage with Chinese power and prospects. Professor Rostow acknowledges the existence of arguments about U.S. prestige, power, ideology, human life, the effect on the next generation of Americans, and the other elements of the Indochina tangle. But he easily satisfies himself regarding the "moral issues" concerned, and his only real disappointment was that both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson resisted his advice to invade North Vietnam (p. 513). In the same spirit he adjudges President Kennedy's failure to deal punitively with violations of the Laos accords "the greatest single error in American policy in the 1960s" (p. 290). Maybe he is right about that, which *did* involve the Soviets and thus the larger equilibrium.

But we really learn nothing new, nor are we helped to a more balanced perspective. The author is at best patronizing to those who disagree, and at worst he is unable to see dissent about foreign policy as anything but hopelessly misguided, glandular, or a fatal disease of the left.

Professor Rostow started out as an economist and, unlike most writers on foreign policy, always has in mind the nonpolitical elements in international relations, which of course were increasingly crucial even as American leaders in the 1950s and '60s became locked into political-military approaches to problems that might have benefited enormously from some of Walt Rostow's own earlier insights concerning the economic, social, cultural, psychological and human components of countries in transition. The heady spirit in which Rostow recounts his wife's *bon mot* that "You're the junior officers of the Second World War come to responsibility" (p. 215), accords with his approving description of the Washington bureaucracy of 1962 as operating "less like a governmental machine than like a regimental command post in combat . . . " (p. 259). But of course no known regimental command post gives much house room to "soft" sociocultural, psychological, and ethical issues.

For us in the center the intellectual dilemmas remain unresolved. (The right and left never had any doubts.) How usable is Rostow's overall map of our times? Does his view of the 1960s expand our understanding? Or is he seeking to make permanent all the conceptions, some of them erroneous, that were activated under savage pressure in that harrassed and ultimately beleaguered command post? Will contemporary history look, in retrospect, like the logical, seamless web Professor Rostow spins for us? Or are there other secular trends that are unavoidably missed by both the committed public servant and the historian *engagé* (just as they are missed by the intellectual *enragé*)?

Who, then, is today's open-minded student of foreign policy to believe? The ivory-tower theorist who pontificates about policy in chronic ignorance of its pressures and imperatives? Or the enthusiastic salesman of official policies who can also write history? The third, and preferred, choice would be a knowledgeable scholar who combines experience and critical judgment. Walt Rostow is a trained historian, a persuasive advocate, and a stimulating intellectual. He could have written his memoirs, and no one would be entitled to criticize them because they were *parti pris*. But he has chosen to write an insider's story with the trappings of both theory and history.

Given the dilemma the author has created for himself, all one can prescribe is a more balanced intellectual diet. We ought to accept with gratitude the generosity to give, and the eagerness to share, of this irrepressible, industrious, committed historian. But we need some roughage from more objective critics, along with a few supplemental vitamins to keep up our strength and enhance our eyesight as we pick our way among the shadows.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
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Small States in International Relations, Nobel Symposium 17. Edited by August Schou and Arne O. Brundtland. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971. Pp. 250. $16.50.)

This book presents papers delivered at a symposium on small states at the Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway. The participants came from twenty countries, most of them small states. Among the groups of internationally known specialists in that particular subfield were David Vital, Jacques Freymond, Gerald Stourzh, and "the mother of small state studies," Annette Baker Fox.

As one would expect from the participation of such high-powered experts, the book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly growing literature on small states in international relations. The contributions, however, are uneven, with little overall coherence between the chapters. Most of the papers are in fact isolated case studies. Considering the amount of expertise gathered at the conference, it could probably have been put to better use if the editors had presented the paper-givers with a conceptual framework prior to the conference, rather than extracting the structure from the transcript of the discussions after the meetings. If the writers had been asked to respond to specific sets of questions and to arrange their data correspondingly, the scholarly value of the book would have been greatly enhanced.

The symposium was to a large extent carried by three groups of specialists: one with Fox, Vital, Barston and others with a background in theory and teaching; another with representatives of developing countries as J. J. Okumu of Kenya; and a third group, with Erling Bjøl of Denmark, L. G. Jaquet of the Netherlands and S. F. Lemass of Ireland, all of whom had long years of practical experience in international politics before they entered academic life.

The first group devotes much effort to definitions and conceptualization. When writing about small states, how can one avoid including middle-range or even ex-great states in the analysis? None of the theorists comes up with a final answer. With close to a hundred countries potentially on the world's small-state list, it seems rather futile to look for a common denominator. Population, size, GNP, and other traditional variables are clearly inadequate as analytic criteria. One tends to agree with David Vital who points at the great diversity involved. A small state may be weak in one area, but still surpass even great powers in another. Vital illustrates some of these differences through his three paradigms, represented by Czechoslovakia, Israel and Finland (elaborated in his book, *The Survival of Small States*). Even if we add some recent modifications for Israel, this analysis by subdivisions and special categories seems more fruitful than the traditional search for general definitions and criteria.

The pragmatic approach is further accentuated by the "ex-practitioners." Bjøl, Jaquet and Lemass all emphasize the historical dimension. Denmark and Holland are both unique in the sense that through centuries they have been able to switch from deep involvement in great power politics to almost complete disengagement—while still maintaining an essential influence. In his paper Bjøl points out the importance of linking small state studies to the constant changes in the international system, while Jaquet, in a more policy-oriented approach, stresses the small states' options for influence within systems of alliances. J. J. Okumu, who confines his discussion to African states, makes an important point by showing how small developing states differ from the small industrial ones in elite perceptions, domestic preoccupations, legal concerns, and other major variables which he feels are accentuated by their newness as international actors. Clearly, in certain areas of international activities, the interests of both categories of state may converge. But while most of the small industrialized states struggle to preserve the status quo and hang onto what they have, most developing states see their future as dependent upon change. These two positions call for a fundamental difference in approach.

In terms of theory and generalized observation, the partly transcribed summary of the discussions is a particularly rewarding part of the book. The symposium stressed greatly the importance of functions, a point which, incidentally, has been dealt with in much greater detail by the leading Norwegian expert on small states' problems, Trygve Mathisen, in a recent book, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers*.

But there is no need for the small state to try to cover all three levels equally well. Attempting to do so, could do more harm than good in systemic as well as national terms. A crucial point, forcefully argued by Jacques Freymond, is how far a small state should try to extend its functions. Should it engage heavily in international affairs or stick closely to its national environment? Using a systems approach, Freymond's concern is the increasing tendency to refer problems to levels above those on which they occur. Local confrontations often escalate into world problems causing conflicts far out of proportion to the original issues. He feels that the international system can function only on the national, regional and global levels. Therefore, each small state should aim for solving its problems on the national level by its own means. It must, he says: ". . . take care not to become a source of trouble to others."

This proposition appears generally acceptable in principle, but is hard to apply in practice. Dr. Freymond's case country, Switzerland, has managed to live close to such expectations for about two centuries. But how applicable is the Swiss experience to that of other small countries? What is involved here is the whole issue of nonalignment as a policy orientation, which a majority of small states practice more or less successfully. To "stay out of trouble" means in more concrete terms to accept the conditions in the country, more or less as they exist. If they are to be improved, it would have to be done by the "bootstrap method," i.e., by internal, national development. Inviting aid and foreign investments may accelerate progress, but this also carries the risk of neocolonialism and external entanglements which might cause escalation and further trouble.

If one carries Freymond's suggestion a few steps further, one will in fact be asking whether a true neutrality or nonalignment policy is conditional on the acceptance of any status quo, modified slightly by marginal adjustments on the national level, possibly with some carefully measured outside help. However prudent this may sound, it seems certain that most small states will find it unacceptable because the whole meaning of their emergence into statehood is connected with major rather than marginal change.

Quoted out of context Freymond might be reprimanded for suggesting some sort of "neo-feudalism" where every nation has its place—and stays there. This is clearly not his intention. The Swiss case, on which he draws, seems to carry his proposition. As it becomes increasingly unique, however, the questions he raises are likely to gain in relevance. While accepting social, economic and political change as the model for behaviour, how can one avoid the corollary of small states' "troubles" spiraling into global engagements, as illustrated by the recent Middle East confrontations. As most of us seem to agree that we cannot afford much more of such, how will the international conflict regulations, which now seem immediately necessary, affect small states' perceptions of change versus status quo as guidelines for their policies?

None of the papers delivered at the Oslo symposium present anything like an answer to this fundamental problem, but even with its blend of triviality and excellence, the book appears to be a useful addition to the literature on problems peculiar to small states.

NILS ØRVIK

Queen's University, Ontario

Aden and British Strategy, 1839–1968. By Harvey Sicherman. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, Research Monograph Series, No. 12. August, 1972. Pp. 53. $3.50, paper.)

To the student of world politics in a post-imperial age, the recent experience of Aden with both imperialism and independence is more instructive than that country's comparatively low power position might initially suggest.

From 1839 on, the Red Sea port of Aden came to be prized as a vital link—"the Gibraltar of the East" it was called—in the extended chain of colonies and holdings which gave coherence and form to the British Empire. Englishmen found Aden commercially convenient and militarily useful. Faith in impregnable fortresses, the utility of direct rule, and the logic of "preventive possession" only further reinforced this imperial impulse. By the late 1940s, however, such conventional wisdom had been invalidated by events, and Britain began her recessional. The intervening century drained imperialist doctrines of their cogency and Britain of her will to empire.

Consequently, 1967 saw Aden pass quickly from imperial outpost to Middle Eastern variant of a people's republic. But almost a decade of sovereignty has merely substantiated rather than altered her previous condition of dependency. Southern Yemen remains subject to the pressures and insecurities of larger forces, of systemic as well as regional considerations. Made vulnerable internally because of a weak social and political infrastructure, Aden finds her domestic instability is matched by total economic dependence upon the reopening of the Suez Canal as a major avenue of international commerce. In terms of the regional subsystem, Southern Yemen's independence is jeopardized by stronger peninsular actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen; while Soviet Russia and China have each established a presence in Aden since 1967.

As the historical perspective offered by this monograph makes evident, Aden would seem, if anything, to illustrate the enduring salience of spatial location and geopolitical configurations. Witness the effective naval blockade imposed during the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict in waters immediately adjacent to Southern Yemen. Situated at the highly strategic point where Asia and Africa meet, where the Red Sea and Persian Gulf converge and lead on to the Indian Ocean, Aden continues to offer inducements to ambitious great powers, and thus serves as a barometer of global trends.

While the author might have expanded upon the prospects and perils for Adeni independence after 1968 as a result of the British legacy and geopolitical constants, he provides a detailed and useful overview of British policy up to that point. Arguments and pressures governing London's attitude toward Aden are surveyed, unfortunately without recourse to the original British archives, for each of the three phases: acquisition, retention, and release of Aden. Sicherman indirectly also offers a potential documentary case study of decision making and bureaucratic politics by recalling the various schools of thought and ministerial rivalries which prevailed. It suggests that rather than being simply a matter of divide and rule in Aden and the Middle East, Britain, as a decisional unit, came eventually to rule and be divided.

With the British record available to them, Soviet leaders will find it difficult to argue, at some future accounting, that they have acted in Aden and the Arab world in a fit of absent-mindedness.

AARON S. KLIEMAN

Tel Aviv University, Israel

Weak States in a World of Powers. By Marshall R. Singer. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 431. $10.95.)

In examining why weak states are weak, Marshall Singer has produced a book on international relations which reverses the usual focus on power. Abandoning the traditional emphasis on great power relations, he looks at the international system from the point of view of countries with little power. He intended to "illuminate the multiple dimensions" of power and to remedy common distortions by including in his analysis interpersonal and intergroup relations. He also meant to concentrate on the noncoercive or "attractive" means by which power is exercised and to mute (even denigrate) military capacity. Following a fairly orthodox discussion of the elements of power which stresses the psychological or perceptual point of view, Professor Singer devotes an important part of the book to a detailed discussion of different kinds of ties between states.

Interesting tables illustrate the existence of perceptual ties (divided into historic, linguistic, religious, racial, class, ideological, and educational identification); of communication ties; economic ties; military ties; and political ties. Many of the tables group the larger powers with smaller states associated with them to tease out patterns of trade, aid, international news service ties, delivery of jet aircraft, voting behavior in the United Nations Assembly, formal political organizations, languages spoken, and the like.

The somewhat prolix discussion of the various ties occasionally produces a noteworthy, or at least novel, point. For example, the "haves" in underdeveloped countries often show important links with the "haves" in advanced countries, but the same is not true for the "have-nots" in the two kinds of countries (pp. 139–41). For another, ideologies of the great powers influence those in smaller states, but not the other way around. Singer stresses the vital influence of education, and in this discussion states that "in 1963 the United States was the country to which almost forty per cent of the independent countries of the world sent most of their overseas students for study" (p. 162).

The author points out the implications that their relatively meager sources of information have for weaker states. When a weak state reacts against a perceptual "mentor," it often turns to another, thus not diminishing its dependency (p. 177), and the same holds true for economic ties (p. 226). In discussing foreign direct investment, Singer states that what began "as a mutually advantageous economic relationship also often takes on, by its very success, highly political overtones" (p. 265). He makes a distinction between "perceived political influence" and "actual political influence," suggesting that decision makers in a weaker state, without basis in fact, behave as though they thought the greater power was almost omnipotent (p. 314).

Professor Singer is from the start concerned about another distinction: between dependence and interdependence. His description of the latter condition, which exists among many of the advanced industrial states, is useful in clarifying many relationships. He comments, for example, that *no* state is interdependent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (p. 362). At several places in his analysis he points out a mutuality of interest between a great power and weaker states, as in the case of educational exchanges and economic development of the underdeveloped countries.

Although the author has avoided a common and rather fruitless effort to define "weak states," and thus avoids the need to rank states according to their power, his approach leads him into another analytical trap. By generalizing about the behavior of weak states he often fails, in the course of his lengthy discussion, to make the appropriate qualifications, and he often makes simplistic statements or judgments concerning some relationships which more detailed diplomatic investigation would reveal to be highly inaccurate. To take a few examples, British power, he says, prevented the U.S. from absorbing Canada in the 19th century but only stopped "political absorption" (p. 106). Later he refers to Canada as being dominated by the United States (p. 363), a statement which would be surprising to Prime Minister Trudeau or any of his predecessors going back a long way. It is quite untrue that dependent countries "send troops when the U.S. says 'Send troops!'" (p. 364). Or consider the absurdity of his statement that "The British Commonwealth and the French Community, while not specifically military organizations, presumably can function that way" (p. 280). His discussion of the OAS is equally faulty, especially as it avoids mention of the ways in which some of the Latin American members have used it to underscore their diplomatic independence of the U.S. when it suited them. His references to NATO, also, reveal a one-sided perception of its functions.

The book runs down hill after a strong effort to be realistic and analytical. The last part is undisguisedly didactic, as the author lays down his prescription for how strong states and weaker ones should behave. And it ends in a jeremiad warning that neither of them show the appropriate signs that they will do so. In this section he throws away all his careful qualifications of earlier discussions of state behavior and group perceptions, repeats the old simplistic adage, that "Decision makers in all states seek to maximize the power of their state" (p. 380), and makes such generalized statements as that "the weaker states believe they need relatively large military forces . . . " (p. 408). He makes recommendations which are quite inconsistent with his earlier analysis, such as that wealthy states should provide aid to weaker countries regardless of regime (p. 403). In this section, the drawbacks of the personal, conversational style of the book are compounded by a tone of outright advocacy.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX

Columbia University

New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. By Joseph M. Siracusa. (Port Washington, N.Y., and London: National University Publications, Kennikat Press, 1973. Pp. viii, 138. $6.95.)

Much of the early writing on the Cold War took for granted sole Russian responsibility for the rupture of the World War II coalition. Debates centered instead on the sources of Soviet imperialism: Was its etiology to be found in Stalin's megalomania? In traditional Russian expansionism? In Bolshevik ideology? Critical reactions to this literature include not only more balanced interpretations which avoid dividing the world into the good guys and bad guys, but also a series of books that return to the theme of a single culprit—the United States. Throughout much of the 1960s, a steady outpouring of books by such prolific authors as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, and others portrayed America not as a nation that had taken leave of its senses in the disastrous Vietnam debacle, but as one that has always been imperialistic owing to one or another aspect of its capitalist political economy. Emphasis varied from study to study, but most adopted some variant of a common theme. Since the late nineteenth century America has had to choose between one of two courses. It could have restructured its institutions by establishing a socialist political economy that is assumed to be self-sufficient, and is therefore without needs that must be satisfied by external economic ties. The alternative was to embark upon a search abroad for raw materials to sustain the industrial complex, and for markets into which to dispose of agricultural and industrial surpluses—that is, the policy of the "open door," a synonym for imperialism in the lexicon of the New Left. According to the revisionist historians, American leaders at least since William McKinley have repeatedly selected the latter course, partly in order to avoid confronting the implications of domestic reform. Thus, imperialism is, in the words of one revisionist historian, "as American as apple pie." San Juan Hill and Vietnam are separated in time and space, but not in the needs and motives which gave rise to them.

That these revisionist works should have had widespread appeal during the agonizing Vietnam years is understandable; that many were spared searching critical review—even by those that had been sensitive to the Manicheanism of the ultra-right—is less so. This state of affairs now appears to be changing. Joseph Siracusa's study, a revised version of his doctoral dissertation, joins a growing list of books and essays that examine critically the premises and practices of the New Left historians.

Siracusa's small book covers a broad terrain. His opening chapter compares and contrasts the revisionists' work with critiques of American diplomacy by the "realist" school. Where Hans J. Morgenthau, George Kennan, and others find a record often marred by naive idealism and irrationality, the revisionists see only consistency and rationality in assessing the needs of a capitalist political economy, and in pursuing policies to satisfy those requirements. One result is that hitherto lightly regarded figures such as McKinley are transformed into political geniuses who saw with great clarity how empire would resolve the contradictions of capitalism. Chapter 2 focuses on William Appleman Williams, the intellectual dean of the revisionist school. The third chapter examines the New Left reconstruction of American diplomatic history between 1898 and 1941, with emphasis on the Spanish-American War, annexation of the Philippines, the Hay "Open Door" notes, American entry into World War I, the League of Nations, and American involvement in World War II. Historians under scrutiny include Walter LaFeber, Thomas McCormick, Gordon Levin, Arno Meyer, Carl Parrini, Lloyd Gardner, and Robert Freeman Smith. The fourth chapter deals with the origins of the Cold War as viewed by four prominent revisionists—LaFeber, Gardner, Alperovitz, and Kolko. The conclusion reports the results of a survey among the most prominent American diplomatic historians; Thomas A. Bailey, Ernest May, Robert Farrell, Richard Leopold, Julius Pratt, and many others were asked to evaluate the work of the revisionist historians. Not surprisingly, these assessments range from mixed to highly unfavorable.

Although it may serve as an introduction to some key assumptions shared by the New Left revisionists, the Siracusa study is not wholly satisfying. It is long on description and very short on analysis. As a result, this book lacks the analytical insight of Robert Tucker's *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, or the specificity and detail of Robert James Maddox's *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War*, a brilliant exposé of logical and methodological horrors in the revisionist literature. In contrast, Siracusa's book seems bland and antiseptic. Long quotations from the books under review mark each chapter, as Siracusa appears content to let the revisionists speak for themselves. Certainly *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians* falls short of fulfilling the promise on the dust jacket: "Dr. Siracusa's provocative thesis challenges revisionist assumptions, methodology, and interpretations, and offers a new perspective on the past decade of historiographic realignment." The survey of leading diplomatic historians reinforces the reader's feelings that Siracusa is willing to let others analyze and evaluate. This is regrettable because as a young historian without a professional stake in "establishment" interpretations of American diplomatic history (unlike those whose judgments were canvassed for the concluding chapter), Siracusa was in an especially good position to develop a forceful case for the strengths and weaknesses of the revisionist literature.

Some New Left historians have launched a vitriolic campaign against the Princeton University Press for having published the Maddox book. Although Siracusa's concluding sentence reads, "In sum, much of the New Left diplomatic historiography that emerged in the 1960s lacked intellectual validity" (p. 119), one doubts that even the most radical of the revisionists will feel much compulsion to undertake a similar attack against the publisher of *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians.*

Ole R. Holsti

Duke University

War Coalitions: The Distributions of Payoffs and Losses. By Harvey Starr. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972. Pp. 224. $12.50.)

This study tests several hypotheses about the distribution of rewards among war coalition partners. It is based on statistical analyses of data concerning 36 coalitions which participated in 30 international wars since 1821. Some major findings are: (1) A coalition member's percentage share of spoils, in the form of territory or indemnity, is more closely related to the extent of its *participation* in the war, than to its power, or its ideological compatibility with other coalition members. (2) The extent to which a coalition member is *satisfied* with the outcome of a war is not closely related to its share of the spoils, but depends on victory in the war. (3) Generally speaking the equality of the distribution of spoils among coalition members is determined by the size of the war, or the size of the coalition. The larger the war, or the larger the coalition, the more unequal the distribution of spoils will be.

This is a tremendously ambitious project in which Starr shows much promise for the future. He utilizes an impressively wide range of historical materials to test a large number of interesting hypotheses. Furthermore, he makes a valiant attempt to communicate his findings clearly to both the historically oriented, and the more quantitatively oriented reader.

Unfortunately, he does commit some serious logical and methodological errors. There is, for example, a series of levels-of-analysis errors. Starr is interested in two basic questions about coalitions: (1) Who gets how much? (2) How equally is it distributed? These are national level, and coalition level questions, respectively. Starr is insufficiently aware of this distinction. When he performs coalition level analyses, he usually assumes that the *N* is equal to the number of *states* involved, thus overestimating the statistical significance of his results by a considerable margin. At one point, he correlates the equality of the distributions of battle losses suffered by coalitions with the equality of the distributions of spoils after the war. Since the correlation is positive, he mistakenly concludes that this means that the spoils are being distributed to *states* according to the share of battle losses they suffer (p. 84). This is a fallacious national level conclusion based on a coalition level analysis. Most seriously, this levels-of-analysis confusion leads Starr to formulate and test a large number of self-contradictory hypotheses which involve incorporating variables into national level models which only make sense in coalition level models, and vice versa. For example, he correlates the extent of ideological compatibility in *coalitions* with percentage shares of indemnity received by *states* in the coalitions (p. 92). It is not logically possible, of course, for *every* state in a coalition to get a *larger* percentage share of *anything*, no matter how great the "we-feeling" in the coalition.

Perhaps the most serious error Starr makes involves his choice of indices for the dependent variables. On the national level, Starr is interested in explaining the distribution of shares *within* coalitions. Unfortunately, his analyses compare percentage shares *across* coalitions. This means, first, that virtually all of the national level coefficients Starr reports reflect irrelevant between-coalition covariance, in addition to the theoretically appropriate within-coalition covariance. Second, the percentage shares are not comparable because of the different sizes of the coalitions in Starr's analyses. Finally, several of the national level correlations Starr reports are statistical artifacts brought about at least partially by the fact that both the dependent and the independent variables are functions of the varying sizes of the coalitions. For example, the larger the coalition, the lower, on the average, will be the coalition member's percentage shares of not only spoils, but also power, participation, or gidgets.

There is a similar problem with Starr's coalition level analyses. The upper limit of the Gini index which Starr uses to measure the inequality of distributions is $1-1/N$. Therefore, if a coalition consists of two states (as do several of the coalitions analyzed by Starr), and one state receives 100 per cent of the spoils, the Gini index is only .50. Thus, Starr finds that the size of coalitions is positively related to the inequality of distributions of spoils in coalitions (p. 77) partly because the index of inequality which he uses is a function of the size of coalitions.

Starr also uses stepwise regression in a rather atheoretical manner which was likely to lead him to his conclusion that the largest pot of independent variables is the most productive. Furthermore, there is at times a tenuous connection between the coalition theory which Starr cites and the analyses he performs. For example, he claims that the negative correlation he finds between percentage shares of spoils states receive, and the size of coalitions, (p. 54) yet another statistical artifact, supports Riker's size principle. Finally, several of Starr's "judgmental" variables are so ambiguously defined that a test of intercoder reliability revealed agreement as low as 49 per cent (p. 195).

Despite these problems, I look forward to Starr's future work. We need more scholars who are willing and able to undertake projects of the kind that Starr attempts in *War Coalitions*. And if this project has serious flaws, that is partly because, to repeat, it is so terribly ambitious.

JAMES LEE RAY
SUNY at Fredonia

The American Revolution and the French Alliance. By William C. Stinchcombe. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Pp. 246. $7.95.)

Until the appearance of this volume the only book that dealt with the origins of the French alliance was Edward Corwin's *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (Princeton, 1916), published well over a half century ago. Corwin relied mainly on edited documents from French archives, wrote from the perspective of European politics, and concentrated on diplomatic problems virtually to the exclusion of other issues.

In contrast, Professor Stinchcombe devotes himself to the American side of the alliance diplomacy. His treatment is also broader. Basing his work on official correspondence, private letters, diaries, newspapers, and relevant secondary literature, he shows the effect of the French alliance on the politics of the American Revolution and analyzes how American leaders used it in formulating foreign and military policy. These are, in effect, his main themes.

In order to accept the alliance and the relationship that went with it the American people had to hold in check a deeply rooted anti-French and anti-Catholic prejudice. The author explains their attitudes, or at least the reactions of special groups of Americans such as the politicians, the military people, the clergy, the business people, and the journalists, to the wartime cooperation with France. He analyzes alignments in the Continental Congress over the alliance and over the politics of the French relationship, the influence of French diplomats on internal as well as external American politics, on military aid, and on diplomacy, and the extent and influence of French propaganda in the United States designed to maintain support for the alliance.

In its main features this story is well known to scholars, but no one has told it as well or in such detail as has Stinchcombe. He sets the record straight, and with no apologetics. For example, he rejects the old textbook chestnut that France aided the United States for the purely selfish reason of seeking revenge on England for the defeat in the Seven Years' War. France's motive, he points out, was neither diabolical nor altruistic. The alliance served the mutual interests of both countries. America's self-interest in the arrangement was as great as that of France, and her need for it was greater. "Americans would have broken the alliance in its first months," the author concludes, if it served their interests to do so—essentially "if they could have ended the war with recognition of United States independence" (p. 23).

Another myth the book refutes is that the American commissioners at the peacemaking in Paris in 1781 were naïvely willing to cooperate fully with their French ally, but did not do so because they had to defend the United States against betrayal and the evils of European diplomacy. Stinchcombe reiterates clearly that the American commissioners, not the French, violated treaty obligations that prohibited either country from signing a separate peace. The Americans unabashedly and self-righteously bypassed the French and concluded a treaty with England on their own.

Despite the difference in approach between Corwin and Stinchcombe, both men reach the same basic conclusion, that without the alliance the United States probably would not have achieved independence, and that with independence in 1783 the alliance had served its purpose and became defunct. This interpretation differs from that of those military historians and others especially imbued with patriotic pride who insist that the alliance was useful but not essential to victory against England, and that the prowess of American fighting men really won independence from England. These writers overlook the changing nature of the war of the American Revolution. Before it ended, it had become a multi-national war of considerable dimension, and as Stinchcombe shows, the United States had become critically dependent on France.

This is a well-researched doctoral dissertation that has been shaped into a gracefully written book. Its interpretations and judgments are usually sound and stem logically from the evidence. It illustrates well principles useful to political scientists, such as how in an alliance in time of war, the weak state becomes virtually the client of the stronger one. It also says much for the skill and *realpolitik* of America's first diplomats. With their eyes on the main chance and with a shrewd awareness of their country's true interest they were able to extract much from both a powerful ally and a strong enemy.

Alexander DeConde
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The United Nations and the News Media. By Alexander Szalai with Margaret Croke and Associates. (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1972. Pp. vi, 323. $6.50.)

Several hundred news correspondents file despatches and talk into microphones at United Nations Headquarters during each General Assembly. Any political crisis promptly increases these numbers. The UN Office of Public Information (OPI) grinds out tens of thousands of handouts, and supplements these with radio broadcasts. It offers recordings, photographs and films to any takers. Surely, it might be thought, no one could lack information needed to judge what happens in the global organization. And, in fact, some governments have so much faith in this outpouring that their delegates vote repeatedly for stronger efforts by OPI to inform the peoples of the world on such subjects as aid for economic development and the opposition to apartheid in South Africa.

Before this study by Professor Alexander Szalai and others at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, almost all statements about the use of public information in the UN setting were based on pure impression. OPI itself never was equipped to research any aspect of its output, and indeed bureaucratic inertia and journalistic pride suppressed efforts to think scientifically about an $8 million annual program, plus an unknown amount more in associated agencies. Such thinking would obviously have practical consequences and Szalai ends his study with programmatic recommendations that are, however, less novel than the mere act of assembling good data.

The data grew out of observation of the OPI output during three periods in 1968 and out of a simultaneous count of what appeared in the press, radio, and television in 50 countries. The output of 54 correspondents accredited to the United Nations in New York also was monitored. This produced 83,420 information items which, classified and coded, were punched onto 96,094 cards to form a unique data archive. The observation did not go beyond the news media; that is, it excluded opinion journals, specialist publications and other means of information distribution, e.g., films for theaters. The observed material is presented by Szalai in 17 tables and six diagrams keyed to the text and in detailed appendices. A useful bibliography, which incidentally discloses the remarkable paucity of quantitative material on an eminently quantifiable subject, is included.

The observation periods were well chosen to generate data on the UN as it acted in several guises. The period from March 18–31, 1968, included discussions in the Security Council of the still hot Rhodesia case and of a flareup of fighting between Israel and Jordan, and the end of the second UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi. The second period, April 22–May 5, encompassed the International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran, a resumed session on the General Assembly on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and a relatively slight disturbance in Jerusalem, which resulted in a Security Council resolution. The final period, November 11–24, fell in the middle of the annual General Assembly, which then was busy with disarmament and Chinese representation. Meantime, away from New York, a UNESCO General Conference took place and the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme met.

All this activity would appear to furnish an ample supply to the journalistic grist mills. What came out of those mills, however, was both sparse and uneven, as Szalai's able, straightforward analysis of the data clearly shows. He documents the extent to which only crises catch the headlines. Even in the elite press, that handful of self-consciously high-quality newspapers, such as *The New York Times* or *Le Monde*, the accent remains on political events, although they carry material that appeals to the readers with sophisticated knowledge of economics and finance. In the highly developed countries, the press carries fewer and shorter items on economic development and other long-term programs than in the less developed countries, but the latter papers reach far fewer readers, either in numbers or in proportion of the population. Radio concentrates even more on the hot story than the press, which has a broader range of coverage. Television plays the crises, especially the ones that lend themselves to visual images, still harder. Most of the news media in the world depend on the five worldwide wire services for their stories: these services must try to serve clients everywhere and can scarcely concentrate on regional or national material, even though such articles obviously get better local play than do more general treatments. Even the prestige and elite press that maintains accredited correspondents in New York tends to intensify coverage only of crisis, and delivers minuscule amounts of news on slowly maturing activities, such as economic development. The output of OPI, which increases rapidly during the General Assembly, appears to have practically no effect on what goes through the media; a principal function of OPI can be found in informing delegations and the secretariat of the activities of the organization.

Szalai's recommendations have a more tentative and slighter character than his description and analysis. He points out as a starter the vagueness of the instructions given OPI during the first General Assembly and suggests a program that depends on targeting. Nevertheless, much of the study implies that spreading the news really remains outside of the UN bailiwick and that any possible improvements would have a rather slight effect in a world still organized around national governments. He—or perhaps rather observers quite unconnected with the UN system—might well have given more attention to the hypothesis that to try to promote the popularity of the United Nations misses the point: the real task may be to get the appropriate information to the relevant specialized publics at the useful moment.

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Greece and the Entente: August 1, 1914–September 25, 1916. By Christos Theodoulou. (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1971. Pp. 379. No price indicated.)

Christos Theodoulou focuses in his book on the origins of a controversy which for almost two generations split the Greek nation into two irreconcilable camps. In March 1915, Eleutherios Venizelos resigned as Premier of Greece in a disagreement with King Constantine over the country's entry into the war on the side of the *Entente*—and this set the stage for a disastrous feud. The book is in effect a collection of telegrams, memoranda, ambassadorial reports, and other diplomatic papers. Since the documents are given for the most part in the original language—French or English—a reader must be versed in both languages, otherwise a major part of the book will remain beyond comprehension. I am inclined to think that to many this bilingual presentation will prove a serious handicap. Nonetheless, the assembled documents do throw some new light on the controversy. Venizelos, convinced of Allied victory, was afraid that the war might end too soon, before he had time to join in and share in the fruits of victory. By contrast, Constantine reasoned that should the war end quickly, the Central Powers had a better chance to emerge if not totally victorious at least in a strong bargaining position. Some readers may be surprised to see in the documents that Venizelos was willing to cede Kavala to Bulgaria in exchange for a promise that after the war Greece would be given the Greek-inhabited lands in Asia Minor.

The origins of the feud can be traced to the disagreement between Constantine and Venizelos over Greek participation in the ill-fated operation at Gallipoli. It received fresh impetus when the Allies following their Gallipoli failure asked Venizelos to allow the landing of allied troops in Salonika. The documents quoted by Theodoulou indicate that the King was willing to agree provided the allies furnished adequate military forces (p. 178) and the landing was made to appear as a violation of Greek neutrality for appearances' sake. The affair was mishandled by the British and the landing further strained the relations between Venizelos and Constantine. In the period following Venizelos' resignation in October 1915, and the emergence of his revolutionary government in Salonika in September 1916, the record minutely quoted by the author bears out his general observation that "personal ambition and hatred in the end took the place of patriotism" allowing the *Entente* powers to engage in a "really scandalous treatment of Greece . . . " (p. 190).

Theodoulou has indeed performed a valuable service by bringing together in one volume the original documents which tell the story without partisan distortion or belated embellishments or rationalizations. The author is very frugal with his commentary letting the documents speak for themselves. This is both a blessing and a drawback because the reader must plow through the record with little guidance and must form his own conclusions with little help from the author. Still, the evidence is there for those who are interested in a crucial period of modern Greek history.

D. George Kousoulas

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Prospects in the Pacific. Edited with an Introduction by Richard L. Walker. (Washington, D.C.: Heldref Publications, 1972. Pp. 212. $8.50.)

The essays collected in the book are based on papers presented at a conference held at the Airlie Institute for International Studies in May, 1970. Participants came from several countries and were drawn from academic, governmental and economic organizations. The editor is Director of the Institute of International Studies, the University of South Carolina, one of the six sponsoring organizations.

The papers in Part One are concerned with problems of power and security. Soedjatmoko, at the time Indonesian ambassador to Washington, weighs the implications of the new multipolar situation. Is there an emerging power balance which can bring peace and a measure of stability to the Asian region? He is guardedly optimistic about the possibilities of neutralization of Southeast Asia. Except for China's concern with her borders, none of the major powers have vital interests in the region, and each is concerned to prevent dominance by any of the others. If the powers exercise sufficient restraint, if Japan does not go nuclear, if an effective regional organization materializes, he feels the balance can be stable.

Owen Harries, University of New South Wales, takes on the liberal critics of containment and American Asian policy. (Fulbright and Schlesinger are his most frequently cited targets.) These critics, he argues, have based their attack on highly dubious propositions: that Southeast Asia is not of major importance to the United States, and that China is not an expansionist power posing any aggressive threat. These and other assumptions he subjects to rigorous scrutiny and finds them wanting in consistency and realism.

Shifts in Australian foreign policy are analyzed by Bruce Grant of the University of Melbourne. The policy of "forward defense" based on alliances with Britain and the United States was designed to provide isolation from Asia. Developments in Vietnam and shifts in relationships among the powers were producing a reassessment even before the advent of the present Labor Government. The American alliance will remain, he predicts, but under conditions giving Australia greater independence.

The second part takes up problems of political and economic viability. Stephen Hosmer, RAND Corporation, assesses the prospects of guerrilla warfare in the 1970s. He concludes it will neither win nor lose. He expects existing regimes to survive but warns that the strengths of the guerrillas, including the advantages of contiguous sanctuary and external aid, mean they can be contained only by the "continued capacity and willingness to practice protracted defense" (p. 31).

Two important elements of such a capacity are effective administration and economic development. Dr. Hahn-Been Lee, of the East-West Center, finds the bureaucracies of developing Asian states inadequate for the current stage of development in which the socioeconomic problems of transformation predominate. He sees a need for more broadly recruited new talent, capable of operating technical and developmental programs.

Dr. Saburo Okita, well-known Japanese economist, discusses the economic problems of Southeast Asia, where development has lagged behind that of East Asia. He recommends policies designed to provide more employment in agriculture, reduced disparities in income, increased exports of manufactures to developed nations, increased foreign aid and private investment. His warning of the possible reaction to the growing weight of Japanese economic power appears prophetic in the light of Prime Minister Tanaka's recent stormy reception in Bangkok and Djakarta.

The major portion of the third part is an essay by Mochtar Lubis, Indonesian editor and publisher, which is primarily concerned with regional cooperation. Among the obstacles he cites, UN agencies, especially ECAFE which he would abolish, come in for the sharpest criticism. Functional organizations, and especially, informal and unofficial channels are more effective instrumentalities in his view.

Readers approach collections of conference papers with justifiable apprehension. The material is frequently diffuse, the quality, uneven. The present volume does not entirely surmount the difficulties. Shifts in perspective from bird's eye to worm's eye can produce a disjointed view of the landscape. Substance and organization are not of uniform quality. (For the hurried reader, this reviewer would recommend Part One plus the Okita article.) Yet, the editor is correct in saying that there are certain recurring questions which provide an element of continuity, and there is a remarkable amount of agreement on major points: prospects for the neutralization of Southeast Asia are reasonably encouraging; China poses some dangers, but even the wary eye of Mr. Harries foresees no Armageddon; Japan's economic strength is increasing her influence, but for her to develop a nuclear force would be a serious mistake; regional cooperation still has a long way to go before becoming more than a "beautiful slogan" (Lubis, p. 187). One concern that is voiced again and again: will America's reassessment of her global interests lead to disengagement from Asia in such a fashion as to upset the emerging balance and compound the region's instabilities? Is the American deterrent still credible? A continuing commitment is assumed, but merely to pose the question is to suggest a growing doubt.

The book deserves one final word of praise: it has stood the test of time remarkably well. The events in the interval since the conference, e.g., the Peking visit, the Vietnam cease-fire, have underlined the enduring nature of the concerns raised, and strengthened rather than diminished the force of many of the arguments.

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World War II: Books in English, 1945–65. Compiled by Janet Ziegler. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 223. $10.50.)

This bibliography distributes its 4,519 titles across eight major categories, each with two to three further sublevels. This yields the first nearly comprehensive checklist of its subject, if one discounts the many editing errors, debatable categorizations, exclusion of all 1939–1944 publications, and spotty inclusion of major memoirs (Lady Norwich in; her husband, Duff Cooper, out).

Ziegler's introduction and 179-item list of specialized bibliographies and other reference books constitute a valuable guide to the literature. However, denied annotation, the user is unwarned about abridgments (of translations and reprints) or even outright forgeries (e.g., Krylov).

Given its fine tradition of bibliographic and documentary publication, Stanford's Hoover Institution should have required higher standards in lending its imprimatur to this thin by-product of UCLA's Graduate School of Library Service. Even brief annotation and, say, library call-numbers would have made this work of much wider practical value to the scholars it claims to serve.

BARTON WHALEY

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